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1. The discussion of the claim that Nietzsche held a pragmatist 
theory of truth (chapter three, pp92-3), is a slightly amended version 
I , a  - 1  * -  - 
oh a section of my M.A. Dissertation, "Nietzsche and theti prbbiem of 
relativismw, submitted to the University of Warwick, September 1988. 
r 
2.  die bf the ideas expressed in chapter four,' parti&lariy 
those relating to Nietzsche's commitment to science and Enlightenment, 
and to the possibility of a "productive logic", have appeared in an 
article 'entitled "~ietzsbhe's ' productive logic", 'submitted 'to the 
-, * 
Journa l  of N i e t z s c h e  S t u d i e s .  The pages of ,the thesis where some 
overlap occurs are: pp138-41, 143-7, 167-8'and 169-70. ,- j 
. . .  , , . . . . . . 
The thesis maintained here is that Nietzsche belongs to and revitalizes 
a rhetorical tradition which has competed with philosophy for cultural 
and educational dominance. The general strategy of the thesis is to 
draw compari80ns between ~ietzdche and those aspects of the ~o~hists' 
activity that were attacked by Plato, in order to challenge 
philosophy's claim to moral and intellectual superiority over rhetoric. 
The first chapter considers the allegation that philosophy is 
demonstrably superior to rhetoric'because it has a proper method and 
can achieve positive results. Against this, it is argued that 
philosophy is distinguished from rhetoric by its values, not,its 
methodological purity; the remaining chapters probe this conflict of 
values. 
Chapter two explores the charge that rhetoric is both 
manipulative and open to manipulation, notes how Nietzsche's texts have 
been subject to these two criticisms, and counters them by challenging 
, . 
philosophyr s models of manipulation and edication. 
Chapter three examines. the -rival educational ideals of 
philosophy and rhetoric, arguing that the key differentiating feature 
is rhetoric's pragmatism. It shows how this feature has been used to 
. I 
disparage rhetoric, and argues that Nietzsche develops a form of 
pragmatism that meets the philosophical attack effectively. 
Chapter four considers the suggestion that rhetoric is less 
rational than philosophy because it employs looser argumentation, and 
argues that, at least as manifested by Nietzsche, rhetorical 
argumentation produces a superior rationality -'according to an 
alternative perspective on reason and science. . . 
Chapter five considers the claim 'that the eloquence of 
rhetoric is to be condemned for seducing and confu'sing the seeker after 
truth; this is countered by developing the Nietzschean dictum that art 
is worth more than truth. 
The main conclusion is that, through Nietzsche's development 
of the ancient tradition, rhetoric emerges as a real alternative "love 
of wisdom". 
It could be said, with some justification, that a thesis on Nie t z sche  
and Rhetor ic  requires no introduction. Ever-since.Nietzsche was first 
published his use of language has been one of the.most controversial 
aspects of his work, and in the recent explosion~of secondary 
literature the question of rhetoric has if anything become even more 
prominent. On the other hand, a familiar theme is in many ways in:.more 
need of introduction than an unfamiliar one, even if that introduction 
will be of a somewhat different nature: when solmany thinkersshave 
concentrated already.on a very particular subject,, any,new treatment 
will have to meet the charge that it merely repeats what has gone 
before. -Such a charge cannot be r e f u t e d  in an introduction, but it is 
at least possible to show here,that the o p p o r t u n i t y  for an.origina1 
treatment exists, by indicating what previous=discussions of Nietzsche 
and rhetoric have ignored.' This is, :in fact, a great deal: it is not so 
much that the answers given hitherto are~inadequate as that-the whole 
approach to the subject of rhetoric has been thoroughly one-sided; what 
is absent, above all, is any h i s t o r i c a l  dimension to the debate.. In 
this introductory,chapter I will outline why such a,dimension is 
required, and how I propose to incorporate it in the structure of my 
own thesis. 
.. . 
The problem of "Nietzsche and rhetoricw that-has come to dominate 
discussion has,many resolutions but always essentially the same 
framework. It arises from the obvious fact that Nietzsche is an 
exciting writer - really rather too good to be a philosopher. The 
appeal of his literary skill is (at least initially) accorded a 
separate status, as "rhetoric", with the problem then being how this 
level of Nietzschers texts relates to his philosophy, and how 
philosophers should react to it. Even if we consider only those 
commentators who are broadly sympathetic to Nietzsche, there are at 
least four significantly different ways of reacting to this rhetorical 
aspect. The first is to ignore it, on the grounds that it has nothing 
to do with Nietzsche's philosophy. Interestingly, this approach crosses 
the boundary between "analyticw and "continental" philosophers who 
otherwise have little in common. On the analytic side, Danto refrains 
from condemning Nietzsche's style outright, but justifies ignoring it 
on the grounds that it will perplex analytic philosophers; his self- 
appointed task is to reduce Nietzschefs style to one that they will 
more readily comprehend.' Heidegger, who has no such concerns, is 
nevertheless equally uninterested in anything outside the traditional 
philosophical terms of reference. His preference for the posthumously 
collated "bookw of Nietzsche's notes, The Will to Power, is in part 
precisely because it was not prepared by Nietzsche for publication, and 
thus was not distracted from the concerns of pure thinking by the 
rhetorical requirement to communicate'with and influence an audience. 
Those (like Heidegger) concerned to piece together Nietzsche's 
essential metaphysical contribution should concentrate on the one work 
in which his thinking is unadulterated.* 
Other philosophers have sought to make more constructive use 
of Nietzsche's rhetoric. Psychologistic readings seek to interpret 
Nietzschefs flamboyant style in terms of irrepressible psychological 
needs for self-assertion, literary self-expression, and so forth. Some 
of these interpretations even suggest the possibility of detailed 
decodings of Nietzsche* s texts to discover. the psyche of their auth0r.j 
Literary-critical readings, on'the other hand, concentrate 
more on the detail of Nietzsche8s,rhetoric, hoping to achieve insights 
into his work through close analysis>of his style; the significance of 
recurring metaphors has been a particularly fruitful topic of 
discussion.' Needless to say, by treating the text as in the :first 
instance literary, this is the antithesis,of the Heidegger-Danto method 
. , of approaching Nietzsche. . r'i 
Finally, Nietzsche's rhetoric canlbe treated as performative 
- a level of the text that performs certain,key functions which would 
be difficult,or impossible to achieve by.direct statements.,Nehamas 
contends that it performs a, hxs 'k  .. of .literary .self-creation, which 
he regards as the primary objective of Nietzschers entire philosophical 
activity. Nietzschean texts are the active creation of a.literary- 
philosophical character that is Nietzsche,himself; this process sets-:an 
example for others to follow, and rhetoric is a central part of it;' 
~econstructive readings; on the other hand, do not find in the rhetoric 
something to enforce a general interpretation of Nietzschers 
philosophy, but rather.a level which thwarts any such general 
interpretation.-In de*Manrs case, textual rhetoric is interpreted as 
those forces in a text which subvert the,production of meaning and turn 
the text towards "~ndecidabilit~~~. Derridat s reading arrives at a 
similar conc1usion;but goes a step,further: Nietzschets styles 
function to ensure that his -writings are structurally open to an,almost 
infinite variety of interpretations, so that any determinate reading is 
automatically overflowed - even,that which asserts the text's 
"undecipherabilityW .? b . , ::, . . - I  
I shall return to consider many of these.approaches in more 
detail in later chapters;' for the present, I shall concern myself only 
with what they hold in common, and what is-problematic about-it. 
Perhaps it will seem implausible that there can be any.meaningfu1 
connection between such diverse readings; but for all their 
differences, they share an objective the'significance of which should 
not be underestimated: to try to assess the contribution made by 
rhetoric to the meaning of the text. ,This is not obviously 
controversial - how else, one might wonder, is a philosopher supposed 
to approach a subject? But-with respect to.rhetoric, this is nottan 
ironic question, but an entirely serious one., Rhetoric is, after all, 
defined in most dictionaries as an "art of persuasion", whereas across 
the entire spectrum of interpretations considered above, the concern is 
essentially cognitive: "what,,if anything,. does rhetoric contribute to 
our understanding?" Insofar as.it i s  stil1:recognizedas actively 
persuasive, Nietzschefs ?rhetoric tends to be despised; by the same 
token, those who praise it admire the intelligence (in both senses) 
added by it. De Man goes so far as to speak.for rhetoric as something 
that denies and negates the explicit textual message, thereby 
withdrawing the workfs immediate impact. Rhetoricfain other words, 
becomes an anti-persuasive,element, .the -very antithesis of what the 
term has traditionally stood for.'. There can be no clearer sign that 
rhetoric, as an art.of persuasion, is of no interest to Nietzschefs 
philosophical readers. . , ,  
Of course, that de,Manfs.understanding of the term "rhetoric" 
is innovative does.not prove ,that it is mistaken,<- for there are often 
good reasons for modifying the meanings of one's terms; nevertheless, 
it will be instructive to ask how he hasfcome to make such a drastic 
revision. Perhaps it is at this point that the general absence of an 
historical perspective starts to become significant: de Man thinks of 
r h e t o r i c  a s  t h e  t r o p e s  and f i g u r e s  of speech i n  a t e x t ,  t h e  func t ion  of 
which he t h e n  seeks t o  determine; i n  comparison with t h e  conception of 
r h e t o r i c  developed i n  t h e  anc ien t  w o r l d , - t h i s  is  both  a  reduct ion  and a  
r e i f i c a t i o n .  I t  i s  a  reduction,  because it makes t h e  whole of r h e t o r i c  
what was f o r  t h e  anc ien t s  only one p a r t  of one element of r h e t o r i c  ( t h e  
e l o c u t i o  o r  e l o q u e n c e  w i t h  which a  c a s e  i s  p resen ted) ; ' '  it i s  a  
r e i f i c a t i o n ,  because it ignores  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  of r h e t o r i c  - tospersuade 
an  aud ience  th rough  language - and i n s t e a d  f i x e s  it a s  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
type  of language use. Thus what was o r i g i n a l l y  t h e  func t ion  of r h e t o r i c  
can a c t u a l l y  disappear from a  modern account a l toge the r .  .. \ 
It would be q u i t e  wrong, however, t o  condemn,,this r e i f i c a t i o n  
a s  an  h i s t o r i c a l  b l u n d e r ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  i g n o r a n c e  of  h i s t o r y  
manifested by many of i t s  adherents .  F o r , i n  a + c e r t a i n  sense  it a c t u a l l y  
encapsu la tes  an h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t  - t h a t  r h e t o r i c  h a s  bec0me.a th ing ,  a  
mummy. while philosophy s t i l l  has philosophers,  r h e t o r i c  no longer  has 
r h e t o r i c i a n s  ( o r  r h e t o r s , "  a s  1, s h a l l  r e f e r  t o  i t s  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  
h e r e ) .  Many.today employ techniques of persuasion,  b u t  no-one makes 
t h e  case  f o r  r h e t o r i c  a s  an a r t  t o  r i v a l  philosophy, a s  t h e  ~ o ~ h i s t s l *  
once did; r h e t o r i c  has  been reduced t o  fragments.  The main reason f o r  
t h i s  i s  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  s t r u g g l e  between p h i l o s o p h y  and r h e t o r i c  f o r  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  hegemony, philosophy triumphed. Pla to ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  made 
r h e t o r i c  appear i n s i g n i f i c a n t  and even s o r d i d  by comparison: i t s  l a r g e r  
c la ims were m a d e % t o  look l i k e  v a i n  boas ts ; .  i t s r e a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  was 
seen t o  be no more than t h e  temporary personal  advantage it could b r i n g  
t o  i t s  p r a c t i t i o n e r s .  Thus t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of  t h e  t e r m  " r h e t o r i c "  t o  a  
p u r e l y  f o r m a l  m e a n i n g  comes t o  seem a  n a t u r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  - a  
r e f l e c t i o n  of r h e t o r i c r s  u t t e r l i  marginal s t a t u s .  
Against this trend, the primary objective of my thesis is to challenge 
philosophy to prove itself once again, to see'whether the Sophistsf 
master art of rhetoric can yet be resurrected. There are two-main 
reasons why such a reappraisal is worth undertaking-now, in spite of 
the aforementioned torpor of rhetoric. In the first place, there are 
already signs that rhetoric is, if not reviving, then at least undead, 
and that philosophy has, conversely, passed the height of its powers. 
In recent decades it has been increasingly recognized that2the'various 
attempts to distinguish philosophy from rhetoricm-sthrough itsbsuperior 
method, which were long considered an established achievement, have 
run into trouble; this gives some limited encouragement to rhetoric; 
and forces philosophy back'to other arguments against it. I consider 
the significance of these developmentscin chapter,one. , . 
The second reason for a reappraisal is the possibility,that 
an exception exists to the rule justlannounced, that there are no 
modern rhetors - the exception being'Nietzsche. If so, it may be that a 
new force can be given to the rhetorsf side-of the argument through 
exploring Nietzsche's rhetoric. This is, in fact, precisely the 
hypothesis underlying chapters two to five,Qeach of'which considers 
Nietzsche's relevance to a particular aspect of the ancient philosophy- 
rhetoric conflict. 6 .  ,, , * ! 
Though it receives thorough examination in the later stages 
of the thesis, this hypothesis is a somewhat startling one,.and 
deserves some preliminary~commentary here, to meet.,the.most basic 
objections to it. For if-rhetoric is a matter, not of tropes and 
figures, but of a general art of persuasion, it seems on the face of it 
less likely that Nietzsche can.be considered a figure central to its 
practice and development'. "Nietzsche's rhetoric" is, as we have seen, 
an acceptable topic for discussion; Nietzsche as rhetor is something 
else e n t i r e l y .  * .  . I 
The main ob jec t ion  t o  cons ider ing  Nietzsche a s  a C . r h e t o r  is  
t h a t  h e  d o e s  n o t  d o  s o  h i m s e l f .  The S o p h i s t s  a r e  o n l y p m e n t i o n e d  
o c c a s i o n a l l y ,  and when t h e y  a r e  cons idered ,  t h e  comments.on:them,are 
o f t e n  r a t h e r  c r i t i c a l .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  N i e t z s c h e  h a s  c l e a r  
a f f i n i t i e s  with t h e  Greeks, it is wi th  t h e  d r a m a t i s t s  and poe t s  of  t h e  
Golden Age, not  t h e  r h e t o r s  who followed them. . - , . . . 
A s  a  b r i e f  summary of h i s  comments on t h e  Greeks t h i s .  has  
some c r e d i b i l i t y 1  b u t  it  b y  no means r e f u t e s  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s ' o f  
Nie tzsche  a s  r h e t o r .  I n  t h e  f i rs t  place , '  he  does n o t  c l e a r l y  condemn 
r h e t o r i c  and t h e  r h e t o r s  i n  t h e  way t h a t , !  f o r  example, h e  condemns 
Socrates;  i n  t h e  mature work, t h e r e  i s - a c t u a l l y  cons iderable  admirat ion 
f o r  t h e i r  achievements. But i n  any case ,  N i e t z s c h e t s  own remarks a r e  
o n l y  one  p a r t  of  t h e  s t o r y .  When one  g o e s  on t o  c o n s i d e r  how h i s  
r h e t o r i c a l  p r a c t i c e  r e l a t e s  i n  v a r i o u s  ways t o  t h e ~ ' a n c i e n t , d i s p u t e  
between p h i l o s o p h e r s  and r h e t o r s ,  how many.of h i s  a r g u m e n t s . s e e m t o  
e c h o  v o i c e s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  t h e  r h e t o r i c a l  t r a d i t i o n , ,  a n d  how h i s  
r e c e p t i o n  d i s p l a y s  many a n a l o g i e s  , t o  t h e  r e c e p t i o n  a c c o r d e d . t h e  
r h e t o r s ,  t h e  hypo thes i s  no l o n g e r  seems s o  dubious.  It i s  wi th  t h e s e  
q u e s t i o n s  of p r a c t i c e ,  argument and r e c e p t i o n  t h a t - t h e  b u l k  o f  t h e  
t h e s i s  i s  concerned, and s o  I w i l l  restrict my in t roduc to ry  comments*on 
them t o  t h e  ba re  minimum. By c o n t r a s t ,  Nietzsche 's  e x p l i c i t  s ta tements  
on r h e t o r s  a n d  r h e t o r i c  d o  n o t  r e c e i v e  any  s y s t e m a t i c  t r e a t m e n t  
elsewhere,  and s o  some d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e i r  g e n e r a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  - and 
some j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  l i m i t e d  v a l u e  I have accorded  them - i s  
. - 
requi red  here.  
. :  
There a r e  t h r e e  p r i n c i p a l  sources  f o r  determining Nie tzschevs  
a t t i t u d e  towards  r h e t o r i c  and i t s  p r a c t i t i o n e r s :  t h e  1872-3 l e c t u r e  
series on c l a s s i c a l  r h e t o r i c  d e l i v e r e d  a t  ~ a s l e ; "  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  
Philosophenbuch, which c o n t a i n s  N i e t z s c h e ' s  n o t e s ,  p l a n s  and e s s a y s  
from t h e  p e r i o d  1872-5;" and The W i l l  t o  ~ o w e r . "  The f i r s t  source  
has  r ece ived  cons ide rab le  a t t e n t i o n ' o f  l a t e , - p a r t i c u l a r l y  a s  a  r e s u l t  
of  t h e  emphasis p l a c e d  upon it by de,Man, f o r  whom it r e p r e s e n t s  an  
i m p o r t a n t  i n n o v a t i o n  i n  t h e  t h e o r y  of  r h e t o r i c ,  moving it towards  
t r o p e s  and f i g u r e s  of  speech.16 However, - r ead ing  through t h e  l e c t u r e  
notes,  it i s  hard  t o  see t h i s  a s  more t h a n , a  r a t h e r  flamboyant at tempt 
on de Man's p a r t  t o  i n v e n t  an i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  r e s p e c t a b l e  p r e c u r s o r  of 
h i s  own theory .  Ne i the r  h e r e  nor,anywhere else does  Nie tzsche  reduce 
r h e t o r i c  t o  a  t h e o r y  of t ropes ;  i f ' a n y t h i n g ,  t h e  l e c t u r e s  a r e  n o t a b l e  
(among Nie tzschers  productions)  f o r  t h e i r  l a c k  of o r i g i n a l i t y ,  and t h e  
h i g h l y  v i s i b l e  i n f l u e n c e  of contemporary German t h e o r i s t s  upon them. 17 
From o u r  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h e i r  main v a l u e  i s  a s  a  c l e a r  p roof  o f  t h e  
e x t e n t  o f  N i e t z s c h e r s , f a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  t h e  t h e o r y  and  h i s t o r y  o f  
r h e t o r i c ,  which cou ld  o the rwise  be  doubted b y J t h o s e  who had seen  on ly  
h i s  o t h e r ,  more p i t h y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t .  The o t h e r  two 
s o u r c e s  c o n t a i n  N i e t z s c h e v s . d i r e c t  e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  r h e t o r i c  and t h e  
Sophis ts .  The Philosophenbuch is  p r i m a r i l y  remarkable, given i t s  c l o s e  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  h i s t o r i r a l  developmebt- 'of Greek philosophy,  f o r  t h e  
absence of  any s e r i o u s  t r ea tmen t  of  t h e  Soph i s t s :  i t s  primary concern 
i s  t o  p r a i s e  t h e  p re -Socra t i c s  and t o  mark o u t  S o c r a t e s  a s  t h e l s o u r c e  
a .. ; 1. 
of declihe. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a t  o n e  p o i n t  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  - n e g d t i v e  - 
, % '  , 
evaluat ion  of r h e t o r i c  i s  woven i n t o  t h i s  framework: 
With Socra tes  t h e  v i r t u o s o s  of l i v i n g  bebin.  ~ o c r a t e s ,  t h e  newer 
dithyramb, t h e  newer t r agedy ,  t h e  i n v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  r h e t o r i c i a n .  
The r h e t o r i c i a n  is a Greek invent ion  o f  l a t e r  times! They invented 
"form i n  i t s e l f N  (and a l s o  t h e  philosopher f o r  i t) .  How i s  P l a t o ' s  
s t ' = u g g l e  a g a i n s t  r h e t o r i c " t 0  b e  u n d e r s t o o d ?  H e  envie 'd  i t s  
influence.  18 , . 
This  r e a d s  l i k e  what it i s  - a n  e n t r y  i n  a  notebook - and no a t t empt  
was made t o  f i l l  i n  t h e  p i c t u r e  it s k e t c h e s  s o  r o u g h l y .  I ts  main 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s  t h a t  by sugges t ing  ( r a t h e r  implaus ib ly)  t h a t  Socra tes  
i n v e n t s  t h e  r h e t o r i c i a n ,  Nie tzsche  a s s i m i l a t e s  r h e t o r i c  t o  t h e - f i g u r e  
whom he blames f o r  v i r t u a l l y  eve ry th ing  t h a t  went wrong i n  G r e e c e . , I f  
t h i s  sugges t ion  appears  t o  c o n f l i c t  wi th  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  on 'Platers 
s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  r h e t o r i c ' ,  it should be  remembered t h a t  throughout h i s  
c a r e e r ,  b u t  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  w r i t i n g s ,  N i e t z s c h e  t r i e d  i n  
v a r i o u s  ways t o  s e p a r a t e  and exonera te  P l a t o , f r o m  S o c r a t e s ' s  legacy.  
I n d e e d ,  it  i s  q u i t e  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h i s  c o n c e r n  e x p l a i n s  why t h e  
r h e t o r i c i a n s  were mentioned i n  t h e  f i rs t  p lace :  t h e y  provide  one more 
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  d i s t a n c e  P l a t o  from S o c r a t e s .  N e e d l e s s r t o  s a y ,  t h e  
judgement contained i n  t h i s  passage does not  accord with t h e  argument I 
w i l l  be p resen t ing  here;  b u t  then  n e i t h e r  d o e s s i t  with Nie tzschers  own 
comments a  decade  l a t e r  i n  The Will t o  Power. There he  r e t a i n s  t h e  
d i v i s i o n  between p re -  and p o s t - S o c r a t i c  Greece, b u t  wi th  t h e  c r u c i a l  
d i f f e rence  t h a t  t h e  r h e t o r i c i a n s  have changed s ides :  . 
( (  -, ,,, 2 '. . 
The appearance of t h e  Greek phi losophers  from Socra tes  onwards i s  
a  symptom of decadence; t h e  a n t i - H e l l e n i c  i n s t i n c t s  come t o  t h e  
top- The " S o p h i s t w  i s  s t i l l  c&ipltitely H e l l e n i c ' .  . . G r a d u a l l y  
everyth ing genuinely Hel lenic  i s  made responsib le  f o r  t h e  s t a t e  of 
d e c a y  ( a n d  P l a t o  i s  j u s t  a s  u n g r a t e f u l  t o  Per ic les ,  Homer, 
tragedy, rhe to r i c ,  a s  t h e  prophets  were t o  David and Saul) .  19 
. . . . 
= I  , 
This  judgement i s  q u i t e  admirable ,  b u t  it must b e  a d m i t t e d  s t r a i g h t  
.. - 
away t h a t  it no more proves t h e  hypothes is  of Nie tzsche  a s  a  modern 
_ < - a  
r h e t o r  t h a n  t h e  e a r l i e r  judgement r e f u t e s  s u c h  a n  h y p o t h e s i s ;  i n  
n e i t h e r  c a s e  d o e s  N i e t z s c h e  expend much e f f o r t  i n  j u s t i f y i n g  h i s  
. . 
a l l ega t ion .  Besides, it is never much more than a  ques t ion  of sympathy 
or lack of sympathy for the rhetors - any more profound alliance~would 
have to be justified by other means than-Nietzsche's comments upon 
them. The important point to be drawn from these comments is that there 
is a clear development in Nietzsche's relationship to-the rhetors; so 
one can anticipate that his later works'will be more attuned to the 
rhetorical tradition than the early writings.*? , . . 
Nietzsche's direct statements on rhetoric, then, are slight 
and inconclusive. The hypothesis 0f.a strong connection with.the 
rhetorical tradition arises from another source, namely those aspects 
of his work which have provoked philosophers into treating him as a 
rhetor. There are two important clarificatory remarks to be made 
concerning this formula. First, it does not imply any especial reliance 
on Nietzschefs recepti0n:'j.t is part of my general case that those 
elements which have caused disquiet are integral to Nietzsche's work - 
the provocation is ine~itable.~Secondly, I am not .claiming that 
Nietzsche has been explicitly identified by his critics as a rhetor. 
Rather, my claim is that manyiof the broad criticisms of Nietzsche's 
work have important parallels-with the arguments that were used by 
philosophers to undermine the rhetors,.and that this prima ,facie 
kinship deserves a more systematic studyythan it has hitherto received. 
There are three main areas-of this parallel criticism, to 
each of which I devote a chapter. The first is the.already familiar 
question of Nietzsche's style and its appropriateness for philosophy. 
Precisely because this has so dominated the modern understanding of 
rhetoric, however, I have postponed discussion of.it until the final 
chapter (chapter five), to allow space for a broader conception of 
rhetoric to develop. The next area of,criticism concerns the emotive 
nature of much of Nietzsche's writing, which gives the impression-of 
wanting to win the argument without caring about thebmeans employed to 
do it or about the validity of the argument (naturally, this was,also.a 
central criticism of the Sophistsf "art of persuasionn); I consider the 
matterunder the title of manipulation,' in chapter two. The third 
important area of criticism concerns Nietzschefs argumentation, and in 
particular the aphoristic "method", which contrasts with the general 
insistence of philosophers on thoroughness and logical~structure; this 
is considered in chapter four. Finally,'there is an aspect of 
Nietzschefs work-which has not attracted.the same degree of attention 
and criticism, but-which nevertheless is inescapable if the,comparison 
with the rhetorica1,'tradition is to be serious. This is the question of 
pragmatism, which was important for differentiatingrthe Greek rhetors 
from their philosophical rivals and which, I 'argue, is also.an urgent 
problem~for Nietzsche;.it.is dealt with in-chapter three. r .  




.,. 1 *** % ' . 
This, then, is a brief outline of the structure of the'thesis and how 
it.arose; but before-the exploration of,Nietzsche and rhetoric.begins 
in earnest,' it is only prope-r to giversome.indication of the purposes 
it is intended to serve, in the light of which its success or failure 
may perhaps be judged. The first objective is the straightforwardly 
scholarly one of producing a thorough comparative study of Nietzsche 
and the Sophists, which can be judged according to the canons of 
scholarship: does'it provide a more thorough and plausible account of 
the relationship than has been produced before? However, the mere fact 
that a comparative study has not been done before is no kind of 
philosophical justification, and there are indeed two rather more 
polemical concerns driving the scholarly elements of the thesis. The 
first relates to Nietzsche. Just as the question of his style was once 
given prominence in order to challenge certain prejudices of Nietzsche- 
 interpretation,:^^ now raising the question of the rhetorical tradition 
is a useful way to challenge new orthodoxies, to reposition Nietzsche 
and to rethink his role. But this in turn has an ulterior purpose 
(otherwise it would merely be a matter of changing the intellectual 
fashion), which is to provide a challenging presentation of rhetoric as 
not simply."an aspect of textsn, but a dynamic force in'conflict with 
philosophy, at bottom over nothing less than the nature of wisdom. 
Nietzsche is only'a.means towards the,main thesis defended here-- that 
rhetoric can defend itself as a "love of wisdom"~without recourse'to 
the values employed by-philosophers to attack it - and yet it is only 
through Nietzsche that an affirmation of alternative values, rather 
than an appea1,to existing ones, becomes .imaginable as a way of 
defending rhetoric. In the face of the long predominance of the forces 
hostile to rhetoric,'maintaining such an approach is, to say the 
least, a tricky undertaking, and I would-not claim that appeal back to 
traditional values has~always been avoided here. Nevertheless, that is 
the objective, and,it is.that which accounts for the two sides of my 
thesis: Nietzsche and rhetoric - to honour rhetoric, but to do so in a 
Nietzschean way, which means, above all, immorally: .., , 
. . .. , 
Grotefs tactics in defence of the Sophists are false: he wants to 
raise them to the rank of men of honour and ensigns of morality - 
but it was their honour not to'indulge in any swindle with big 
21 words and virtues- ~. 
. : magLtBzpnaT . h . , .  
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Unti1,very recently, a defence of rhetoric - of whatever kind - would 
~ 
have been dismissed by most philosophers as an irrelevance; even today, I 
there are doubtless many who still adhere to this view: Their reasoning 1 
is straightforward: rhetoric is not a part of philosophy - it has been 
excluded from philosophy - and so, however.interesting a:discussion of 
it might be, it is simply not their concern. By,way of preparation for 
the defence of rhetoric that follows.in chapters two'to five, I shall 
consider'this proposition in some detail here. . A .  
Naturally, it will be objected that.there is nothing to be 
gained from such a discussion. In the first place, it is hard to 
imagine the audience that will be impressed by it - and the question of 
the audience is always important for a rhetorician. Those who are 
interested in a consideration.of rhetoric no doubt already acceptlthat 
philosophy-has not excluded rhetoric, and require at most an 
acknowledgement of this failure. On the other hand, those diehards who 
insist that philosophy is only,about -logic and deduction'are unlikely 
to be moved by the assertion that it is not; for-they are, naturally, 
quite deaf to persuasion. Furthermore, it can be argued that, if the 
case against rhetoric's exclusion is to be put at all, it requires more 
than a chapter to do it, given the already huge literature onethe 
subject . . -  I ,  . . . - .  
, - These objections presume that my ambition here is simply to 
reject philosophy's claim to have excluded rhetoric, but while I do 
indeed reject the,claim,'this move;is closer to a, postulate than a 
demonstrandum, The.main objective .of this chapter is to highlight'the 
consequences of philosophy's failurest0 exclude rhetoric, and my 
conclusions here7help;to explain the basic framework adopted in the 
ensuing,chapters. Two of these conclusions.are particularly important 
for the thesis as a whole. First, I argue that a general historical 
survey indicates why Plato is, now more than ever, the essential figure 
, . %  - , A. .- 
when considering the con£ lict between philosophy' and rhetoric '(hen& 
the chapter subheading: "from Descartes to Plato"); this provides the 
justification for Platofs prominence in the remainder of the thesis. 
But, more importantly, this,chapter provides good reasons for the 
stress on the value of rhetoric that,underpins my approach to the 
subject. Only when the exclusion of rhetoric is seen not as an abstract 
, , 
methodological question but as a moral necessity does the general 




Methodology cannot be lightly dismissed, however, given the important 
role it has-played in philosophyfs conflict with rhetoric, and in this 
chapter I propose to give it serious consideration. A natural route 
exists for such an exploration to follow, for while various 
philosophers have introduced rules of method which, .if adhered to, 
would have the effect of excluding elements of 'rhetoric, <'in Descartes 
. , 
this exclusion is absolute ,and uncompromising: if his method,works, 
then rhetoric is no longer any part of philosophy. As the apotheosis of 
methodological exclusion, and as the key moment in determining modern 
philosophy's relationship.to rhetoric,' it ris the obvious starting-point 
I, ' for our survey. 
Descartesfs fullest treatment of method is contained in his 
early work, the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii (Rules for the direction 
of the mind), and it is on this that the account given here7is based.' 
The most important and inescapable-element of Descartes's thinking is 
the deep impression made upon it by aeomefry ahh m a + h n a ~ i c s ,  which he 
insists must set the standard for all future efforts to gain knowledge: 
in seeking the right path of truth we ought to concern ourselves 
only with objects which admit of as much certainty as the I 
demonstrations of mathematics and' 2 
~ 
. ' * J-, 
All speculative forms of reasoning ark riled out: Descartes allows 'into 
his system only twd' "actions of the inte'llectw, whichi he -terms 
_ 1 :l \ , .  intuition and deduction. As ik well'know6, "intuitionw has a ;cry 1 
, - ,  _ I... I I 
special meaning in Descartes; in the' ~e~ulae,' it is defined as ,the 
, , 
conception of a clear and attentive mind, whioh is soeasy and distinct 
that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding.' 
Deduction is simply a chain of reasoning, too long to be taken in at a 
. .. 
glance, but in which each link is intuitively certain, as is its 
connection to those before and after. How these two legitimate elements 
of reasoning are employed by-the methdd to produce knowledge is 
announced in Rule five: t 
We shall be following this method exactly if we first reduce 
complicated and'obscure $repositions step by step tb simpler ones, 
and then, starting with the intuition of the simplest ones of all, 
try to ascend through the same steps to a knowledge of all the 
rest. 
These are the two sides of the Cartesian method:-the analytic movement 
consists in the steps up to the "simplest" intuition; the synthetic 
movement comprises the steps back down from that basic element. The 
remaining essentia'l eleme; of the method is enumeration,' which 
,consists in a thorough investigation of all the points relating-to the 
4 problem at handr. , The purpose of this survey is to make sure,that 
nothing has been omitted from the chain of reasoning; if;,after such an 
enumeration has been conducted, the problem remains unsolved, it must 
be considered insoluble and outside the bounds of human knowledge. 
Descartes predicts -that this method will bring tremendous 
benefits to mankind. It can be applied to all areas of intellectual 
activity and not only produces -indubitable positive knowledge.but also 
allows-insoluble problems to be abandoned. Moreover,-the-rules 
themselves are .in essence so simple that, notwithstanding,the 
tremendous advances in human understanding that they must assuredly 
produce, they can be followed by any human being of average 
intelligence; knowledge will no longer be.the prerogative of the 
intellectual elite: ' - 
t -  * 
< .  * 
, , 
Throughout this treatise we shall try to pursue every humanly 
accessible path which leads to knowledge of the truth. We shall do 
this very carefully, and show the paths to be very easy, so that 
anyone who has mastered the whole method, however mediocre his 
intelligence, may see that there are no paths closed to him that 
are open to others... 5 
While Descartes does not dwell on the exclusion of rhetoric, 
this is clearly an important by-product of his method, given the views 
he expresses on the subject elsewhere: 
One can talk of persuasion whenever there is ground for further 
doubt. One can talk of science,, however, only when there is an 
unshakeable ground. 
. . 5 - .  
; . , ,*;< 
According to the Regulae, there is "unshakeable groundw in the form of 
the absolutely ~imple:~intuitions, and the geometrical method more or 
less abolishes persuasion even in the process of 'pedagogy: the student 
does not take the lessonstof~his teachers on trust, but has them proved 
to him; knowledge and1 proof go hand in hand. At- all points,. then; 
,I . I rhetoric is excluded. 1. . 
Though few philosophers have accepted the Cartesian,method"in 
all its particulars, elements of it have had a powerful~effect on 
modern philosophy. Perhaps most'influential of all has been the 
scientism at the heart of Descartes8s method - the belief that 
philosophy can and must look t o t h e  sciences-for its model. Even 
thinkers whose work diverges greatly from the simple geometric model 
have often stressed-the importance of turning philosophy towards 
positive, assured knowledge;, it is an important-part of.Descartesfs 
legacy that discussion~of method-has become almost obsessive in modern 
phi1osophy:Thus Kant; for example, makes it'plain that his primary 
objective is to set 'philosophy on the 'secure path of a science', and 
says of his own work: 
, - '1 I . $ .  . . . 
 his attempt to alte; the procedure which has hitherto prevailed 
? in metaphysics, by completely revolutionizing it in accordance 
with the example set by the geometers and physicists, forms indeed 
the main purpose of this critique of pure speculative 'reason. It 
is a treatise on-the method, not a systei of the science itself. 
But at the same time it marks out the whole plan of the science, 
both as regards its limits and as regards its entire internal 
structure. 7 
,. 1 
In more recent times, the various programmes of analytic philosophy owe 
far more to the Cartesian method than just the analogy with science. 
 educing complicated and.obscure propositions to simpler onesw is at 
the very heart of the analytic movement and, under the influence of 
logical atomism, the Cartesian belief in , nabsolutely simple" 
propositions that could act as foundations for a-logical reconstruction 
of the world.-was widely held in the first third of the twentieth 
century. Many analytic philosophers also shared Descartes's belief that 
the thorough enumeration of problems+could determine the limits of 
possible knowledge, so.that-athe remainder could be removed from the 
sphere of-philosophy.' Thus both in general terms and in its 
specifics, Descartes's effort to make philosophy'a scientific I 
enterprise has been hugely influential. * :s ~ 
This leads on to the question of whether the Cartesian method 
has,been successful and, in particular, whether the methodological 1 
exclusion of rhetoricihas been effective. One rather trite but 1 
nevertheless unavoidable observation is that the recurring "Cartesiann 
efforts t o  establish philosophy as a science demonstrate more I 
powerfully than any critique the failure of-Descartes~s~geometrical $ 1  j 
model. Consider Kantrs justification for his project:, 
Metaphysics...has not yet had the good fortune to enter upon the 
secure path of a science. For in it reason is perpetually being 
^ L 
brought to a stand, even when the'laws into which it is seeking'to 
have, as it professes, an a p r i o r i  insight are those that are 
confirmed by our most common experiences. Ever and again we have 
to retrace our steps, as not leading us in the direction in which 
9 we desire to go. 
~his'echoes Descartes, but it was written one hundred and fifty years 
after the ~ e ~ u l a e - .  In other words, Descartesrs belief that his method 
would prove the corrict one has not prevailed, and still today there is 
no "established wayw of doing philosophy. 
Apart from this general 'problem, neither the analytic nor 
synthetic side of the method has met the' su:cess ~escartes claimed foe 
it. There have been many programmes of,reductive analysis, but none of 
them has established the.absolutely simple intuitions upon which a 
positive system could be built. Descartesfs own cogito has been by far 
the most enduring candidate, but the patent lack of success of all 
foundationalist projects has led to a widespread disillusionment with 
the very possibility of foundati~nalisrn.~~ If the analytic side met 
with failure, however, the project of a synthetic demonstrative,system 
has scarcely even been attempted: Spinozars-Ethics is the only major 
work of philosophy that has sought to derive a system.from a small set 
of fundamental axioms, and nobody would todayspretend that it works-as 
a demonstration. 8 .  
Of course, there are important elements of the Cartesian 
system which are still very muchkalive-- in'particular, the ambition to 
"clarify" obscure and complex concepts that is the surviving element of 
analytic philosophy. The trouble is that!this is pretty much the only 
objective to which today's analytic philosophers are willing to commit 
themselves," and in itself it is simply not enough to constitute an 
exclusion of rhetoric. If the possibility of a demonstrative system is 
ruled out, it would appear that conceptual analysis must either make 
contentious assertions about the meaning of statements -.in which case 
it enters the sphere of persuasion - or it can- say nothing,at all.'* 
The failure to establish philosophy as a scientific activity 
has serious consequences for its efforts t ~ ~ e x c l u d e  rhetoric::By 
streamlining discourse into the two categories of "pure science" and 
"persuasion", modern philosophy stares into the abyss once'its path to 
the first category is blocked. Deconstructive close readings can show 
and have shown rhetorical elements creeping into'texts that claim to 
exclude them; the distinction between philosophy and rhetoric becomes 
blurred, and is in .danger of disappearing* altogether. 13i What started 
off as a project that would.give philosophy a strong.identity, 
radically independent from rhetoric, ,has ended up'producing the 
opposite effect. 
, '. 
Given this, general failure of the geometric model, there~can surelyabe 
no objection to a re-examination of Platofs approach to rhetori~~in the 
search for a way out of the impasse: he -was,. after all, 'the~bfirst 
philosopher openly to attack rhetoric and seek to exclude it from 
rational discourse. Naturally, no miracle solution is to beCexpected - 
the perceived failure of ancient and mediaeval thinkers to set 
philosophy on a secure basis was what led Descartes towards his new 
method in the first place, so *it caa be assumed 'fairly con£ idently that 
the procedures laid down by Plato were less than totally successful. 
Viewed from a Cartesian perspective,.it will be seen that Plators 
. ' 
procedures are full of loopholes; but it may be' that ~ldto never saw 
the problem in Cartesian terms, and that his strategy has to be 
assessed from an altogether different standpoint. 
Platofs efforts to distinguish philosophy -from rhetoric 
revolve around the two closely connected ideas of dialogue and 
dialectic, both of which I shall briefly consider here. 
Dialogue concerns the fundamental structures of discourse. 
Socrates often suggests that,his procedure is marked by an openness 
I .  
that the rhetors lack, because while he prefers conversation with an 
individual, they prefer speeches made to crowds. So there are 
basically two injunctions that go under the heading of dialogue. The 
first is that it be between two individuals, rather than between an 
(active) orator and a (passive) crowd or audience. The other point is 
that the.dialogue should not consist of a series-of long speeches, but 
of a session of question-and-answer, through which the participants 
probe each other's ideas on a given subject.:Although the importance of 
this kind of dialogue is affirmed periodically throughout: Plato's 
writings, its strongest articulation is.in,the Protagoras,,- in which 
Socrates and the Sophist Protagoras share a heated.discussion about the 
form that their debate should take. While Protagoras suggests that each 
speaker should take-as..long as he deems appropriate to discuss the 
matter in hand, Socrates protests.that his memory,is not good enough.to 
cope with anything other than the question-and-answer format. It is 
left to Alcibiades to articulate the real reason for Socrates's 
insistence on the strict dialogue form: I . . :/ 
let him [Protagoras] continue the discussion with question and 
answer, not meeting every question with a long oration, eluding 
- .  
the arguments and refusing to meet them properly, spinning it out 
until most of his hearers have forgotten what the question'was 
about - not that Socrates will be the one to forget it: I'll 
guarantee that, in spite of his little joke about being 
) I .  . . t a  
forgetful .I4 
* .  t 
h I 
The long speeches' of the sophists are: thus seen as' diversionary 
. , 
tactics, deflecting 'attention awiy frbm wh.at should be the' rgal 
. . -  
purpose: to pursue in earnest a rational'discu'ssion of a serious 
v <  7 
intellectual problem. 
Dialectic, or the art of critical discussi~n,'~ developed 
. . 
, .,. i "  
gradually in Plator,s work; three distinct phases in its evolution can 
be distinguished.'' The early Socratic dialogues are marked by an 
almost complete absence of positive doctrine and even of positive 
results. Socrates asks the respondent to answer a very.genera1 
question, usually on an ethical matter, and then proceeds to cross- 
examine his response. The invariable outcome is that the answers given 
to the detailed questions are seen to conflict.-withsthe"origina1 ~ 
general' statement,-which is thereby shown to be inadequate; this 1 
procedure is knowwas elenchus. Naturally enough, the strategy often 
greatly irritates ' its. victims, but- Socrates insists. that it is 'a 
necessary-part'of'the philosophical process. People must firstbbe 
brought to the realization that they are ignorant before they will 
aspire to the true.and certain knowledge that is -the goal of 
philosophy; if they think that their opinions are.~already adequate, 
there will be no incentive to travel along-this path.17 -_ 
However'dmportant this preliminary step may be, if there were 
no promise of anything more constructive to follow,, it could encourage 
only scepticism - and that is certainly not Platoes intention.-So while 
the elenchus.never entirely disappears it-gradually becomes less 
significant, and the attempt to arrive at. positive knowledge,of the 
world is made through the art of d i a l e c t i c .  This project.of coming to 
know the essences of things is always the aim of the dialectic, but the 
method itself undergoes a gradual change. In fact,.->in the -middle 
dialogues, while Plato makes reference to an art of dialectic, he.never 
explicitly.states its nature, and the method - such as it is - can only 
be pieced-together.from.scattered comments. Nevertheless, there is'a 
consistency to them, and the term that describes the middle period 
dialectic most succinctly is hypothesis. ,  , ,  . 
. .  i 
To hypothesize -is to posit as a preliminary. It_ conveys the 
notion of laying down a proposition as the beginning of a process 
of thinking, in d&er to work on' the basis thereof .la 
5 , - . . 
. - 
A platonic hypothesis is believed be 'true, and 'deductions are hide 
from it, forming an ever' greater system of 'belief .' This differ8 from 
the Cartesian process ofLsynthesis in the crucial respect that the 
hypothesized proposition is not an "absolutely simple intuition" the 
truth of which is indubitable. On the contrary, it is quite possible 
that an hypothesis will have to be rejected, if the deductions arising 
from it conflict with more fundamental beliefs.'' The procedure thus 
produces a gradual attunement of opinions rather than a scientific 
demonstration. 
Platofs later theory of dialectic requires no reconstruction, 
since it is stated in ,several dialogues in which he appears 
particularly optimistic about the prospects for attaining knowledge of 
ultimate truth. It is deemed possible to fix the essence of a concept 
by a combination of movements up to the more general and down to the 
more particular, which Plato-terms synthesis (combination) and 
diairesis (division) respectively. For example, suppose the question 
before us is, as$in the Phaedrus, "what is love?" The answer should, 
according to Socrates, be given by an exhaustive procedure which would 
give love foundation as one species of a "higherw genus,20 and divide 
love into several*different sub-species, such as "love of a lover", 
"love of a non-lover", etc. Plato insists that this procedure is more 
than an exercise in reporting the standard usages of words: the skill 
of the dialectician lies precisely in founding and dividing along the 
right lines. He is not playing with words, he is mapping out being; and 
he must do this in a careful, step-by-step manner, never.omitting 
intermediate stages. 21 
These, then, are the bare essentials of Platofs method; as 
with the geometric model, my interest in it concerns its capacity to 
exclude rhetoric. In general, it can be said that the two methods are 
weak at opposite points: the Cartesian method would provide a complete 
exclusion of rhetoric but has proved impossible to implement in 
anything remotely approaching its complete form; the Platonic method; 
on the other hand, is quite credible as a'description of actual 
philosophical practice but, even if fully implemented, cannot,guarantee 
the exclusion of rhetoric. Nevertheless, there,-are a few significant 
"problems of implementationw facing the P1atonic~method;'before turning 
to its major drawbacks, I shall give these brief consideration. , .  . 
While it is not difficult to'find places where Plato 'follows 
his own rules, it is also easy to find points at which he breaks them; 
Socratesrs propensity for telling myths, for example, has'nothing to'do 
with the proper procedures of dialogue'or'dialectic. So long'as these 
lapses are considered'idiosyncrasies on Plato's part, they are not of 
any great concern to us. The rea1"question is whether the practice can 
meet the theory,'not whether it always does, and there are good reasons 
for believing that in certain respects it cannot. One particular 
problem is the nature of dialogue in Platovs late works:"to all intents 
and purposes, wdialoguesw like the Sophist and Statesmanare:rnonologues 
with occasional interruptions, and certairily"disp1ay none of the 
qualities that made Plato such'a keen advocate of the dialogue-form; 
 his has sometimes'been passed off as the'sign of an'old man's 
declining literary powers, but a more interesting explanation is that 
the lack of genuine dialogue is directly connected to the seriousness 
with which these works pursue the late conception of dialectic. 
~iairesis and synthesis are techniques 'for producing a systematic and 
comprehensive ontology, and would seem to require no questions other 
than wwhat comes next?", which can just as well be asked by the lone 
inquirer as by an interlocutor. Thus if dialogue and late dialectic are 
not actually incompatible, they can hardly be said to complement one 
another. There is also a more general doubt'concerning dialogue in 
Plato: despite,the protestations about theJsupreme value of speech and 
d i s c u s s i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  no escap ing  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e s e  wdia logues"  a r e  
w r i t t e n ,  and t h a t  t h e  d e b a t e s  a r e  s t a g i n g s  o f  t h e  i d e a s  ,of  a  s i n g l e  
t h i n k e r  r a t h e r  than  a  genuine d i a l o g i c , i n t e r a c t i o n .  By t h e  same token, 
t h e  r e a d e r  i s  a  s p e c t a t o r  of t h e  .d ia logue  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  p a r t i c i p a n t ,  
and  t h e r e f o r e  n e i t h e r  s c r u t i n i z e s  n o r  i s  s c r u t i n i z e d ,  b u t  s i m p l y  
watches t h e  scene  unfo ld .  Genuine d i a l o g u e  i s  t h u s  h a r d  t o  r e c o n c i l e  
wi th  t h e  s imple  f a c t  of  a w r i t t e n  t e x t  a s  w e l l  a s  wi th  o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  
of P l a t o f s  own method. , . , . .  , .. , 
But even i f  t h e  procedures of P l a t o t s  method _ a l l :  worked 
p e r f e c t l y  and harmoniously ,  t h e y  c o u l d  n o t ,  e i t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l l y  o r  
c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  gua ran tee  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  of rhetoric:.To unders tand t h i s  
w e  n e e d  o n l y  r e c a l l  D e s c a r t e s ' s  comment t h a t  "one  c a n - t a l k  o f  
persuas ion whenever t h e r e  i s  ground f o r  f u r t h e r  doubtw; i n  P l a t o  t h e r e  
is  always ground f o r  f u r t h e r  doubt. Here, once again,  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e , o n  
d i a l o g u e  i s  t h e  m o s t  o b v i o u s l y  p r o b l e m a t i c .  From a  C a r t e s i a n  
p e r s p e c t i v e  it c a n  o n l y  be a  s i g n  o f  f a i l u r e ,  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  
knowledge has not  y e t  been a t t a i n e d .  There is,  a f t e r  a l l ,  no need f o r  a  
g e o m e t e r  t o  a l l o w  t h e  r i g h t  o f  c h a l l e n g e  , t o  h i s  t h e o r e m ;  a  
d e m o n s t r a t i o n  i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  any r e a s o n a b l e  p e r s o n  t o  
accept  it. 
A l l i e d  t o  t h i s  is  t h e  genera l  ques t ion  of why - P l a t o  should 
have p a i d  s o  much a t t e n t i o n  t o  pedagogical  matters: '  Why, f o r  i i k t a n c e ,  
i s  e l e n c h u s  s o  i m p o r t a n t ?  When s u c h  w e i g h t  i s  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  
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impor tance  of  f o r c i n g  peop le  t o  c o n f r o n t  t h e i r  ignorance  it i m p l i e s  
t h a t  t h e r e  is  no easy  way f o r  them t o  f i n d  knowledge and t h a t  they  must 
be  i n s p i r e d  t o  look f o r  it. This  problem i s  n i c e l y  i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  
analogy of t h e  cave  i n  Book Seven of t h e  Repub l i c  - a f t e r  P l a t o  h a s  
s t a r t e d  t o  t a l k  of d i a l e c t i c a l  method. The phi losopher  i s  compared t o  a  
man who h a s  s e e n  d a y l i g h t  r e t u r n i n g  t o  a  g roup  o f  p e r p e t u a l  cave-  
d w e l l e r s .  H i s  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  n o t  s imply how t o  l e a d  them'out  i n t o  t h e  
l i g h t ,  b u t  how t o  make them u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  more t h a n  t h e  
cave 's  darkness i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l ace .  The phi losopher  somehow has t o  g e t  
t h e m  t o  t u r n  r o u n d ,  t o w a r d s  t h e  l i g h t ,  b e f o r e  h e  c a n  m a k e ~ a n y  
progress .22  Thus t h e r e  i s  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  s t e p  t o  b e  t aken ,  when f a c e d  
I 
by a  s c e p t i c a l  audience ,  b e f o r e  t h e  work o f  d i a l e c t i c  can  begin:  t o  
make them have f a i t h  i n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of d i a l e c t i c .  This beginning 
is  not i n  i t s e l f  a  d i a l e c t i c a l  move, s o  one might s a y  t h a t ,  while P l a t o  
warns a g a i n s t  t h e  seduct ions  of r h e t o r i c ,  philosophy i t s e l f  must f i r s t  
of a l l  seduce people away from t h e i r  cond i t ion  of  "darknessw. They a r e  
persuaded of  t h e  v a l u e  o f  d i a l e c t i c  - it i s  n o t  p r o v e d  t o  them. 
Moreover, t h e s e  mys te r i e s  of  i n i t i a t i o n  seem p e r f e c t l y  a t t u n e d  t o  t h e  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  method of  d i a l e c t i c  advoca ted  i n  t h e  middle d i a l o g u e s ,  
which promises  no more t h a n  a  g r a d u a l  a s c e n t  towards  knowledge, and 
g i v e s  no i n d i c a t i o n  of  how c e r t a i n t y  can  be  a t t a i n e d .  Indeed,  t h e r e  
seems e v e r y  r e a s o n  t o  suppose  t h a t  t h e  t e s t i n g  o f  hypo theses  i s  an  
e n d l e s s  t a s k ,  and t h a t  ground f o r  doubt  - and t h e r e f o r e  p e r s u a s i o n  - 
a l w a y s  r e m a i n s .  I n  d i r e c t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  P l a t o n i c  model ,  
D e s c a r t e s  d i s m i s s e s  "knowledge o f  i g n o r a n c e w  and  h y p o t h e s i z i n g  a s  
u t t e r l y  worthless:  
* 
A l l  knowledge is c e r t a i n  and e v i d e n t  c o g n i t i o n .  Someone who has  
doubts  about  many t h i n g s  i s  no wiser t h a n  one who has  never  g iven 
them a  thought...Hence it is b e t t e r  never t o  s t u d y  t h a n  t o  occupy 
o u r s e l v e s  wi th  o b j e c t s  whi'ch a r e  s o  d i f f i c u l t  t h a t  w e  a r e  unable 
t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  what i s  t r u e  from what i s  f a l s e ,  and a r e  f o r c e d  t o  
t a k e  t h e  d o u b t f u l  a s  c e r t a i n . . . w e  r e j e c t  a l l  s u c h  p r o b a b l e  
c o g n i t i o n  and r e s o l v e  t o  b e l i e v e  on ly  what i s  p e r f e c t l y  known and 
incapable of being doubted. 23 
While i n  t h e s e  r e s p e c t s  P l a t o  and Descar tes  c l e a r l y  have 
almost nothing in common, it is possible to believe that the late 
dialectic method marks a considerable advance towards the Cartesian 
model: the two sides of division and composition obviously bear a 
considerable resemblance to the Cartesian analysis and synthesis; 
However, the procedure is less closely described in Plato, and the 
details he does give seem insufficient to exclude rhetoric.-A 
particularly intriguing phrase occurs in the description of dialectic 
given in the Phaedrus: .., . s .  , 
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we are enabled to divide into forms, according to the objective 
articulation: we are not to attempt to hack off parts like a 
clumsy butcher... 2 4 
. . 
This simile is problematic: the good butcher, or the anatomist, cuts 
incisively along the natural divisions of the body; he thus already 
knows these natural divisions. But the dialedtician, who must allegedly 
do the same, faces the problem of habeas corpus. How does one know the 
universe resembles a body, let alone one with':" "ob ject'ive 
articulations", until after one has completed the dialectical 
procedure? Or does one know in advance, through some other p r o ~ ~ s s  than 
dialectics? It does not seem contradictory to the rules iaid down by 
Plato to suppose that two dialecticians could produce two different 
dialectical divisions of the same subject, and both claim that theirs 
followed the "objective articulation" while their rival's amounted to 
, ,. 
"clumsy hacking". Assuming that both passed the elenchus test of 
logical consistency, how would one choose between them? There appears 
to be no objective test, and yet to resort to claims about relative 
, . 
plausibility is to fall back into rhetoric. The same applies here as 
applies to the rest of Plato's method: for all his insistence that 
philosophy shall attain certainty, he never achiev'es that certainty 
himself, and so the absolute exclusion of rhetoric remains a mere 
promise. It will have been proved - by the master dialectician who, 
after more than two thousand years, is still y e t , t o ' c o m e  into 
existence. . - .  + 
In the light of these criticisms, the Cartesian: method is 
liable to look much more impressive - until the extent of i t s  failure 
is recalled. In any case, the complaints just outlined have all made 
the assumption that Plato was attempting something very similar to 
Descates - an exclusion of rhetoric based on a sound and scientific 
method. And there is one very good reason for supposing that this is 
not  an accurate description of Platofs approach to rhetoric, which is 
that he himself made "criticisms" of his "method" very similar to 
those just recited. This fact requires some kind of explanation. 
. . 
The absence of effective guarantees against rhetoric is fully 
discussed in Platofs Seventh L e t t e r .  There, he criticizes treatises 
that claim to offer knowledge on philosophical subjects, ' b; arguing 
/ r 
that words are incapable of directly approaching the real essence of 
things. More specifically, Plato lists four elements of human 
apprehension of objects - names. descriptions, particular expressions, 
and concepts - and warns that even the last of these, the understanding 
in the mind, always falls short of the thing itself. This has an 
unfortunate consequence, as Plato points out: . 
In those cases...where we demand answers and proofs in regard to 
the fifth entity [the object itself], anyone who pleases among 
those who have skill in confutation gains the victory and makes 
most of the audience think -that the man who was first to spe'ak or 
write or answer has no acquaintance with the matters of which he 
attempts to write or speak ... To sum it all up succinctly, natural 
intelligence and a good memory are equally powerless to aid the 
man who has not an inborn affinity with the subject.25 
 his i s  an e x t r a o r d i n a r y  passage,  f o r  it n o t  .only seems t o  a n t i c i p a t e  
and reject t h e  C a r t e s i a n  demands f o r  "answers and-proofsw, '  -it i s  even 
aware of what t h e s e  demands w i l l  l e a d  t o  and i n  our  century  have l e d  t o  
- a  s i t u a t i o n  where " t h o s e  who have  s k i l l  i n  c o n f u t a t i o n  g a i n  t h e  
v i c t o r y " .  P l a t o  h a s  n o t h i n g  i n  p r i n c i p l e  a g a i n s t  a t t a i n i n g  wisdom 
th rough  p r o o f s  - o t h e r  t h a n  h i s  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  it i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e ,  
which t o d a y  seems a  f a r  be t t e r  e s t i m a t i o n  t h a n  D e s c a r t e s f s  b l a n d  
assu rance  t h a t  " the  p a t h s  t o  t r u t h  a r e  v e r y  easy". The Seventh Letter 
i n  f a c t  cont inues  with a  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  arduous journey t h e  would- 
. - 
be d i a l e c t i c i a n  must undergo b e f o r e  he  can even hope to '  '=arr$ o f f  t h e  
p r i z e  : 
The s t u d y  of v i r t u e  and v i c e  must b e  accompagied by an  i n q u i r y  
i n t o  what i s  f a l s e  and t r u e  of e x i s t e n c e  i n  g e n e r a l  and must b e  
c a r r i e d  on b y  c o n s t a n t  p r a c t i c e  t h r o u g h o u t  a  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  
t i m e . .  . a f t e r  p r a c t i s i n g  d e t a i l e d  c o m p a r i s o n s  o f  hdmes a n d  
d e f i n i t i o n s  a n d  v i s u a l  a n d  o t h e r  s e n s e  p e r c e p t i o n s ,  a f t e r  
s c r u t i n i z i n g  them i n  benevolent d i s p u t a t i o n  by , , the  use  of ques t ion  
and answer without jealousy, a t  l a s t ,  i n  a  f l a s h ,  understanding of 
each b l a z e s  up, and t h e  mind, a s  it e x e r t s '  a l l '  i t s  'powers t o  t h e  
l i m i t s  of human capaci ty ,  is  f looded with l ight .26  . =  
I f  c e r t a i n  knowledge is  only  t h e  f i n a l  goal ,  a s  P l a t o  
i n s i s t s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  something p r e s e n t  a t  e v e r y  s t e p  a l o n g  t h e  way, 
t h e n  it i s  no l o n g e r  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  c r i t i c i z e  P l a t o ' s  method f o r  
a l l o w i n g  i n  e l ements  of  p e r s u a s i o n .  ~ e s t i n ~ ' h i s  t e x t s  f o r  t r a c e s  of  
r h e t o r i c  e n t i r e l y  misses  t h e  p o i n t ,  f o r  P l a t o  does n o t  u s e  t h e  s imple  
o p p o s i t i o n  be tween  t h e  p r e s e n c e  a n d  a b s e n c e  o f  r h e t o r i c :  ' i n  t h e  
Phaedrus ,  f o r  example, t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  drawn between " t r u e "  and 
"fa lse"  r h e t o r i c ,  t h e  former recognizing t h e  importance of t r u t h  a s  t h e  
founda t ion  of pe r suas ion ,  t h e  l a t t e r  t a k i n g  no concern f o r  t r u t h  and 
only bothering about persuasion. What I am suggesting is that. Plato 
should not be seen as presenting, like Descartes, a method which has as 
one of its attributes the exclusion of rhetoric. Because-of the 
difficulty of attaining certain truth, it is notipossible.simply to 
sweep rhetoric away: rather than an absolute exclusion, what, is 
required is a continuous p r o c e s s  o f  e x c l u d i n g  which would only be 
completed with the attainment of absolute knowledge. As azdistinguished 
modern Platonist has put it: , - - .i.. "' ] '  
The philosopher and the sophist are all too easy to mistake for, 
each other. Hence it must be the task of philosophy to separate 
\ , ,  
them and to separate itself from the impurity of sophism within 
itself, a task which creates the perpetual tension in which 
philosophy has found itself since Plato's time. 27 
I . I  
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Does this illustrate Plato's failure, or his success?, For 
" . - 
Descartes, of course, it is a failure: Plato does not succeed in 
establishing philosophy as clearly distinct from,rhetoric. But there is 
another sense in which Plato has achieved virtually complete success: 
he has turned philosophy against rhetoric, and made it regard sophism 
as an wimpurityw to be attacked and expelled. That this achievement 
generally passes unnoticed only shows that the victory is total: 
philosophers after Plato have scarcely bothered to point out why 
rhetoric should be excluded; like Descartes, if they are interested in 
the question at all, it is to determine how that exclusion , , is to be 
carried out. Plato separated philosophy and rhetoric, ,if not in 
I 
practice, then at least as rival v a l u e s ;  the attempts to separate-them 
in practice flow from this crucial first step. 
, 
.* . , 
In this chapter I have considered only Plato's "practicaln measures,to 
deal with rhetoric; but if I am right, then his really important 
! 
contribution is to expose the unacceptable values inherent in rhetoric 
so convincingly that philosophy has been co'mmitted,to the struggle 1 
I 
against it ever since. From now on, my focus will be exclusively on 
this devaluation of rhetoric. 
It is not particularly easy to organize Plato's attacks on 
rhetoric into neat categories, since they occur haphazardly throughout 
his work and many different criticisms are often-subtly blended 
together; one commentator has even suggested that the whole-of Plators 
work is in essence an attack on rhet~ric.~' My tactic .in the chapters 
that follow is to group together the attacks on rhetoric into four 
major themes, each of which is treated,in turn. 29 The next chapter 
(chapter two) considers the significance of the commitment to dialogue 
and reasoned debate, in contrast with the rhetorical objective, of 
winning an argument and thus trying to direct an audience towards a 
particular viewpoint, often by dubious means. Chapter three explores 
philosophy's commitment to the cultivation of the intellect and the 
pursuit of knowledge, in contrast with rhetoric's more pragmatic 
educational objectives. Chapter four looks at.philosophyts commitment 
to a standard of rational argumentation-in.comparison with rhetoric's 
less rigorous requirement of persuasive argumentation.30 Finally, 
chapter five looks at philosophy's commitment to plain prose and clear 
thinking, in contrast to rhetoric's stress on beautiful-speech and 
writing -which, it is claimed, clouds the reason both of its 
practitioners and its audience. These four attacks can, alternatively, 
be regarded as four species of a generic criticism of rhetoric:. it does 
not value truth. , . 
It may be objected at this point .that the jump from the 
f a i l u r e  o f  modern e f f o r t s  a t  e x c l u d i n g  r h e t o r i c  t o  a  m a j o r  re- 
examination of  t h e  value of r h e t o r i c  i s  a  r a t h e r  l a r g e  one. Cer ta in ly ,  
t h e r e  i s  no th ing  necessa ry  about  it. One could  con t inue  t o  s e a r c h  f o r  
new ways of making philosophy s c i e n t i f i c  - no doubt t h e r e  w i l l  be those  
who w i l l  do t h a t ;  one c o u l d  e q u a l l y  a c c e p t  t h a t  r h e t o r i c  i s  an eve r -  
p resen t  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  and rega rd  t h e  f a c t  with concern o r  ind i f fe rence ,  
a s  temperament d i c t a t e s .  But f o r  a l l  t h i s ,  t h e  e x p l o r a t i o n  of  P l a t o r s  
devaluat ion  of r h e t o r i c  i s  of more than  merely an t iquar i an  i n t e r e s t .  I n  
t h e  f i r s t  p lace ,  t h e  f a i l u r e  of e f f o r t s  t o  exclude r h e t o r i c  completely 
from philosophy means t h a t  r h e t o r i c  i s  s t i l l  an i s s u e  f o r  phi losophers  
t o  conf ron t ,  one way o r  another ,  and t o  p rec lude  a p r i o r i  any s e r i o u s  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  why ph i losophy  s h o u l d  b e  h o s t i l e  t o  r h e t o r i c  seems 
under t h e s e  circumstances t o  be more t h a n  a  t r i f l e  dogmatic. Moreover, 
u n l e s s  t h e  r i v a l  v a l u e s  i n v o l v e d  come i n t o  q u e s t i o n ,  t h e  c o n f l i c t  
b e t w e e n  r h e t o r i c  a n d  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  l i a b l e  t o  r e m a i n  r a t h e r  
u n i n t e r e s t i n g  - t r a p p e d  i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l i t i e s  o f  whe the r  o r  n o t  
r h e t o r i c  has been excluded. A t  t h e  very  l e a s t ,  such d i scuss ions  deserve 
t o  b e  supplemented by a  t h o r o u g h  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  why t h i s  s h o u l d  
matter .  
A s  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  made c l e a r ,  however, t h e r e  is a  f a r  more 
concre te  ambition d r i v i n g  t h e  exp lo ra t ion  of P l a t o f s  a t t a c k  on r h e t o r i c  
p u r s u e d  h e r e  t h a n  s i m p l y  t o  add  a new p e r s p e c t i v e  on p h i l o s o p h y ' s  
r e v i v e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  s u b j e c t .  For t h e  hypo thes i s  of t h e  t h e s i s  i s  
t h a t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t r u t h ,  t h e  supremacy of  which u n d e r p i n s  a l l  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  a t t a c k s  on r h e t o r i c ,  may i t s e l f  b e  s u s p e c t .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
P l a t o  appears he re  a s  both  p rosecu to r  and defendant. On t h e  one hand, 
it is h i s  c r i t i q u e  of r h e t o r i c  t h a t  u n d e r l i e s  a l l  t h e  most impor tant  
and  e n d u r i n g  s u s p i c i o n s  of  N i e t z s c h e f s  work; on t h e  o t h e r  hand, i n  
~ i e t z s c h e  l i e  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  t o  c o u n t e r  t h a t  c r i t i q u e  and  make t h e  
p o s i t i v e  revaluation of rhetoric  a p o s s i b i l i t y .  Plato versus Nietzsche: 
t h i s  i s  the heart of philosophy's c o n f l i c t  with rhetoric.  
Of all the suspicions of Nietzschefs rhetoric, none'is more~commonplace 
than the idea that it is in some sense dangerous.- It is often seen 
either as the deliberate technique:'of a preacher and sponsor of power 
politics or, more charitably, as the unfortunate,excess of an-otherwise 
great philosopher, a power that others,,have been able to harness for 
their own sinister purposes. Either way; it,is the language that is the 
problem, and the essence of that problem is identifiable by a single 
term: manipulation. 
This term is of no little significance in the history of 
philosophy's struggle with rhetoric, for it has been used to set up an 
opposition between the two which emphasizes philosophy's superiority. 
~ h u s  it is claimed that rhetoric manipulates, whereas philosophy does 
not, because the rhetor uses language to enhance his power, whereas 
the philosopher uses language only to learn. It is even,suggested at 
times that philosophy does not really~uae.language at all; that the 
very term "use" already suggests something too instrumental: the 
philosopher only wants to enlighten, not to control his audience,: and 
the source of this enlightenment lies outside both him and his 
addressee, in the essence of things: . . 
These assertions will be examined fully below. At'-this stage, 
it is enough to see what the argument is about: to put,it in the most 
general terms, it is a question of the'relations of power flowing 
between a source and an addressee through written and spoken messages. 1 
Using these terms it is possible to construct-the limit cases that will 
be seen to dominate the debate: at one extreme, the message serves to 
increase.the power of the source and diminish,that,of'-the,addressee. 
Through the.medium of the message, the addressee is moved towards 
courses ofkaction desirable to the source; the message-acts, in other 
words, as a form of control or manipu1ation:At the other extreme, the 
message serves to augment the capacity and power of the-addressee.' The 
source gains nothing; indeed, due to the relative increase in the power 
of the addressee;it might,be.thought to have lost power, or at least 
given it up. In'this case, then, the message.acts as a form-of 
empowering or education. The complex relationship between.these 
apparent opposites of manipulation and education will be the guiding 
theme of this chapter. " .  , . . .  j >  . . ,  . . ,  
. . 
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While my primary concern here is~to'consider how the contrast.between 
manipulation and education relates to Nietzsche, I will preface this 
with an exploration of Plato8s Gorgias, in which'the opposition is 
vividly expressed. Beyond the intrinsic interest of an historical 
parallel, there are two main reasons for beginning the discussion here. 
In the first place, it shows the extent to which.both Nietzsche and his 
modern critics are re-enacting an ancient antagonism between philosophy 
and rhetoric rather than creating a new controversy'of'their own.: But 
as well as indicating the historical pedigree of the problem, and far 
more importantly, the Gorgiaa matters here because through it certain 
prejudices and assumptions about the status of philosophy are 
established as beyond debate. To break free fromrthe web of Platonic 
assumptions, questions have to be raised that Plato did not even allow 
Socrates's opponents to voice. In particular, there are good reasons 
for believing that the historical Gorgias could have produced a-far 
more radical and confident.assertion !of the role-'of rhetoric than he 
manages in the Gorgias dialogue. And>the.case of Gorgias parallels that 
of Nietzsche, precisely because Nietzschefs apologists have, so often 
sought,to-defend him using categories that.remain within the platonic 
code of philosophical conduct, rather than using Nietzsche(or Gorgias) 
to challenge that' code. .: ! *  - . , .  . , ,  ji- iL ,. - 
The Gorgias is one of Platofs greatest dialogues, and3by'far 
the most important source.when it,comes.to determining his relationship 
to rhetoric. In this chapter, attention is-fixed purely on the 
criticism that rhetoric concentrateshpowerd angerously in $the hands of 
its practitioners,.but it must at once be confessed that this is not 
Platof s main, line of. attack. His principaL explicit criticism is that 
rhetoric is a 'form of pandering to the ,audience's desires, and is 
therefore'corrupt-because its practitioners offer the people what they 
want rather,than what.is good for themisthis and other aspects of the 
dialogue will .be ,considered ,in :later chapters. 2 
~ Pandering, however, is a problem of democracy, and quite 
different from the complaint that rhetoric abets the would-be tyrant. 
The latter "criticism" is-in fact an idea voiced by the r h e t o r s  
themselves, which Socrates does no more - but also no lesst- than 
c o n f i r m .  -Polus, Callicles, and Gorgias - the three adversaries of 
Socrates in.this dialogue - all defend the manipulative power%of 
rhetoric in different ways. I want briefly to explore the differences 
between them here, mainly because echoes of these."defencesW turn up in 
the a t t a c k s  made on Nietzsche; . -  :? . . - -  , . -  "0 . , , * -  
Let us take Polus first,. since his position is themost 
straightforward.. He makes~no attempt at an ethical or in any sense 
universalizable defence of rhetoric's manipulative power. The simple 
fact that rhetoric can be used by:,an aspiring politician to increase 
his control is justification enough, in the eyes of Polus.'The argument 
is blindingly simple: rhetors havedpower;'.and those who have ,such 
power are in an admirable *position: Ethical considerations 'are .an 
irrelevance: Polus is an advocate of pure political cynicism. 4 
Socrates, for his part, does not ,dispute that- the -rhetor has such 
powers of manipulation at his disposa1,'but-rather triesbto show that 
this does not amount to effective power,. because this model,politician, 
if he has 'not "tudied philosophy,- will . n o t  know *'where' his true 
interests lie, and-may thus be' able to' effect states of .affairs, 
including tyranny, which, if,he were enlightened, he would not want; . .' 
/- 
Most'. of-the debate'betweenTSocrates and.Polus turns around 
this question,. and-yet it is' not the truly important one. Whetheroor 
not Socrates'loses this particular argument, he surely wins 'the 
struggle'in a more general sense; for even if Polus is right, he proves 
only that rhetoric helps tyrants, and one does n o t ~ n e e d  to be a 
Platonist to-be disturbed and threatened by an;art of speech.that might 
have such consequences .- Polus gives no indication that sthe .addressees 
of rhetoric are. anything more, than its dupes. - , , ;- - . . , . . 
But 'while Polus makes' no attempt to defend.the? manipulative 
power of rhetoric in any general sense, both,Callicles and Gorgias 
offer arguments that could,provide for it a more serious justification; 
they provide, 'indeed, -the only serious defences that P1ato~:allows'his 
opponents. i'.r . . .  .. , , -  ,- " .  
The approach of Callicles is to offer an uncompromising 
vindication of manipulation. He argues that in the natural'social state 
(physis) all creatures seek to maximize'their pleasures'and i m t h e  
process struggle against.one another for the power so t o  do. 
~nevitably, the stronger members of society come out on top, and-rule 
the rest. .But the majority 'of weaklings, disliking this state of 
affairs, seek to establish a society based on rules and conventions 
(nomos) in which thevstrong will be restricted. General rules always.in 
practice inhibit only the strong, Callicles argues,~-because the weak 
are incapable,of breaking3them anyway. Dissatisfied with this.tyranny 
of convention, he advocates a return to .the natural order in which the 
strong are once more unrestricted in their,power; and while rhetoricvis 
notC'directly mentioned at this point, it* clearly has a role to play in 
restoring the,strong to their rightful- place as leaders of society. 
Central to Calliclesrs argument is the notion that justice resides in a 
certain t y p e  of social organization,'. rather' than 'in a set of 
procedures; thus the apparent unfairness of rhetoric's manipulative 
powers-can be.defended by reference-to the state of affairs.they help 
to bring about - an important principle when it comes to considering 
Nietzschegs position. . . ,  !.. ‘ ' , .  
Once'; again, the -details' of : -Socrates's . response to this 
position,are of little relevance to the discussion of rhetoric"as 
manipulation, -and can be dealt with ,briefly.' He tackles - Callicles by 
arguing that*it is.better torsuffer than to,do-wrong and, ,therefore; 
that the .type of society idealized by Callicles, in which all men seek 
to maximize theircfreedom to do as they like, is-undesirable. By.doing 
as they please; thetstrong are likely to do wrong<and hence to,damage 
themselves. The,implication is the same as in the debate with Polus: 
the power of rhetoric is illusory~because it:produces effects willy- 
nilly, without discrimination in'terms of their ethical value. 
' - The ... conversation , with Gorgias (the , dialogue's first 
confrontation). is markedly,different from the other two. While Polus 
and Callicles aresboth students of. rhetoric, interested in..it only for 
its political benefits, Gorgias is a teacher of the art and therefore 
predisposed to offer a'defence of his work-other than that of 
expediency or a "might is,rightVV doctrine. Unlike~~Polus:andCallicles, 
he desires to make rhetoric appear respectable, ,.and his-approach to-its 
manipulative abilities ,is therefore more.circumspect. He,t,too, 
emphasizes the power it puts in.the hands of its practitioners, butehe 
immediately adds that 'there are of course limits to its proper use, as 
there are to the use of any other ac~omplishment..'~~~This caveat .is used 
by Socrates to wring from Gorgias the promise.that if someone came to 
him unaware, as ,it were, of :the "proper usew of.* rhetoric . (i;e. for 
moral aims), then he would have to teach him.' But such;a concession.is 
a gift, as is recognized even3 within.the dialogueby Po1us:and 
Callicles. It allows Socrates to draw the conclusion that, according to 
Gorgias, the rhetor can never do wrong; an opinion which,clashes with 
the warning Gorgias gives about the potential misuse of:rhetoric..The 
argument is, as so often, dependent on the PSocratici paradox" .,(that 
knowledge = virtue). If Gorgiasrs pupils are"a1ready ethically 
knowledgeable or are taught ethics by him, they must:use rhetoric .for 
virtuous purposes* (because to know what is right is to do what is 
right). Thus the possible abuses of rhetoric mentioned by Gorgias.would 
be impossible: he would be arguing.against an+illusory.danger. 
Nonetheless, as we.have:seen, P01us:presents~unchallenged by*Socrates 
the idea that rhetoric is in.practice used by tyrants.--therthreat is 
real, in other words., Moreover, .the way in-iwhich Polus and Callicles go 
about defending rhetoric>shows'that they at'least have no:compunctions 
about "immoralw uses.'The implication of all of this is plainly that 
the.ethica1 education of- rhetors has not always been,-successfu1,~which 
to Plato is no great surprise: one has to have,a.thorough grasp.of 
dialectics to.know what is right. Thisyfits in with a central claim,of 
the Phaedrus, (a dialogue-sometimes thought,to be in conflict..with the 
Gorgias) that dialectic iscthe true foundation of rhetoric.' Without 
ethical knowledge, which Gorgias accepts rhetoric does not teach, 
rhetoric cannot help its practitioner (as Socrates "demonstratesw in 
his arguments with Polus and Callicles). Ethical knowledge 'is-thus the 
cornerstone of true mastery - and this,-of course, is Socratesfs home 
territory. . " ' > .  , . , A  . ( 
The dramatic development of the dialogue, as much as 
Socratesrs arguments, indicates that Gorgias is well-meaning but rather 
nalve. He may hope that rhetoric is put to good ends, but his own 
pupils undermine this idea and demonstrate that. in practice Gorgiasrs 
teaching opens a Pandorats box. It is important to-note-that, so far as 
the estimation of Gorgias is concerned,.,the validity 'or otherwise of 
the Socratic paradox is an irrelevance: Gorgias'loses either way. If 
the paradox is accepted, then rhetoric will,be.an acceptable activity, 
but only as an ancilla to philosophy:' If,'however;'it is rejected, the 
desirability of rhetoric is diminished still further. It will then'be 
dangerous not only in the hands of the Ignorant, but also-inrthe hands 
9 . . .  ,. ,"., - of the knowledgeable but' vicious. I .  a - , ' 1  I 
Running through all the debates within the Gorgias, is the 
common assumption that,rhetoric is an art-of manipulation ~ h i c h ~ g i v e s  
its practitioners enormous potential power over their addressees, and 
while this power'"is~we1comed by all, of rhetoric's defenders, it 
nonetheless puts a great pressure on them. Gorgiasts insistence that 
this power be used responsibly ties him in knots, while Callicles 
, ' ; '. r.. . . -. * , 
justifies rhetoric within the fr:mework of an "ideal" society that 
. ?'.,. ." - .  
L. . ! 
bears strong resemblances to a fascist state..So perhaps it is this 
, . *  
unqualified assumption, that rhetoric is a means for its practitioners 
to control its addressees, that is-the real problem for the rhetors. 
Because it is a point agreed by all the participants, the question of 
quite how rhetoric exercises such powers is,never really examined, and 
yet this is a question that clearly must be .addressed'if Platofs 
understanding of,rhetoric is to be.fully scrutinized. The way I propose 
to do this,*is to:see just how Nietzsche has5been attacked for 
manipulative use of language, and to follow that-up with a more general 
consideration of-the nature of linguistic manipulation.' - * '  i 
I mentioned,earlier that the attacks on Nietzsche"ech0 the discussions 
within the Gorgias, lo and it is -now ,time, to make ^ that ' point: in :more 
detail. .'. Essentially, there are two ways :of conceiviG Nietzsche in the 
role of rhetorical~manipulator, and these correspond respectively to 
the position of Callicles and to that of Gorgias. * ' -  ' , , <., - - 
The . first  line^ of attack :'is' that * some of Nietzschef s 
doctrines advocate, or at' least accommodate, manipulation. His 
admiration for many of the more ruthless'figures.in'history, such as 
Napoleon and'cesare Borgia, suggests an affinity with' Calliclesf s 
defence of rhetoric as a weapon in the hands of the strong. On the 
basis of such'attitudes it has been-'*claimed that Nietzsche shares 
Calliclesfs Blitist cynicism and uses language accordingly, to help 
bring about a shift in the political order in favour of the strong. 
E.R. DO&, for example, argues that 
. L 
, . . . . , I  , - . , .,, 
. , 
there can...be little doubt that~certain of the most notorious of 
[Nietzschefs] own doctrines were in some measure inspired...by the 
anti-Plato in Plato whose persona is Callicles. 11 
So the stress here falls on Nietzsche the author, who is accused of 
i '  ' 2 . . .  . - .* 
using language to manipulate his readers in order to benefit the most 
" . , . .  
, _ > I  
ruthless and power-hungry elements of society. 
The argument t h a t  Nietzsche was an advocate f o r  some k ind  of  
power-poli t ics  is  a c t u a l l y  less commonly p u t  than t h e  c la im t h a t  he was 
an  out-and-out Nazi. This  i s  r a t h e r  cu r ious ,  s i n c e  t h e  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  
f e a t u r e s  of  Nazism, such a s  t h e  German r a c e  myth and v i r u l e n t  a n t i -  
s e m i t i s m ,  a r e  d o c t r i n e s  t h a t  Nie tzsche  q u i t e  e x p l i c i t l y  r e j e c t s . - . H i s  
l i b e r a l  a p o l o g i s t s  g i v e  t h e m s e l v e s  r a t h e r  t o o  e a s y  a t a s k  b y  
concen t ra t ing  t h e i r  f i re  s o  i n s i s t e n t l y  on t h e  d i s t o r t i o n s  of t h e  Nazi 
propagandis ts ;  perhaps t h e y  hope t h a t  t h e s e  r e f u t a t i o n s  w i l l  s i l e n t l y  
bury t h e  more s e r i o u s  doubts about Nietzsche's l i b e r a l  credentia1s:At 
any r a t e ,  I t a k e  it a s  r e a d  h e r e  t h a t  Nie tzsche  cannot  s e r i o u s l y  be 
taken a s  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  forerunner of German ~ a z i s m . l *  
, r .  
Nonetheless, t h e r e  a r e  p l e n t y  of Nietzsche passages t h a t  
c a u s e  d i s q u i e t  t o  l i b e r a l s  a n d  s e e m  t o  have  a f f i n i t i e s  w i t h  non- 
r a c i a l i s t  f a s c i s t  d o c t r i n e s .  The s u g g e s t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e s e  comments 
would al low Nietzsche t o  defend t h e  manipulat ive f o r c e  of r h e t o r i c  B' l a  
Ca l l i c l e s ,  a s  use fu l  t o  t h e  B l i t e .  I reproduce a few of them here. 
The most concentra ted  source of evidence f o r  such a 
Nietzschean power d o c t r i n e  lies i n  t h e  no tes  c o l l e c t e d  wi th in  The w i l l  
to Power under t h e  heading nDisc ip l ine  and breedingn."Nietzsche sees 
t h e  r e l a t i o n  between B l i t e  and mass a s  one of exp lo i t a t ion :  
The dwarfing of man must f o r  a long  t i m e  count  a s  t h e  on ly  goal;  
b e c a u s e  a b r o a d  f o u n d a t i o n  h a s  f i r s t  t o  b e  c r e a t e d  s o  t h a t  a 
s t r o n g e r  s p e c i e s  of man can s t a n d  upon it. (To what e x t e n t  eve ry  
s t r e n g t h e n e d  s p e c i e s  o f  man h a s  s t o o d  upon a l e v e l  o f  t h e  
! , 
What i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h i s  passage  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
a t t e m p t  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  s u p e r i o r  t y p e  o f  man by invok ing  b e n e f i t s  it 
might produce f o r  t h e  i n f e r i o r .  On t h e  contrary,  s o  f a r  a s  Nietzsche is  
.,- .- . . .. fl . . i. 
concerned'the in£ erior type - numerically, the 'vast" majority - ' f i*d$ 
i. . ' 
its justification for existing at all solely in the benefits, it can 
provide the "mastersw. 15 
... ' 




struggle of the strong to reassume their rightful place is echoed in 
Nietzschef s repeated insistence that the new masters must be hard and 
, .  . . L  ) 
have the instincts of warriors; to the weaker elements of society they 
' ,," . ,  . % 8 
will even appear as barbarians.16 In a famous passage from T h e  
". . , , z 
G e n e a l o g y  of M o r a l s  Nietzsche goes out of his way to emphasize the 
immense forces unleashed with the advent of these new barbarians: 
once'th=y go outside, where the strange,; the & r a n g e r  is' f'dund, 
they are not much better than uncaged beasts of prey. There they 
savour a freedom from all social constraints, they compensate 
themselves in the wilderness for the tension engendered by 
, , 
protr'acted confinement and enclosure within the' peace of society, 
they go b a c k  to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey, as 
triumphant *. '- monsters who perhaps emerge from a disgusting . . 
procession of murder, arson, rape, and torture, exhilarated and 
undisturbed of soul, as if it &re no more than a studentsf prank,' 
convinced they have provided the poets with a lot more material 
for song and praise.One cannot fail to see at bottom of all these 
noble races the splendid b l o n d  b e a s t  prowling about avidly in 
search of spoil and victory; this hidden ridre needs to erupt from 
time to time, the animal has to get out again and go back to the 
wilderness... 17 
,. - . (. . 
. . 
Kaufmann points out that the "blond beastw is not a racial concept, 
since Nietzsche immediately goes on to mention the Arabic and Japanese 
nobility,as examples of the type; 'the "blondnessW obviously refers to 
- .  




no resonances? The fact is that Callicles makes not only a.similar 
point about society, but actually uses the same image: . - 
W e  mould t h e  b e s t  and s t r o n g e s t  among o u r s e l v e s ,  c a t c h i n g  them 
young l i k e  l i o n  cubs ,  and by s p e l l s  and  i n c a n t a t i o n s  w e  make 
s l a v e s  of them, saying t h a t  they  must be content  with e q u a l i t y  and 
1 )  < .  . . .a. ( I  .. 
. " .  , 
t h a t  t h i i ' i s  what i s  r i g h t  and ? a i r .  But 'if a  man arises".ndbwed 
x '  - : w i t h  a  n a t u r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s t rong ,  he w i l l ,  I ' b e l i e v e ,  shake o f f  
a l l  t hese  cont ro ls ,  b u r s t  h i s  f e t t e r s ,  and break loose.  19 
L . 
. .. 
What I have been t r y i n g  t o  sugges t ,  h e r e  i s , t h e  p l a u s i b i l i t y  
. .  . *; L . , . ' , ,  . . . . 
of a  ~ i e t i s d h e a n  p o l i t i c s  t h a t  c o u l d  j u s t i f y  r h e t o r i ' c l s  p d w e r s  o f  
manipulation through t h e  r e s u l t s  t h a t  such manipulation might achieve,  
and which i n  s o  doing fo l lows  c l o s e l y  t h e  l i n e  adopted by C a l l i c l e s .  
, ,  , , , . " 
- ' C .  $ " .  " . * 
While Nietzsche could no t  be desc r ibed  a s  C a l l i c l e a n  i n  a l l  r e spec t s ,  20 
3 '  . , ,~ . 
. , 
he does appear t o  be i n  t h e  sense  t h a t  i s  c r u c i a l  f o r  de termining t h e  
. ; ,  . . - * ( ,", 
r o l e  o f  r h e t o r i c ,  i n  t h a t  h i s  s t a n d a r d  o f  v a l u a t i o n  i s  a  t h i n g ' s  
. . 
p r o p e n s i t y . t o  advance o r  t o  o b s t r u c t  t h e  would-be masters ,  and i f  t h i s  
i n v o l v e s  e x p l o i t i n g  t h e  mass, t h e n , s o  be i t - o r , r a t h e r , ~ , s o ~ ~ m u c h  . j  t h e  
better! . , ;. - 1 
There a r e  v a r i o u s  ways of  responding t o  t h i s  cha l l enge ,  b u t  
t h e  most popu la r  of them - t h e  a p p e a l  t o  "good i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  - i s  
4 : ,  . .~ ,(._ r I - - .  , , ;  
less t h a n  convincing.  For t h e  awkwa=d f a c t  i s  t h a t  l i b e r a l  Nie tzsche  
: 
s c h o l a r s  have t h e i r  p r e j u d i c e s  too, and a r e .  jbs t  as' l i k e l y  a s - t h e i r  
6 
f a n a t i c a l  oppo*Lnts t o  b e  blinded by them i n  t h e  f a c e  of c o n f l i c t i n g  
" 't 
t e x t u a l  e v i d e n c e . '  A i i s c i n a t i n g  c a u t i o n a r y  t a l e  h e r e  i k  ~ a u f i a h n ~ s  
2 .  
attempt t o  d ismiss  Nie tzschels  a l l e g e d  admirat ion f o r  Cesare Borgia on 
a .  " h l  
t h 6  s t r d n g t h  of  'a p a s a g e  f r b m ~ c c e  Homo which" s t a t e s ,  according'  t o  
t h a t  one should  look 'even f o r  a  Cesare Borgia r a t h e r  t h a n  f o r  a 
p a r s i f a l '  ( E H . , I I I  I ) .  Trans la to r s  and i n t e r p r e t e r s . h a v e  not  always 
minded t h e  e h e r  noch: 'even f o r  a  Borgia r a t h e r  t h a n  a  P a r s i f a l . '  
 his' e h e r  noch ' l e a v e s  no doebt  t h a t  Nie tzsche  c o n s i d e r e d  Cesare 
~ o r g i a " f a r  from admirable b u t  p r e f e r r e d  even him t o  t h e  P a r s i f a l  
ideal, (cf A 46,61. WM 871) .21 
~ l l  is notrwhat it seems, however. One of:.the ancillary passages which 
Kaufmann mentions, presumably to support his claim, actGiiiy states 
that . . ,  . . . , ,  
.'.. - ; ' %. . 3 .  I . 
" ' 
, I  . .  ** f-. < .  
.. , 2 
confusion went so far that one branded the very virtuosi of 
life...with the most opprobrious names. Even now one believes one 
- , - i  C . ,  
must dis~pprove' of a 'Cesare Borgia; that is. simply"laughable .22 
,- .\< " . " , - 9,. '. -. . ,- . . . r , , 
,- 1 . , - ;1 ,-. . . , - ,  
It will take conside;able exegetical skills for that'passage to"be 
. , ,  . .> . ,- I "  . ,  , 
squared with ~aufmanh's vie" 'of the matter. Worse f dllows, howevsr, 
,...., , 
because the very padsage Kaufmann .accuses' otddrs of mistralislating, he 
misquotes from the ~ermen; m he serkence acfuHlly runs: 
. . h...=..3 ,. : 2 . I , . - 
. I  , 
Wem ich ins Ohr fliisterte, er solle sich.eherVnach - einem ,Cesare 
Borgia als nach einem Parsifal umsehn, der traute seinen Ohren 
nicht .23 
. , .  , '  " .. . p  2 * ,* 
- ,  : . . l a - ,  . A - 
Translated, the passage states simply: "rather a Cesare Borgia than a 
. a . , 
Parsifal"; there is no "evenn in sight. Clearly Kaufmann is one of 
. , a  _ . .  ( .  2 
those "der traute seinen Ohren nichtn! 
-, - . , -  :;. - .  $ 
There may be other ways to give Nietzsche a more liberal 
;. :,, . 
face, and to undermine the Calliclean image of him that has so far been 
, ,. 
presented;24 but even if we "assume the worstw, there are three 
. .. 
- ,  . , 
- 1 '  - 
important reasons for rejecting a deduction from a politics of 
, ?  , 
manipulation to a manipulative rhetorical practice. 
. , 
. '  . . 
In the first place, it is highly presumptious to assume that 
for either Nietzsche or Callicles the rule of the strong automatically 
' . ,  . , 
implies the employment of deceptive, manipulative techniques. Indeed it 
may be a defining feature of this politics that it does not need such 
techniques: 
The princes of Europe should consider carefully whether they can 
do without our support. We immoralists - we are today the only 
power that needs no allies in order to =on&er: thus we 'are by far 
the strongest of the strong.,We doqnot even need to,tell lies: 
what other power can dispense with that?25 
i' : .. 
This passage is . ~ admittedly ambiguous, since it leaves open the 
possibility that while the "immoralistsw can do without deception, no 
other power can.;-This alternative in rpretation, however, suggests 
another reason for rejecting a commitment to,rhetorical~manipulation, 
$ 1  
namely that, even\if it is appropriate for politicians.to ,adopt,such 
practices, the vocation of the thinker imposes, different demands, and 
indeed requires uncompromising.frankness, After all, Nietzsche is 
forever ready to. insist.(exceptionally among philosophers) that the 
same rules of conduct cannot and should not be applied indifferently to 
all walks of life. 
One need.not~take it on Nietzschefs authority,..though, that 
.. . 
diff er&t roles imply dif ferentS'Qtrategies : so fa'r as manipulation is 
, . .. L - 
concerned, there is a structural logic involved, which might be termed 
- ,  
26 . the "paradox of propaganda". In simple terms, this means that a 
figure who advocate$ rhetorical kanipulation catkot at' the same time be 
practising it, since the first function obstructs the second: the 
practitioner of deception is lost if he tells the world what he is 
doing. Or, to put it another way: if Nietzsche is a modern Machiavelli, 
he cannot for that very reason be a Cesare Borgia. So even if he 
advocates an art of political manipulation in theory, this makes him 
less rather than more likely to be a rhetorical manipulator in 
practice. 
1. . . 
, , 
If this defence gets Nietzsche-off one hook, however, it would 'appear 
to do so only at the price of fixing him far more firmly upon another. 
 his is because the dismissal of authorial intentions cuts both.ways: 
if bad intentions do not prove Nietzsche,'guilty of rhetorical 
manipulation, it, is just as certain that good intentions -are 
insufficient grounds for pronouncing him innocent. Moreover, at the 
level of textual structures and their effects, there is a considerable 
case to answer: Nietzsche is well-known for his rhetorical excesses, 
and equally notorious for the uses to which they have been put; in two 
world wars, his worksrwere used to help justify imperialism and 
fa~cism.~' Once the shield of good intentions is removed, the fact that 
Nietzsche's works proved so easy to "exploitw inevitably leads to 
suspicions of irresponsibility and negligence in his use of language. 
I (  > 
Derrida accurately exp;esses the position: 
, , 
if one no longer considers only intent...when reading a text, then 
the law that makes the perverting simplification possible must lie 
in the structure of the text "remainingW...Even if one of the 
signatories or shareholders'in the huge "Nietzsche Corporation" 
had nothing to do with it, it cannot be.entirely fortuitous that 
the discourse bearing his name in society...has served as a 
28 legitimating reference for ideologues. 
. . 
What I aim to do in the fol10wi'n~'~a~es ' i s  to enact the project 
_ .  ( h  - 
outlined but not' undertaken by Derrida: to explore the features of 
", . , . 
~ietzsche's texts that allow the "perverting simplification" of the 
' .  L 
"ideologues" - the dangerous  elements. However, while I begin by 
identifying particular textual structures in Nietzsche and asking what 
is problematic' about them, the discussion soon becomes much broader. 
* . , \ A  ! 
For when philosophyf s warning about the abuses oi rh&o=ic remains 
a - i 
essentially unchanged from Socratesfs attack on Gorgias to the worries 
of the present day, it is clear that more than a straightforward piece 
of exegesis will be required here. 
I will turn first to a detailed consideration of Nietzschefs 
alleged rhetorical excesses: what are the features that have caused 
peace-loving philosophers disquiet, and given succour to the wild men? 
In general terms, the element in Nietzsche that has cons'istently 
, - 
aroused suspicion among philosophers and scholars is his propensity to 
crusade for various causes, to write texts that seem to be imploring, 
cajoling, sometimes even bullying their readers. Nor is this suspicion 
a modern one: it was the first response of Nietzschefs contemporaries 
to the'publication of The Birth of Tragedy in 1872. As Strong has 
noted, the work 
appeared to the academic world as the writing of a man obsessed 
with the most dubious of contemporary artistic phenomena, Richard 
Wagner, and Nietzsche was immediately cast as a man who had given 
up scholarship for propaganda. 29 
And yet Nietzsche never did anything to try to refute this hostile 
reaction, and if anything seemed to revel in the role allotted him. The 
Genealogy of Morals is actually subtitled 'cine Schreitschriftf (*a 
polemicf ) ,  indicating Nietzschef s disdain for academi= respectability. 
In most of his late work, he is seeking out enemies and picking fights 
with them; he seems never more at home than when he is in the middle of 
a battle. The suspicion is that such an approach stirs up passions 
against Nietzschefs opponents, but does nothing to further 
understanding, which - these critics would contend -.is the task of the 
genuine philosopher. Heidegger has made this point succinctly: 
Any kind of polemics fails from the outset to assume the attitude 
of thinking. The opponent's role is not the thinking role. 
Thinking is thinking only when it pursues whatever speaks for h 
subject . 
For Heidegger, this rather puts the late published works of Nietzsche 
under a cloud, as he goes on to make plain: 
... 
Nietzsche never did publish what he really thought after 
Zarathustra - something we tend to overlook. All his writings 
after Zarathustra are polemics; they are outcries. What he really 
thought became known only through the largely inadequate 
posthumous publications. 3 0 
1' :' -PI - 
Here, we have the essence of the philosophersf dislike of rhetorical 
manipulation: it strikes poses, it aims to produce effects on its 
audience. The philosopherfs true goal of saying "what he really thinks" 
is sidetracked and subverted by his desire to win victories over his 
, - 
enemies. Heideggerfs inference is plainly that rage makes blind. 
, 
To come to specifics, one can point to Nietzschefs use of 
, . 
highly emotive terms in these polemical works, which agitate the reader 
towards certain conclusions purely through their unconscious 
associations. In The Genealogy of Morals there are phrases like "the 
. : ,7. 
slave revolt in morals" and "reactive man", which are opposed by terms 
with positive connotations - "master" and **activew. In The Antichrist, 
,-. - 
too, the enemy is often attacked in a highly aggressive fashion. For 
example : 
it is Christianity ... which translates every revolution into mere 
blood and crime! Christianity is a revolt of everything that 
crawls along the ground directed against that which is elevated: 
the Gospel of the "lowly" makes low. 31 
~ u t  as'well~ as producing and vilifying enemies, .' Nietzschefs 
works resound with positive appeals to the emotions of their readers, 
7 ,.> !,f . ,r- Y>c. ' 
with dramatic slogans and pow~rful exhortations. ~ h u s  Spoke Zarathistra 
: 5 
contains many, such as the speech in which Zarathustra thunders to the 
crowd: 
, . .  i . . 
Behold, I teach you the Overman (ijbermensch) . 
, ' 
The Overman is the meaning of the earth. Let ydur will say: The 
Overman. shall be the meaning of the earth!32 
In other works;' the reader is not even'the witness of these:onslaughts, 
but -is directly apostrophized,,, as in the-much-quoted demand:' 'live 
dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your 
ships into uncharted seas!t33 . .  < , ,-. 
.'The passage just cited is particularly potent, since it not 
only produces a sense of'purpose, but directly challenges the audience 
to accept this ethic as its own. Adopting.the imperative mood is one of 
the clearest ways of seeking to direct and influence an audience; it is 
too intrusive to be easily ignored. One need only think of the power of 
~itchener'; pointing finger Gith the sloiai country needs YOU!" 
to recognize the propaganda.potentia1 of Nietzschef.s language. , , 
Nor is this all. Another technique for encouraging 
. , C ' .  
participation, to' which' ~ietzsche* frequently resorts,' is what might be 
called the "conspiratorial 'wev". Of course, the occurrence of the 
first person plural is common, even commonplace, in philosophical 
, ' 
. , . - -  
. . 
texts; but it does not often assume an important rhetorical function: 
. ~ 
it could, by and large, be substituted by "1" or "onew without altering 
I;. 
-' \ 
L I ,  "..' .. 
the text's impact. With Nietzsche, the situation is often different, 
for instance in the closing sections of The Gay Science. Here, the "wew 
( . , . * 
operates to denote a group sharing certain ideals and rejecting others; 
it is a group with a s t rong  d e f i n i t i o n ,  with c l e a r  limits. An-example: 
. 
. W e  c h i l d r e n  of t h e  f u t u r e ,  how.could w e  be  at .home i n  this,:-today? 
W e  f e e l  d i s f a v o u r  f o r  a l l  i d e a l s  t h a t  might l e a d  one t o  f e e l  a t  
:a 
, . 
3 4 home even i n  t h i s  f r a g i l e ,  brok& time df t r a r k i t i o n . .  . 
,.. p ' < .. . ,  ,,. . ,  
. . .  ,, 
.- 
., 
, I  i . e  ... . i . , . 
I*' t h i s  and i n  'many ;the'= i n s t a n c e s  t h e . ' r e a d e r  i s  b i r t u a l l y  o b l i g e d  
,.. ,, - . - , . . . 
e i t h e r  t o  a'&ept o r  r e j e c t V ' t h i s  group.  He i s  fGrced ' to  a s k  h i m s e l f :  
' *..., . . 
c o h d  I b e  a t  home i n  t h i s  ;;day? If n o t  - and a g i t a t i o n a i  ' r h e t o r i c  
always works b e s t  on t h e  d i s c o n t e n t e d  - t h e  r e a d e r  i s  encouraged t o  
. ., 
b e l i e v e  himself p a r t  of t h i s  "we", and i s  drawn towards those  who have 
understood him and h i s  needs s o  w e l l .  Nietzsche's'"weW he lps  t o  , forge a 
. . 4 
' I .  
group ' i d e n t i t y .  
One f i n a l  technique worth no t ing  i n  t h i s  context  is  
Nie tzschef  s u s e  of hyperbole ,  which of c o u r s e  r e a c h e s  i t s  z e n i t h " i n  
~ c c e  Homo. The audience is encouraged t o  b e l i e v e  ' t h a t  t h e  cause i s  not  
mere ly  worthy b u t  'of earth-;battering s i g n i f i c a n c e ;  t h e  s t a k e s  a r e  
ra ised ,  t h e  t ens ion  is  heightened: 
. . 
' a 
I know my f a t e .  One day t h e r e - w i l l  be a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  my name t h e  
r e c o l l e c t i o n  of something f r i g h t f u l  - of a cr isis  l i k e  no o t h e r  
be fo re  on e a r t h ,  of t h e  profoundes t  c o l l i s i o n  of conscience, of a 
d e c i s i o n  evoke'd a g a i n s t  e v e r y t h i n g  t h a t  u n t i l  t h e n  h a d  b e e n  
I be l i eved  i n ,  demanded, sanct i f ied . .  I am not  a man, I am 
dynamite. 35 
L. 
B U ~  even i n  t h e  e a r l i e s t  works t h e r e  i s  an immodesty e v i d e n t , . a  sense  
of uniqueness and innova t ion .  Nie tzsche  e x c i t e s  h i s  r e a d e r s  wi th  t h e  
promise t h a t  t h e y  a r e  wi tnesses  of something s p e c i a l  - something which 
cannot be ignored. . , . L 1  
,what a l l  t h e s e  techniques  have in.common is t h e i r  tendency t o  
a g i t a t e  t h e  r e a d e r ,  and  t h e *  a l l e g a t i o n ,  i s  t h a t  t h i s  r e n d e r s ' ,  them 
i r r e s p o n s i b l e  and dangerous. For whether o r  no t  Nietzsche intended-them 
t o  be used t o  forward a n y . k i n d  o f i p o l i t i c a l  o r  s o c i a l  programme, t h e y  
a r e  p e r f e c t  f o r  t h o s e  who do h a v e  s u c h  d e s i g n s .  T h e ' s l o g a n s  a n d  
e x h o r t a t i o n s  and s h e e r  ex' hberance  of N i e t  zsche, s t e x t s  have provided 
no t  only  m a t e r i a 1 , t o  be c y n i c a l l y  used, b u t  genuine i n s p i r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
twen t i e th  century 's  most f a n a t i c a l  f i g u r e s .  The l ead ing ,French  fasc is t , ' -  
Marcel DBat, was not  simply "making propagandan when he wrote t h a t  
Nietzsche's idea  of t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of  "good~Europeans~  i s  now-being 
r e a l i z e d  on t h e  b a t t l e f i e l d ,  by  the .LFV and t h e  Waifen. SS. An 
a r i s t o c r a c y ,  a  knighthood i s  b e i n g ' c r e a t e d  by t h e  war which w i l l ?  
be  t h e  hard, pure nucleus of t h e  Europe of t h e  future.36' 
I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h i s  k i n d  of  r e c e p t i o n ,  it i s  argued,  N i e t z s c h e r s  
',' . L< \, . ' " 3 
r h e t o r i c  has t o  b e  considered  a* ' e r r o r  of thste and judgement. The key 
complaint aga ins t  it is- t h a t  it is too easily used. 
. '  . c ,  
While t h i s  ' dis'cussibn' has '=oncentrated on ;ar t icular  
- . I , . ,  
structures i n  N i e t z s c h e t s  t e x t s , ' t h e y  h a v e ' b e e n  deemed p r o b l e m a t i c  
b I , . . , r  . ...,. "I- , 
because of t h e i r  a l l e g e d  effects: some a c c o u n t  'is t h e r e f o r e  ' r equ i red  'of 
. . . 
how and w h j  t h e s e  e t i e c t d  a r e  supposed t o  b e  achieved - and, i o r  t h a t  
- ,  
m a t t e r ,  how t h e y  a r e  t o  bk measured. No r e a l l y  i G i t i s f & t o r y  
. . 
. ,  . 
method e x i s t s  £6; r e s o l v i n g  t h e s e  pribiemi;37 b i t ' t h i s  is *o t  a  niajor 
. -  . . , . . . ,~, , , , . . 
obstac le ,  s i n c e  t h e  oritiiisms of t h e  a l l e g e d l y  manipulat ive r h e t o r i c a l  
..,.. . *. . . '  .. 
t e c h n i q u e s  i n  N i e t z s c h e f  s '  t e x t s  a r e  c l e a r l y  r e l i a n t - .  on c e r t a i n  
. (," * .., , , .  < > P - . ,  
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  about  what makes such l anguage  manipulat ' ive ." To put 
it i n  ' a  f  o=kula, t h e  ' fea; i s  t h a t  ~ i e t z s c h e  = & i t a t i o n  = propaganda. 
. .L  . ,. 
~ l l  t h e compla in t s  a r e  a g a i n s t  t echn iques  which' c a j o l e  br b lackmai l  
r .  
r e a d e r s  t o v a r d s  a d o p t i n g  p h r t i c u l a r  v i e w p o i n t s .  The u s e  of  emot ive  
. .  
terms a l l eged ly  " plays  on unconscious fea& ' and &ir& ' t o  di;ect 
the reader on a particular course. This may be good for producing 
action, since it holds up certain,paths as desirable and others as 
detestable, but it is surely not good for*encouraging careful-.thinking 
and reflection (so the argument goes). Such agitation belongs-.to the 
realm of politics, not philosophy; indeed, due to its widespread use 
by the Bolsheviks, a new~word has'even-come into the English language: 
agitprop. In his comments on its use by Lenin, Mae,\ and Hitler, .Ellul 
gives an indication of its revolutionary potential: , .. 
. < ' , *: , : 
~gitation propaganda...addresses itself to the interior of each 
$ , ,  I% . 
one of us, but it always translates itself into a material 
engagement in tense and overexcited activity. By being socialized 
into this activity, the inner brakes and psychological bolts on 
the individual's habits, beliefs and judgements are blown apart. 3 9 
, 
... 
. , - >  
There are two main problems with this neat analysis of 
* < 
Nietzschers texts as manipulative. The first is that we have as yet 
'r 
heard insufficient, aboutFthe alternative; how are other texts, 
especially philosophical texts, supposed to be non-manipulative? It may 
prove impossible ,to give out-a formula defining the non-manipulative; 
perhaps indeed there is no such thing as a pure, non-manipulative text? 
~f this is the case, then plainly the problem of manipulation becomes a 
quite general one,,and the attack on Nietzsche loses the force provided 
by a meaningful alternative. The* second problem is with the assumption 
that agitation implies,manipulation in all cases. It may,be that within 
a certain framework, Nietzschers polemics operate differently, and that 
the term wmanipulationn is in this case misapplied. . . , . 
Let us turn, then, to the,efforts to establish philosophy as 
"outside" manipulation. How might this be , . done? 
, h ,  
* )  * 
The most simple idea is that,the philosopher and manipulator 
, , 
are just different types. While the political figure uses language to 
direct his audience, the philosopher is essentially an explorer in 
language, unconcerned with any notion of effects; the philosopher is an 
inquirer tout court. The contrast is thus betweenfthe politician, who 
knows what he wants and is merely concerned with how to'get it, and the 
philosopher, who asks what he (and everyone else)'-should want. But this 
distinction would only be perfect if the philosopher never ended his 
inquiry and therefore never took any decisions and never reported back 
any results. Notwithstanding those critics of the vita'conternplativa 
who regard it as an excuse for inactivity, philosophers do, at least in 
part, aim to produce right action, based on sound and thorough 
refle~tion;'~ so, once the philosopher has decided what constitutes 
right action, he is presumably duty-bound to report these findings and 
seek to convince others to act in the same way. The problem he faces is 
. . 
how this report can possibly be distinguished from that of the 
propagandist, who also claims to know what is right, and advocates 
accordingly. It looks as if inquiry and propaganda need not be the 
activities of two distinct types, but may perhaps be merely two 
different stages of a Single process. . - . :  ,. , 
Still, to persist, it could,be claimed that, 'even at. the 
point of communication to an audience, the philosopher and propagandist 
are clearly distinguishable on account of their different,goals; 
philosophy, it can be argued, does not treat its'audience as :means, 
since it is concerned to work out action that is to the benefit-of all. 
 his distinguishes it from propaganda, which.has no concern'for the 
interests of its audience, and'indeed will use that audience if at all 
possible'to further the propagandist's private goals. 41 
  his amounts to saying no more than that t h e  philosopher 
comes to his audience with good intentions; A cynic might contest the 
point, but it can be accepted quite happily; it does not salvage the I 
argument. For, in the first place, good intentions arenot a'quality 
likely to make the philosopher distinguishable from the propagandist. 
As we saw when considering the case of Nietzsche, the propagandist 
would for tactical reasons clearly not reveal hi8 .intention to dupe 
people, and so it is not a difference that could in any way be read 
directly from the respective texts .'* And in any case, the propagandist 
- certainly the modern propagandist - is not likely to be motivated 
purely by self-interest, greed and opportunism. On the contrary, he is 
likely to believe fervently that his ideo10.g~ is beneficial to his 
audience. He probably believes, like the philosopher, that he has the 
best interests of the people at heart. Goebbels, for example, wrote 
that 
What matters is 'that my political perception should, like the 
artist's aesthetic one, be genuine and true, that is to say 
beneficial to society. Detail doesn't matter. Truth consists in 
what benefits my country. 43 
Is Goebbels not talking like a good philosopher here? His 
language suggests the intriguing possibility that, rather than helping 
to distinguish philosophy from propaganda, the desire to help the 
audience discover its true interests actually makes philosophy more @ 
likely to manipulate. In part, the problem is simply that the emphasis 
, . 
on "true interestsw adds a moral force to the process of argument and I 
intensifies the urge to convince. But, more importantly, it increases i 
the susceptibility of the audience. Since Plato, philosophers have 
tended to claim that they can help people discover their true 
I 
interests, and suggested that reflection may help to determine whether 
an action is right or wrong. The dialogue Euthyphro, indeed, is 
fundamentally concerned with t h e  importance o f :  justifying. ac t ions ,  and 
a s  it p r o g r e s s e s  E u t h y p h r o ' s  d o g m a t i c  a s s u r a n c e  . t h a t . h e  s h o u l d  
p r o s e c u t e  h i s  own f a t h e r  i s  brought  i n t o  doubt ;  S o c r a t e s f s  ( i r o n i c )  
comment towards t h e  end of t h e  d ia logue  c l e a r l y  s i g n a l s  t h e  educa t ive  
r o l e  p h i l o s o p h y  c a n  p l a y  i n  h e l p i n g  p e o p l e  d i s c o v e r  t h e i r  t r u e  
i n t e r e s t s  : 
I f  you d id  n o t  know p r e c i s e l y  what i s  h o l y ' a n d  unholy ,  it i s  
unthinkable  t h a t  f o r  a  s imple l a b o u r e r  you e v e r  would have moved 
t o  prosecute your aged f a t h e r  on a  charge of murder. No, you would 
have f e a r e d  t o  r i s k  t h e  wrath .of  t h e  gods on t h e  chance that- .you 
were n o t  doing r i g h t ,  and would have been a f r a i d  of t h e  t a l k  of 
4 4 men. 
While t h i s  may i n d i c a t e  Socra tes t  s "good i n t e n t i o n s " ,  it a l s o  h a s '  t h e  
e f f e c t  of  inc reas ing  t h e  p o s s i b l e  scope of manipulation: The message ' t o  
Euthyphro i s  t o  doubt  h i s  i n s t i n c t s  concern ing  how t o  behave: t h o s e  
i n s t i n c t s  must be  c e r t i f i e d  by argument. Once he' accepts  t h a t  h i s  "bes t  
i n t e r e s t s "  a r e  a  m a t t e r  of  knowledge r a t h e r  t h a n  i n s t i n c t ,  he accep t s  
t h a t  someone else may be a b l e  t o  t e l l  him whe'rebthey l i e ,  and t h e  
scope  f o r  t h e  p r o p a g a n d i s t  i s  t h e n  enormously e n l a r g e d .  A s  w e l l  a s  
s u g g e s t i n g  a c t i o n  b a s e d  on  a r g u m e n t  f r o m  p e r c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t s ,  
propaganda can sugges t  a c t i o n  based on attacking perceived i n t e r e s t s ,  
which opens up f a r  more r a d i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
But  i f  m a n i p u l a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  s t r u c t u r a l l y  r e q u i r e  s e l f -  
I . . .  
i n t e r e s t  o r  m i s c h i e v o u s  i n t e n t i o n s . o n . t h e  p a r t  o f  i t s  p r o d u c e r s ,  
n e i t h e r  d o e s  it n e c e s s a r i l y  i n v o l v e  t h e  a g i t a t i o n a l d t e c h n i q u e s  
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  Nie tzsche .  E l l u l  draws a d i s t i n c t i o n  between what he  
terms " a g i t a t i o n  propagandaw and " i n t e g r a t i o n  propagandaw. While t h e  
former  t e n d s  t o  b e  u s e d  on i l l - e d u c a t e d  peop le ,  i n  less deve loped  
c o u n t r i e s ,  and aims t o  a c t i v a t e  t h e  people,  propaganda of i n t e g r a t i o n  
aims t o  make peop le  conform and a c c e p t  what is :  it i n h i b i t s . c h a n g e ,  
r a t h e r  than encouraging it. Moreover, it i s  t h e  form par excellence of 
t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y  p ropaganda .  I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  which E l l u l  
regards a s  t h e  prime producer of i n t e g r a t i o n  propaganda, 
it i s  ev iden t  t h a t  t h i s  propaganda i s  much more s u b t l e ,  much more 
complex and nuanced than t h e  o t h e r  type  [ a g i t a t i o n  propaganda]. It 
does not  seek e x u l t a t i o n  bu t  r a t h e r  a t o t a l ,  in-depth modelling.45 
' (1: ' 
- . i '  I 
The importance of t h i s  new c a t e g o r y  of propaganda i s ' t h a t  it d i s p e l s  
t h e  n a i v e  i d e a  t h a t  l i n g u i s t i c  man ipu la t ion '  can  o n l y  o c c u r  under  a 
n a r r o w  se t  o f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  i n  which  p o s t e r s , ' p o l i t i c i a n s  o r  
newspapers scream o u t  messages of h a t e  o r  desire.  I f  t h e r e  were a 
Mas te r  P r o p a g a n d i s t ,  H e  would want u s  t o  b e l i e v e  e x a c t l y  t h a t ' , " a n d  
would  no  d o u b t  f e e d  u s  some p i e c e s  o f  s t e r e o t y p i c a l  a g i t a t i o n  
propaganda s o  t h a t  w e  could congra tu la te  ourse lves  on'how good w e  were 
. , , - . , s  
a t  r e s i s t i n g  it ! L 
The d e v i l  i s  most powerful  when'he i s  l e a s t  expected .  More 
and more, argues E l l u l ,  propaganda i s  not  emotional and i r r a t i o n a l , - b u t  
q u i e t ,  r a t i o n a l  and informative,  because modern man'does not  l i k e  being 
b u l l i e d .  H e  sums u p  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  r e l i a n c e  dn  
information p i t h i l y :  
A r e f e r e n c e  t o  f a c t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  modern  man - a s e l f -  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  which a l lows him t o  convince himself  t h a t  i n  a c t i n g  
thus  he i s  obeying reason, he is  fol lowing what i s  proven. 4 6 
' : 
. , 
One might perhaps c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h i s  tendency of modern man a s  Socra t i c .  
, 
people a r e  doing a s  Socra tes  advised Euthyphro: b e l i e v i n g  i n  something 
only once its value has been proved to them. ~ * .  " , , , .  
The key question is whether this represents an aavance .in: 
scepticism or merely an aging world's attempt to retain room for faith: 
faith in truth, in right ways of doing things.:Certainly there can be 
no doubt about Plato's Socrates: for him, scepticism is only a means; 
as an outcome, as a final result, he detests it.47 He is certain that 
there is a general truth, but he is equal1yrcertain';that'one must be 
careful and methodical if one is to find.it - that,.is<perhaps the core 
of his teaching. And, of course,the -aim'of the'philosopher must then, 
be to find that truth, so that he can'know how to'live. Along the way, 
he will come across many manipulators who either"do;not2know or-" do 'not" 
care about the truth; when this .happens; his: aim! will always" be to 
expose them. 4 8 1 i . . . , . c~ # a A  - . F a  . 
It 'would not-, be melodramatic 'to assert ,'that the : entire 
edifice of phi1osophy~s'traditiona~'pose'against propaganda' and 
manipulation rests on these optimistic ontological and'epistemological 
assumptions. If there is an essential'ontological "tr~th"of'things~~'and 
this truth of things is capable of being'known,- or' at least. 
approximated, then the exposure of propaganda.can proceed apace. "If, on 
the other hand, there are only interpretations, then the ability to 
pass off an interpretation'as a description is::one'of thesmost 
effective propaganda devices,available:;the philosopher may ultimately 
be a manipulator of a superior type! , . , ,. . . ., . 
Once one begins to look at,philosophy in this light,ithe 
suspicions rapidly multiply. For example, the widespread insistence 
among philosophers on "rigorous" and'logical debate,.which is-vaunted 
by its adherents as a symbol: of their~rectitude, could,'beh.viewed 
instead as an effective tool of.manipulation, since it helps to set its 
users above suspicion. In ancient Greece it was3common practice for 
rhetors to protest their ignorance of the artS,of speaking and bemoan 
their plainness of speech, because elaborate techniques were liable to 
arouse the audiencets suspicion. Such ploys actually -formed a 
recognized element of rhetoric: ethos, or the attempt to establish the 
speakerfs good character. 49 . 9 ,  I .  ,, 
One might even suspect, in a cynical moment, that it is 
precisely the philosopher's nlove of truthn that helps keep propaganda 
in business. Demystification always follows the same logic: "this-is 
not telling the truth, but someone, somewhere, sometime, will be 
telling it to you; perhaps, indeed, you yourself will discover it." In 
other words, it is only particular instances of alleged truth-telling 
that are criticized - the general principle is always :left 
unchallenged. More than that: it is precisely in orderrto defend that 
principle that the debunking of propaganda takes.place; it gives truth 
a bad reputation. But if the main aim were to reduce susceptibility to 
manipulation, the most effective route would be to cast suspicion on 
the very possibility of finding the truth. That way, the next'prophet 
who claims to have the answers could be met with the.simple response 
that answers are not to be found; the credulity on which propaganda 
plays would be undermined." , , 
The obvious objection to this line of argumentais that it 
amounts to a programme of complete cynicism, since it'suggests that all 
discourses are equally bad, equally manipulative, and all alike should 
therefore be disregarded. Apart from the fact that this would be an 
impossible task, is a doctrine that would equate a Kantian treatise 
with a fascist broadsheet anything other than an'absurdity? Does it not 
take suspicion to a self-destructive extreme? And does its advocacy not 
in any case involve a performative paradox, since in affirming the 
doctrine one must ignore the very text that propounds it? Above all, 
surely there is an empowering potential in,philosophy,,* such that it 
cannot be all manipulation and no education? S T  . , . 
These criticisms are serious, but they misread thertrajectory 
of my argument. There is no question here of somehow sheltering the 
addressee from all-discourse on the grounds that none of it is pure and 
honest enough: such a response would manifest the nihilism that derives 
from the deflation of ideals, whereas my aim here is. rather to 
challenge these ideals; consequently, theiperformative problem does not 
arise. This need to challenge the ideal of a~pureidiscourse iskfurther 
demonstrated by the inevitable instinct.of philosophers that only their 
work retains an educational ideal, even-if it is difficult always to 
show how it differs from the charlatans and propagandists, and even if 
it does not always attain the ideal. The real shock to the system will 
only come if the rhetorical alternative is seen .to havesits own 
"empowering potentialw; with this in mind, I want to returnsnow to 
Nietzsche, to consider afresh his "manipulationw. 5 I '  
Resources are availabletfor attempts to deny, or at least to 
modify, the claim that Nietzscher s writings are. agitational, '' but -I am 
happy not to explore these, .and instead to ask more thoroughly about 
the effects of the agitational rhetoric.. They are not as 
straightforward as was earlier suggested; other ways of looking~at the 
rhetoric lead towards very different conclusions. 1,will first give 
detailed responses to the criticisms made earlier, and then outline 
what are perhaps the fundamental clashes and contradictions between the 
two perspectives. . ,  . . . , , t 
First, consider polemics, which, as we have seen, Heidegger 
(among others) regards as obstructive to genuinethinking.-But why 
should this be? Not, surely, because thinking is the-' pure, 
indiscriminate affirmation of all things. If that were the case, it 
would be nothing but the braying'of Zarathustrars ass, which'can o n l y  
affirm.52 Presumably; 'Heideggerf s point'is that forging an attack on 
something does nothing to'further understanding, which mustVbe.the.'goal 
of thinking. Does 'one not understand something better, hexsuggests, 
when.one has looked at it, from all sides,. without the prejudice 'and 
blindness of the.opponent3 This claim should not be allowed to go 
uncontested: why must the opponent's'role imply a lack of perspicacity? 
It may be that one sees only the weaknesses of oners,opponent,'-not'his 
strengths, but this is not as a consequence'of'being in opposition, but' 
because one is a type of human'being that requires its enemies to be 
purely evil - and Nietzsche quite explicitly repudiates:this5kind of 
enmity." Contra Heidegger, it. is ' precisely the opponentr s.'role :which 
demands the most thorough understanding of "whatever speaks,for a 
subject" in order to oppose it'effectively: the -two processes are not 
in any sense contradictory. Moreover, 'there is no iron law which 
suggests that understanding a subject better means that one-will'like 
it any better (only politicians'who lose elections cling to t h i s  
claim); nor is there a converse implication that one will understand 
something better if one likes it.' Here; the.,opposite danger is present 
to'that of the opponent: namely, that one willnnot see the'weaknesses 
of one's friends. Nietzsche is just as-aware of this danger as he is'of 
the danger of slandering one's enemies, and opposes-all compl'acent 
-I - friendship ." _ ,- 
neideggerrs criticism of'polemics clearly emanates.from'some 
of the traditional prejudices concerning philosophy and the standpoint 
of the philosopher. The aim is-to lose particularity and approach Being 
by a careful'process~of listening: one might say that the best 
philosopher is the one with the biggest'ear; the one"who has'made 
h k e l f  nothing but  an ear." Given such an understanding, polemics 
will inevitably be a desecration of the process of thinking,-,which 
requires peace and quiet-?rather than shouting. But what if Being is 
silent, and the sounds the philosopher hears emanate from inside? If 
that is the case, then the relative propaganda,values of "neutraln and 
polemical prose change radi~ally:~the.~neutral" work will then, just as 
much as the polemic, be the:expression of,a philosopher's "for and 
against", only with the critical difference that it no longer presents 
itself as such. This sublimated expression of.interests is still 
implicitly in conflict with rival versions, but it either refuses to 
recognize the alternatives altogether or, like Hegel,. recognizes them 
only as subsumed within a more complete understanding: conflict is 
either denied or resolved. By contrast,~the visibility oflthe opponent 
within polemics implicitly rejects the possibility of a value-neutral 
truth-telling or truth-hearing exercise. In The Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche even points out directly that Hesiod divided the same epoch 
into two, wsilverw and "bronzew, as the only way of expressing the 
incompatibility of meaning experienced by oppressors and oppressed 
within that epoch .56 . j - t > ,  
The other criticisms of:Nietzsche~s-wmanipulativew,writing 
can be challenged along similar lines. Just as po1emic"makes blatant 
the fact that philosophical texts.exist within and as part of various 
struggles and conflicts, so,the other features mentioned make blatant 
the intervention of the author in ways normally considered beneath the 
dignity of philosophy. It is suggested that these devices may-pressgang 
the reader into blind acceptance of the Nietzschean message; the reader 
may be overwhelmed.by*the prophetic tones and injunctions, the 
conspiratorial "weu, and by the assurances that both the work and its 
author are of world-historical. importance. But is this really so 
certain? . . , . k 
It is true that agitation propaganda needs to attempt to 
involve the addressee, and to convince'him/her-that the cause is 
important. Buta,the usual'appealV'in such cases is t o  accepted 
commonplaces, whereas in Nietzschefs case the appeal is'to the authorfs 
own authority. And doesnft this reflexive appeal actually undermine the 
propaganda value by causing the addressee to'speculate.about..its 
nature? In contrast to the Kitchener poster, which appeals in,the name 
of patriotism and military'authority, Nietzsche-appeals only in his own 
name. And who is he? Any reader with the merest sprinkling of 
scepticism will surely ask'this question, and thus come to question and 
perhaps doubt the,status of the "messagesw contained within-the texts. 
And of course, this is precisely the opposite to the requirements of 
propaganda, which above all else needs to preserve respect for.its 
status in order to function effectively. Seen"in these lterms, Ecce'Homo 
is an astoundingly unegotistical work of philosophy; since it.almost 
completely lacks the mechanisms to control and compel. asse*t, without 
which a philosopher feels naked in front of his readers. One of,the 
most effective of these mechanisms is, of course, to'create the 
impression that nobody',at all i s  speaking: that way, therreader 'is 
encouraged to concentrate exclusively on the "messagew and to treat it 
with respect as emanating.from the vaults of reason rather than from 
some living, desiring, idiosyncratic human organism (as is actually,the 
case). Nietzschefs self-advertising detracts from this cust.omary 
respect; indeed, through its sheerbassertiveness, the text,disqualifies 
itself from all claims to have the right to be heard. : - ,  
These points lead towards the general idea that what matters, 
from the point of view of manipulation, is whether the text.produces a 
series of predictable, automatic responses, or whether it surprises and 
provokes the addressee. Clearly, however, this depends not only on what 
is in the text, but also on the ch;racte='diWthe addresse, whichis 
inevitably variable and unpredictable. It is remarkable how crudely 
philosophers have tended to deal with the whole question of "effects": 
the guiding assumption of much of the critique of Nietzschets emotive 
writing, for example, is that there is a simple-.cause-effect 
relationship involved; but, granting that the addressee is agitated or 
"set in motion", is that necessarily an indication of~manipulation? 
Certainly, if emotive writing were like a doctor's hammer, producing 
reflex responses when applied to the correct part of the body,-'then one 
would be quite justified in making 3uch.a claim; and this crude model 
is the one most post-Platonic philosophers have quite happily accepted. 
They give the impression that once the emotions are aroused judgement 
disappears completely, and human beings become hyperactive automata 
until the passion has passed. But isnrt.this just onerrnore aspect of 
the very old prejudice splitting the "animal" (physical/passionate) 
part of homo sapiens from the "fully humanw (rational) side?" 
My suggestion is that the provocation of the "animal". 
passions can, under the right circumstances, produce more intense 
reflection than straightforward cerebral 'writing. Nietzsche's writing 
is full of agitation that runs,"against the grainw, against what in our 
tradition are deep-set prejudices, and from the point of view of 
manipulation, this,is highly significant. Successful propaganda, in 
order to have something on which-to bite, has to be preceded by a 
process of "softening up", which will proceed slowly and steadily over 
a number of years, conditioning individuals to respond positively,to 
certain stimuli and negatively to others. There are many words for this 
process; "moral educationw is certainly not the least appropriate. 
~llul terms it "sub-propagandaw, and comments that 
it has as its goal to mobilize individuals in the etymological 
sense, that is t o  say to make them mobile, t o  make them 
mobilizable, so that they can be pressed into action at the 
appropriate moment. 5 8 ' -_. . 
NOW while agitational writing clearly can be what mobilizes, it is hard 
to believe this.in Nietzschefs case, since he"tends to praise what-sub- 
propaganda would suggest be condemned, and fights against causes,and 
values that are victorious, or at least in the a~cendenc~.~' Thus the 
controversial passage from The Genealogy of Morals cited above6' 
appeals against deep-seated, commonplace assumptions, not in their 
name. Negative values are given to: "justicew, "concordw, "humanew, 
"righteous", and "peacew, while positive values are given to "war", 
. , 
. , '  4 .  . 
wslavery'", "deist of prey"," "arson", "rapew and  torture", 'among 
others. Surely this will only act as propaganda for the "blond beastw 
on those who have already made this inversion of-values? For the .rest, 
. . - .. 
it brings into queition values which' thby may have thought 
unchallengeable, and this increases the obstacles facing "activew 
propaganda. For to be effective, it will no longer be sufficient merely 
to label someone or something as "unjustw or "evilw. These terms will 
no longer produce automatic reflex-responses, because Nietzsche-,raises 
the doubt: what is wrong with being "unjustw or "evil"? In other words, 
his agitation can be seen as striking against the structures supporting 
propaganda, rather than itself being-propaganda. 
-1 -. / - , .  
What this amounts to is a response to manipulation very 
* ,  
different from that advocated by Socrates in the Gorgias. For Socrates, 
the problem was that 
' >  . ;  . '  
. .  - t' 
, , 
? 
the rhetor...does not teach courts and other bodies about right 
- .  
and wrong - he merely persuades them; he cokld ha;dly teach so 
large a number of people matters.of such-importance in a short 
 he implicit judgement,is that, given more time, in private, such a 
moral education would be possible. Rhetoric' and education-are-presented 
as contrasting methods for overcoming doubt and uncertainty on a 
matter; and.since.education produces conviction and knowledge, .while 
rhetoric merely..produces conviction,: the ,former .is clearly tosbe 
preferred. Socrates's key assumption is that the manipulator's 
enchantment will be ineffective against an enlightened audience, and so 
this kind of knowledge-producing education will provide an antidote to 




, ; . .. 
. . , . - 4  . , , 
Socrates:,A-rhetor will be more persuasive than a doctor 
regarding health? . .  
.~ . - '. : ' i , . 
Gorgias: Yes, I said so, before a crowd. 
Socrates: And before a crowd means among the ignorant, for 
surely, among those who know, he will not be more convincing than 
the doctor? - . .- . I.I .. ,+ . ; -, ,. ‘. . ;? ! 
Gorgias: That is quite true. 62 
- _  : *. . * *  ; ;  
~~" 
. . . .  . 
. L ,  r a . . , ' ~. 
: ' F  . 
Is a moral education the answer, or merely part of the 
problem? 1fbpropaganda.i~ conceived as "distortion of the truthmm, then 
the antidote to it will be to find and disseminate the truth; but if 
,- ,,. . . , , s, 
there is no "truthw, then all attempts to claim otherwise will 
themselves be exercises in propaganda, or at least in sub-propaganda - 
disseminating the values on which propaganda plays. According to the 
> .  
latter view, the only way in which education , can . counter propaganda is 
by bringing into question fundamental values, not trying to establish " .  
them. This means, of course, that there can be no ultimate bulwarks 
'. . i  .- . . 
against propaganda, only a series of shifting strategies,; because as 
9 ' t  
soon as anything is assigned a fixed and certain value, it is a 
potential resource for manipulation. Against Socrates: the, fundamental 
requirement of an audience for it to,be manipulated is not,that'it be 
ignorant but that it be unsuspecting. 
There is in fact good reason to believe that Gorgias - the 
. , * . .  
historical figure - was unlikely to agr&, as '~l=to ventriiotquizes him 
, < 
to, with the Socratic suggestion that the answer to the problem of 
manipulation is a sound moral education. His acquiescence is not even 
h., 
consistent with Platots characterization 'bf him in another dialogue, 
the Meno: 
, - . . . .  . - Z' " . ,, . . 
Socrates: And what about the Sophists,'the-only people who 
profess to teach it [virtue]? Do you think they do? , .  ;. ., , ,& 
Meno: The thing I particularly admire about Gorgias, 
,. - , . .~ ., 
Socrates, is that you will never hear him make this claim; indeed, 
he laughs at the others when he hears them do so. 1n.his.view his 
63 job is to make clever speakers. , ,  , , b  . , : . . .. . - 
- i , ' -,.  I ..A I L- - ~ 
' . . !  / 
And it is this latter version which fits with the epistemological 
pessimism of Gorgiasrs treatise On Non-Being or on Nature, which makes 
* .  
the threefold claim * , < * . .  , , - , I  . i- , 
. . ' 9  :' . ,. ' : , ,I-% P ( .  
firstly, that nothing exists; secondly, that even if anything 
' . ,  
exists ' it is ' inapprehensible" by man;' thirdly, that even if 
anything is apprehensible, yet it is certainly inexpressible ,*and 
incommunicable to one's neighbour. 64 
* I 
~ .. J 
~t is hard to see how the author of such..a doctrine could glibly agree 
to teach his pupils virtue, Should they come to him in ignorance of it. 
untersteiner has argued that Gorgiast s ontological- 
epistemological comments are only-one part of an,.attitude to existence 
which also embraces rhetoric. 65 The key element in-, this - utterly alien 
t o  t h e p l a t o n i c  t r a d i t i o n . -  i s ' t h e . i d e a  t h a t  t h e r e  can  b e  a , p o s i t i v e  
value a t t ached  t o  deception ( a p a t e ) .  For,example, Gorgias s u g g e s t s . t h a t  
t ragedy . , . -., . , . , . + .  ,*. .:-. 
r. . , . . ,, '; " 
with i t s  myths and,emotions has  c r e a t e d  a decep t ion  s u c h . t h a t e i t s  
success fu l  p r a c t i t i o n e r  i s  n e a r e r  t o  r e a l i t y  than t h e  
unsuccessful ,  and t h e  man who lets himself  be ded=ived i s  w i > t i r  
than  he who does not . . . for  anyone not  l ack ing .  sin s e n s i b i l i t y  
allows himself t o  be won by. t h e  p leasure  of words .66 
... . ' 
. .. 5 ". .,, . - .  ,- ' - .- 
, , 
There i s  no promise t h a t ,  t h e  audience i ~ ~ p n d e c e i v e d ,  because according 
,, * 
t o  t h e  ontology of Gorgias a b s o l u t e  t r u t h  r e s i d e s  on ly  i n  t h e  p e r f e c t  
oppos i t ion  of a l l  t h i n g s .  Thus t h e  on ly  t r u l y  r a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y ~ . w o u l d  
be t o t a l  non-act ivi ty;  indeed, no t  even t h a t ,  s i n c e  even doing nothing 
invo lves  a choosing of one side of an . ,oppos i t ion  over  a n 0 t h e r . a n d . i ~  
t h u s  i r r a t i o n a l .  There i s  no op t ion  a v a i l a b l e  of a  " r a t i o n a l  dec i s ionw 
- t h o s e  who b e l i e v e  o the rwise  a r e  s e e i n g  a S o c r a t i c  mirage. Knowledge 
and a c t i o n  a r e  i r r econc i l ab ly  opposed. 67 . , . .  
. . .~ . 
. - 
Thus t h e  preparedness of t h e  r h e t o r s  t o  speak on e i t h e r ,  s i d e  
of an argument - desp i sed  by S o c r a t e s  a s  a  s i g n  both  of  ignorance and 
immorality - can be seen a s  a  n a t u r a l  development from t h i s  p e s s i m i s t i c  
.,, , . .  
ontology, r a t h e r  than  an , inherent  opportunism. There is  a need f o r  t h e  
c o n s c i o u s  d e c e p t i o n  of r h e t o r i c ,  f o r  w i t h o u t  i t  t h e  p a r a l y s i s  of  
knowledge i n h i b i t s  a c t i o n .  Against  t h e  S o c r a t i c  n o t i o n  t h a t  r h e t o r i c  
r e q u i r e s  i g n o r a n c e  t h e r e  r u n s  t h e  c o u n t e r  t h a t  t h e  t r u l y  wise 
a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  va lue  of r h e t o r i c .  Such an ,argument  does no t  appear i n  
plate; b u t  t h e n  h i s  t a s k  i s , t o  make h i s  o p p o n e n t s  p l a u s i b l e ,  n o t  
convincing. 
, , .  
The o t h e r  s u r p r i s i n g  absence i n  t h e  Gorgias i s  t h e  lack of 
. , , ,  
any sense  o f , t h e  f a l l i b i l i t y  of t h e  r h e t o r .  There a r e , . a f t e r  a l l ,  two 
obvious reasons why he cannot simply impose his will as a tyrant might, 
so that the dialogue's persistent analogies-between the two are highly 
misleading. In the first place, no threat of violence emanates-from 
the rhetor. If his speech is to work, it must win the voluntary assent 
of its addressee, and  there^ is nothing to prevent this being 
withheld. Ellul has pointed out.this feature with respect-ito modern 
propaganda: it is not possible for an individual 'simply to be directed 
from above through the medium of language. He is not a,passive'victim, 
since he must in some sense desire the message' he is being~given, 'or 
else it could not affect 'him." Effective rhetoria cannot ,be 'the 
imposition of something totally alien; at the maximum; it can allow'one 
drive to dominate (for a while at least) the- others. It can alter the 
* .  
. P balance of forces; nothing more. 
But the rhetor's ability to do 'as he wills is also inhibited 
by the likelihood that he will be pitted'against'an opponent. This is 
clearly the case 'in law-courts and the (democratic) political arena, 
the two most common rhetorical stages, ,and'is perfectly compatible with 
Gorgias's pessimistic ontology. When one'understands the universe as a 
scene of conflicting forces; there can be no grounds for denying the 
opposition the chance to present its case: in marked contrast,' Plato 
insists that.there is only-one way, the task being to find-it. * -  
< . , . -  
~t would be a mistake to conclude from this discussion that Nietzsche's 
texts have somehow "solvedvv the problem of manipulation, and the idea 
,. . ' ,  ~ < .a'., 4. - $ 
that pol.kics might provide some kind of model for a "healthyw, no*- 
: ,  ,. . '  
manipulative communication is quite untenable. Communication is a 
relational activity, 'and as such there can be no models to allocate 
' . t . : ~ ,  ..% , . - 
, * 3  - :  " heroes and v i l l a i n s  t o  t h e i r  r o l e s  i n  advance. 
' -e -. -. 
1t is  no t  even a  case  of arguing t h a t - N i e t z s c h e t , s  t e x t s  a r e ,  
c o n t r a r y  t o  a l l  expec ta t ion ,  of educa t ive ,  ratherlthan,manipulative 
1 q *  7 ? " , ,  
', 5 
na tu re ,  f o r  nothing i s  "educat ive  i n  i t s e l f w .  To specu la te :  it may be 
t h a t  e d u c a t i o n  has  two c o n t r a s t i n g  s i d e s  t o  it, each wi th  a t t e n d a n t  
d a n g e r s .  One s ide  i s  t h e  l e a r n i n g  of  t ' h e  l a i g d a g e ,  c i n v e h t i o n i ,  
* . v , . * _ 
t r a d i t i o n s ,  knowledge and wisdom t h a t  a  ' c i v i l i z a t i o n  has developed over 
. + , . -. 3. 
c e n t u r i e s ,  perhaps mi l l en ia ;  a l s o  t h e  methods f o r  pro&resii '*g'  f u r t h e r .  
- ~. 
It t e a c h e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  how . t o  become s r e s p o n s i b l e '  c i t i z e n .   he 
_t / 
o t h e r  s i d e  i s  i n  c o n f l i c t  wi th  t h i s ,  f o r  it i k  t h e  development of a& 
. ... 
" i n t e r n a l  oppos i t ion" ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n i n g ,  ' doub t ing  and c h a l l e n g i n g  ' o f  
, * 
e v e r y t h i n g  a p p a r e n t l y  c e r t a i n  and e s t a b i i s h e d ;  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  on t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r i g h t  t o  t r a v e l  i n  a  different d i r e c t i o n .  I t  gikes t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  a  c u t t i n g  edge, e s t a b l i s h e s  it p a '  i n d i v i d u a l ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
merely  a  " p a r t  of s o c i e t y " .  The p o t e n t i a l  dangers  of  t h e  f i r s t  t y p e  
' +  
a r e :  i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  and s t u l t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  ind iv idua l ;  complacency 
, . 
and s t e r i l i t y  of  a  s o c i e t y .  The p o t e n t i a l  dangers  of  t h e  second t y p e  
a r e :  i s o l a t i o n  and r e c k l e s s n e s s  on t h e  p a r t  of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ;  chaos 
, , 
and c o n f l i c t  a t  t h e  soci61 l e v e l .  ' ' ,' 
Nie tzsche  h imse l f  was h o t  dogmaticb1concerning"'the ba1an;e 
between t h e s e  t u b  forms of e d u c a t i o n :  t h e  needs  bo th  of  s o c i e t y  and 
, . 
i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  change f rom epoch  t o  epoch,  and  i n  any c a s e  e a c h  
"educa to r"  w i l l  v iew t h e  t e r r a i n  d i f f e r e n t l y .  ~ o t w i t h s t a n d i ' n ~  h i s  
g e n e r a l  h a t r e d  of t h e  S o c r a t i c  tendency, he i s  prepared  t o  accept  t h a t  
it answered a  r e a l  need a t  t h e  th=: 
. , 
Shrewdness, c l a r i t y ,  s e v e r i t y  and l o g i c a l i t y  a s  weapons a g a i n s t  
t h e  f e r o c i t y  of t h e  d r i v e s .  These,must  be  dangerous and t h r e a t e n  
d e s t r u c t i o n :  o t h e r w i s e  t h e r e  would b e  no s e n s e  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  
.,1' . , 
shrewdness  t o  t h e  p o i n t  o f  making it i n t o  a t y r a n t .  To mak'e a  
t y r a n t  of shrewdness:-but f o r  t h a t  t h e  d r i v e s  must be t y r a n t s .  I n  
t h o s e  days it was a ve ry  t ime ly  problem. Reason became = v i r t u e  = 
happiness. .  .To be reasonable  o r  p e r i s h  was t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  be fo re  
which t h e y  a l l  s t o o d .  The mora l i sm of  t h e  G r e e k . p h i l o s o p h e r s  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  they  f e l t  themselves . t o  be i n  danger .69 
F ' , . 
BY way of c o n t r a s t ,  he  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i n  h i s  own epoch t h e  d r i v e s  had 
become g r e a q y - ,  weakened a n d  a t t e n u a t e d .  I n s t e a d  o f  p o w e r f u l  
i n s t i n c t s  producing a t h r e a t  bo th  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  and s o c i e t y ,  through 
r a s h  a c t i v i t y ,  he diagnosed a p e r v a s i v e  f e a r - o f  a c t i o n ,  a d i s l i k e  of 
a n y t h i n g  n o t  f i r s t  s a n c t i o n e d  b y  o n e ' s  p e e r s .  Under  t h e s e  
circumstances,  N i e t z s c h e t s  r h e t o r i c a l  shock t a c t i c s  might be  t h e  on ly  
way o f  s h a k i n g  a d d r e s s e e s  o u t  o f  a t e r r i b l e  c a u t i o n ,  o u t  o f  t h e  
expec ta t ion  t h a t  t h e i r  t e a c h e r  w i l l . " t a l k  sensew t o  them and t e l l  them 
what t o  do, o r  a t  l e a s t  how t o  'decide.  I £  t h e  addressee  i s  ext remely  
pass ive ,  on ly  an i r r e s p o n s i b l e  t e a c h e r  i s  l i k e l y ? t o  induce him t o  ask  
h i s  own ques t ions  and thence perhaps f i n d  h i s  own answers. 
The c o m p l a i n t  t h a t  ~ i e t z s c h e ~ s  a g i t a t i o n a l  r h e t o r i c  i s  
i r r e s p o n s i b l e  i s  t h e r e f o r e  c o r r e c t ,  bu t  un in te res t ing .  I t  amounts t o  no 
more t h a n  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  Nie tzsche  does no t  f u l f i l  a r o l e  t o  which 
he never a s p i r e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p lace .  What t h i s  chap te r  has been about,  
' .  
i n  shor t ,  i s  t o  agree  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  g r e a t  dangers involved i n  t h e  way 
Nietzsche writes, bu t  t o  emphasize t h a t  t h e  a g i t a t i o n a l  r h e t o r i c  cannot 
somehow b e  d e t a c h e d  from h i s  " r e a l  t h i n k i n g w ,  and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
magic formula f o r  t h e  w r i t i n g  of philosophy which i s  c o r r e c t  from a l l  
perspect ives .  Texts  t h a t  cannot be "usedm1 i n  any way, and which do not  
conf ron t  t h e  reader ,  a r e  b e t t e r  f o r  purposes of i n s t r u c t i o n ;  b u t  t h i s  
i s  not  t h e  only educat ional  value.  
The dark  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  conjured up by Nietzsche d i s t u r b  those  
t h e y  d o  n o t  d e l i g h t :  t h e  q u e s t i o n  t h e n  i s  t h e  r e s p o n s e  t o  this 
dis turbance .  H i s  well-meaning defenders c l a im he did not  r e a l l y  i n t e n d  
t o  d i s t u r b  anyone; h i s  e q u a l l y  well-meaning c r i t i c s  d e c l a r e  t h a t  he  
d id ,  and censure him f o r  it, because phi losophers  have a du ty  t o  t h i n k  
of t h e  consequences of t h e i r  wr i t ings .  There i s  no p o i n t  going f u r t h e r  
i n t o  t h i s  claim: a t  any r a t e ,  they  h a v e + , t o l d  us  what k ind  of educat ion  
t h e y  p r e f e r ,  and consequent ly  t h e  s o r t  of r i s k s  t h e y  f i n d  accep tab le .  
It can hardly  be p u t t i n g  words i n t o  t h e i r  mouths t o  say  t h a t . t h e y  would 
r a t h e r  be  r i g h t  t h a n  b e  s t i m u l a t i n g ;  one need o n l y  f l i c k  through t h e  
l a t e s t  volume of any journal  of philosophy t o  s e e  how many subscr ibe  t o  
t h i s  o r d e r  of va lues!  Nobody shou ld  doubt  t h e  profound contempt wi th  
which Nietzsche regarded such a s e t  of p r i o r i t i e s :  
. ' .  . '  : , I  
it is of course  c l e a r  why our  academic t h i n k e r s  a r e  not  dangerous;, 
f o r  t h e i r  thoughts  grow a s  peace fu l ly  out  of t r a d i t i o n  a s  any tree 
e v e r  b o r e  i t s  a p p l e s :  t h e y  c a u s e  no' a larm,  t h e y  remove n o t h i n g  
from i ts  hinges; and of a l l  t h e i r  a r t  and aims t h e r e  could be s a i d  
what Diogenes  s a i d  when someone p r a i s e d  a p h i l o s o p h e r  i n  h i s  
p resence :  "How can  he  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  g r e a t ,  s i n c e  he h a s  been a 
philosopher f o r  s o  long and has never y e t  disturbed anybody?*170 
wi th  r h e t o r i c ,  t h e  va lue  of "disturbance" goes' a l l  t h e  way 'down: it' i s  
n o t  a m a t t e r  of  i n i t i a t i n g  con t roversy  i n  o r d e r  t o  reach a pr&$under 
consensus,  b u t  of v a l u i n g  t h e  s t r u g g l e  between r i v a l  p e r s p e c t i v e s  i n  
i t s e l f ;  t o  a r g u e  on b o t h  s i d e s  i s  a n  h o n o u r a b l e ,  ' n o t  'a c y n i c a l  
u n d e r t a k i n g .  And s o  if r h e t o r i c  is ,  a s  I have  s u g g e s t e d ,  ' a  r i v a l  
e d u c a t i o n a l  f o r c e ,  t h e n  t h a t  r i v a l r y  i s  abou t  n o t  o n l y  t h e  means o f  
. , 
e d u c a t i n g  b u t  a l s o  and above a l l  t h e  g o a l s  of  t h a t  e d u c a t i o n  - t h e  
people and s o c i e t y  it wants t o  h e l p  shape. 
saas&sZhrae . '  - " 
-. . , 
. ., ,. . . . . 8, % .  . . 
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I, 
To raise the question of pragmatism with respect,to Nietzsche and 
rhetoric is, to say the least, something of'a puzzle. In each of the 
other chapters we take suspicions +that already exist and subject"them 
to a critical re-examination: to the extent thatlthere is a method 
guiding the project . as a, whole, that is. it,. Here, however, the 
connections are for once not.obvious. In-everyday use, rhetoric,is a 
way of making one's ideas more appealing, whereas "pragmatismw denotes 
a particular way of lookingt-at the world. It. is therefore quite 
possible to contrast the two, for example in the political c14ch6: 
"wetre hearing a lot of impressive.rhetoric,:but-the Government. isn't 
actually doing anything..." Moreover; the prospects look scarcely more 
promising for connecting Nietzsche with pragmatism. Although some 
commentators have attributed to him a pragmatist theory of truth,' it 
seems highly implausible that.the8prophet of Zarathustra could be a 
pragmatist in any more general sense: Can these initial impressions be 
overturned? Can it be'shown that Nietzsche and rhetoric are pragmatic? 
As we shall see, pragmatism is central to the historical 
struggle between philosophy and rhetoric, since it lies behind all the 
teaching methods and educational goals that differentiate rhetoric from 
philosophy; but because there is no obvious link between Nietzsche and 
pragmatism it will no doubt be suspected that the general theme of 
wNietzsche and rhetoricw breaks*down,here. However, while it is 
certainly true that Nietzsche displays a fierce hostility to many 
aspects of pragmatism,' I'shall argue that on the crucial'points he is.a 
 ragm ma ti st, and for theifirst.time presents pragmatism as a nobler 
alternative to the qphilosophical- ideal-of contemplation. of course, 
talk of divergent senses of pragmatism inevitably sounds like the old 
dialecticianr s trick: when 1 in ,trouble, change +the wordt s . meaning. f -  But 
the etymological root.-of thepterm -.the,Greek pragmata ("actionsw or 
"deedsw) - leaves-great scope--for interpretation,,,and it.would-be 
unhelpfully restrictive-to pick one of the.narrower,meanings and 
implant that as the definition.:When I use.the term "pragmatismw-I 
therefore take it to mean simply "belief in the overriding importance 
of action", which covers all the nuances considered here. To avoid 
confusion, the subordinate meanings gathered under this definition-,are 
then clearly distinguished as I proceed, and the differences.between 
them, ~farsfrom-being covered up, ,aret.the, prime concern in the 
concluding stages of the chapter. 
It is worth emphasizing-at the outset what this prospectus 
has perhaps in a small way already helped to indicate: that the main 
concern of this chapter will-not be to establish that pragmatism-= 
Nietzsche = rhetoric, which in,itSelf is ,an insignificant matter, but 
to.use this triad to-ask new questions about the relationship between 
philosophical contemplation and practical life. 
- 
. I ..?' . *** , 
Whatever the final course of the discussion, the first task must be to 
s .  , 
re-establish the connection between rhetoric 'and which has 
just been put in question; it is no more than a re-establishment. The 
two have been disconnected because of the modern tendency to reduce 
rhetoric to the expressive use of lan&aget2 and as soon as one begins 
. , , . 
to explore the role of rhetoric in the ancient world, the importance of 
 ragm mat ism becomes transparent. The reason why this should concern us 
is that it is fundamental to the dispute between philosophers-and 
rhetorsvin-one key area: their rivalry as educators. At the end of the 
previous chapter'it was suggested that a difference in educational 
functions - rather,than a contrast between "propaganda" and "truth" - 
could account for the more polemical tone of rhetorical discourse; But 
even in their acknowledged rolesas educators, the rhetors were harried 
and criticized by Socrates and Plato; it is appropriate at this point 
to consider why. 
" A  dispute over education , may sound like a .  fairly 
insignificant matter to modern ears, accustomed as they are to an 
educational debate that rarely questions beyond how-to achieve more 
examination passes. But in the fifth and fourth centuries at least, the 
argument transcended technicalities (although it did not ignore them), 
because the rival programmes and methods of education were inextricably 
tied to more general ideas about the nature of society and the educated 
individual's relationship to it. Disputes concerning quantity and 
quality did not occur in an ideological vacuum, as is all too often.the 
case today, but,were governed by the fundamental.question: what is 
educati on for? , , 
An education in rhetoric was primarily for a new social and 
political situation that had arisen in Athens, as the historian Henri 
Marrou explains: 
The problem that faced the Sophists, and which they succeeded in 
solving, was...how to produce capable Statesmen. In their time 
that had become a matter of the utmost urgency. After the collapse 
of tyranny in the sixth century most of the Greek cities, and 
democratic Athens in particular, developed an intensely active 
political life; and exercise of power, the management of affairs, 
' 
became the essential concern.. .in the eyes of every  reek, the 
ultimate aim of his ambiti~n.~ 
For all the9differences in detail between the Sophists, they shared 
this,common educational ideal or paideia:'  the purpose of education 
was to equip the individual for a leading role in politics and civic 
life.  his thoroughly pragmatic concern is in marked contrast to 
Socrates and Plato, whose pa ide ia  can be described in general terms as 
the discovery of the true and good life for man. 
While pragmatism was crucial to the educational disputes 
between Socrates and the Sophists in the fifth century, its importance 
is perhaps most clearly visible in three concrete distinctions between 
the rival schools established by Plato and 1socratesS in the fourth 
century. The first is that Plato's education l a s t e d  longer .  It took the 
teaching of abstruse subjects such as mathematics and astronomy far 
more seriously; although they were not excluded from Isocratesfs 
syllabus, their importance for the practical man was naturally strictly 
limited. It is notvsimply.that Plato was "more thorough" - he had a 
d i f f e r e n t  g o a l .  The programme described in the Repub l i c  could quite 
literally last a lifetime: acquiring knowledge was an,end in,itself, 
rather than simply the preparation for a "life outsidevv. The second 
obvious divergence concerns Isocrates's heavy emphasis on practice 
w i t h i n  the educational framework, which had no equivalent in Plato. 
Students of rhetoric were taught-only a few guiding principles before 
they were encouraged to start composing and practising speeches of 
their own. Such a flexible and undogmatic approach was not universal 
among the r h e t o r s  - Gorgias, who was well-known for his immensely 
technical training in rhetoric, offers an obvious. contrast. 6 
 onet the less, it can be considered a natural element' of'an education 
designed to help students to deal with unpredictable events in public 
life; the philosophical quest for pure knowledge did not impose any 
equivalent,requirement for a practical element in education. Plato 
c l e a r l y  r ega rds  t h i s  stress on p r a c t i c e  and exper ience  a s - a  weakness, 
s i n c e  he has Socra tes  d e f i n e  t h e  r h e t o r i c  t augh t  by Gorgias a s  'a s o r t  
of knack gained by exper ience  (empeir ia)  ,'- which i s  c o n t r a s t e d  wi th  
t h i n g s  done  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a  t e c h n e  - a r t  o r  r e g u l a r  method.  The 
complaint is  more a p p r o p r i a t e l y  addressed t o  I s o c r a t e s  than  to -Gorg ias  
and  h i s  p u p i l s ;  it seems l i k e l y - t h a t  p l a t 0  sen$ed  a  d e f e c t  i n  - h i s  
contemporary's e d u c a t i o n a l  system and v e n t r i l o q u i z e d  Socra tes  t o  make 
. * 
. . '  - 
t h e  charge aga ins t  another  s o p h i s t .  
' ,  , 
The f i n a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  *between ' the two schools  is '  t h e '  h o s t  
dec i s ive .  Each t augh t  both  r h e t o r i c  and ' d i a l e c t i c s ,  bu t  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  
o r d e r '  and wi th  d i f f e r e n t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s .  P l a t o  p l a c e d  r h e t o r i c  below 
d i a l e c t i c s ,  claiming th& a t r u e  a r t '  of speech requ i red  more than  t h e  
m a n i p u l a t i v e  t r i c k s  b e l o v e d  of the '  teach 'ers '  o f  r h e t o r i c ;  i tT '*eeded  
k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  t r u t h ,  w h i c h  o i l y  d i d l e b t i c s  w a s  c a p a b l e  ok  
a t t a i n i n g . '  I s o c r a t e s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  r e g a r d e d  d i a l e 6 t i c s  .'as' 
e s s e n t i a l l y  t r i v i a l ,  and u s e f u i  o n l y  a s  a  t & i n i n g  ' i n  a"rgumentative 
d e x t e r i t y .  F o r  him, t h e  p i n n a c l e  o f  t h e  e d u c a t i v e  p r o c e s s  w a s  t o  
acqu i re  t h e  s k i l l s  of eloquent  speech' and  wri t ing,  t h e r e b y  t o  in f luence  
one ' s  p e e r s .   ere; y e t  a g a i n ,  ths c o n f l i c t  between t h e  i d e a l i s t i d  
philosophical  and' t h e  rhat&idai  pa id& pfroduced ' a  condre te  
, 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between'' t h e i r  r ep resen ta t ive  i r k t i t u t i o n s .  ' 
 his is only  t h e  b a r e s t  o u t l i n e  of t h e  r i v a l  approaches, 
which s e r v e s  a s  an  i n t r o d u c t i o n  'ti t h e  e v a l u a t i v e  ques t ions  wi th  which 
t h e  remainder of t h e  - chap te r  i s  occupied. perhaps, given t h e  n a t u r e  ' of 
t h e  d i s p u t e ,  it s h o u l d  come a s  no s u r p r i s e  t h a t  t h d s e  a d j u d i c a t i n g  
between t h e  r i v a l  p a i d e l a s  have t e n d e d  t o  acknowledge a  ' d i s t i n c t i o n  
b e t w e e n  s u c c e s s  i n  p i a c t i c e  a n d  s u c c e s s  i n  t h e o r y .  I n  terms o f  
p r a c t i c a l  success, t h e  r h e t o r i c a l  p a i d e i a  appears t o  b e  t h e  undisputed 
r r  r 
v i c t o r .   soc crate;^ s 'school a t t r a c t e d  f a r  more p u p i l s  than  t h e  Academy; 
but his triumph was far greater than that. Marrou puts it~brutally: 
On the level of history, Plato had been defeated: posterity had 
not accepted his educational ideals. The victor, generally 
speaking, was Isocrates, and Isocrates became the 'edicator hirst 
of Greece and then of the whole " "ancient world. His 
success...became more and more marked.as,the generations wore on. s 
,i . -. -1: . \ .. 
These comments apply to the ancient world, but the struggle does not 
end there. In our "postmodernW society the syllabus may not include 
rhetoric, but there has never been an epoch in which "pure knowledgew 
has been so discredited, or in which the pragmatic ideal of equipping 
people for social roles has been more dominant.1° 
I shall <postpone further consideration of this apparent 
historical triumph,of the rhetorical paideia until the end of the 
chapter; it is, after,all, relatively uncontroversial.,What has always 
given defenders of the philosophical paideia some comfort is the 
conviction that,?outside narrowly practical,criteria, , . their ideal is 
demonstrably.,superior: if the rhetors,can.be lured into debating the 
value rather than the success of their approach to education, they can 
be defeated. This shift from success to value arguably describes the 
basic trajectory of the Gorgias: Gorgias's extravagant claim that 'the 
art of rhetoric is the art of speech par excellencer1' is "shownw 
under the pressure,of Socrates's cross-examination to be quite hollow. 
T ~ U S  it has often been.-argued that, while the rhetors may have best- met 
. . 
the practical needs of their society, they only partially'educated the 
individual, and their,training lacked any organizing principle; that, 
in truth, the rhetorical paideia was no paideia .at all.12. In the era 
of state funded education it is perhaas of little conseq&nce if no 
higher justification of the system can be found than its social 
utility, but3for the Sophists, who had to,attract fee-payingbprivate 
students, it was absolutely necessary to., respond to the 
Socratic/Platonic suggestions that their educational~programme was 
unworthy of an Athenian citizen. This is in -fact.the central question 
confronted in this chapter: whether the pragmatism of the,rhetorical 
education can be defended on principle, as well as on purely pragmatic 
groundsr or whether, as the consensus sapientum supposes, its high- 
sounding claims can only satisfy those-who have never seriously 
considered the philosophical alternative. + 
The essence of any serious defence of rhetoric as a paideia must be the 
attempt to show the superiority of the practical life,, for which 
rhetoric presents itself as the ideal preparation. To,the puzzlement of 
many commentators, the most,.:eloquent expression of -this viewpoint was 
written by Plato and given ,to-Callic1es.a~ part of a long speech 
attacking-Socrates. It challenges him to,abandon philosophy in favour 
of nobler activities: . : : ' ,  -. 'i 
- - > . '  . . 
I like philosophy in a young lad; it is thoroughly,suitable and 
the mark of a liberal nature...But when I see an older man still 
at philosophy and refusing to abandon it, that man seems to me, 
socrates, to need awhipping...such a'-person, however great his 
gifts, will never be a real man...Take my advice,then, my good 
sir; "abandon argument, learn the accomplishments of active life", 
which will give you the repbtation of a man of sense. "~eave 
others to dispute the nicetiesw of what I don't know whether to 
call folly or nonsense; "their only,outcome is a barren house1'. 
Take for your models not the men who spend their time on these 
petty quibbles, but those who have a good livelihood and 
reputation and many other blessings. 13 
For once, Plato.cannot be accused of, caricaturingfhis opponents, since 
there are passages in Isocrates which bear an uncanny resemblance to 
this one.?' Indeed, the vehemence with which Callicles is allowed to 
put the rhetorsf case has led some?interpreters to suppose that the 
Gorgias.was written at a'stage'in his career.when Plato-retained some 
sympathy for their cause. This is going too far: it is a genuine 
dialogue (a distinction shared withethe Protagoras and the Symposium, 
the rest being no more than disguised - often thinly-disguised - 
lectures) but, as we shall see, Socrates ultimately trounces Callicles; 
through a mechanism far more powerful than nit-picking dialectics: 
Nevertheless, Callicles raises'doubts that Plato could scarcely ignore. 
On the one hand, the maturity and virility of the philosopher is 
impugned: he remains a child, he is not "a real man", he wastes his 
time on "petty quibblesw. Perhaps he is a bit of a coward, afraid of 
the adult world and the "accomplishments of active lifew? Furthermore, 
~allicles emphasizes the importance of -winning a reputation (mentioned 
twice in the passage cited). This would have impressed Platofs earliest 
readers far more than it does today, because virtue was then intimately 
tied with public reputation. In Homeric times, the highest value was 
arete, which means "virtuew but also had connotations ~f~*~valour"'and 
wprowess", and was something to be earned through heroic'deeds. The 
rhetors claimed that they could teach arete, which by the fifth century 
had become political in the dual sense that it was virtue appropriate 
for the city-state, and that its mode1,was the statesman'rather than 
the warrior .15 Despite these changes, they could 'legitimately claim to 
belong to a centuries-old tradition that placed the highest value on 
public action; Socrates, lost in thought, could not. 
, , I' , - .  
The case which philosophy was called upon to answer can be summarized 
quite easily: the active life is best and the rhetorical education is 
the appropriate preparation for such a life. Responses to this claim 
have been many and varied, but to make discussion of them coherent, 
they can be sorted into three basicsstrategies. The first essentially 
accepts without qualification the superiority of active life, but 
argues that philosophy, too, is relevant t o  it. The second also 
acknowledges the superiority of action, but not without qualification: 
action is only good if it is guided by serious philosophical thinking; 
otherwise, it is stupid and self-defeating. The third strategy, the 
importance of which cannot be over-estimated, marks a more radical 
departure from rhetorical pragmatism. It accords a value - indeed, the 
highest value - to "thinking for its own sakew, ungoverned by practical 
ends of any kind. Remarkably enough, it is this withdrawal from active 
life that has always constituted philosophy's most powerful appeal: 
The uncomplicated defensive strategy - to accept the primacy 
of pragmatism - is relatively modern, and can be identified in two 
quite different forms. The first consists in the various efforts to 
show philosophy's wrelevancen to practical life and social utility. ~t 
its most extreme, this means creating courses in business ethics and in 
other ways relating traditional philosophical debates to the "outside 
worldn. ~ u t  quite apart from these developments, philosophy as an 
academic discipline has not escaped the general trend towards 
regulation and homogenization imposed by practical interests. A degree 
in philosophy is an indication that certain socially useful skills have 
been acquired, such as the ability to summarize and analyse data; 
increasingly, it is this aspect of a philosophical education that is 
prized by students and employers rather than the "contentW.l6 
But philosophers can also acknowledge the primacy of 
p r a c t i c a l  l i f e  i n  d o c t r i n e ,  t h e r e b y  p r o d u c i n g " a  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  pragmatism, which h a s  been p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  i n  
America. Ph i losoph ica l  p r a g m a t i s t s  couch t h e i r  answers t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  d e b a t e s  about  t r u t h  and meaning i n  t e r m s  of  p r a c t i c a l  
human i n t e r e s t s :  if two t h e o r i e s  have i d e n t i c a l  p r a c t i c a l  consequences 
t h e n  t h e y  have t h e  same meaning; if a  b e l i e f  i s  proved success fu l '  i n  
p r a c t i c e  and accords  w i t h  t h e  t o t a l i t y  of  e x p e r i e n c e  t h e n  i t " c a n  b e  
pronounced t r u e .  l7 T h i s  d o c t r i n e  e f f e c t i v e l y  a b o l i s h e s  a n y .  s e r i o l ' s  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  r h e t o r t s  c o n c e r n  w i t h  a c t i v e  l i f e  and t h e  
philosopher 's  ques t  f o r  t r u t h .  If t r u t h  is i n  a c t i v e  l i f e ,  then  t h e  two 
a r e  a l l i e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  opponents. I s u s p e c t  t h a t  it i s  p r e c i s e l y  f o r  
t h i s  r e a s o n  t h a t  mos t  p h i l o s o p h e r s  h a v e  re jec ted  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
pragmatism: t h e y  c a n n o t  a c c e p t  a c t i o n  a s  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  t h a t  s h a l l  
decide a l l  t h ings .  
I f  philosophy i s  t o  reject r a t h e r  t h a n  appease pragmatism, a  
c r i t i q u e  of t h e  C a l l i c l e a n  c a s e  needs t o  be  developed; t h e  remaining 
two s t r a t e g i e s  o f f e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  ways of doing t h i s .  ~ h e ' f i r s t  r e t a i n s  
t h e  i d e a  of p o l i t i c a l  a r e t e  b u t  q u e s t i o n s  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i &  of t h i s  
concept  o f f e r e d  by t h e  r h e t o r s  and s u g g e s t s  t h a t  r h e t o r i c  i s ' n o t .  t h e  
appropr ia t e  veh ic le  f o r  a r r i v i n g  a t  such a  goal .  The b a s i c  case  i s  t h a t  
s e r i o u s  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t h i n k i n g  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  g u i d e  a c t i o n s  a n d  
p o l i t i c a l  decision-making. Rhe to r i c  may t e a c h  d e c i s i v e n e s s  and'how t o  
pe r suade  o t h e r s  towards  one 's  d e c i s i o n ,  b u t  i t ' d o e s  n o t  p r o v i d e  any 
framework f o r  d e c i d i n g  which d e c i s i o n  i s  t h e  r i g h t  one.' I f  anything,  
t h e  n e e d  t o  win o v e r  p o p u l a r  a s s e m b l i e s  w i l l  p r o d u c e  a n ' . i n b u i l t  
t e n d e n c y  t o  p i c k  e a s y  o p t i o n s  a n d  t o  a v o i d  h a r d ' c h o i c e s '  whenever 
p o s s i b l e .  S o c r a t e s ,  who p o i n t s  o u t  e x a c t l y  t h i s  s o r t  o f  problem,' 
' . .. , introduces a  f avour i t e  analogy t o ' s t r e n g t h e n  h i s  case: 
. ' ., * 
Do you think that when men act they will their act itself or the 
object of their act? Take, for example, patients who drink 
medicine by doctor's orders. Do you think that they will the act 
of drinking the medicine with its attendant disagreeableness.or 
the object of the act, that is, health?'' 
. - I - I  
The moral islplain: actions which may,seem unpleasant or undesirable 
when considered in isolation are often recognized as necessary in 
pursuanceof a desired goal, just as intrinsically enjoyable actions 
may have disastrous consequences. Socrates is pleading for knowledge - 
or, to put it more modestly, foresight - as a vital component of 
prudent decision-making. This is a powerful argument: antlike activity,, 
incessant and irrational, is as unappealing as the "petty quibblesw of 
philosophical discourse described by Callicles. 
But philosophy's criticisms go beyond the relatively, 
uncontentious call for prudence and foresight. For Socrates, it is 
insufficient to ask whether one's immediate activity is leading towards 
desired goals; the process of reflection must go on to test the 
desirability of the goals themselves. Political activity must be more 
than just prudent; it must be ethical, it must aim for the,good. If the 
rhetorical paideia excludes such concerns and is in its teaching 
indifferent to those who wish to exploit the political system for their 
own cynical purposes, then can it seriously,claim a value other than 
helping its adherents to line their pockets? This is one part of a 
wider failing of the rhetorical ideal, as seen from the perspective of 
philosophy: its version of political arete is restricted to an 
essentially practical guide to using the system, which structurally 
ignores possible abuse. But this implies silence not only tabout 
exploitation of the political system by unscrupulous parties, but also 
concerning the system itself. Is it just? Does it produce good results? 
For a l l  t h e i r  emphasis on p o l i t i c s ,  t h e  r h e t o r s  do no t  o f f e r  a coherent  
p o l i t i c a l  theory ,  o r  even acknowledge t h a t  such a t h e o r y  has  a va lue .  
This  gap i s  f i l l e d  by t h e  product ion  of  p o l i t i c a l  philosophy,  a genre  
i n  which P l a t o f s  Republic and A r i s t o t l e ' s  P o l i t i c s  a r e  seminal t e x t s .  
T h e i r  s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l s  concern ing  i d e a l  s t a t e s  and t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
t h a t  *should guide t h e  reform of e x i s t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  s t i l l  widely 
d i s c u s s e d  today;  b u t  t h e  more remarkable  s i g n  of  t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  i s  
t h a t  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  t h i s  t y p e  of q u e s t i o n  and t h i s  s o r t  of d i s c o u r s e  
i s  l a r g e l y  t a k e n  f o r  g r a n t e d .  However r e a c t i o n a r y  some of P l a t o f s  
p o l i t i c a l  i d e a s  may seem, t h e  s t e p  t a k e n  b y  h i s  r a d i c a l  c r i t i c s  i s  
u s u a l l y  t o  seek  b e t t e r  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  phi losophy;  t o  a v o i d  
such ques t ions  a l t o g e t h e r  appears e i t h e r  na ive  o r  deeply  conservat ive .  
The r h e t o r s ,  by  i g n o r i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n s ,  s e e m  f rom t h i s  
p e r s p e c t i v e  t o  condemn t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  s e r v e  whatever system i s  i n  
p lace .  I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  l u s t r e  has  today faded from t h e  r h e t o r i c a l  
" idealn :  it now looks complacent and cowardly. 
Despite  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e s e  c r i t i c i s m s ,  they  do do no t  
c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  p r i m a r y  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  r h e t o r i c a l  
p a i d e i a .  So f a r ,  w e  have s e e n  ways i n  which p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t h i n k i n g  
would r e f o r m  a n d  redirect p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n ;  b u t  t h e  more r a d i c a l  
approach is  t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  p u b l i c  ac t ion ,  however i t  is guided, i s  f a r  
less important  than t h e  i n n e r  q u a l i t i e s  possessed by ind iv idua l s .  This  
o r d e r  of  p r i o r i t i e s  i s  a t t e s t e d  by a famous passage  i n  t h e  Republic.  
s o c r a t e s  is asked whether t h e  i n t e l l i g e n t  man w i l l  engage i n  p o l i t i c s ,  
and r e p l i e s :  
oh  y e s  h e  w i l l ,  v e r y  much s o ,  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y  where h e  r e a l l y  
belongs; b u t  not ,  I th ink ,  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y  where he ' s  born, u n l e s s  
something ve ry  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  happens. . .perhaps. . .it i s  l a i d  up a s  
a p a t t e r n  i n  heaven, where t h o s e  who wish can see it and found it 
. i n  t h e i r  own h e a r t s .  But it doesn ' t  m a t t e r  whether  it e x i s t s  o r  
e v e r  w i l l  e x i s t ;  i t ' s  t h e  o n l y  s t a t e  i n  whose p o l i t i c s  he  can  
19 p a r t i c i p a t e .  
< ,  , ' 
The wi thdrawal  from p u b l i c  l i f e  i s  j u s t i f i e d  on t h e ' g r o u n d s  o f  t h e  
impe;fection of  e x i s t i n g  s o c i e t y ,  which makes it imposs ib le  f o r  t h e  
would-be statesman t o  a c t  moral ly.  Ul t ima te ly ,  p e r s o n a l  r igh teousness  
:. 
must ' t a k k  precedence: "it 'doesn't  m a t t e r w  whkther t h e  i d e a l  s t a t e  i s  
. ,. ,. - 2 
r e a l i z e d  i n  prac t ic&.  
9 
It might be argued t h a t  P l a t o  i s  ' a t  t h e  ext'reme, u topian  end 
7 .  
of p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t h i n k i n g ,  and t h a t  h i i " p r i o r i t i e s  a r e  a t y p i c a l .  But 
t h e s e  value-ju'dgements a r e  p e r v a s i v e  i n  Western phi losophy,  even i f  
, . . ,  . ~ " ,  . 
t h e y  a r e  n o t  always e x p r e s s e d  s o  d i r e c t l y .  Thus t h e y  a r e  sha red ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  b y  A r i s t o t l e ,  t h e  g r e a t  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i s t .  G r a n t e d ,  
~ r i s t i t l e  concentra tes  less on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of an i d e a l  s t a t e  than t h e  
. . 
q u a l i t i e s  r e q u i r e d  by '  t h e  good statesman,  c h i e f  of which i s  phronesi s 
o r  " p r a c t i c a l  wisdomw - t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  app ly  t h e o r e t i c a l  knowledge t o  
p r a c t i c a l  a f f a i r s . 2 0  1t i s  a l s o ' t r u e  t h a t  he i s  f a r  more generous t o  
e x i s t i n g  s t a t e s m e n  t h a n   lat to: ~ e r i c l e s ,  who was d i s p a r a g e d  i n  t h e  
Gorgfas a s  a  r h e t o r i c a l  panderer ,  i s  p r a i s e d  by A r i s t o t l e  a s  a  man of 
phronesis.21 But none 'o f  t h i s  i m p l i e s - t h a t  ~ r i s t o t l e  a c c e p t s  t h e  
p r i o r i t y  a c c o r d e d  t h e  a c t i v e  l i f e  by  r h e t o r i c .  Even though  h e  i s  
p e r h a p s  t h e  c l o s e s t  t h a t  philos 'ophy comes t o  r h e t o r i c ,  he remains  
d i s t a n t ,  f o r  two c r u c i a l  r easons .  F i r s t ,  t h e  n o t i o n  of  phronesis i s  
t h o r o u g h l y  ethical i n  i t s  £firmuli t ion.  1t' i s  n o t  j u s t  " c a p a c i t y  t o  
a c t w ,  b u t  a  " t r u e  and reasoned s t a t e w  which &ms a t  "human goodsw; i n  
o t h e r  words, it i s  a c t i o n  informed by e t h i c a l  knowledge: t h e  l a t t e r  
v a l u e  t a k e s  p r i o r i t y .  But i n  any c a s e ,  p r a c t i c a l  wisdom i s  n o t  t h e  
i d e a l  o f  ~ r i s t o t l e *  3 p h i l o s o p h y ,  d e s p i t e  i t s  d e s i r a b i l i t y ;  i t  i s  
trumped by sophi a (wisdom) which contempla tes  t h e  e t e rna l , '  t h e  o b j e c t  
of metaphysics. Aristotle states that ?sophia must plainly be the most' 
finished-of-the forms of knowledge, and adds, by way of explanation, 
that tit would be strange to think that the art of politics, or 
.-; 7 %  
phroneds, is the best 'knowledge, siinde man is not the best thing in 
, . ,  
the world. '22, , . 
, . 
Granted, then, that Plato and Aristotle both in their 
different ways, suggest that the active life is only of secondary 
importance, it , , +  is all the more-necessary to find out what they regard 
as of ultimate ,importance, and why they .wanted to change a hierarchy of 
virtues that had, after all, stood at least since ~omeric times and was 
imbedded in Greek., culture. . > il. $ .  
The+revolution undertaken by Plato and deepened by Aristotle 
is to accord pride of, place to nous (mind), ,to make thinking the 
highest virtue. This doespot just mean that thinking   is recognized as 
an invaluable guide to action; if that were the case, action would 
still be primary. To the.philosophers, thinking is rather,an end in 
itself and does-not need, to be justified as a means to achieving 
practical goals; ,indeed, the highest form of thinking is precisely that 
which is free,and outside pre-established objectives of any kind; to 
avoid confusion with other types of thinking, I $,)\all refer to it as 
contemplation. 2s . . 
' .  
, I, Z 
The most prominent arguments in support of the primacy of 
contemplation are overtly .theological. Plato,.divides the human being 
into soul and body-and declares that ,the  soul^ is most like that which 
is divine.. .whereas body isu most like that which is humanr ;*' hence 
for us to come closest to the,gods will entail privileging the soul. 
The problem is that the body corrupts and misleads the soul: the senses 
distract us from perceiving the Real; the bodily desires distract us 
from wanting the Real. Philosophy's true,rnission is thus not to 
c r i t i c i z e : a n d  a d a p t  o u r  common modes o f  a c t i v i t y ,  b u t  t o  t r a n s c e n d  
bodi ly  a c t i v i t y  a l toge the r :  
Every seeker  a f t e r  wisdom knows t h a t  up t o  t h e  time when 
philosophy t a k e s  it over  h i s  s o u l  i s  a h e l p l e s s  p r i soner ,  chained 
hand and f o o t  i n  t h e  body. . .25 
9 
A r i s t o t l e  a l s o  p r i v i l e g e s  contemplat ion through a connection 
: , <  ,-'. 
with t h e  d iv ine ,  al though he moves away from t h e  S o c r a t i c  "care  of t h e  
sou lw towards a s u b t l e  metaphysical idea  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  d i v i n e  
. .. 
na tu re .    here a r e  two main arguments here .  The f i r s t  is  t h a t  i n t e l l e c t  
i s  t h e  d i v i n e  element i n  man and t h e r e f o r e  t h e  essence  of man, s o  t h a t  
t o  e x e r c i s e  it i s  t o  be most f u l l y  human.26 The second s t e m s  from some 
. - . *  , _... 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  about  t h e  n a t u r e  of d i v i n e  a c t i v i t y .  I f  God's a c t i o n s  
\ ,  . 
were d i r e c t e d  towards e x t e r n a l  goals ,  t h i s  would imply t h a t  he had not  
. F .  > ...* Zb 
y e t  achieved t h o s e  goa l s ,  and was t h e r e f o r e  i m p e r f e c t ;  consequently,  
p u r e  t h i n k i n g ,  which a ims  a t  n o t h i n g  beyond i t s e l f ,  i s  t h e  o n l y  
. + 
p r o p e r l y  d i v i n e  a c t i v i t y  and, a s  such, it i s  t h e  most p e r f e c t  form o f  
. ,  . . 
a .< 
a c t i o n .  Contemplation is  t h u s  t h e  most d i v i n e  a c t i v i t y  of which man i s  
< > ' 5  - 
capab le ,  which means t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  s q u a r e s  t h e  c i r c l e :  t h i n k i n g  is 
. , 
. . 
- , .  
act ion ,  and t h e  complete a c t i o n  a t  that .27 
Of course,  I have on ly  very  b r i e f l y  o u t l i n e d  arguments which 
,-,,.q: 7 ,.' .. 
I , '  
could be considerably  expanded and deepened. Nevertheless,  whatever t h e  
%, - I  
. . 
improvements, t h e y  c o u l d  h a r d l y  be  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  suppor t  t h e  c l a i m  I 
m a d e - e a r l i e r  t h a t  t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  i n t o  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  ' h a s  a l w a y s  
t . 
c o n s t i t u t e d  phi losophyr  s most powerful  appea l r  :*' arguments from t h e  
n a t u r e  'of God and t h e  human s o u l  a r e  of  l i t t l e  more t h a n  h i s t o r i c a l  
. . !.. . 
i n t e r e s t  today. So how can t h e  case  be made more compelling? 
# .  . The key h e r e  i s  i n  P l a t o .  My e a r l i e r  o u t l i n e  of  C a l l i c l e s ' s  
:.: ' .  
polemic aga ins t  t h e  phi losophica l  l i f e  omit ted one element which not  
?,,. f ,. . , 
only is full of draLatic irony but also tilts the balance of the 
dialogue; without it, Callicles would be dangerously convincing. He 
; < ; .  ' 
iarn's socrate$ : 
, ;. t s  r y %  ' , '  =, . .. , 
As things are now,.:if anyone were to-arrest you or one of your 
sort and drag you off to prison on a charge of which you were 
innocent, you would be quite helpless - you can be sure of that; 
you would be in a daze and a gape and haLe nothing to =ay, and 
when you got into court, however sorry a rascal the prosecutor 
might be, you would be condemned to death, if he chose to ask for 
the death penalty...what kind of wisdom can we call it,,Socrates, 
that...a man...cannot defend himself or another from mortal 
danger.. .?" , ,. %5 , . _  
No direct response to this point is made until the end of the dialogue. 
~ u t  here is no "defencew anyway; everyone knows that. What Callicles 
offers as a warning,-.to cajole Socrates back to the practical life, is 
what actually happens, what Socrates allows to happen. For it is not 
just that Socrates's death reflects back on Calliclesrs warning: 
~allicles's warning'equally reflects on to Socrates's death. Socrates 
was forewarned,-he knew the consequences; yet he took no notice and 
moved inexorably towards his self-sacrifice. Why? What kind of wisdom 
can we call it?.'The answer is revealed in Socrates's extraordinary 
closing speech. One may lose one's reputation, and even one's life;,but 
Socrates offers the magnificent counterweight of freedom from guilt: 
. , 
the defence which.consists in never having committed an offence 
against God or man either in word or deed...is the best of all 
kinds of self -defence.. . If I were to come to my end for lack of 
the pander's type of rhetoric, I am sure that you would see me 
facing my fate with serenity. The mere act of dying has no terror 
for anyone not utterly devoid of sense and manliness; it is 
. . 
wrongdoing that is terrible; for to enter the next worl'a with 
one's soul -loaded with. sins is the supreme misfortune.30 
, +- 
< ... 6. ' 
Here is a powerful piece of psychology, to supplement the unconvincing 
metaphysics. . , The contemplative life can be a balm to those suffering 
from "the supreme misfortunen , < ' ,  of a troubled conscience, for the less 
. , 
one does, the more.confident one can be , of."never . having committed an 
offence...in word or deedw. The inverse is also thercase: the active 
life increases the likelihood of wrongdoing: , , 
,. 1 .  . . - 
the majority of...exemplary sufferers are drawn from among 
dictators and kings and potentates and public 'men, whose pow& 
gives them the opportunity of committing the greatest and 
deadliest sins. 31 
5 .  
. , 
. . i c 
. . 
The moral: better to remain a private citizen! Whatever external 
misfortunes arise, you will be guaranteed inner peace. 32 
These lines of thinking (or, rather: these instincts) clearly 
have a much broader appeal than the metaphysical arguments outlined 
above. But how influential have they been and do they remain among 
philosophers? Throughout the Christian centuries, the value of the 
contemplative life went virtually unchallenged, and so it is only in 
L 
our own times that its advocacy and defence has re-emerged - most 
notably in Heidegger. To what extent does this thinker "at the end of 
metaphysicsw follow Plato? There can certainly be no doubt about 
~eidegger's commitment to contemplation, for he not only praises 
thinking, he privileges within that category what he terms 
"meditative" (besinnliches) thinking, which 'contemplates the meaning 
which reigns in everything that is .r33 His metaphysical defence of 
meditative thinking is highly Aristotelian, so I will not add to my 
earlier discussion on that score." The most novel and interesting 
aspect of ~eidegger's argument for contemplation is the use it makes of 
very modern"neuroses. Atomic energy; computers and hydro-electric dams 
are among the developments regarded as manifestations'of a pervasive 
wcalculativew '.(rechnendes) thinking,. which always ,seeks to exploit 
situations to gain an advantage. Heideggerrs descriptions of technology 
play on two powerful emotions: fear and shame. Technology's 
relationship.to the earth is one of domination, but far from being to 
mankind's advantage;rHeidegger suggests it is doubly dangerous. In,the 
first place, technology is presented as a sort of Frankenstein's 
monster, no longer under mens' control; increasingly it will dictate 
the tasks, and we will serve -it.35 - But this relationship to the earth 
of master to slave' is not just a mistake in Heideggerrs eyes; it is.a 
sin, as his lurid-descriptions make plain: 
~. . . ~  1 * 
  he world now appears as an object open to the attacks of 
calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any 
longer to 'resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station.. . 3 6 
., , . -, , 
Mother earth, out of Ghich humanGy eme;ged, in which it dwells, has 
become something mankind uses rather than respects and reveres. ~hti 
modern world is characterized by rootlessness and homelessness," but 
that is because 'we have dug up the roots "for our advantage", and are 
busy werploitingw the eartK on which we live. The fear and the shame 
are linked, therefore: both together belong to the wilfulness that has 
characterized the western world. SO it can come as no surprise that the 
objective,of the return to contemplation is to find a more reverent 
to things: 'in answer to your question as to what I really 
wanted from our meditation on the nature of thinking, I replied: non- 
willing. , 
With these considerations, Heidegger has effectively 
radicalized and modernized the Platonic defence of contemplation. 3s BY 
making-the connection with technology; Heidegger.transfers .a prob1em:of 
individua1,conscience to a world-historical crisis, and focusses-on 
offences'against'the world rather than ."against gods and menn. But by 
retaining the fundamental structure of rash activity, guilt, and 
redemption through meditation, 'he demonstrates that the ultimate 
philosophical reaction to pragmatism is not dependent on theism or 
ingenious metaphysics, .but rather on'deep-rooted psychological affects 
that are as powerful-today as they weresin Plators time.-" 
.. , . An interim report' on the rival paideias of rhetoric and 
philosophy would-have to conclude, -on the strength of the evidence 
reviewed so'far, that the pragmatism of rhetoric makes-its, appeal very 
much to ,the-nlowest common denominatorw: to individual. vanity, greed, 
and narrow-mindedness. When the allegedly high ideals'espoused by 
Callicles are'interrogated more thorough1y;they appear superficial and 
fatally flawed. There is no more-eloquent testimony to-the weaknesses 
of rhetoric8s ideal than the tactics employed by'Isocrates in'.his 
critique of the'philosophers: rather than engage in'reasoned argument 
with their views,"he appeals to the.prejudices of the common man 
(idiotos) concerning the 'impracticality and hypocrisy of the 
philosophers, and on that basis alone advises that they and their 
education ,be avoided." The philosopherst " sense of moral-intellectual 
superiority is perfectly expressed by Jaeger's response to Isocrates: 
, . . , . . , , -  
~ i s  invective . is entirely realistic... He. never makes it a 
theoretical refutation of his opponents' position, for he knows 
.that if h: did he would lose. his case. The terrain he chooses is 
that'of ordinary common sense. 41 . . . 
The philosophical ideal" may not have the support ' or even the 
comprehension of the majority, but it stands convinced of its 
superiority, for all that: against democratic opinion it can hold out 
the consensus sapienturn, the judgement of those fit to judge. Even 
while it loses out "in practicew, it always has this solace. 
AS a candidate for ,defending pragmatism from the philosophical 
onslaught, Nietzsche does not appear t o  have very convincing 
credentials. 1 t . h  not Simply that he never describes himself as a 
pragmatist; there are many passages in which he-attacks pragmatic 
trends quite savagely, and any account which ignored them would retain 
little credibility. Nevertheless,.there is an equally prominent 
emphasis on action throughout his work, which also requires some 
explanation. To try to resolve this paradox, I will situate Nietzsche 
in relation to the three philosophical responses to pragmatism outlined 
above; my suggestion is that the highly qualified pragmatism that 
emerges,.under this analysis .is not a compromise with philosophy but 
rather a necessary sharpening of,the attack upon.it. . I <  , .  
The first category - the philosophical compromise with 
pragmatism - is where those who have hitherto considered Nietzsche a 
pragmatist have located him; due to certain-comments on..truth and 
meaning, he has been labelled by some commentators a traditional 
(philosophical) pragInatiSt. Danto, for example, asserts that 'Nietzsche 
advanced a pragmatic criterion of truth: p is true and q is false if p 
works and q does What gives rise to this interpretation is 
~ietzsche's tendency to discuss truth in anthropological terms; perhaps 
the most striking example is his comment that 'Truth is the kind of 
error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value 
for life is ultimately decisive.t43 Danto suggests that "the kind of 
errorw is a typically flamboyant but somewhat misleading phrase, which 
can safely be ignored; in which case one has the clearly pragmatist 
, . - - .., 
theory that ^t;uth is what serves human interests. 
+ 
Notwithstanding the ingenuity with which it is executed, this 
interpretation of Nietzsche as a traditional philosophical pragmatist 
is a complete mistake, arising from two basic misunderstandings. First, 
it is seriously misleading to talk of Nietzsche as "advancing...a 
criterion,of truthn of any kind. Rather than participating in the old 
philosophical debate about .the nature of truth, Nietzsche casts doubt 
on the value~of~,truth: his answersto the question "what is . truth?" , are 
quite tangential to his main concern - "what is truth worth?n44 But 
even if ,,this ,,point ,is put to "one side, Danto's .interpretation does not 
stand up to scrutiny. Phrases like "the kind of errorn (in the passage 
cited above) are not meaningless extravagances, for they point to a 
paradox that Nietzsche asserts with almost monotonous regularity: 
mankind's basic."truthsW are what the species needs - but they may be 
mfstakes, for all that. So, while things may tend to become established 
as true because of their utility, that does not mean that they are 
true; pragmatics are relevant to, but not the criterion of truth.15 
Nevertheless, although this pragmatist interpretation of Nietzsche is a 
failure, it does'at least bring to light a concern with pragmatics that 
& 
will need to find some explanatory framework; all too often, rejection 
of ~ietzsche's "pragmatic truth theoryw becomes the excuse for dropping 
discussion of pragmatism altogether. 
There is certainly no question that Nietzsche indulges in 
that other philosophical compromise with pragmatism which consists in 
asserting philosophy's usefulness for a life in society. The essay 
~schopenhauer as Educatorw, for example, is,an impassioned demand for 
the'integrity and independencenof philosophy.from all',practical 
interests: 
--of what concern to us is the existence of the state, the promotion 
of the universities, when what matters above all is the existence 
8 ,  ,. - 
of philosophy on earth!46 
. . 
. >  , . . 
One of the essay's major themes is that 'the quest fo; truth is 
.. , , 1 .  . * 
compromised by any involveinent of" the stat; in philosophy, let alone 
' " .  . .  
the highly organized modern inititutional structure. The focus on 
, .  . % , , ., .. 
examinations, the'value ad=orded to 'scholarship, the increasing 
tendency to teach the h i s t o r y  of philosophy, and indeed the very fact 
-. . 
that philosophy is taught within a university system; all these are 
regarded by Nietzsche as signs of the degradation of philosophy.47 In 
I 
a ' 
the sense that making ph~losoph;'pragmatic means making it u s e f u l  t o  
society, Nietzsche is an implacable opponent. 
-so. far, ~ietzsche, s responses to pragmatism are' in harmony 
, , , ,* 
with the majority of philosophers, and the same appears to be the case 
when weturn to the second basic response to the r h e t o r s  - to 'criticize 
;- , , , - > 
the narrowness and cbnselvatism of their "active lif en. No phi losopher 
ever .treated the ~tu~idity'of action with loftier disdain: 
, * , - 
: i ' ~ t  is the misfortune of'the active that their activity is-always a 
little irrational. One ought not.to ask the cash-amassing banker, 
for example, what the purpose of his restless activity is: it is 
irrational. The active roll as the stone rolls, in obedience to 
the stupidity of the laws of mechanics." , , .  
AS we have seen, the "irrationalityw of restless activity is used by 
other phi1osophers'to"justify'the study of ethics and political 
philosophy: in such a way, action can be directed towards truly 
rational-ends. Nietzsche, however, does not develop the argument in 
this manner; indeed, his criticisms of the traditional "idealist" 
responses to pragmatism are just as thorough as his attack on the 
narrowness of-practical life. It is worth highlighting these 
criticisms, to show,that Nietzsche does not fit neatly into either,of 
the categories considered hitherto. - a,. 
Nietzsche's pragmatic instincts are most obvious when he 
insists that theories,- especially "moralw theories --are only of any 
value if they can be tested in practice.. There is more.than a hint of 
the Calliclean disdain for "petty quibblesw: 
I. favour any skepsi s (inquiry,. doubt) to which 1, may reply: "Let 
us try it!" But I noslonger wish to hear anything of all those 
things and-questions.that do not permit any experiment. This is 
the limit of my "truthfulness"... 4 9 
. , -  . ' 
AS well as insisting on the primacy , of . action (the fundamental tenet of 
any pragmatism), Nietzsche is also . . cautioning here-against unrestricted 
flights of philosophical fancy. Nevertheless, this alone would not 
constitute a radica,lrdeparture from philosophy's . , moral and political 
theorizing; philosophers. are always concerned with how their ideas can 
be put into practice, and even if they would not state the point as 
bluntly as Nietzsche, many would agree that problems of implementation 
have been unjustifiably neglected. But Nietzschevs dissatisfaction with 
the versions of "rational actionw peddled by philosophers goes deeper 
than this. The fundamental principle guiding philosophical reforms of 
, ' .  8 r '  . 
action has been that knowledge of right action is possible and can be 
used to direct personal and public life; by the same token, one 
of the rhetorical paideiafs greatest failings was, seen to be its 
. c .  4 ,  
unconcern about which actions should be undertaken and why, 
'_  . . 
Nietzschefs interventions suggest a justification for rhetoric's 
silence on this question by insisting that the sort of rational action 
I- . *, - . >  - ;- , , : .., 
dreamed of by philosophers is an iGpossibility, 'and that the results. Gf 
" , . ~ .  
ethical thinking hitherto have been thoroughly undesirable. It is 
impossible to talk of objectively.rationa1 action, Nietzsche-argues, 
. , I .  . . .  
because none of the varidis ways of assessing an action's v~iu~'p'a'ss 
>l 
any kind of scrutiny. The origins and consequences of an . action . are 
always obscure and, even if'the situation were otherwise, the action 
still could not be wobjectively assessedw, as the utilitarians naively 
suppose, since 
.- . 
, .,. ">  ' ~ , .. , 
. < 
we must first .know what is useful: . . . (the utilitarians) ' look only 
five steps ahead ?,- ,They have no conception of. the* grand economy, 
which cannot do without evil... 5 0 
e 
Nor is the subjective pleasure or displeasure produced by actions any 
4 
,. . , , . 
better guide - ,that would be like assessing the value of the music 
.* ~ 
according to the pleasure or displeasure...it gives its composerr. 
(I 
Taken together, these criticisms lead Nietzsche to the conclusion that 
the whole project is hopeless: 'If therefore,an action can be evaluated 
neither, by its origins, nor by its,. consequences, nor by -,its 
. ,  
epiphenokena, then its value is "xW, unknown -, 
On the strength of this assessment, the field of ethics and 
political philosophy has nothing to do with llrational'actionll:.that 
"I . .. ~ ' 
claim is &rely the cover for a certain &t of instinct:' and value- 
, , , .  
judgements to come to the fore..The philosophersf demand for abstract 
general justifications for actions and political institutions marks a 
preference for security and order: life will be made less arbitrary and 
capricious, regulated to as great an extent'as possible. For Nietzsche 
at least, this way of determining action marks a serious decline in 
strength and reason: 
The great rationality of all education in morality has always been 
that one tried to attain to the certainty of an instinct: so that 
.< 1 
neither good intentions nor good means had to enter consciousness 
. - a s  such.~As the soldier exercises, so should man learn to 
act. ..Positing proofs as the presupposition for personal 
excellence in virtue signified nothing less than the 
, . 
disintegration of Greek instincts. They are themselves types of 
' .  -: disintegration, all these great "virtuous menw and word- 
spinners. s~ 
' .L 
Al1,this amounts to a considerable revaluation of the aspects of the 
rhetorical paideia most thoroughly criticized by the philosophers. 
Action that is instinctive, unconscious, and ungoverned by ethical 
principles and political ideals is accorded the highest honour once 
more; Nietzsche aims to undo the work of the moralists, and this means 
an uncompromising affirmation of pragmatism, against the onslaught of 
philosophy. Ideals are seen not as a way of improving action, but as a 
decline from the heights reached by action, as a sign of weariness: 
, "', , , 4  , 
One cannot have too much respect for man when one sees how well he 
understands how to fight his way through, to endure, to turn 
circumstances to his own use, to overthrow his adversaries; but 
when one looks at his desires he appears the absurdest of 
animals- 
~t is as "if he required a playground of cowardice, laziness, 
weakness, lusciousness, submissiveness for the recreation of his 
strong and manly virtues: observe human desiderata, his "idealsw. 
Desiring man recovers from the eternally valuable in him, from his 
deeds. . . 52 
I .  
''  his is an eloquent affirmation OF pragmatism, but it s e k k  
, , 
to conflict with Nietzschers insistence on the stupidity and 
irrationality of the active type of human being. Given the problems 
Nietzsche identifies with the traditional-dideas of "rational action", 
what justification can he retain for his'own attack on -irrational 
activity? The paradox disappears when it is recognized-that the 
pragmatisms Nietzsche attacks and defends are not one and the same. The 
pragmatism he detests is the very British type, noted in the Oxford 
English Dictionary as matter-of-fact treatment of thingsr :53 *one 
limitssoneself to "what can be doneN; one does not entertain 
"unrealistic" possibilities. This commonsense pragmatism, as I shall 
call it, is "a very way of interpreting the priority bf 
. . 
. . 
action,,for it assumes that action pertains to a fairly consistent 
pattern, so that precedent, rather than principle or desire, is the 
best guide. This type of pragmatist simply does what has always been 
done,'.and sees,the alternative as doing nothing.'For Nietzsche, the 
contrast is rather with another kind of activity, which is not pre- 
determined;by a,fatalistic view of the world and oners role within it: 
This-contrast is nowhere more clearly expressed than-in the same 
aphorism (A, - # '283) from Human, All Too Human which was cited above as 
prima facie evidence of Nietzschefs anti-pragmatism: 
~ctive men are,generally wanting-in . c the higher ~activity:~I mean 
that of the individual. They are active as officials, businessmen, 
, :  , .+ : 
'scholars, that is to say as generic creatures, but not as distinct 
.,- individual and unique human beings; in this regard'they are lazy. 
That ~ietzsche's pragmatism gives priority to a certain -type of action 
- individual action - is n 0 t . h  itself a criticism, since a pragmatism 
which~excluded no interpretation of '"actionn would be completely 
meaningless: But why,is individual activity "highern? This requires 
further explanation,if Nietzschegs complex position. is to ,be 
understood. . " " (j . .  . -,* 
, .  Whereas the defence. of pragmatism usually takes place against 
an alternative of "idealism" of some kind, Nietzschers affirmation of 
action is contrasted first and foremost with re-action.. This explains 
how the most'superficially "active" types - the busiest - can be 
disparaged despite all Nietzsche says in favour of action: the 
involuntary response to a stimulus is a sure sign of being acted upon, 
not of activity. , - .  
A strong nature manifests itself by waiting and postponing any 
reaction: it is as much characterized by a certain adiaphoria 
(indifference) 'as weakness is by an involuntary countermovement 
and the suddenness and inevitability of "actionw ." 
 he inverted commas signal quite clearly that Nietzsche does not 
consider reactive haste to be true activity. His pragmatism can thus be 
qualified as indi vldualisti c; he affirms action to the. extent that it 
exhibits the individual's uniqueness and self-reliance. But it is 
equally necessary to insist that his individualism be qualified as 
pragmatic, because individuality is something that is achieved through 
action, not any kind of inalienable right: 'your true nature lies, not 
concealed deep within you, but immeasurably'high above you,. 55 
Nietzsche's pragmatism can thus be seen as the polar opposite of 
commonsense pragmatism, which Suggests that people do "the done thing": 
on the contrary, the challenge is to do what has never been done before 
and to press autonomy into ever more spheres of activity. 5 6 
Nietzsche, then, rejects ethics and political theory as ways 
of "guidingw action: it is UP to the individual to determine the course 
his activity will take. But this does not touch the fundamental 
response to pragmatism, which is to reject activity 
altogether in favour. of..contemplation. To make pragmatism 
individualistic wil1,not deter this rejection; on the contrary, it .is 
precisely the world.of arrogant, self-assertive individuals ,that 
philosophers have most despised and sought to evade. Their action 
causes suffering and has no justification; where is the virtue in that? 
~t remains to be seen whether ~ietzsche has' any response to this level 
r c  . , , . 
of critique. 
? 
,The most blunt response, one which seems to make this entire 
discussion look a little ioolish; is to say that there neve'r wai a 
problem in the first place, because Nietzsche is,as.committed to-the 
. . 
contemplative life as any other philosopher. What is more, there is no 
' ,. 
need for any elaborate arguxieiit ' tb jbstify this claim,.. 'since he says so 
directly himself, in a number of places." This is clearly a potential 
..'% + . . .  . ) , , - c :  I ,. . 
embarrassment for the claim that 'Nietzsche 'is a pragmatibt,' but it ii 
. . 
" I (  
not a refutation.   or ,what thes'e btatemensts cannot conceal is the 
- . - .  
extent to which Nietzsche diverges from traditidnai intkrpretatidns and 
; *. .. . ?  justifications of the contemplative life; ,what therefore remains to be 
seen is quite how ~ietzsche differs f;6m the philoso~hical defences' of 
5 ,  
outlined 'earlier, Hnd to \hat ef f kt. 
4 . '  
Nietzschers affirmation' of" the 'vita contempl~tiva is 
certainly nbt dependent on the sort of 'hetaph;sicalarguments we saw 
produced by traditional philosophers; indeed, h e  606s out of his way to 
reject all the usual techniques for exalting contemplation. The 
. . 
argument that thinking most nearly approxirnates the divine essence 
"' " 2  ' , . .\ . 
clearly cannot survive -the death o f  god; but the more mundane 
* I J justifications, that "&ants essence i; thoughtn and that" l8thinking is 
the highest firm of actionw, are just a's fi& contradicted, 
~ h k  idea of "thihking essencen to man is ' most visibly 
rebuffed. in the course of Ni&trschef s "speculative f oraib into 
anthropogeny. These thoroughly materialist accounts consider mankind as 
a gradually evolving animal species, to which conscious thought came 
very late and as a result of its weakness, not as the mark of its 
exaltation: 
Where need and distress have forced men for a long time to 
communicate and to understand each other quickly and subtly, the 
ultimate result is an excess of this strength and art of 
comunication...Consciousness is really only a net of 
communication between human beings; it is only as such that it had 
to develop; a solitary human being who lived like a beast of prey 
would not have needed it...As the most endangered animal, (man) 
needed help and protection, he needed his peers, he had to learn 
to express his distress and to make himself understood... 5 8 
On this model, thinking cannot claim any primordial wessencew. It could 
of course still be argued that conscious thought is essential in the 
sense that it distinguishes man from other animals. As a statement of 
fact this distinction is difficult to dispute, but as a statement of 
fact it can hardly be seen as an argument in favour of the 
contemplative life. It could only play such a role if wdistinctionw 
were to be understood in the other sense, as a mark of superiority - 
and it is precisely such an understanding that Nietzschers account sets 
out to deflate. Moreover, Nietzsche's insistence that conscious thought 
above all served the practical function of communication completely 
detaches it from its philosophical function of leading mankind to 
knowledge of or attunement with Being. It might still be claimed that 
thinking is the profoundest element of man, even if it developed very 
late in the day; but Nietzsche suggests that it is, on the contrary; 
the most superficial - it is the "herd elementw that lies on top of 
everything truly individual. As for the special type of thinking known 
as contemplation, Nietzsche is if anything even more scathing 
concerning its origins: >,. . .. . , , .  
In rude ages...the individual in the feeling of possessing all his 
powers is always intent upon...translating idea into action...But 
if his powers decline, if he feels weary or ill or melancholy or 
satiated...his pessimistic ideas discharge themselves only in 
words and thoughts...In this condition he becomes thinker and 
prophet...but whatever he may think about, all the products of his 
thinking are bound to reflect the condition he is in, which is one 
in which fear and weariness are on the increase and his valuation 
of action and active enjoyment on the decrease. . ." 
, I . .  / 
- ,  , . 
Far from being the essence of mankind meditative thinking is, 
in its origins at least, an indication of sickness - the pathological 
condition of a few individuals. Given the additional claim that 
conscious thought of any kind originated in the collective weakness of 
mankind, this hardly amounts to a prospectus for the"contemp1ative 
life. Even so, it would be a mistake to jump to the opposite conclusion 
and assume that Nietzsche is hostile to contemplation. It is almost a 
matter of principle with him to "showw that the greatest things have 
foolish or unpleasant origins, but this only undermines the thing 
itself in the eyes of those who, unlike Nietzsche, demand 'a proper 
pedigfee. What this exercise does 'indicate is that the contemplatives 
will have to do without bupercilious references to "essencesw when they 
cdme:.tb justify themselves, which is in itself no minor reform for 
philo$&hers to have to accept. 
. . 
As well as rejecting the innate superiority of the 
contemplative life, ~ietzsche strongly resists the conflation of 
thought and action. Against the ~ristotelian (and ~eide~cjerian) idea 
- .  
that "thinking is the highest form of actionw Nietzsche presents the 
opposing view that thinking is deeply antagonistic to action. ~his,+of 
course, has echoes -in the Calliclean criticism of philosophy's "petty 
quibblesw distracting people from making decisions and engaging in 
active life. But Nietzsche quite explicitly goes beyond this idea: it 
is not' simply that thinking occupies time which could otherwise be 
engaged in action; the fruit of any serious meditation is the 
inhibition of action: 
Knowledge kills action; action requires the veils of illusion: 
that is the doctrine of Hamlet, not thatcheap wisdom of Jack the 
Dreamer who reflects too much and, as it were, from an excess of 
possibilities does not get around to action. Not reflection, no - 
true knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any 
60 motive for action... 
, . '  # . * .  ' 
It could be said that the dispute bethee*'Nietzsche. and the 
~riitote1ians'~is merely a matter of semantics: the iatter a=e inclined 
to ';edef ine waction" to include thinking, whereas Nietzsche prefers to 
retain it as a contrast to thinking. But this' objection misses the 
point, which is that' to t=eat thinking as a sp&cies of action removes 
action as a problem for philosophers 'to face: "we do act; where is the 
conflict?" Nietzsche, uniquely among the adherents of the ;i ta 
,? , 
contemplativa, chooses to dramatize rather than defuse the 
objection of the active man to philosophers, that they do nothing. 
w~nowledge'kills actionw: with this,' he not only discards part of 
. t  
philosophyr s amour, he even' sharpens its opponentr s sword. So how does 
he overcome this '=onflict? 
In the first place, he refuses to display the usual 
philosophical hostility towards active types. One of' ~ietzsche~s 
distinctions is his effort ' to find merits even ' in opponents and 
I 
enemies, s o  it i s  hardly  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  he says  much i n  favour of t h e  
v i t a  a c t i v a  d e s p i t e  i d e n t i f y i n g  h imsel f  wi th  t h e  v i t a  contempla t iva ,  
warning: ' , - . % . , . -  
L e t  u s ,  a s  men of  t h e  v i t a  c o n t e m p l a t i v a ,  n o t  f o r g e t . .  .what  
counter-reckoning t h e  v i t a  a c t i v a  has  i n  s t o r e  f o r  u s  i f  we b o a s t  
61 ' 
' t o o  proudly before  it of our good deeds. 
. . 
+ < 
The re l iGious  typeif i n  p i r t i c u i a r ,  ,have k t  a l l  t i m e s  hkdl ' the  e i iect  
of &king l i f e i h a r d  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  men and, where poss ib le ,  i i t o i e r i b l e  
I ., 
io;' them-.  his d o e s  n o t  mean t h a t  ~ i e k s c h e  " r e a l l y "  a f f i = m e d  t h e  
r .  
i i f e ;  r a t h e r ,  it i s  a  c a s e  where th'= v a l u a t i o n  'of t h e  same 
4 *. + .  
even t  'is doubled, because t h e r e  i s ' m u c h  t b  be $ a i d  ' i n  f avour  of b o t h  
. 6* ,< ' - $ ides .  The cleirest mark of  ~ i e t z ' k h e ~ s  r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  a c t i v e  l i f e  
i s  h i s  i d m i r ' a t i o n  f o r  c e r t a i n - ' " v e r y  p r a c t i c a l  men, mos t  n o t a b l y  
. . - ,.> 
Napoleon, whom he had occasion' t o  d e s c r i b e  a s  ; the .  noble i d e a l  as such 
made f l e s h f  .63 This  r e c a l l s  on6 of t h e ' d i s t i n c t i o n s  between p l a t 0  and 
, .* , 
~ i o c r a t e s :  while t h e '  f  okmer educated ' h i s  p u p i l s  t o  become philosophers,  
believini phi1o's&phy t d  b e  t h e  h i g h e s t  achievement p b s s i b l e  f o r  man, 
. , 
t h e  latt;;: hLd no e q u i v a l e 6 t  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  reproduce  ' t e a c h e r s  "of 
? % , .  
r h e t i r i c .  i i t h  h i s  fuisome p i a i s e  f o r  n o n - p h i i o s o p h e r s  - i n c l u d i n g  
, * 
t h o s e  'who' a r e  t h e  a n t i t h e s i s  of ph i losophers  - Nietzsche  approximates 
t h e  broader ed6cat ional  i d e a l  of r h e t o r i c .  
Nevertheless, d e s p i t e  h i s  generos i ty  towards t h e  kchieirements 
of t h e  a c t i v e  l i f e ,  N i e t z s c h e  r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t  h e  h i m s e l f  does  n o t  
be long t o  t h a t  c a t e g o r ~ , . ~ " w h i c h  l e a d s  i n e v i t a b l y  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  
.. * 
whether 'h is . 'ow* i d e a l  t h = = e f o = e  i m p l i e s  a  r e j e c t i o n  of  a c t i o n .  MY 
ar&me.nt i n  what ' f o l l o w s  i s  t h a t  it doe's no t :  Nie tz$che 'ma in ta iks  a  
' . " .  
v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  ' c o n t e m p l a t i v = '  l i f e  r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom ' t h a t  
i - .  
bdpoused b y  o t h e r  ph i lo . sophers ,  b e c a u s e  i t  r e t a i n s  t h e  pr imacy o i  
action; the commitment to pragmatism is indeed central to the 
Nietzschean project. . . _  
, s The question of how to reconcile the desire for insight.with 
the goal of a rich +and active life ,(which can be termed the "problem of 
action") preoccupied Nietzsche throughout his career, but the most 
sustained and concentrated treatment of this problem is the second of 
the Untimely Meditations, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for 
lifew (henceforth abbreviated to "UDHLw) . The title is apt - to - mislead, 
so that the essay's full significance has often been missed; 
Nietzschevs concern is not the role of the academic discipline called 
whistoryn, but of -the relationship between life and learning. The 'term 
Wissen could be substituted for Geschichte without distorting 
Nietzsche's purpose;*"historyw in the.more specific sense.is. at m0st.a 
concrete example of the general theme. 
The Goethean epigraph in fact makes the-essay's primary - 
pragmatic - objective unmistakeable: '"In any case, I hate everything 
that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my 
activity.w' To this, Nietzsche immediately adds his own assertion that 
'knowledge not'attended by action...must...be seriously hated by us., 
unfortunately, knowledge unattended by action is the norm in our modern 
"historical culturew; the world is out of joint. The essay then 
presents a two-fold solution to this problem. First, Nietzsche outlines 
three ways in which history/knowledge can be useful for life - the 
famous triadtof monumental, antiquarian and critical history. However, 
he warns that it is quite possible for any of these modes of treating 
history to become unproductive and inimical to action; and that, in any 
case, modern societies have become obsessed with turning history into a 
scientific understanding of the past, and have lost sight even of the 
goal of turning history to use. Nietzsche therefore develops'a second 
requirement: beyond making history useful, there is a need-to get away 
from all forms of historical awareness and t o  return to the 
nunhistorical", which he defines at one point.as 'the art'and-power of 
forgetting and of enclosing oneself within a bounded-h~rizon~.~' 
Although the overall objective is a balance between these two forces, 
the'virtual disappearance of the unhistorical sense in our own age 
means that, for a time at least, it is more important to develop this 
side of our nature than to make use of history.66 The upshot. of this 
bias:in favour of the unhistorical is that knowledge will have to be to 
a certain extent restricted: 'science requires superintendence and 
supervision;. a hygiene of life belongs close beside sciencet .67 There 
will need to be'a decline in the absolute amount known, until the 
drives are once more sufficiently strong to cope with knowledge and 
make use of -it., 
This essay constitutes one of the most remarkable attacks on 
the value' of the contemplative life ever made by a philosopher. For 
Nietzsche goes beyond suggesting that the acquisition of knowledge must 
be directed towards action, and asserts that it must be (to some 
extent) sacrificed in favour of the needs of healthy life: we must 
learn to forget. Perhaps because of the sheer extremity of thid demand, 
even commentators as distinguished as Heidegger have tended to ignore 
it and discuss only the three types of historical thinking, as if the 
question were how to do history pr~perly.~' In fact, the essay marks h 
pragmatic conkitment to subordinate history and knowledge to action, 
and thus stands as Nietzschers most clearcut affirmation of th; 
rhetorical paideia. The "contemplative lifen is not a genuine ideal at 
all :' ."ifen 'demands that limits be set to contemplation. 
,. , 
~ u t  while "UDHLw marks an unequivocal commitment to 
pragmatism, the essay's positive programme is itself highly 
problematic, as Nietzsche rapidly realized. The whole conception of 
antiquarian history which "reverently preserves" tradition and allows 
nationalistic self-satisfaction over past achievements is completely 
inconsonant with everything he wrote after that time, and even with 
muchSelse in the essay; it is almost as if a couple of"pages,;of 
Heidegger had found their way in from a later epoch of Being. More 
importantly, the central theme of a "superintendence of science" is ,the 
doctrine-of reactionary Romanticism, which wants to turn back toJa 
simpler, stronger age; "untimely" only in the sense of being behind its 
contemporaries, and not at all uncommon in late nineteenth century 
Europe. After this period, Nietzsche was never againto consider an 
anti-Enlightenment solution to his "problem of . indeed, 
he was later to claim that eveni-at the time of writing the essay he'had 
, ." , g. f ' ;.. already "overcome its conclusions:' ' ' 
% -, ~, II s . ", ,> 3 - : a ,  ..., . - .   : r. - :, ' " 
One should speak only when one may,,not stay.~ilent;..~and;then , 
- only 
of that which one has overcome...what I had to say.against the 
, . ., . . 
."historical sicknessw I said is one who had'slo"iy and tbilsomeiy 
,, learned to recover from it and was in no way-prepared to give up 
"history" thereaf tar because he had once suffered. from it , 
, -. . . *., . , . . -  , . 
Given Nietzsche's rejection of his own youthful proposals, .it 
might be argued that his "pragmatismw was a passing phase and.does not 
extend to the mature and more significant work. Certainly, the.sirnple 
affirmation of action.above,knowledge and as substitute,for knowledge 
disappears,. -8 but . the . :  problem : of the , conflict between 
knowledge/meditation.and life/action remains. 1.think that the 
responses to;it offered:do.still constitute a kind of pragmatism, ,,which 
I shall.term Promethean because the mythic figure of Prometheus best 
encapsulates Nietzsche's ideal. As will become clear, this: type 
presents a.radica1 alternative to the traditional philosophical ideal 
of the contemplative life. - t . r^ 
While Prometheus appears sporadically throughout' Nietzschefs 
work, his meaning is thoroughly explored only in The B i r t h  o f  Tragedy. 
Nietzsche takes the figure from the Aeschylus play, Prometheus Bound, 
in which ' the Titan ' Prometheus is chained to a rock for stealing- fire 
from the gods to give to mankind, and then later punished further (with 
the infamous eagle) for daring to express his defiance of Zeus. How 
this mythi=al tale can be formed into a pragmatic ideal in oipositi& 
to philosophical contemplation is a matter I s h a i  deal with presently. 
~ u t  he immediate question is how Prometheus can symbolize the mature 
Nietzschefs response to the problem of action when the ideal arises in 
The B i r t h  o f  Tragedy, his f irst  published work. The answer to this is 
that, while Nietzsche's exegesis of the Prometheus story in The B i r t h  
o f  Tragedy is entirely consistent with the pragmatism developed in the 
later works, the context of the description makes it clear that he had 
not at that stage alighted on the problem of action,-let a1one"the 
Promethean response to it. For in The B i r t h  o f  Tragedy;~ the variations 
in plot between the various Attic tragedies are not accorded particular 
significance: in each case, the hero is not an individual but rather a 
f~ionysian maskr - one way among many in which the suffering god 
reveals himself .?' So the focus is on Dionysus, not Prometheus, and 
the f a c t i v e  sinf 72 which is the latterf s 'characteristic virtuef is no 
more than one facet of the Dionysian: the 'glory of passivityf which 
Nietzsche finds in the Oedipus tragedies is just as important', for in 
1872 the wDionysian" stands above all for the Schopenhauerian insight 
into the "primal unity of being" and the illusory nature of 
individuality. The Dionysian hero-god s u f f e r s  from individuality 
whatever he does or does not do: the purpose of tragedy is to give the 
spectator an insight into the awfulness of this suffering from 
individuation that nonetheless is also r e d e m p t i v e  through the awareness 
of the indestructability of life and its triumph in individuation's 
dissolution: 
we are...to regard the state of individuation as the origin and 
primal cause of all suffering, as something objectionable in 
itself...But the hope of the epopts (the.initiates) looked toward 
a rebirth of Dionysus, which we must now dimly conceive as the end 
of individuation...it is this hope alone that casts a gleam of joy 
upon the features of a world torn asunder and shattered into 
individuals... 73 
In passivity we can still participate in the t r u e  world of the unified 
life-force. Indeed our situation, as particles of this holistic 
universe, is e s s e n t i a l l y  passive. We can hope at best for a redemptive 
self-awareness, but not for action: 
we are merely images and artistic projections for the true author, 
and...we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of 
art...while of course our consciousness of our own significance 
hardly differs from that which the soldiers painted on canvas have 
of the battle represented on it." 
As these motifs of The B i r t h  of T r a g e d y  either disappear 
altogether or undergo a revaluation in Nietzsche's later work, so the 
promethean and the pragmatic gain in importance. The single most 
significant change is the abandonment of the basic "message" of the 
~ionysian as it is conceived in The B i r t h  of Tragedy - the notion of a 
primal unity of being and of individuation as a problem i n  i t s e l f ,  
overcome in ecstatic moments in which the "truthv1 is glimpsed. For 
once, it is not a matter of refinement or development but of complete 
abandonment: this,framework is in direct opposition to Nietzschefs 
later thought. The degree of the break is perhapsr'obscured by 
Nietzschefs .disingenuous claims in Ecce Homo that his first work 
manifests 'a profound hostile silence with respect to Christianityf. 75 
On the contrary, the idea of the suffering individual who requires 
* 
redemption and receives it in union with his "godw is thoroughly 
infected with Christianity; if Nietzsche had beendmore honest he would 
have recognized the nihilism at, the heart of The Birth. of ~ r a ~ e d ~ . ~ ~  
~. With the disappearance of this "Dionysianw framework, the 
myth of Prometheus inevitably becomes more than just.another "Dionysian 
maskw-and in~tead~~takes on significance for its own specific 
characteristic ofwactive sinw. More importantly, the relationship of 
Prometheus to'the spectators ,of his fate changes. Nietzsche had 
stressedsin The Birth,.of Tragedy that Prometheus - and the other tragic 
heroes - are really-only incarnations of the god'Dionysus; "this 
symbolism is, moreover, rec0gnized.b~ the spectators ofbthe tragedy, so 
that:the art form performs primarily a religious'function - to bring 
the God to his worshippers, so that they can -participate in his 
suffering and redemption. 'There is thus no . such thing,-"strictly 
speaking, as a Dionysian man or evenia Dionysian hero: there are only 
~ionysian states in which'individuality is mysteriously experienced as 
overcome. The "Dionysian" therefore means primarily participation in a 
religious cult: ' . I <* -. 
- .  Yes, my friends, believe with me in,Dionysian life and the rebirth 
of tragedy ... Only dare to be tragic men; for you are to be 
redeemed. You shall accompany the Dionysian pageant from India to 
Greece. prepare yourselves fo'r hard strif;, 'but believe in the 
miracles" of your god.77 
In the later Nietzsche,there is above all a change of voice.; from 
passive to active: no longer the promise of-redemption-but the call to 
become redeemers; no longer the individual as'"work of artw of his god; 
but'rather the artist who himself creates his gods; no longer witnesses 
of the sufferings of.Prometheus, but potential Prometheans. 7 8 p ~ 
But if Prometheus becomes'an ideal attainable by men, what1 
then is the content of that ideal? It is certainly,very differentfirom 
the relationship between knowledge and action,suggested in - "UDHL". 
In the first place, Prometheus's original act of,defiance was to give 
knowledge to -humans - "f ire" is only the symbol, for astronomy, 
mathematics, language and all the other,types of reasoned activity'of 
which mankind .is capable.79 .This presents action in the service of 
knowledge as supremely noble, in contrast t o  the insistence on 
knowledge in the service of action; Secondly, Prometheus himself is 
given the epithet "farsighted": for him at least, it' was not necessary 
to draw a veil of "unhistorica1"'forgetting'in order.to act, even 
though he foresaw his own nemesis as the consequence of that action. . 
Moreover, this nemesis is the ' third distinction from "UDHLW : whereas 
there Nietzsche foresees in action a "restoration of healthw and a 
return to a secure and well-founded existence, the action of.Prometheus 
leads'into conflict with the gods. This is perhaps the most important 
difference of all: rather than the.simple-minded optimism which 
supposes that modernity is in.an ,evilr state which can be returned to 
a paradise of healtht by restoring life and action, Prometheus 
offers the warning - there is a price to pay: - . . 
. ., - 
" i . _ . . ,  
, The best and highest possession mankind can acquire is obtained by 
sacrilege and must be paid for with consequences that involve the 
whole flood of sufferings and sorrows with which the offended 
divinities have to afflict the nobly aspiring race of men. 8 1  
There is no greater issue than this conflict between,men and gods over 
knowledge: Nietzsche describes it as 'the very first philosophical 
problem' which stands 'before the gate of every culture,, like a huge 
boulder.' . , .  a 1 
_I' - We can see from this that there is a crucial difference in 
meaning between the Promethean and the Socratic sacrifice. Prometheus 
foresees his fate, just as Socrates foresaw his;.but while Socrates met 
his fate by doing nothing, Prometheus meets his through his -deeds; and 
while Socrates suffers at human.hands in the sure and certain,hope of 
divine salvation, Prometheus -is punished by the~gods themselves. As 
soon as.one starts to make these comparisons, it becomes plain how 
important an advance this Promethean ideal is on the pragmatism of 
nUDHLw. For the latter cannot meet the Socratic challenge head-on: it 
tacitly acknowledges the premise "if '$6~ 'kn=G' all the .%otives and 
, .- ,~ , . . 
consequences of.your action, you would not act!", and is thus forced to 
impose limits on the commandment wKnow,thyself!w, in order to preserve 
scope for action.. But ~kometheui is *ot intimidited by the possibility 
, , r  ! 
that he will do wrong: on the contrary, he knows that he is doing "the 
wrong thing" and that he,will suffer dreadfully for it; but he carries 
on regardless. He is prepared to do what Socrates finds unthinkable: 
knowingly to Sin. . + - a  .+ I , - . . . . + $  
Prometheus is thus the true opponent of the.Socratic outlook 
- that much is clear; but the nature of the~opposition still-remains 
mysterious, shrouded, in riddles about gods and ,sin. This is 
unsatisfactory, especially for such an~uncompromising materialist as 
Nietzsche; some effort must be made to translate the opposition into an 
irreligious language. In particular, it still remains to be seen in 
, d .  'b 
what sense thi; Promethean i d e h  is and how that pragmatism 
contrasts with the philosophical justification.of the contemplative 
- * i  l .  . - 
life.'   he initial i. h o w ~ ~ i b t r s c h ~ ~  s own commitment tor.thk 
, . 
contemplative .life can be reconciled with any type of pragmatism; but, 
at least in his own.terms, there is an answer to that. Earlier, we saw 
. , 
the individualistic nature of Nietzschefs hragmatism: those-"actsw 
which are not individual but merely conform to roles established by 
others are, strictly speaking, mere reactions. To act means among other 
things "to exert energy or influencew, and the relevince of 
. , 
contemplation and the insight,gained through it is that it improves the 
individualfs chance'of acting as an individual. This is in contrast to 
an education that limits the understanding, which makes action easy and 
attended by a good conscience, but still essentially always whatcis 
sanctioned by the community: ' r . ,  
The environment,in which he,is educated seeks to make every,man 
unfree, inasmuch as it presents to him the smallest range of 
possibilities. The individual is treated by his educators a s  
though, granted-he is something new, what he ought to become is,a 
, repetition...by placing itself on the side of the fettered spirits 
the child first proclaims its awakening sense of community; it is 
on the basis of7 this senie of community, however, that it 'will 
later'be useful to its state or its class. 02 , 
< ; ; >  
Nevertheless, this only seems-to suggest that "actionw and the 
individual's interests are in conflict: it is still not obvious how the 
contemplative life can contribute to action. The latter problem is 
overcome in a crucial passage which suggests~how-the wcontemplative" 
misunderstands himse1f;and has no cause to feel that ,he is merely an 
observer of life: , . . . , 
He fancies that he is a spectator and listener who has been placed 
before the great visual and acoustic spectacle that is life: he 
calls his own nature contemplative and overlooks that he himself 
. ,. *. i s  r e a l l y  t h e  poe t  who keeps c r e a t i n g  t h i s  l i f e .  Of course,  he i s  
* ,  
, .  , . 
d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  a c t o r  of  t h i s  drama, t h e  so -ca l l ed  a c t i v e  type; 
b u t  he  i s  even less l i k e  a  m e r e  s p e c t a t o r  and f e s t i v e  g u e s t  i n  
. , +  t .  * .  . 1. + , . ,  * 1, 
f r o n t  of  t h e  s t a g e . .  . he .  has. .  .above a l l  v i s  ' = r e a t f  va, which t h e  
. . , , : ,, .  3 . 1 ,  * , - 1 .  . - 
a c t i v e  huma* b e i n g  l a c k s ,  wh'atever v i s u a l  appearancis' and t h e  
. . . ,\ 
f a i t h  of a l l  the '  world may say..   his poem t h a t  w e  hdve inven ted  
i s  c o n t i n u a l l y  s t u d i Q d  by' t h e  s o - c a l l e d  p r a c t i = a l  human b e i n g s  
. . 
(our  actor;) who l e a r n  ' the ' i r  ' = o l e 3  and t r a k l a t e  eve ry th ing  i n t o  
< .  . ' . . .  
f  l t ish and a c t u a l i t y ,  i n t o .  t h i  everyday. whatever has  va lue  i n  .our 
, - . < _ . ,  _I " 
world.. .has. been given va lue  a t  some time, a s  a  p r e s e n t  - and it 
was w e  who gave and bestowed it. Only w e  have c r e a t e d  t h e  world 
83 t h a t  + concerns man. . 
. < 1 - ( , ', ; < .  - . ,  . 
, - .  
.'. I , .  I. . , 
The "so-ca l ledw a c t i v e ,  p r a c t i c a l  t y p e s  a r e  merely "ac tors" :  t h e . . r e a l  
movers a r e  t h e  p l a y w r i g h t s  who p o s s e s s  t h e  c r e a t i v e  f o r c e  t o - w r i t e  
i 
v a l u e s  i n t o ,  t h e  wor ld .  But how d o e s  t -he  Prometheus  myth f i t  , t h i s  
a c c o u n t ?  I n  t h e  f i r s t ; p l a c e , , h e  was p r e p a r e d  t o  d e f y  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  o r d e r  t o - t r a n s f o r m  t h e  f u t u r e .  According t o  Nietzsche,  
" t h e  gods" a r e  t h e  p r o d u c t s  o f , , t h e  enormous d e b t  f e l t  by s u c c e s s f u l  
tribes t o w a r d ~ ~ t h e i r  anceqtors :  t o  make one's ances to r s  i n t o  gods is  a  
way of honouring ,them." Prometheusfs de f i ance  of t h e  gods i s  t h u s  t h e  
. ' 
d e f i a n c e  of t h e  community, i t s  a n c e s t o r s ,  t r a d i t i o n s ,  and v a l u e s .  
prometheus is  no t  prepared  t o  accept  t h a t  he should  "act"  according t o  
t h e  r u l e s  set downsby h i s  "god"; he  is n o t  p r e p a r e d  s imply  t o  be an 
a c t o r .  But does he have .vis c r e a t f  va, t h e  c ru ' c i a l  element? A f t e r  a l l ,  
, ,* ! 
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  Greeks  Prometheus  commit ted  s a c r i l e g e :  h e  " t o o k  
possess ion  of what was s a c r e d w .  H e  t h u s  appears  a s  t h i e f  and c r i m i n a l  
r a t h e r  t h a n  c r e a t o r  and  i n v e n t o r .  But " c r i m i n a l w  and  " c r e a t o r w  a r e  
merely two d i f f e r e n t  d e s i g n a t i o n s  of  t h e  same type! It i s  t h e  f a t e  of 
t h e  c r e a t o r  of  new v a l u a t i o n s  t o  b e  s e e n  a s  c r i m i n a l  by a l l  t h o s e  
committed t o , t h e  o l d  d e i t i e s ,  which i s  t o  s a y  by t h e  " ~ o m m u n i t y ~ ~ .  
Perhaps,  ' under t h i s  weight ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  even sees himsel f  i n  t h i s  
" . L  . . , . p *  
.. ,' ) 
light; 'for all that, he is a 'creator:' 
y,- 2 . *  . % 
Did Prometheus have to fancy first that he had stolen the light 
' - ,  , i  and then pay.for that -.before:he.finally discovered that he had 
. .  , created the light by coveting,the light and*that not only man but 
also the god was the work of his own hands and had been mere clay 
i. I , ' 
in his hands? ~ l l ' m e r e  images of the maker - no less than the 
. .:, fancy, the theft,,the Caucasus, the vulture, and the whole tragic 
, ,: -.. Prometheia of all cseekers after knowledge?85 . . _  , 
. .. ! .  t, . . ' -- , 
TO change values and shape the future are properties-that belong to 
gods, yet at the same time they are.the truly active functions to which 
an individua1,can attain; they are what raise him above the level of 
the."actorw. To act means: to attack the community and its values,, to 
usurp.the functions of a god, to destroy gods -,.!for what would there 
be to create if gods - ~ e ~ i s t e d ? ~ ~ ~  
- .  
.. . 
" . ,  , This ,shoulgindicate the gulf that separates Nietzsche's 
conception of,~the,wcontemplative,life" from those philosophical 
versions,we considered earlier. Nietzsche does not view it-as a means 
of avoiding the guilt involved in activity; on the contrary, he sees it 
as a means,to take on a larger guilt than is possible for a "fettered 
. , 
spirit" involved in repetitive activity; it is the very antithesis of 
the Socratic demand t o  do the right thing. The hardest yet 
simultaneously most necessary part of the task is to overcome the sense 
that a "divine sanctionw is required fcr all -t'hought and idtiin.  his 
. . 
is absolutely not an outmoded task, rendered obsolete by the death of 
god:For the "divine sanctionn. is an integral part of the modern 
pro jecti of hermeneutf cs, which ~ e i d e ~ ~ e r  states is . 
referable to the name of the god Hermes by a playful thinking that 
is more compelling than the rigour of~science...hermeneutics means 
,,, , n o t  j u s t  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  b u t ,  even b e f o r e  it, t h e  b e a r i n g  of 
message and t i d i n g s .  . . 87 
. , * 8 .  . *- ,, 
Heidegger ' s  p r a i s e  f o r  t h i s  "messenger god" e n c a p s u l a t e s  t h e  r o l e  
, . 
a c c e p t e d  by p h i l o s o p h e r s  from S o c r a t e s  onwards, a s  i n t e r p r e t e r s  of  
a ~ 
d i v i n e  wishes ,  f o l l o w e r s  o f  t h e  gods '  commands: p h i l o s o p h y ' s  l o n g  
a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  p i e t y  i s  n o t  y e t  ended .  I t  i s  t h u s  o f  no s m a l l  
i n t e r e s t  t h a t  Hermes p l a y s  an  impor tan t  r o l e  i n  Prometheus Bound: he 
b r ings  t h e  message t o  Prometheus t o  mend h i s  ways, accept  Zeus's r u l e ,  
o r  e lse f a c e  an  even  worse f a t e .  Prometheus ,  though,  mee t s  t h e s e  
e n t r e a t i e s  with contempt: 'Lapdog of t h e  gods!...I look a t  t h i s .  I look 
I 
a t  you./ Torment o r  s l a v e r y ?  I wouldn't change.r88 Prometheus v e r s u s  
, 5 
H e r m e s :  t h e r e  i s  t h e  r e a l  a n t i t h e s i s .  A g a i n s t  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
. . I ' 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  contemplat ive l i f e ,  t h a t  men have been t o o  proud 
a n d  r a s h  i n  t h e i r  a c t i v i t y  a n d  n e e d  t o  l e a r n  t o  obey,  N i e t z s c h e  
s u g g e s t s  t h e  o p p o s i t e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n :  t h a t  men have n e v e r  been proud 
,- . 
enough, and need t o  t a k e  t i m e  f o r  t h e m s e l v e s  i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  g a t h e r  
s u f f i c i e n t  p r i d e  f o r  t h e  h ighes t  t a s k s  of revalu ing values  and usurping 
t h e  g o d s .  I t  i s  above  a l l  n o t  a  f i n a l  e s c a p e  f rom a c t i o n ,  b u t  a  
I 
temporary absence, a  d e p a r t u r e  t h a t  always promises a  r e t u r n ;  t h i s  i s  
- ,  
t h e  only wcontemplative l i fe"  Nietzsche can accept  a s  an i d e a l :  
. . 
,., ,- . , * '  - 
h e  must  y e t  come t o  u s ,  t h e  r e d e e m i n g  man of  g r e a t  l o v e  a n d  
'k+....contempt, t h e  c r e a t i v e  s p i r i t  whose compell ing s t r e n g t h  w i l l  n o t  
, l e t  him rest i n  any a l o o f n e s s  o r  any beyond, whose i s o l a t i o n  i s  
misunderstood by t h e  peop le  a s  i f  it were f l i g h t  from r e a l i t y  - 
w h i l e  it i s  o n l y  h i s '  a b s o r p t i o n ,  immersion,  p e n e t r a t i o n  i n t o  
r e a l i t y ,  s o  that , -when he one day emerges again  i n t o  t h e  l i g h t f s h e  
89 may b r i n g  home t h e  redemption of t h i s  r e a l i t y  ... 
I n  t h i s  i d e a l  of .Promethean pragmatism Nie tzsche  p rov ides  a 
match to the philosophical v i t a  c o n t e m p l a t f v a  at the level of the 
paide ia  or cultural ideal. The philosophers have always~oversimplified 
the choice, to a straight contest bet~een~~worldly successw:and "inner 
satisfactionw. Their trump card was the assertiontthat the.rhetorica1 
p a f d e i a  could only triumph among the ignorant:-the . r h e t o r s  offered a 
limiting education quite deliberately, to prohibit full, philosophical 
awareness of the practical life and the '!true naturew of action. In the 
face of its defamation by philosophers,Nietzsche was, after The B i r t h  
o f  Tragedy ,  $always committed to rehabilitating.action: first, :by 
arguing (in "UDHLn) very much .along the lines of the r h e t o r s ;  but 
ultimately,. by embracing the search for ~ k n o w l e d g e -  and the 
wcontemplative lifew that the philosophers had c1aimed.a~. their 
privilege, and demonstrating that it, too,, could serve,a practical 
purpose. . . - -. 
' f  . .- . .  ,. 
* * *  . . ' . .  - .  
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~t is clear, then, that-Nietzsche offers a powerful alternative~to.the 
traditional philosophical defences of contemplation. Nevertheless, 
doubts must remain over the status of this alternative, since it seems 
far distant both from the pragmatism of-the r h e t o r s  and from the 
wcommon sensen understanding of pragmatism as practical success. I will 
therefore conclude this,chapter by considering Nietzsche's pragmatism 
in these contexts. . * . 3  ~ \ _  . I *  . , r . . . .  . ,. 
So far ;as; the r h e t o r s  are concerned, it is certainly true 
that they were inclined to appeal to the,cotnmon sense of.the common 
man," which is utterly alien to Nietzsche. But it would be a grave 
mistake to deduce,from~such moves that the rhetorical education 
reproduced uncritically all the.banalities of wcommon sensew and saw~in 
them universal truths of existence. After dismissing the unworldliness 
of the philosophers, Isocrates immediately opens a second front against 
the narrow-minded-"teachers of politicsw who assume that-everything of 
importance can be transmitted unproblematically-straight from.teacher 
to pupil.g1 Against them, he insists on the dmportance of individual 
experience (empelria) and practice, as the only way of,attaining kairos 
- the ability to .respond appropriately t o , a  unique situation. By 
arguing that the meaning.of empelria cannot be taught, Isocrates 
diverges dramatically.from all pragmatists and dogmatic empiricists-who 
assume that they know what' experience is and.can determine in advance 
the "matter of factw course of action. He therefore3stands?in close 
proximity to Nietzschevs individualistic pragmatism, which insists that 
once the uniqueness of the individual's situation is appreciated it can 
no longer be governed by rules and formulae. 92 8 
Notwithstanding this affiliation it is, of course, hardly 
plausible to claim that the rhetors'valued scientific,inquiry in the 
manner of a Nietzsche, but it would be just as great a mistake to 
assume that they were social conformists of the type that Nietzsche 
. t .  . 
despised, who evaluated according to calculations of bsefulness to the 
state, of prudence, and of the "possible". The object of their 
education is rather to instil an independence and stern pride that asks 
how the world can be set to work for the individual's exaltation. In 
the Gorglas, Callicles remains completely immune to the argument that 
it is better to-suffer than to commit wrong; Socrates supposes a case 
where'a powerful man commits crimes and claims that, by way'of 
compensation, 'he will be a villain and his victim an honourable man'; 
t o  which Callicles replies: Isn't that exactly what " i s  so 
revolting?"3 .The virtuous man as "victimw, as the passive sufferer of 
fate, is beyond Calliclesrs comprehension, and can be regarded only 
with contempt and disgust; it:offends against pride and dignity. The 
great,.contrast with Nietzsche ,is perhapsFthat Callicles's-reaction is 
the instinctive rejection of-a monstrous proposal: Socrates is.ahead of 
his-time. The task with which Nietzsche is faced is to regain the 
spirit that informed Calliclesrs judgements,: and,bring: it into pan 
altogether subtler age.-,Today, blinded by the transfigurations~of 
"suffering wrongw effectedaby the martyrdoms of Socrates and the god-on 
the :cross -for - whom* he wasy a prophet, it is difficult to see any virtue 
in~Callicles,,anything beyond a: defence of Realpolitik. But Callicles's 
refusal to offer a.!'higherU defence was no aberration: suffering wrong 
was for him almost a vice; how could he know that it would one day be 
. . ,  . -I . . ? -  
accounted a virtue'worthy of a god? ~evertheles$, given the'great 
,, . . . ,. . .. 
burden of Christian history it is inadequate now to give the same 
peremptory response that Callicles gave then. What is required is a way 
to overcome the great fear of doing wrong that pervades the modern 
1 
world, by giving this "evil", too, its virtuous defenders, prophets - 
and gods: 
*..; .. 
. . .  
. . ,  . I : ' , a  
~f one is rich enough, it is even fortunate to be in the wrong. A 
god come to earth ought to do nothing whatever but wrong: to take 
upon oneself, not the punishment, but the quilt - only that would 
be godlike. '' 
# -  . I .  , ' - .  
This suggests a continuity between the ideals of Nietzsche 
<,.. ' 
and.the rhetors, but isn't there a fundamental paradox about any 
--t , 
"ideal" .of pragmatism? What if the moral-intellectual ideal of the 
. , 
. >. 
philosophical life turns out to be less alluring on closer examination? 
The real pragmatists are only concerned about what happens "in 
i' 
practice",; . and z. there, even the philosophers are,agreed on the 
. . 
outcome..g5 But if the institutions of the world work by and large along 
- ,  : , . 
practicalrlines, .and the philosophical' pafdeia remains the preserve of 
a'monkish.minority, then what need does Nietzschefs pragmatism and its 
attack on the idealists serve? Is it,q after all, a purely academic 
. . question? . , 
; :.-The answer to this will depend, in large measure, on the 
extent to which pragmatism is reckoned'to have won the ancient argument 
over.cultura1 ideals; perhaps.the situation is less clearcut ,than-has 
so far been suggested. ~ietzsche;-after,ali, reserved his greatest 
disdain for the idea l f  sm of .- the modern "active menw, which, he regarded 
as their distinctive vice: . -  . . <  : : '  . . 
,, " : The place one is most certain to . ,  find , idealist theories is with 
unreflective practical men; for their reputation requires an 
" * -.. 96 ' idealist lustre. 
., ' . . ,. 
7 .  - . . /  
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Following from-this, it must be seriously doubted whether our practical 
men and society bear much similarity to the ancient r h e t o r s  and their 
ideals. ~atterday prahatism receives its justification in its social 
utility: things get done, wheels keep turning, and the productive 
. <  - . , . -_ , P . 
economye advances. The individualistic 'ideal of political a r e t e  tauiht 
, , & , ,  . 
by the r h e t o r s  has'utterly disappeared:' so how can pragmati& have 
Set against this, of course, is the continuing sense of 
!: 6 .  
philosophers that they are surrounded by a wasteland of pragmatism, 
which today even penetrates into the once sacred space of the 
. .  . 1 \ .  
university, testin6 all institutions through "perf orkance criteriav1 and 
.I , I 
. . 
demanding the,usefulness.of all skills: there has, it would seem, never 
been a time when worldly, practical forces have been more dominant. But 
it is interesting t o  see where these critics of "postmodern 
performativity" locate their enemy. Within the university,. it'has often 
been observed that the contemporary syllabus places a heavy emphasis on 
direct contact-with lecturers: so many courses are.undertaken on such 
wide-ranging matters that the most conscientious student is.only ever 
capable of surveying a small quantity ofZthe available information, and 
has to rely on the lecturer to give a fuller picture. This has been 
depicted as the real fact-value distinction: the'teacher has,the facts, 
while all the student has is values., From a-performative perspective, 
there is nothing inadequate in this education, since it prepares the 
student perfectly for the situations he will.encounter~~as a'"second- 
class citizenw in which'the important decisions will be taken by those 
with power-knowledge, and he will be left on1y:with- ancillary 
functions ." Applying the same. idea to society 'generally, Lyotard 
views the growth of computerization as the potential 
"dreamw instrument for controlling and regulating the market* 
system, extended to include knowledge itself and governed 
, " 
exclusively by the perf oAativity principle ." In that case it wbuld 
98 - .. . . inevitably involve the use of terror. 
~ u t  his scenario could be avoided by an,'alternative which at the same 
time seems to present the one potential weakness of an otherwise all- 
embracing pragmatic performativity: . ) . < .  
it could also aid groups discussing~metaprescriptives by supplying 
them with the information they usually lack for making 
knowledgeable decisions. The liGe to follow for compu&rization to 
take the second of these two paths is, in principle, quite simple: 
give the public free access to the memory and data banks. Language 
games would then be games of perfect information at any given 
. . .  
moment. 
 his outburst of optimism has often been lampooned for its failure to 
provide any account of why the "second pathw might be taken; Butait 
deserves to be treated seriously, if for no other reason than the 
relationship it and other radical critiques (re)identify between 
philosophy and pragmatism: not the former's oppression by the latter,, 
but - their mutual dependence. For if.the battleground is:the access to 
knowledge and the restrictions on it imposed under,the*present system, 
then both sides believe that knowledge - the power to act and that 
absence of knowledge - impotence. But to emphasize the necessity of 
knowledge for decision-making is implicitly-'to repeat the basic 
- . .  
Socratic critique of the rhetorical paideia: the individual dare not 
take responsibility for acting without the reassurance of knowledge. . -  - 
Naturally, it will be said that our 'age ill&& indikiduais 
do whatever they like; that never before was action so 
nindividualisticn. Yet at the same time "individual actionn is 
increasingly governed by regulation and protocol; one acts when one 
finds a justification for that action and preferably with as little 
nexposurew as possible. The scope for truly individual action is found 
in the frivolous, the unaccountable, and the inconsequential. For 
anything that matters, what has value is information - not opinions. 
~xpressing values and discussing opinions is what anyone can do, even 
the most impotent; thus little care is taken with them, and the most 
powerful men may have utterly puerile opinions. If the individual acts 
through knowledge, then he acts according to what is least individual 
about him, according to the universal, or at any rate to the socially 
testable; he does what anyone would do, given the available knowledge. 
'I 
The Socratic guilt-complex dominates, whether it drives one to the 
contemplative or to the practical life: action without knowledge, let 
alone Promethean action in spite of knowledge, is to be avoided 
whenever possible. 
In sum, then, it i s - n o t  pragmatism that has emerged 
victorious, but a framework.of impersonal questioning - "what is to be 
done?" - to which today both the contemplative and practical lives in 
their different ways respond. Rhetorical pragmatism stands outside this 
framework; it "justifiesw actions not according to norms of ethics or 
performativity, but through the pride taken in them, and it-insists on 
asking the most personal questions, whatever the consequences: '. . .: - 
4 .  1 C  . 
"What am I really doing? And why am I doing it?" - that-is the 
question of truth which is not taught in our present system of 
education and is consequently not asked;*we have ;lo time' for 
it...But what, after all, are seventy years! - they run on and are 
soon over; it matters so,little . , whether the wave knows how and 
whither it flows! indeed, it could be a piece of prudence not to 
know it. "~dmitted: but not even to ask after "it is' not a sign o i  
possessing much pride; our education does ,not make~people 
proudw. - So much the better., - " ~ e a l l ~ ? " ~ ~  . ,  
,. 6 
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Asserting that Nietzschets texts are rhetorical is always liable to 
fuel the prejudice that they:substitute eloquence for argumentative 
rigour and represent another.triumph of style over substance. There'are 
indeed those who see in Nietzsche - and not- just in Nietzsche - a 
serious threat to rational inquiry.which-needs to-be put in its place, 
namely "literature" or "entertainment", or in fact any category which 
reveals the essentially non-rational nature of his writings. At best, 
he has some interesting ideas which can be made into philosophical 
arguments; but he himself does not bother. To these guardians of logic 
and rationality, Nietzschefs.biggest fault is that he-lacks proper 
argumentation. This chapter consists of an analysis of this notion of 
"proper argumentation", and a two-pronged attack+on the sort of 
position I have just outlined.. - -;, 
Firstly, it is no longer credible simply to assert that 
rhetoric "lacks argument" and consists merely of appeal to the 
emotions. A new wave of thinkers, most notably Perelman and Olbrechts- 
Tyteca,' have gone back to Aristotle and rediscovered the central place 
of argumentation in rhetorical theory.~The general tendency of this 
revaluation is to minimize the differences between philosophy and 
rhetoric, and to describe those that remain in terms of context and 
assumed audience rather than the absolute polarities : o f  
rationallirrationa1,and argument/style. c ,. 
However, both the Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian accounts 
leave philosophy as the highest ,and' purest form of rational 
argumentation, even if no longer the  only form, and.so with respect %to 
Nietzsche the problem is,modified and rephrased, but not dissipated. 
His quirky argumentation~could-be commended by the Aristotelians as an 
appropriate form of addressJto-a less academic audience, but this 
nlegitimacyw would be'bought for it at the price of,recognizing-its 
inferior rationality - and Nietzsche makes%no such bargain. - , . % .  ' -" ' '- 
The bulk of this chapter is thus devoted to-a second line of 
defence - or rather attack - which repudiates,the."live and let livev1 
approach o f + t h e  first:My thesis. is that Nietzsche's f o r m - o f  
argumentation is, for now at least, the one most appropriate to 
rational, scientific inquiry and - to recall an old-fashioned phrase - 
. , - . \ ? '  , 
to the search fo;'wisdom. As we shall see, this cannot be' the case 
, , C C .  r ; .  
according to the Aristote1ian.conceptions of science and wisdom, which 
must therefore themselves become the subject-of,dispute. This is as it 
should be: it is just as important to dispel 'the image of ~ristotle. 'as 
the nprotector of rhetoricw as it is to counter the all-out Platonic 
attack which he is taken to ward off. Nietzsche, and rhetoric, neither 
desire nor require such patronage, for they want to be masters - over 
I ' , . ,  i 
their "patronsn, too! 
Whatever the ultimate deficiencies of the neo-Aristotelians, they have 
, +. 
- >  * :+.. L .- .- 
unquestionably performed a valuable function by rescuing rhetoric from 
. , . , 
. . 
- t  I . 
the ghetto of "stylen and "eloquence" to which it has for many 
. , ' > * '  - r \ .  
centuries been confined. Historically, the blame for this lies, 
according to Perelman, with sixteenth century figures such as Peter 
? ' t .  
Ramus, who distorted the traditional tripartite Aristotelian scheme of 
, , 
logic, dialectic and rhetoric. Logic for Aristotle consisted of 
2 ,. > - 
procedures of demonstration through valid reasoning; dialectic laid 
down the rules and tactics for questioning and answering in.a dialogue; 
and~rhetoric dealt with the methods appropriate.when..addressing an 
audience..Crucially, all three employed structured arguments - a point 
which Ramus ignores. He reduces Aristotle*s;three categories to two, 
with,the major category of dialectic becoming.the "one.methodw for 
reasoning well which, in its all-encompassing scope, ,presides over 
mathematics, philosophy, opinions and human conduct. * Rhetoric, 
conversely, gets squeezed out of the realm of rationality. As Perelman 
puts it: - 
.. . 
The scope that was now given to dialectic, as embracing both the 
study of valid inferences and the art of finding and discovering 
arguments, deprived Aristotlef s rhetoric of its. :.essential 
elements..., leaving only elocution, the study of ornate forms of 
language...this rhetoric of figures ... led progressively from the 
degeneration to the death of rhetoric. 3 
-. , 
An interesting and by no means purely academic question is 
, . 
8 . 8  , 
why this relatively impoverished conception of rhetoric came so rapidly 
* , . 
to dominate. Perelman offers the fascinating suggestion that since the 
end of the sixteenth century there has been a turn quite generally in 
,. . , , 
European thought towards settling debates by providing evidence of 
r 
various kinds (Cartesianism, Protestantism and empiricism being three 
prominent examples). Given that rhetorical argumentation comes into 
play preciselywhere evidence does not, for.whatever reason, settle a 
dispute,' it was perhaps inevitable in such circumstances that its 
importance would diminish Hnd its role become redefined.' One might ddd 
. ,  . 
that, conversely, 'twentieth-century disillusionment over optimistic 
claims for the panacea of "evidencew provides fertile ground for,the 
. . 
regeneration of rhetoric. However, another ieaibn ibr the widespread 
acceptance of Ramusfs views wks that the dismissiv= 'attitudes towards 
rhetoric which they embodied were not at all new. The criticism of 
rhetoric as no more than the presentation of pre-established-opinions 
goes back at least to Plato's Gorgias: Perelman is exaggerating when he 
describes Ramus's trivialization of rhetoric as an 'innovationt. 5 
In the end, though, it matter; more' where rhetoric is going 
- 7  ' 
' ,  
than where it has come from. For Perelman, it is more than a question 
- ? .> '. . 
of publicizing Aristotlers Rhetoric, despite his debt; to that woi-k. 
, \ , . " ( , .  
Perhaps surprisingly, he too herges 'certain' of '~ristotle's categories, 
.< , , 3  just as Ramus had done before him. Instead of incorporating logic 
,. ,. 
within dialectic and leaving rhet'oric on t h e  outside, perelman 
, , ,~ . ., . , 
incorporates dialectic within a widened cat&ory of rhetoric, leaving 
logic on the outside. The justification for this procedure is that 
dialectic and rhetoric both involve argumentation, whereas logic is 
simply concerned to demon$tra&, independent of what anyone;b opinions 
. - I .  - ,  
are on a given subject. Since demonstration occurs only in formal 
. , 
logic, mathematics and the sciences, all other areas of discourse must, 
according to Perelman, be considered the realm of rhetoric. This is not 
. . 
to say that the same stand&ds of argumentation will apply across the 
board in undifferentiated fashion, but it broadens rhetoric 'from the 
traditional image of the orator 'in front of a c=ow'd. As perelman 
. * 
explains : 
In contrast to ancient rhetoric, the new rhetoric is concerned 
with discourse addressed to any sort of audience - a crowd in'a 
public square or a gathering of specialists, a single being or all 
humanity. It even examines arguments 'addressed to oneself in 
private deliberation...The theory of argumentation, conceived as a 
new rhetoric or dialectic, covers the whole range of discourse 
that aims at persuasion and conviction, whatever the audience 
addressed and whatever the subject matter. The general study of 
argumentation can be augmented by,specialized~methodologies. 
according to the type of audience and the nature of the 
- . t -  - .  
discipline...In this manner we can work out a juridical or'a 
philosophical logic that would be the specific application of the 
new rhetoric to law or philosophy. 6 
- 5 .  I, ; . . *  
. . , - , .  
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It does not require too much imagination.to see .. . what sort of? 
defence of Nietzsche's argumentation could be,.mounted from this 
starting-point. If formal logical demonstrations are,taken i )i( as the 
measure of proper philosophical reasoning, then clearly Nietzsche will. 
fail the test. But what work of philosophy would pass such a test? The 
excuse for the failure is often the notorious difficulties of 
translating natural languages into formal languages, with.the promise 
appended that in time a workable solution to these problems will be 
found. Perelman's case is that such an "answerw is,in principle 
unavailable, and that the search for it stems,from a,misunderstanding 
of the nature of philosophical discourse. Lacking the possibility.of 
secure foundations, philosophy has to abandon demonstration,in favour 
of argument. In practice, according to Perelman, it has always,done 
t .  , 
this and will continue so to do, whatever its aspirations.,to 
wscientificw status. On the other side of the coin, eloquent and ornate 
speeches and writings have always been accompanied.by,serious, 
argumentation - otherwise they are simply bad (i.e. ineffective) 
Consequently, the antithesis melts away: philosophy is,always 
less than logical proof and involves elements of persuasion; (good) 
,, i 
rhetoric is always more than mere style and involves an appeal through 
argument to the rational faculties. Or, to put it-another way, the 
di f ference  is largely a matter of presentation, of e locu t fo .  Philosophy 
likes to dress up in what Nietzsche described as 'the hocus-pocus of 
mathematical formr,' whereas rhetoric prefers to dress down in 
emotional appeal and aesthetics; but; eitheraway, the.core of good 
argumentation is essential. The attack on Nietzsche,thus collapses, 
since it was based on a false dichotomy.' . L, . 
I have already argued that+Perelmanes central contention - 
that philosophy is a form,of argumentation, not.demonstration - is a 
good one,' and I ~hall.not.discuss it further.-But even if this is 
granted, I do not. think, that the suspicions of Nietzschers 
~unphilosophical" argumentation can be dismissed as lightly as I have 
just now suggested. In particular, there are two key points at which 
Perelmants departure from the Aristotelian. schema suppresses important 
doubts, most obvious1y.against Nietzsche,but ultimately, I shall be 
arguing, against the,whole neat separation of logic/science from 
rhetoric which underlies all the hitherto-existing accounts. 
  he first point concerns the elision~of~Aristotlets distinct 
categories of "dialectic" and-"rhetoricn,: which Perelman defends by 
claiming that, set beside the fundamental divide between an argument 
directed to an audience and a1demonstration.that is entire unto itself, 
all other divisions pale into,insignificance.,This is surely to assume 
what requires some-sort of argument: is there'not, for example,-a 
profound difference between the framework of dialectical inquiry among 
those seeking truth and knowledge, and the framework of debate within 
courts and political.-assemblies, which manage practical, affairs?.Even 
accepting that2philosophy does.not "demonstratew, there remains a 
strong inclination to c1aim:that its argumentative procedures indicate 
a seriousness about discovering the truth which Nietzschefs (for 
example) lack. The urge to insist on profound divisions within.the 
sphere of argumentation therefore remains, and Aristotle's 
dialectic/rhetoric distinction could be a useful guide for remaking it. 
However, the second point is in many ways even more 
important. Perelman's concern to differentiate argumentation from 
demonstration seems to blind him to the affihities between dialectic 
and science:. Indeed, ,according to Aristotle, the main difference is 
that the'initial-premise in a dialectical procedure does not have the 
status of~"truthW~accorded to the first premise in a scientific 
demonstration, but is rather the "probable opinionv1 adopted by the 
interlocutor and subjected t o  probing. The fundamental logical 
structure of the argument is still, according to Aristotle, the 
syllogism. Even in rhetoric, the syllogism remains the model, although 
it is altered in the guise of the wenthymemew. This in turn raises two 
big doubts against Nietzsche which Perelmants account would not allow. 
E'irst, if the big distinction is between valid arguments and less-than- 
valid arguments, -rather than between demonstration and argumentation, 
it becomes possible to-resurrect the case against Nietzsche, since he 
clearly despised the pretensions of valid argumentation, which could be 
seen as "propern to philosophy. Secondly, it returns the question of 
logic centre-stage. For if the syllogism is the model for the highest 
forms of reasoning, it would seem that the less strict one's reliance 
on the syllogism in argument, the less reliable one's conclusions 
become, and the less rational in the highest sense one's argument. In 
fact, I suspect that Perelman implicitly accepts something like this 
graduated view, but because its source in logic and science is kept out 
of the discussion, offstage, it is impossible for any alternative 
paradigm t o  argue its case; he presents just the tip of the 
~ristotelian iceberg and makes us think we see it whole. To sharpen up 
the debate, therefore, and to avoid confusion, it is the Artistotelian 
framework and not any modern derivative that will provide the basis for 
our discussion of argumentation. 
A'critique of the "inadequacy" of Nietzschefs argumentation could quite 
easily use the Aristotelian schema as its starting-point,.and indeed; 
to do.this might well give greater definition to the often.rather 
nebulous distrust of his presentation. For,it is hard-to read the 
Rhetoric without being struck by the applicability to Nietzsche of many 
of the ke~~elements-of rhetorica1,argumentation as Aristotle sets them 
out. And since Nietzsche is supposed to be a philosopher, he ought, 
* , a  . , - 
according tb the .Aristotelian division' of intellectua'l labbur, to be 
. .~ 
.,!" - - , ,  
employing scientific or dialectical forms of argumentation, where 
stricter standards {of rationality are required.'' I will. concentrate 
> .  / .  
here o n  four i'Qspects in which Nietzschevs argbmentatibn seems i b  
belong to Aristotle's rhetorical, rather than scientific or dialectical 
categories. 
The first two issues relate to the enthymeme, which Aristotle 
asserts is the core of rhetorical argumentation. Despite this, its 
precise nature is never clearly defined. It is described as the 
, - , - 
rhetorical syllogism8, l1 which suggests the fundamental deductive 
, . I .  . , 
, , .  
framework common to the whole of Aristotle's Organon, but of course 
s .  ? .  
1 '  
.. . . 
leaves unanswered the question of what makes the rhetorical syllogism 
, -  , 4 . : "  - 8 .  * .  I 
distinctively rhetorical. Some commentators have suggested that it is 
, II 
- '  , 
impossible to achieve the formal definition possible for the scientific 
. I .  . . . I L. 
demonstration simply because of the essentially pragmatic nature of 
rhetorical discourse. According to this position, Aristotle only 
, . ,  , . >  . - a .  . 
. I 
defined the enthymeme functionally, as "argumentation appropriate for 
I :  , . 
persuading an audience to accept a thesis" - precisely what is 
, . 
appropriate will depend on the  circumstance^.^^ Unhelpful as it may be 
. i 
for comprehending the nature of rhetorical argumentation, this 
pragmatic element, is an important~and distinctive feature, which I 
shall be returning to later."However, even these commentators admit 
that Aristotle provides a formal description of enthymemes too, which 
is alleged to apply at least in.the great majority of cases. It will 
not distort Ariatotlees account greatly to concentrate on this aspect. 
What distinguishes the enthymeme from its equivalent in 
dialectic is the truncated nature of the reasoning, best expressed in 
Aristotle's restatement towards the end of the Rhetoric: + 
It has already .*been+ pointed out . that the enthymeme is a 
deduction...We have also noted the differences between it and the 
deduction of dialectic.. '~hus we must not carry its reasoning too 
far back, or the length of our argument will cause obscurityt nor 
must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion, or we 
shall waste words in saying what is manifest." 
. P 
There are actually two distinctions marked here. The first concerns the 
~, 
reduction of the syllogism, which normally consists of two premises and 
a conclusion. In rhetorical argumentation, the major premise is 
frequently omitted, leaving a leap from premise to conclusion which is 
justified by what is tacitly "understood" by the audience." 
But Aristotle also mentions that we 'must not carry our 
reasoning too far back', which is presented as a different point from 
that about particular syllogisms. A demonstration or argument is never 
4 
just a single syllogism but rather consists of a whole series of them; 
moreover in science and dialectic they form a chain, in which each 
conclusion forms one of the premises for the next syllogism. Aristotle 
suggests that the rhetor will use a shorter chain, not wishing to 
overtax his audience by reasoning up to or down from basic general 
principles. 
What is abundant ly  c l e a r  i s  t h a t  f o r  A r i s t o t l e  t h e  a t t e n u a t e d  
n a t u r e  of  r h e t o r i c a l  a rgumenta t ion  h a s  no r a t i o n a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  b u t  
stems from t h e  r e q h r e r n e n t  o f  p e r s u a d i n g  a  n o n - s p e c i a l i s t  aud ience .  
From t h i s  p ragmat ic  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  complete  s y l l o g i s m s  a r e  t o o  bo r ing ,  
and long cha ins .o f  argument a r e  t o o  d i f f i c u l t .  
The s t r i k i n g  t h i n g  about  N ie t z sche , ' o f  course ,  i s  t h a t  much 
of  h i s  work c o n s i s t s  o f  "defec t ivew deduct ions of e x a c t l y  t h i s  type.  So 
f a r  a 8  t h e  t r u n c a t e d  s y l l o g i s m  i s  concerned, an  extreme example would 
be  one of  N ie t z schees  maxims." Thus ,What does  n o t  k i l l  m e  makes me  
s t rongert1 '  c o u l d  be  r e w r i t t e n  a l o n g  t h e  fo l l owing  l i n e s :  "Re f l ec t i on  
on eve ry  new expe r i ence  makes me ' s t ronge r ;  what does n o t  k i l l  m e  i s  a  
new experience I can r e f l e c t  on; t h e r e f o r e  what does n o t  k i l l  m e  makes 
m e  s t r o n g e r . "  The l a s t  p a r t  a l o n e  i s  a  maxim, t h e  f i r s t  a n d  l a s t  
t oge the r  an enthymeme, and a l l  t h r e e  t oge the r  form a syllogism. 
But, even more p l a i n l y ,  t h e '  chain o f  r ea sons  is  n e v e r " v e r y  
long i n  Nietzsche. The a p h o r i s t i c  form dominates h i s  work, s o  t h a t  h i s  
development of an  i d e a  r a r e l y  exceeds  a  couple  o f  paragraphs ,  a n d . i s  
o f t e n  j u s t  a  few l i n e s .  No-one accuses  t h i s  procedure of  be ing  boring, 
b u t  it means t h a t  t h e  t h e s i s  l a c k s  t h e  grounding i n  f irst  p r i n c i p l e s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s c i e n c e ,  ' a n d  t h e  s u b j e c t i o n  t o  c r i t i c a l  i n q u i r y  
. , 
as soc i a t ed  with d i a l e c t i c s .  
Besides t h e  enthymeme, ~ r i s t o t l e '  = i n s i d e r s  t h e  exam$l; ' t o  be 
t h e  o t h e r  form o f  a r g u m e n t a t i o n  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  r h e t o r i c .  It h a s  a 
s i m i l a r  r e l a t i o n  t o  induc t ion  d s  t h e  enthymeme has  t o  deduct ion ' -  it i s  
a  t r u n c a t e d  ve r s ion .  whereas induct ion '  wo;ks up 'from p a r t i c u l a r  ' c a s e s  
t o  a  g e n e r a l  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  a n d  t h e n  "deducesw from t h a t  
example moves from p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  (s) t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  (s) . A r i s t o t l e  
g ives  a s  i l l u s t r a t i o n  t h e  at tempt  to -  prove thaf  war  aga ins t  t h e  Thebans 
would be a n  e v i l  f o r  t h e  ~ t h e n i a n s .  S i n c e  t h i s  i s  a  c a s e  o f  "war 
against oneta neighbourn, argumentation by example would operate by 
showing that, in another instance, a war against a-neighbour turned out 
badly8 the would reside in the comparison between the two 
cases. Argumentation by.induction, on the other hand, would seek to 
establish the general proposition that "war against one's neighbours is 
an eviln, and assert the Athenians' situation as a particular instance 
of the rule ." Strictly speaking, induction ,has only been completed 
when all known instances of one type have been shown to have the 
relevant qualities. 
As was the case with enthymemes and complete deductions, the 
justification for using examples rather than inductions is pragmatic 
rather than rational. Aristotle suggests that examples are often more 
popular than enthymemes, because men 
like to learn and to learn quickly, and this end is achieved more 
easily by examples and stories, since these are familiar to them 
and are of the nature of particulars, whereas enthymemes are 
proofs based on generalities, with which we are less familiar than 
with the particular... 19 
. , 
Here once again the emphasis,is on ease, speed, and familiarity, rather 
than accuracy and reliability. As a result, two concrete theoretical 
problems may arise for the example that are not difficulties for the 
completed induction: first, is the analogy between the two cases 
sufficiently accurate38 and, secondly, are there counter-examples which 
would suggest different conclusions? Both these questions show up 
apparent weaknesses of the example when considered from a purely 
scientific perspective. . 
While Nietzsche occasionally introduces examples of the 
strict Aristotelian description, in which "particular justifies 
particularw,20 it is far more common for examples to be used in support 
of a g e n e r a l  thesis. Even then,-however,.there is no attempt to 
construct an inductive proof and e s t a b l i s h  the general statement: it is 
quite foreign to Nietzsche's argumentation to .justify a universal 
statement by a complete or,even thorough enumeration of particular 
instances. Consequently, -many of the aphorisms fit the broader 
Aristotelian description of "learn(ing) quickly...by examp1es.and 
storiesw, with al1,the problems that entails from the perspective of 
.As well as the length and thoroughness of rhetorical 
argumentation, its other prime distinguishing feature is .the 
potentially vertiginous freedom at its disposal- in the choice'of 
m a t e r i a l  with which to construct an argument. And this relative freedom 
applies both with respect to the starting-point of an argument, and the 
. . . .  
development which that argument follows.  h he astringent ~tartin~-~oint 
, -  - . . 
is in fact shared with dialectics: whereas science has to start from 
universal, necessary truths, dialectic and rhetoric operate in an 
argumentative context, and sd it is 'only an accident' if thk premise 
with which they begin happens to be a necessary proposition. In 
general, it will simply be a wcommonplacew, that is to say a reputable 
opinion. 
Though rhetorical and dialectical discourses might start from 
the same proposition, -they are unlikely to continue in the same manner. 
~ialectics probes the opinions presented by asking whether they assert 
essential or accidental predicates; whether they could be used as 
. . 
definitions and if "so whether the definition would be appropriate; 
- ,  
whether the opinions would be asserted in other cases from the same 
genus and.species and, if not, whether that undermines them. Rhetoric 
does not "testw 'opirkons in such a 'mithodical manner, and employs the 
material of history, political science, psychology, and even literature 
and fable in order to justify the opinions asserted.12 - 
 his contrast between.the logico-linguistic critical analysis 
of dialectic and the more diverse and unsystematic processes of 
rhetoric can be explained by reference to,their differing interactions 
with the audience. The dialectician must bring a real or imagined 
respondent round to his point of view through posing a series of 
interconnected questions. It is the logico-linguistic implications of 
whatever attitude.he adopts that are significant. And these will have 
significance not only for "winning an argumenta, but for establishing 
the truth of certain propositions, if they withstand the testing 
procedure. Aristotle asserts the two-fold importance of dialectics for ' 
the philosophical sciences: . . 
it is useful,,because the ability,to puzzle on both sides of a 
subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about 
the several that arise. It has 'a further ude in relation to 
the principles used inathe several sciences.,,it is through 
, reputable opinions about them that these have to be discussed, and 
this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic1 
for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein' lies the path to 
the principles of all inquiries .13 - ,. 
Through its procedural rules, dialectic-can hope to produce common 
ground from the initial diversity of opinions and perspectives. As one 
commentator has put.it: * . . I. . , I . % ' *  - 
The faculties are engaged scientifically when these differences 
between individuals have been eliminated and the object is the 
same fot all faculties which are directed towards it. Dialectic is 
the activity which effects the passage from the prescientific to 
the scientific use of the fa~ulties.~' 
Rhetorio has no such horizon. The r h e t o r  is  concerned only  t o  win t h e  
audience over, s o  t h a t  any mate r i a l  which may t end  t o  do t h i s ,  however 
use less  a s  a preparat ion f o r  science, w i l l  be employed. . - 
One o f  t h e  most  d i s t i n c t i v e  f e a t u r e s  o f  N i e t z s c h e ' s  
philosophy i s  t h e  v a r i e t y  of sources  a n d ~ r e s o u r c e s  he b r i n g s  t o  h i s  
i n q u i r i e s .  H e  u s e s  h i s t o r i c a l  e v e n t s ,  famous p e o p l e ,  c u l t u r a l  
s tereotypes,  fables ,  parables,  and h i s  own wpsychological i n s i g h t s w  t o  
back up asse r t ions .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, he s tud ious ly  avoids t h e  usua l  
recourse t o  arguments about concepts  a n d - l i n g u i s t i c  s t r u c t u r e s  which 
dominate much o f  modern ph i losophy .  T h e . d i v e r s i t y  of  m a t e r i a l  i s  
evident  i n  a l l  t h e  works from Human, All Too,Human onwards, but  i n  Ecce 
Homo it h a s  o f t e n  been t a k e n  a s  a s i g n  o f ' N i e t z s c h e t s  i n c i p i e n t  
madness, t h e  p r o c e s s  i s  t a k e n  t o  such an  extreme: whi le  t h e  major 
themes o f - W e s t e r n  ph i losophy  a r e  d i s m i s s e d  w i t h  l i t t l e  more t h a n  
slogans, i n f i n i t e  c a r e  i s  taken with t r i v i a l ' m a t t e r s  such a s  when and 
how t o  d r ink  one's t e a .  Even i f  t h i s  does not  i n d i c a t e  an unbalanced 
mind, it c e r t a i n l y  bears  no r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  se r ious  t e s t i n g  procedures 
of d i a l e c t i c s  .lS . . , -. 
To summarize t h i s  s e c t i o n :  I have t r i e d  t o  b r i n g  o u t  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i v e  f e a t u r e s  o f  r h e t o r i c a l  a rgumenta t ion  a s  p r e s e n t e d  by 
A r i s t o t l e ,  and  a t  t h e  same t i m e  I have  a r g u e d - t h a t  N i e t z s c h e v s  
argumenta t ion  i s  p r i m a r i l y  r h e t o r i c a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  d i a l e c t i c a l  o r  
s c i e n t i f i c .  Given t h a t  p h i l o s o p h y  i s  s c i e n t i f i c  ( a c c o r d i n g  t o  
A r i s t o t l e )  o r  s c i e n t i f i c - d i a l e c t i c a l  ( t o  u s e  t h e - A r i s t o t e l i a n  
terminology t o  descr ibe  Plato 's  pos i t ion) ,  t h e  suggestion may be made, 
and  h a s  o f t e n  been,  even  i f  n o t  i n  p r e c i s e l y  t h e s e  terms, t h a t  
Nietzsche's argumentation i s  inappropr ia t e  f o r  philosophy, and l acks  
the  s c i e n t i f i c  and c r i t i c a l - r i g o u r  required. 
The usual ways of dealing with this paradox are unsatisfactory. The 
first is to claim that Nietzsche was interested in emotional effect,and 
art only, so that the rhetorical nature of,his argumentation is 
unsurprising: he does not aspire to the whigher rationalityw of 
philosophy and science. Against. this, I Shall indicate Nietzschers 
passion for science and enlightenment - which, ofTcourse, only brings 
the paradox of his argumentation back. into sharp relief .lc The second 
approach is to attempt to turn Nietzsche into a scientific-dialectical 
philosopher by filling in the gaps and employing the more traditional 
forms of argumentation to defend his "conceptsn:This accomplishes even 
less than the first defence, since it does nothing to challenge the 
notion that Nietzsche argues badly, and removes the excuse that the 
"artisticn interpretation had provided. The third approach - the one I 
adopt - is t o  challenge the "inappropriatenessw of'rheto=ical 
argumentation for scientific and philosophical . inquiry. . I develop this 
approach in two ways: 'first, by attacking the presuppositions on which 
the ~ristotiiian schematibm rests; second,' 'by reinterpreting the 
allegedly "less rational" features of Nietzschean argumentation to 
illustrate the powerful reinforcement they in fact provide for his 
> .  
revalued ideals of science, reason, and wisdom. 
In the first instance, then, it must be stressed that there 
is a problem about Nietzschefs argumentation, 'as there would not be if 
. . .." 
he were, as hai sometimes been thoubht, a'Romantic irrationalist and 
anti-scientific "poet-philosophern. If that interpretation were true, 
the rhetorical argumentation could be dismissed (or welcomed) as 
consistent with Nietzschees disdain for reason. However convenient and 
reassuring such a reading might be, it conflicts with a great deal of 
what ~ietzsche actually wrote, and shuts out any wider debate about the 
relationship between reason and argument. 
. , 
Improbable as it may seem, there is o ~ e r w h e l m i n ~  evidence"' 
that Nietzsche was deeply committed to the Enlightenment, to 
rationalism (in the broad sense of trust in reason) and to science. The 
allegiance was advertised by the conspicuous choice of   re fa& for 
Human, All Too Human - a quotation from Descartests Discourse on 
Method, including the famous comment: '1 thought I could do no'better 
than...devote my 'whole life to cultivating my reason...t27 Just how 
I, r 
seriously Nietzsche takes this to heart can best be measured by 
considering two particularly striking passages which are worth quoting 
at length. The first extols the virtues of logical,, rational thinking; 
the second explicitly aligns Nietzsche with the Enlightenment, against 
German Idealism, Romanticism, and Kant . 
Reason in school. Schooling has no more important task than to 
teach rigorous thinking, careful judgement, logical conclusions; 
that is why it must refrain from every thing which is not suitable 
for these operations...schooling should force into being what is 
essential and distinguishing in man: "Reason and science, the 
supreme strength of man," in Goethees judgement, at least. The 
great natural scientist von Baer finds all Europeansv superiority, 
compared to Asians, in their learned ability to give reasons for 
what they believe, which Asians are wholly incapable of doing. 
Europe has gone to the school of logical and critical thinking; 
Asia still does not know how to distinguish between truth and 
poetry, and does not perceive whether its convictions stem from 
its own observation and proper thinking, or from fantasies. Reason 
in the schools has made Europe into Europe...In the middle ages, 
(Europe) was on its way to becoming a part and appendage of Asia 
again, that is, to forfeiting the scientific sense that it owed to 
the Greeks. 20 
The second passage is entitled: German hostility to the Enlightenment. 
1 .  P I < 
The whole great* tendency,, of the Germans was against the 
Enlightenment...The cult of feeling was erected in place of the 
cult of reason and. .' .there was no small danger involved when.. .the 
movement...- in the words Kant employed to designate his own task 
- "again paved the way for faith by showing knowledge its 
limitations.* Let us breathe freely again: the hour of this danger 
has passed.. .This Enlightenment we must now carry further forward: 
let us not worry about the "great revolutionw and the "great 
reactionw against it which have takeriplace - they are no more 
than the sporting of waves in comparison with the truly great 
flood which bears us along!" 
Given ' such unequivocal' statements it becomes tempting to 
turn the tabies and ask how Nietzschets commitment to Enlightenment 
might be contested or explained away. One common response 'is to accept 
that for a while ~ie'tzsche did indeed have some kind of faith -in the 
possibilities of reason and science, but that he later became more 
sceptical. And, indeed, both the passages just quoted come from the so- 
called wpositivistw period, reckoned by those who employ the phrase to 
comprise the works Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, and the first four 
books of The Gay science: the period. 1876-1882. 
Even if such a neat division were clearly justified, the 
astonishing neglect of the middle-period by the modern Nietzsche 
industry would be worthy of redress. But in fact, while there is a 
change of emphasis and style, there i= no obvious repudiation of the 
doctrines of the middle period by the later Nietzsche; at most, the 
earlier works are seen as transitional steps along the path taken - 
they are never s'imply "wrongw. Besides, there are plenty of indications 
that Nietzsche retained a positive commitment to science and 
Enlightenment throughout his career, and not just for a brief phase of 
it .'O 
Despite this weight of evidence, it would be quite 
unsatisfactory to oppose the prevailing view of "Nietzsche as artistn 
with the stark alternative of -Nietzsche as scientistn. It is not just 
that such an interpretation would immediately run up against,the 
apparently anti-scientific comments in the early and late works, the 
praise of artists, and the central problem 'of Nietzsche's 
munscientificn argumentation8 the real disadvantage is that such a 
reading would preserve the-validity of the science-art opposition and 
the traditional categories into which all works are shovelled. For my 
main thesis ie that it is the traditional hierarchies and divisions-- 
represented here by Aristotle's schematism - that need changing, not 
the place Nietzsche occupies within that system. 
According to the' Aristotelian framework a scientific 
programme and a rhetorical procedure are simply incompatible; they 
belong to different fields of human activity: 
it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each 
class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; 
it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from 
a mathematician and to demand from a rhetor scientific proof ." 
Clearly, this judgement lends a paradoxical air to Nietzscheqs 
scientific pretensions. Of course, it might be objected that 
"Aristotelian sciencen is not science as we now understand it, and that 
the "problemn I have set up here has vanished in the course of history. 
Certainly, it is worth considering the changes that Aristotle's 
framework has undergone; and I outline these very briefly below. But I 
think that none of them would amount to a reconciliation of acience and 
rhetoric so that the "problemn not only remains but becomes more 
p r e s s i n g  - it  i s  n o t  j u s t  N i e t z s c h e  c o n t r a  A r i s t o t l e ,  b u t  c o n t r a  
mundum. " .  
The most i n t r a c t a b l e  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  A r i s t o t l e ' s  sys tem h a s  
concerned t h e  strict  n o t i o n  of  demonstrat ion o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  P o s t e r l o r  
A n a l y t i c s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  which g e n u i n e l y  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge mus t  
c o n s i s t  o f  v a l i d  d e d u c t i o n s  from t r u e ,  necessary ,  p r imary  premises .  32 
While t h i s  ha s  some p l a u s i b i l i t y  f o r  mathematics  and geometry, it i s  
supposed t o  app ly  t o  a l l  t h e  s c i e n c e s  - i n c l u d i n g  onto logy  - and t h i s  
a s p e c t  h a s  a l w a y s  p u z z l e d  commenta tors .  Not o n l y  d o e s  it b e a r  no  
r e s e m b l a n c e  t o  t h e  p r o c e d u r e s  o f  p r a c t i c a l  s c i e n c e ,  i t  i s  e v e n  
c o n t r a d i c t e d  by A r i s t o t l e ' s  own t r e a t i s e s - o n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  s c i ences ,  
none of  which adhere t o  h i s  s t r ict  t h e o r e t i c a l  standards." 
So f a r  a s  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  development o f  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e  and 
p h i l o s o p h y  a r e  conce rned ,  A r i s t o t l e 8 s  dominance was a l m o s t  t o t a l  
throughout  t h e  middle  ages .  The rea f t e r ,  a  g r a d u a l  p roces s  o f  r e v i s i o n  
h a s  o c c u r r e d  - n o t a b l y  e a r l i e r  a n d  f a s t e r  i n  t h e  s c i e n c e s  t h a n  i n  
p h i l o s o p h y .  Not  o n l y  t h e  s t r i c t  r u l e s  se t  o u t  i n  t h e  P o s t e r i o r  
A n a l y t f  cs, b u t  a l s o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  A r . i s t o t e l i a n  s c i e n t i f i c  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  became d i s c r e d i t e d  du r ing  t h e  Renaissance. They were t o o  
c l a s e i f i c a t o r y ,  and t o o  r e l i a n t  on me taphys i ca l  n o t i o n s  such  a s  t h e  
formal cause, which could  f u r n i s h  explana t ions  without t h e  need of any 
exper iment .  A s  e a r l y  a s  1 5 6 0 ,  Ramus was d e f e n d i n g  t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  
'everything A r i s t o t l e  t a u g h t  was f a l s e m .  A s  one h i s t o r i a n  of s c i e n c e  
has  succ inc t ly  pu t  it: 
Gio rdano  Bruno h a d  t o  b e  b u r n t  and  G a l i l e o  condemned b e f o r e  
d o c t r i n e s  which were d e r i v e d  from A r i s t o t l e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  from t h e  
Bible ,  cou ld  be  overthrown. The s u b s e b e n t  h i s t o r y  of  s c i ence  i s  
la rge ly ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  s t o r y  of how A r i s t o t l e  was overthrown i n  one 
f i e l d  a f t e r  another.  3 4  
In philosophy the model of a complete system, derived more 
geometrico from unquestionable first principles, has had a far longer 
life, but even here the retreat from foundationalism has gathered pace 
in this century. The problem is that Nietzsche8s argumentation is 
still incompatible with much philosophy and philosophy of science even 
after the demands for perfect deductive systems are dropped - the 
standards of rationality remain resolutely non-rhetorical. Ideals 
of proof and consistency are intimately linked to deductive  logic, 
and many philosophers who reject foundationalism retain a faith in 
necessity in the logical sense: they try to "show" that one judgement 
follows necessarily from another, and regard this as a triumph of 
philosophical method." Nor does the move to induction mark a break 
with deductive logic: the inductive generalization serves as the major 
premise in a syllogistic judgement; it is part of the rationality of 
proving and establishing, not an abandonment of it. In sum: even if the 
model of demonstration no longer holds, rationality is still strongly 
associated with deductive logic and "rigorous" critical method similar 
to that outlined in 'Aristotle8s Topics. 
  gain st this can be counterposedthe stark Nietzschean thesis 
that science and logic are oppositional forces, and that science has no 
need of proof and refutation, necessity and consistency. I want to 
argue that ~ristotelian principles have only been withdrawn on an ad 
hoc basis, which will never be good enough to meet the fundamental 
problem, that the faith in logic itself is a piece of unreason, and 
that until this is recognized and practice adapted accordingly, the 
progress of scientific knowledge will continue to be held back. 
. , 
Accordingly, I will consider what is "unscientific" about traditional 
form of argumentation, and then look at the scientific qualities of 
Nietzsche8 s. 
m i l e  ~ietzsche's attacks on logic are well-known, they are 
nevertheless frequently misunderstood as Romantic bleating about the 
rigours of rational thinking. In fact, Nietzsche does not attack logic 
in the name of art and poetry, but in the name of science.  Moreover, he 
does not attack the forms of logic themselves but the interpretation of 
them and the uses to which they have been put. Stated crudely, it is 
the suspicion that the justification for "logical methodw is not 
scientific but metaphysical. Where science simply manifests the will to 
find out, logic manifests the will to find unity. 
The critique of the irrationality of "faith in logicw 
proceeds along various paths. The first and best-known of Nietzschets 
criticisms is that the laws of logic do not present any insight into 
the nature of reality but are a system for organizing that reality. 
The "Aw of logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the thing 
- if we do not grasp this, but make of logic a criterion of true 
being, we are on the way to positing as realities all those 
hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc; 
that is, to conceiving a metaphysical world, that is, a "real 
worldwsc 
Though they would not use Nietzsche's language, this is a judgement 
with which many modern logicians would concur. Thus for example the law 
of contradiction is no longer expressed in ontological terms - "no- 
thing can both be and not bew - but as a rule governing propositdons - 
"not ( p  and not-p) ". 
However, Nietzsche's criticisms extend beyond a caveat 
concerning the interpretation of logical terms. Granted that logical 
"laws" govern propositions and not reality, the question of their value 
and appropriateness for organizing and guiding science still 'remains. 
Niet rsche ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  such a  r o l e  can be  gauged by t a k i n g  t h r e e  
examples of  t h e  a l l e g e d  v i r t u e s  of l o g i c a l  method: drawing v a l i d  
c o n c l u s i o n s ,  r e f u t i n g  e r r o n e o u s  h y p o t h e s e s ,  a n d  c h e c k i n g a t h e  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of v a r i o u s  e lements  of a  system of s c i e n t i f i c  b e l i e f .  
Without  much d i f f i c u l t y ,  one  c a n  c o m p i l e  a  l i s t  o f  N i e t z s c h e a n  
cri t icisms of  a l l  t h e s e  " v i r t u e s " .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  N i e t z s c h e  
dec la res  t h a t  h conclusions a r e  conso la t ions~ , "  and p i l l o r i e s  t h e  value 
of proof: 
Honest  t h i n g s ,  l i k e  h o n e s t  men, do n o t  c a r r y  t h e i r  r e a s o n s  
exposed. . . i t  i s  indecen t  t o  d i s p l a y  a l l  one 's  goods. What has  
f i r s t  t o  have i t s e l f  proved is  of l i t t l e  value." 
Likewise, he dismisses t h e  value of r e fu t ing  a l t e rna t ives :  'what have I 
t o  do wi th   refutation?,^ '1 do n o t  r e f u t e  i d e a l s ,  I merely draw on 
gloves  i n  t h e i r  presence,  ." He a l s o  famously r e j e c t s  t h e  value of a  
sys temat ic  o rgan iza t ion  of knowledge - @I m i s t r u s t  a l l  ~ ~ s t e m a t i z e ' r s  
and avoid them. The w i l l  t o  a  system is a lack of integrityr. ' '  
What i s  the  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  these  comments and t h e  h o s t i l i t y  t o  
l o g i c a l  v i r t u e s  t h a t  t h e y  express?  There a r e  b a s i c a l l y  two, c l o s e l y  
r e l a t e d  e lements  t o  t h e  s u s p i c i o n  o f  l o g i c a l  form. The f i r s t '  i s  .a'n 
a n t i - o n t o l o g i c a l  pe r spec t ive :  g iven Nie tzscheVs  assumption t h a t  t h e  
world i s  a  world of becoming and development r a t h e r  than  an ordered  
t o t a l i t y ,  it i s  impossible f o r  any sys temat ic  "body of knowledgen t o  
express a  descr ip t ive  t r u t h  about it. T h e  i d e a l  of s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge 
a s  pure  and p e r f e c t  d e s c r i p t i o n  and e x p l a n a t i o n  of phenomena - s o  
obviously t h e  paradigm envisaged by A r i s t o t l e  - presupposes a  world 
wi thout  h i s t o r i c a l  and geograph ica l  v a r i a t i o n .  Of course ,  one can 
continue t o  defend l o g i c a l  method from a  non-epistemic pe r spec t ive 'by  
claiming t h a t  it has a  p r a c t i c a l  value i n  organizing and s t r u c t u r i n g  
otherwise useless and bewildering information - and, indeed, Nietzsche 
does in places explain and defend logic along precisely these lines." 
However, if this is the real value of deductive logic, it can be asked 
whether it is the best, or at any rate the only way of structuring and 
developing thinking about the world. As a matter of practice, 
"organizing the chaosw may not be our only need, and even if it is, 
there may be a multiplicity of ways of going about it. 
But in any case, Nietzsche's anti-ontology cannot be 
separated from his revaluation of values: he does not want a world 
capable of pure description, precisely because faith in such a world 
always threatens the death of sci ence and fosters anti -scienti fi c 
forces. For Aristotle, by contrast, science and philosophy are 
once-and-for-all projects of finite duration8 there is a teleological 
horizon in all ontology. He describes this basic trajectory of 
philosophy in a famous passage in the Metaphysics: 'all men begin...by 
wondering that the matter is so...But we must end in the contrary and, 
according to the proverb, the better state.. . '* The di sturbance of 
wonder is cured by the narcotic of philosophy. 
Against this reaasurence, then, Nietzsche offers a view of 
science that stresses above all else its restlessness and infinity. 
Science is not associated with "body of knowledgew, "system", "rational 
understanding", or any other static term. His conception is essentially 
science as a process, comprising activities such as doubting, 
experimenting, questioning, observing and exploring. Nietzsche does not 
associate science with obtaining truth but with the refusal to accept 
the finality of any alleged "truth": inquiry must carry on, most of all 
where everything seems settled and determined. The contrast with more 
conventional conceptions of science is highlighted by an extraordinary 
passage in The Will to Power: 
.*i 
-. 
The development o f  s c i e n c e  r e s o l v e s  t h e  " f a m i l i a r "  more and more 
i n t o  t h e  un fami l i a r . . . I n  summa, s c i e n c e  i s  p r e p a r i n g  a  sove re ign  
* , .,. ; 7 , * ' $  . . 
i gno rance ,  a  f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no  s u c h  t h i n g  a s  "knowingw, 
' ' t h a t t i t  was a ' k i n d  of  a r rogance  t o  dream of  it, more, t h a t  w e  no 
l o n g e r  h a v e . t h e . l e a s t  n o t i o n  t h a t  w a r r a n t s  o u r  c o n s i d e r i n g  
"knowledge" even a  p o s s i b i l i t y . . .  43 
, " + . .. 
Nietzsche,  of course,  was w e l l  aware o f  t h e  r ad i ca l i sm of t h e s e  views; 
t h e y  u n d e r l i e  h i s  r e j e c t i o n  o f  more t r a d i t i o n a l  a n d  c o n s e r v a t i v e  
. , p , i .  . 
phi losophies  of sc ience .  For example, he a t t a c k s  
, . , . . , 
.. ! * ! .  * .  . , , 
s .  t h e  f a i t h  with whidh s o  A n y  materialistic n a t u r a l  s c i e n t i s t s  rest 
c o n t e n t  nowadays, t h e  f a i t h  i n  a  w o r l d . t h a t  i s  supposed t o  have 
, i t s  e q u i v a l e n t  a n d  i t s . m e a s u r e  i n . h u m a n  t h o u g h t  a n d  human 
v a l u a t i o n s  - a "world o f  t r u t h "  t h a t  can  be  mas t e r ed  comple te ly  
' '  and f d r e v i r  wi th  t h e  a i d  of our  s q u a r e " l i t t l e  reason. 4 4 
.. - , $ 7  - 
These 'a rguments  a r e  a s  r e l e v a n t  t o d a y  a s  t h e y  were i n  t h e  
. 3 .  
_'. . 
1880,s. ~ n d e e d ,  N i e t z s c h e  may be =e'garded as "ahead o f  h i s  t i m e "  i* 
. , %  v * .  
t h i s  mat te r ,  s i n c e  t h e  s o r t  of fundamental r e th ink ing  of t h e  n a t u r e  of  
* .  
sc i ence  which h i s  work implies has  s t rong  l i n k s  with r a d i c a l  i d e a s  pu t  
forward by Kuhn and Feyerabend i n  t h e  l a s t  t h i r t y  y e a r s  and which a r e  
- .  
now a t - t h e  c e n t r e  o f  d e b a t e  i n  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  s c i e n c e . "  The 
7 i -  *-:. . 
e d u c a t i o n a l  i m p l i c a t ' i o n s  o f  ~ i ' e t z s c h e ' s  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  s c i e n c e  ' a r e  
, - i 
e q ~ a i i y  i kpo r t an t .  ~f  s c i ence  i s  'Hn ongoing process  of explora t ion ,  it 
, , , - . , 
i u s t  be  taught  and presen ted  i n  such a  way t h a t  encourages i t s  s tuden t s  
t o  forward t h a t  process,  r a t h e r  than  ixi ways t h a t  suggest  t h a t  s c i ence  
, .: .{ ,. , ,- 
i s  o r  can become a s t a b l e  body of doc t r i ne .  Nothing should be presen ted  
< *. 
a s  c e r t a i n ,  no t  even a  method, n o t  even a  goal,46 i f  dogmatism is  t o  be 
avoided. 
j _  . ,  
On t h e  bisis of t h i s  r e v a l u a t i o n  of  s c i ence ,  it i s  p o s s i b l e  
t o  & t u r i ' t o  t h e  ques t i on  of N ie t z sche f s  argumentation and r e i n t e r p r e t  
the rational force of those rhetorical structures identified earlier. 
~ccording to the Aristotelian conception of science, these structures 
are less rational than forma1,deductions; however, within,the framework 
of Nietzschean science, they have distinct advantages, which logic 
lacks. This review entails in its turn a reappraisal and critique of 
, s -  . 
the ~ristotelian depiction 'of rhetoric (which until this point has been 
taken for granted), since the general approach, as well as many of the 
specific elements of the Rhetoric, ,is dictated by Aristotlers 
ontological convictions. So let 'us return and re-examine the four 
specific areas outlined above: the elided syllogism, the diminished 
chain of deduction, the use of examples, and the unrestricted choice of 
topics for argument. All these, I want to argue, perform functions 
outside or supplementary to those suggested by the Aristotelian 
account. 
The elided syllogism omits one (or, in the case of maxims, 
both) premises. According to Aristotle, the motive is to avoid boredom 
on the part of the listener, the hidden premise(s) 'beiAg tacitly 
understood by both rhetor and audience. In the case.of ~ietrjche, this 
interpretation can be challenged in two reipects. ~ i r s t l ~ ,  it is 
doubtful whether the sole explanation is entertainment, even if the 
, .  . 
"missing premisesw are thoroughly obvious. An analogy can be drawn with 
- p . .  I 
educational methods, which have mobed' away from ~rad~rindian "filling 
with factsn towards more active itudent participation in the 
acquisition of knowledge-skills. "Leaving gapsw'turns the audience 
towards making connections for itself, rather than having a 
. . 
* .  , 
demonstration laid out before it 
But the mo=e ' s'igni£icant objection is' that the whole 
description of nsyllogism-~ith-gapsw 'inisrepresents the cha;acter of 
maxims and e n t h e s .  Both '~ietzsche's explicit remarks concerning his 
argumentation and an analysis of his practice suggest the,inadequacy of 
such an interpretation; There is no question of premises "waiting to be 
graspedw by the audience: the whole point of the exercise .is to'make 
reading and thinking as hard as it can'be:' . * , .  , , - . . 
,, . , ; . . . , :" 
. . 
people find difficulty with the,aphoristic form: this.arises from 
the fact that today this form is not taken seriously enough. An 
aphorism, properly stamped and moulded, 'has 'not be& %ecipheredw 
when it has simply been read; rather,,one has then to begin its 
exegesis, for which an art of exegesis is required.. 
. , ' v? > -.. 
A good aphoris.m is too hard for the tooth of time and is not 
consumed by all millenia, a1though.d.t serves every time for 
- . 
nourishment... . . 
i C ,- " . . 
. . 
i. . C  . -  
' . 
' Nowadays it is not only my 'habit, it is & ~ ' t o  my taste - a 
, -  malicious taste, perhaps? - no longer towrite anything.which does 
not reduce to despair every sort of man,who is "in a hurry". 47 
. . 
., 7 ' ;  
. ' .  . ,* 
~hese-thoughts are borne out when one studies Nietzsche's aphorisms and 
maxims: rarely is an obvious "reconstructionw available, and even when, 
, - 2  
as in the example ,cited earlier," one could produce some sort of 
syllogism, it is completely irrelevant to the.force of the idea. The 
reason for this is that, unlike Aristotle's examples, Nietzschean 
maxims do not rest on generally accepted notions or "commonplacesw. 
 his misrepresents the logic of such maxims, which do not make obvious 
* T ( 1 . .  ." .I , , 
implicit appea.ls to "groundingw propo+sitibns. ~f gnything, 'the maxims 
1 
contradict a commonplace, they draw attention to their lack of ground. 
~t is surely no accident that Nietzsche entitles thebsection in 
~wilight of the Idols nMaxims and arrowsw (my emphasis) : they are 
shooting at targets, they are blows and assaults. According to,the 
I ' 
~ristotelian formula, the best maxims would be uncontroversial and 
:.+ " 
banal, whereas Nietzsche wants t h e  o p p o s i t e  e f f e c t ; '  In the 'book's 
. . 
foreword he asserts that ' e t e r n a l  idols...are here touched with the 
hammer as with a tuning fork - there are no more ancient idols in 
existence.. .Also none more hollow.. .'lg Seeking j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for the 
hammer-blow in a syllogistic "proofw would be seeking to turn,the 
hammer-blow into an idol: the "apparent" arbitrariness of the maxim is, 
after all, no illusion. This is what Aristotle codhnot understand: 
-- - - -  
reasoning that does not seek something secure and reliable as its 
starting-point and basis. But such reasoning exists, and good maxims 
: r '  
number among its highest achievements. 
. .. 
,This point is developed if one considers the aphoristic form 
more generally and the idea that it demonstrates-an "incomplete chainw, 
because of,the non-specialist audience which would find a complete 
deduction too difficult to follow. This assumes that . . the model.for a 
rational argument can only be a decisive "proof."; but Nietzsche has 
arguments agains t  the scientific and dialectical methods, as well as in 
favour of his own. A d e m o n s t r a t i o n  is supposed t o  start from 
universally true, highly abstract first principles, which,.-the peoplew 
, .  / , 
may find too' hard to grasp; against this, Nietzsche for once takes thb 
, , , 
side of the common people, rejecting the mysteries of ."Reasonw and with 
them the Aristotelian theory.of science: . . .  
We possess scientific knowledge today to precisely the extent that 
we have decided to a c c e p t  the evidence of the senses - to the 
'extent that' we have 1earned.to sharpen and arm them and to think 
d~ them throughst0 their conclusions. The rest is abortion and not- 
yet-science: which is to.say metaphysics, theology, psychology,, 
epistemology... 
The o t h e r  idiokyncrasy if theLphilo;ophers is no less peri16us: it 
consists in mistaking the last for the first. They put that which 
comes at the end - unfortunately! for it ought not to come at all! 
- the "highest conceptsw, that . . is to say the-most general, the 
emptiest concepts, the last fumes of evaporating reality, at the 
I I . , 
beginning a s  the beginning.50 
. . 
, - ' Z  ,- ' 
, ., 4 ,  ' I:* 
In hialebtics, of course, the chain of reasoning doe: nit go 
) , . L  , . - 7  
back to established first prixiciples, but there is a ci&r tra'jectory 
, ' . 1 -  . . r ,  " 
of proof, from commonplaces accepted by the ;espondent. Through 'a 
. 
" ?  
process of question 'and answer, dialectics shows unfore'se-en 
. - * .  . . , v .  ,; ": * 
donsequence; and" presuppositions of such commonplace opinions, leading 
, .  , ,  . - 
to a greater "understandingw of the overall scope of apparently 
restricted judgements. The most common use of dialectics is to get the 
, ,  . 
respondent to modify his initial opinions because of the conflict with 
other commonplaces which they are seen to produce. 
~. . 
~iet=sche's cdmments on dialectics are "fill of 'disdain: it is 
> .  c * -  a ., . 
. - 
seen as a logical game, rather than a scientific endeavour. It is a 
, , 
means to gaining power over one's opponent rather than to uncovering 
4.  : , 
the truth: 
, - . , , -  
AS a dialectician one is in possession of a merciless instrument; 
with its aid one can play the tyrant; one compromises by 
,- conquering.. The dialectician leaves it to-his opponent to prove he 
is not an idiot: he-enrages, he at the same time makes helpless. 
, . 
The dialectician d e v i t a l i z e s  his opponent's intellect ." 
. -,. , . 
,i I 
. 4 .  
. . 
The "logical chainw of the dialectician is a means of compulsion, 
. . z,. ' I 
rather than persuasion. The traditional assumption is that rhetoric 
, .  . - 
. . , .  . 
persuades because it cannot  compel; in its sphere, compulsion, the 
, + .  
. > 
"higher formn of argument, is unavailable. But Nietzsche's comments 
" - 
, . 
suggest rather that the cause of the different forms of argumentation 
n 
is the s p i r i t  in which they are conducted. Does one desire to overcome 
all opposition? To force the opponent to admit agreement? What, on the 
other hand,-:if one does n o t w i s h  to ,obliterate-one's opponents but 
merely to convince them? Does this make one's reasoning weaker, or just 
less tyrannical?- All these questions are -,given the fullest 
considerationvin section 381 of The Gay Science, the key to which is 
the opening sentence: 'One does,not only wish to be understood when one 
writes; one wishessjust as'surelyinot to be understood.'. This dictates 
the brevity of Nietzsche's argumentation, which is.clearly not a matter 
of? "avoiding difficulty". 'And 'he-goes on to insist on the 
reasonableness of this procedure: I t '  
- .  ," . .  
, < ' %  . , . , . . "* : - . ? . i r  ' - 2  
t , L .  : 1.approach deep problems .like,cold baths:_quickly into them and 
quickly out again. That one does not get to the depths that way, 
. , . : , .  ( I  . , 
not deep enough do&, is the superstition of'thoke a£raid of cold 
.. c.water...And to ask this incidentally:,,does a matter remain 
ununderstood and.unfathomed merely because it has been touched 
only in flight, glanced at, in a flash? Is it absolutely 
,- , 
imperative' that b:e settles down oh it? that one' has brooded ove: 
it as over an egg?..-.At least there are truths that-are singularly 
shy and ticklish and cannot,be caught except suddenly - that must 
be surprised or left alone. 
3 .  i - ' , :, i 
A fascinating feature of this passage is its metaphors of water ("cold 
-, . . . , 
baths") and air ("touched only in flight"), which are of tremendous 
, ' * d  - .- 
importance not just here but throughout Nietzsche's work. One of the 
. . 
. ,  ,,-.. " I r - :  
advantages of "speaking in metaphorsw in this case is that it 
7 , , . .  , .,. - .  
highlights the nature of the opposition provided by those critics who 
complain of the superficiality of Nietzschefs argumentation. This 
- t 
opposition is not ratf anal, but instinctive; for they, too, have their 
I r -  . ,  -: 
guiding metaphor, of painstaking, step-by-step uncovering, which no 
reasons will persuade them to give up. Granted, it works for 
archaeologiStS: but Nietzsche's point is that not all problems are 
. . \ .  
, , t., .- - 
inaccessible because they are fixed deep in the earth, as foundations 
are. . .. . % ,. .+ .I .r , , ,  . . . 
. . -  What we have here is4a whole series of scientific reasons for 
the Pincomplete chainw of Nietzschean-argumentation.;%The truths may be 
obscured or,lost or never even,seen in the first place if they are 
brooded.over; the.alleged."first principlesl.of-a founded demonstration 
are bogus; the concern:with'dialectics is a concern' to overwhelm an 
opponent .rather than to binquire honestly, and-a-concern to compel 
rather than to persuade; the brief argumentation leaves many lines of 
inquiry for.the.reader,,who7is not simply V e d  informationw; likewise 
its adoption as "methodn allows researchers to.concentrate more on new 
explorations rather than the laborious "testing and justifying" of any 
nuggets -of wisdom they may have,brought backt and, perhaps most 
importantly.of all, science as an endless process, .restless and mobile, 
is confirmed andtiorwarded by these tactics. All this is an attack-on 
the ~ristotelian~depiction of the.enthymeme as a diminished deduction; 
for it is,no kind of deduction at all, but is reasoning according to a 
different logic, which I will consider further:below, when the other 
~haracteristics of. rhetoric's-distinctive argumentation have been 
(re) considered. . , . . . . - . ,.: ' 
Argument by . example. is, according to Aristotle,~; the 
alternative form!of rhetorical argumentation.to the enthymeme; and as 
the enthymeme (is .related to~deduction, so example is related to 
induction. Though Nietzsche does not often employ example.in the strict 
Aristotelian sense of "argument from particular to particular", he does 
ernp10y:examples in ways which are clearly very similar to the 
~ristotelian-description, and certainly are nothing like induction, 
which.;is the important point. . - r ,. . 
.-  -- - The anotion that an *example is a sort of -"poor .mants 
induction" is actually undermined by some of Aristotle's own comments 
on the forms.'. His examples of examples.actually suggest a. different 
kind'of logic, while the officialbaccount insists on the link with 
induction. A perfect induction is perfectly enumerated, according to 
Aristotle, which makes-it almost-unattainable. A case of'induction 
might be a statement like:."all: mountains are less than ten miles 
high." But most inductions will be imperfectly enumerated; both because 
not all'cases have been investigated, and/or because casesiwill, occur 
in the,future, which'cannot now be investigated. .,, - . -  ,.. 
> .  : There are two primary respects,in which Aristotle's depiction 
of. "examplew is unsatisfactory; In the first place, sthere'.is a 
difficulty over the relationship with induction. Induction seeks to 
establish a general principle through an accumulation of particular 
cases of the same type,, whereas example bypasses the:general rule. As 
we saw, Aristotle gives the impression that this is simply a weaker 
form of induction, in that only one or-two cases are given rather than 
a complete or near-complete enumeration.. However,-this cannot account 
for cases in which the "example" is not-in-thesame class or category 
as the other particular for which it is an argument:Aristotle himself 
states that a fablesis one,legitimate form~of~example;.but in that 
case, the link with'induction breaks down, since..one cannot claim that 
the.fable is another instance of the same class of events. Moreover, to 
multiply the number of fables would in no way strengthen the case, as 
it would if the example were simply a reduced induction. What occurs 
here is argument by analogy:-.reasoning which seeks'to establish 
parallels between cases recognized as fundamentally different .'? 
. . 
, Nietzsche does not discuss the contrast in.these terms, but 
from his perspective it would be more accurate to describe induction as 
a species of analogy, rather than analogy as a species of induction. 
. , , , . ,  . 
For if no two objects or events are the =ame, the "laww asserted by the 
inductive generalization will always be a fictitious construction 
placed upon events to give them some order. Argument by analogys,.is.a 
far more fluid form of reasoning than induction: for while the 'latter 
seeks to establish a correct general description, from which the case 
under examination can be deduced as a particular instance, argument by 
analogy allows a case to be viewed from a potentially infinite variety 
of perspectives - as many as imagination will allow. To assume that 
, >  - . " 
this is a less rigorous form of thinking is to assume that the highest 
objective of reason is to assign a perfect description to each 
*' ' G ,  
particular case; to give it a definite form. If, on the other hand, the 
. , 
same event can be described and explained adequately in many different 
ways, each adding a new and different insight into the event, then it 
is arguable that argument by analogy is the more scientific 
' . 
', . . . ,. . 
-1 i' 
procedure. 53 
' . .  , + , , I  .. .~ , . I ,  ' ,  
The other aspect of Aristotle's description of argumentation 
. . - .  
by example which needs investigating is his insistence that the example 
must be more familiar5' than the case under discussion to which it is 
applied. Once again, this has nothing to do with rational insight, 
r,. 
everything t o  do with the effectiveness of an argument on an 
unsophisticated audience: a simple fable or a well-known historical 
I .  ., # -. r 7 ' *  
example will make the case at hand seem much easier t o  grasp. 
~ietzsche's practice turns this rule on its head, since the cases he 
chooses to discuss are generally more familiar and uncontroversial than 
. ., 
the wexamples" through which he discusses them. Instead of resolving 
the unfamiliar through the familiar, he dissolves the familiar through 
: i n 
the unfamiliar. He could hardly do otherwise, given his critique of the 
alternative: 
r' ' 
' . .. . 
~. , a .  
mat is it that the common people take for knowledge? What,do they 
I I . I . 
want when they want "knowledgen? Nothing more than this: something 
. 
strange is to be reduced to something f a m i l i a r .  ..Error of errors! 
What is familiar is what we are used to; and what we are used'to 
A . .  
is most difficult to llknoww - that is, to see as a problem; that 
, . * " .  - 
is, to see as strange, as distant, as "outside usn.55 
..* + ,  . 
3 ~ * 7 ,  . 
, ~' 
.* , . . " .  i ' . - 
Here again, then, we have a case in which rhetorical structures of 
+ .  
, , 
argumentation perform an entirely different f u n c t i o n  from that 
., . . .  s - , S. 
envisaged by Aristotle. Nietzsche argues "by examplen, but instead of 
> ,  ,-, , - , 
being the crudest form of reasoning, suitable only for the mob, it 
I . I <  
takes on the sophisticated functions of multiplying descriptions and 
- .  
challenging familiar assumptions, neither of which can be achieved 
I .  




The last question mark against Nietzsche's argumentation 
-.. z* , 
concerned the sheer v a r i e t y  of topics it discusses and deploys. Here, 
. . 
too, the Aristotelian categorization on which the criticism rests is 
, * '  
suspect in two respects, which are by now familiar: the restriction of 
. G C ,  . - 
eclectic argumentation to the "practical sphere" of rhetoric is a 
<I 
prejudice; and, in any case, Aristotle's description of how topics are 
j ' I  . - , -  
employed has serious flaws. 
I , >' 
- .  . 
Through his flouting of the rules, Nietzsche poses in the 
. . , i , . , ' :  
starkest possible way the question of whether there are, should be, or 
. , 
must be any rules for building up and defending a thesis in science or 
" i 
philosophy; for hh, it seems, anyth ing  goes .  As we have seen, this has 
led to charges of frivolity, and even insanity; more than any other 
philosopher, Nietzsche invites the response - "but what has this to do 
with philosophy?" 
+ .  
. .  . - .  . .  >,. 
It is worth considering the Aristotelian roots of such 
A .  . - 
accusations."In,rhetori~'~ proper sphere, it is perfectly-legitimate to 
talk about anything under the sun, because the only.restriction.,on 
topics'of argument is whether they will have the desired effects on the 
audience. The matters under,discussion are practical, the requirement 
is to reach-!a decision, and so criteria*of validity-and truth need-not 
apply. However,-the dialectical and scientific situations are 
different:Science consists%of pure-demonstration from first 
principles, so there is no question3of "topics of argumentn; merely of 
formal validity. A closer?comparison is possible.with dialectics,~where 
the horizon of truth leads to the development of procedural~rules. 
~ialectics is essentially about testing opinions against' often hidden 
background assumptions. Will the opinion still be asserted once*it has 
been-taken to pieces and compared with other commonplaces? . , ... 
.~ , - ,., It is not hard to see the attractiveness of this process: no- 
one likes to hold contradictory opinions: However, the.procedura1 rules 
of dialectics have certain very important rational defects, which the 
"freer", unmethodical processes of rhetorical argumentation can 
overcome. There are two main difficulties. The first is that what 
Aristotle terms the 'dialectical problem' is not itself sufficiently 
open to criticism. The criteria for acceptance are minimal: the 
question must admit a "yesn or "now answer, and it must be capable of 
serious disputation - matters of universal acceptance or rejection are 
. ;A * ,  . 
not candidates 'for dialectics. Aristotle ' gives as t&amples, among 
others: "Is the life of virtue pleasanter than the life of self- 
indulgence?" and "is justice always a virtue?n56 Once it is established 
that these questions have the correct form,,.they are tackled by 
analysing the nature of the concepts_involved. Thus in the first case 
one would.ask whether virtue and self-indulgence are never, sometimes . 
, . 
or always pleasant, and then reflect on the ,nature of pleasure. In the 
s e c o n d  . c a s e ,  o n e  h a s  t o - d e t e r m i n e - w h e t h e r  v i r t u e  b e l o n g s  t o  t h e  
essence, and t h e r e f o r e  t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of j u s t i c e ,  o r  merely numbers 
among i ts  o c c a s i o n a l ~ a t t r i b u t e s .  - .  . 
. I n t e r e s t i n g  a s  such procedures may be, t h e y  l a c k  any 
s u s p i c i o n  concerning t h e q p r o b 1 e m ; i t s e l f .  To proceed towards an answer 
t o  such  q u e s t i o n s  i s : a l r e a d y  t o  have  assumed t h a t  j u s t i c e ,  v i r t u e ,  
p l e a s u r e  etc. can b e  f u r n i s h e d  w i t h - d e f i n i t i o n s  and f i x e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  one a n o t h e r .  One t a k e s  it f o r  g r a n t e d  t h a t  such  q u e s t i o n s  have a  
s e r i o u s  purpose ,  which means t h a t  one  assumes a  r a t i o n a l  o r d e r  o f  
t h i n g s ,  i n t o  which t h e s e  a b s t r a c t  concepts  can  be f i t t e d .  There i s  no 
- ** r n  = 
mechanibm f o r  ques t ioning whether t h e s e  terms have any i-&&rent, o r  cdn 
* ,  
be g i v e n  a n y  g e n e r a l  d e f i n i t i o n .  W e  may l a u g h  a t  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  
~ r i s t o t e l i a n s ~  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a n g e l s , " . b u t  t h e  
d i a l c i c t i c a l  procedures  which 'allowed such a b s u r d i t i e s  a r e  s t i l l  ve ry  
much i n  p l a y .  I n  c e n t u r i e s  t o  come, many o f  o u r  c o n c e p t s  w i l l  b e  
v ,. . , - . . . , . .  ' I .  . 
regarded a s  equal ly  qua in t .  But, of Course, t h i s  w i l l '  be impossible f o r  
. L " .  
i s  t o  see whi le  w e  a r e  s t i l l  ' i s k i n g  ques t ions '  which presume t h a t  such 
I I . -, :' s " 8  " 
bo&epts have a  r o l e ,  and do n o t  a s k  where t h e y  come from, whd ises 
, . 
them and t o  what end .  
The importance ~ i i t z s c i i e  a t t a c h e s  t o  a sk ing  t h e  . r i g h t  
L : / I  . .  
q u e s t i  ons is s t r e s s e d '  i n  'E&& ~ & d :  '
. - .  , - -  . \ I' ~ .. 
why do 1.know a  few more t h i n g s ?  Why am I p s o  c l e v e r  a l t o g e t h e r ?  I 
have never r e f l e c t e d  on ques t ions  t h a t  a re ,none . -  I have not  
squandered myself ." 
. ,  , 27, . - , # - ,  ' _  
, , . 1 .  , . , ... , - 
The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  procedura l  method l i k e  t h a t  set ou t  i n  t h e  Topics i s  
. , '  . . . : , , 
capable only  (and t h i s  on ly  does no t  minimize t h e  value  such procedures 
- .  .. . . . 
may a t  times have) of reaching r e s o l u t i o n s  of t h e  problems a l ready  set 
by t h e  e x i s t i n g  system of concepts and values.  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h i s ,  t h e  
r ! .  
mixing of "inappro~riatew sLbjects has thec capacity to ldestabilik the 
, 1 
traditional frameworks of concept-analysis. Thus Nietzsche's extended 
discussions of climate, nutrition and other "mundane" details are a way 
of mocking the dialectical problems associated with Being, soul and 
existence - for to discuss them along traditional lines would already 
*.. .; . , . ' .,, 7 ,. . " 
concede tbo much to idealism. ~ietzsche*; "alternativB is 'riot"; .ign of 
.. " :,  < ,  
. t  I I , . 
madness, but the only way of rejecting the concepts involved; it seems 
"inappropriatem only to the extent that we remain under the grip 'Gf 
- ,  
idealism: 
The concept "soul", "spirit", finally even "immortal~.soul", 
invented so as to despise the body, so as to make;it sick - "holy" 
- so as to bring to all the things in life which deserve serious 
attention, the questions of nutriment, residence, cleanliness, 
weather, a horrifying f r i v ~ l i t ~ ! ~ ~  
The other "blind-spot" of dialectics is equally important for 
understanding Nietzsche's argumentation. As well as being restricted in 
the ways in which'it can approach a given "problemw, dialectics is also 
incapable of regarding certain things as problems at all; there are 
. ' .  
issues which simply cannbt be discussed. This is actually inevitable 
. . 
once one insists on having a method , - . any method - for testing 
opinions. A method has to rely on certain things being fundamentally 
agreed; .otherwise the method becomes what .is tested, as well as what 
does the testing. In dialectics, the procedure is to weigh 
controversial opinions against the,,background of % I  commonplace, 
reasonable opinions. For this to work, the~dialectical,problem must be 
something in the "middle range" of values;.if it questions,,something 
which everybody either accepts or rejects, the method,will be 
paralysed: , : . \  
it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that is to be 
set down as dialectical; for no one in his senses would make a 
proposition of what no one holds, nor yet make a problem of what 
is obvious to everybody; for the latter admits of no doubt,,while 
to the former no-one would assent. 60 
. , .  ., , 
 his is an absolutely correct judgement on Aristotlefs part: such 
problems cannot be given dialectical treatment. However, the reason is, 
not that one would have to be mad to consider such a problem, but that 
the procedures of dialectics could not cope with it. One cannot have,a 
dialectical discussion of a question such as "is virtue good?" because 
all the commonplaces upon which such a discussion would be based are 
less cer ta in  than the belief that virtue is good. Dialectics can only 
work where the disputants can hope to appeal to opinions that are not 
disputed. When it is clear that everything will be disputed, dialectics 
becomes inoperable. 
This is of obvious relevance to Nietzsche, for whom the chief* 
fascination lies precisely in those cases that fall outside the limits 
of dialectics as demarcated by Aristotle: 
I r: 
I attack only causes that are victorious - under certain 
circumstances I wait until they are  victorious...^ attack onl; 
causes against which I would find no allies. . .61 I 
One might say that the distinction of Nietzschefs philosophy is.to 
"make a problem of what is obvious to everybodyw, and therefore the 
procedural method of dialectics is unavailable to him. TO bring into 
question "fundamental truths" simply requires a bombardment of all 
commonplace opinions, and this is only likely to be achieved by,going 
outside the normal confines Of discussion and introducing "foreign" 
in order to stimulate a reappraisal. , . ,  i i 
< ,  - * ,  ' The key idea here is that the deployment of multiple sources 
of argumentati0n.i~ not simply to do,with "crowd pleasingw as Aristotle 
would have it and, conversely, it is not -necessarily llmore*scientificlv 
to adopt a step-by-step approach in the examination of hypotheses. It 
is only scientific in the sense that it helps to define and clarify the 
existing conceptual and evaluative frameworks within which inquiry 
takes-plabe. Any more radical ipplication of rational thoughf is ruleh 
out by this very insistence on,strict method. Of course, to suggest the 
scientific value of such unmethodical and free-ranging thinking is 
" _ # '  I . . ; . ." $ 
effectively to break one of 'the great1 taboos-of webtern philosophy - 
that reason and imagination. are essentially separate faculties. But in 
the end this means no more (though also no le9s) than to recognize, as 
many scientists have already.done,-the value of possibility and the 
corresponding disadvantages of seeking only what,is necessary in 
62 things. d , , . , , . .  . . . 
So far, I have been arguing that rhetorical argumentation has 
a role to play +science and philosophy. However, this . role . .  could not 
be fulfilled by retaining the structures outlined in Aristotlefs 
. . t 
Rhetoric and-simply broadening their scope. The - .  main reason for this,-is 
that the Rhetoric is not just a handbook for rhetors but ,also an 
important part of Aristotlefs general.theory of discourse; one which 
cannot,be+.~eparated from the rest. To take,rhetoric as outlined by 
~ristotle-as the master-discourse of politics, ethics, or science, 
would be-an impossible exercise, precisely because Aristotlets 
understanding of rhetoric is fundamentally reliant on these other 
-disciplines": rhetoric employs.the knowledge gleanedelsewhere: I 
think it is possible to strip 'away the basic ontological 
. . 
masquerading as a descriptive ac.count, thus opening the way for a more 
, - .  
distinctive role for rhetorical argumentation, which does not see-it as 
L ' .  
closely allied t d  logic &id dialectics. 
Y . '  , > . L  ; 
That rhetoric is nothing radically different from other modes 
- .  
of reasoning is made clear'in the first book of the Rhetoric.s-, The' 
t > * ,  s 
serious student of rhetoric is enjoined to make a close comparative 
,. . y For the true and'the approximately true.are apprehended'by'the 
.'h. 
same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient, 
. . 
natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the 
;,< truth.' Hence th=-man who 'makes a good guess at truth is likeii to 
. . , ,  :.make a*good guess at what.is reputable...Rhetoric is useful 
because things that are true and things that are just have a 
natural tendency to prevail over their opposites.. .63 
, :Y, , .. , ,. 
t : ' 6  . ? ' \ : . '  . '  
In seeking to defend rhetoric against Plators charge of immorality, 
Aristotle emphasizes the extent to which it . , . partakes of the moral , , 
order. If truth and right have a "natural-tendency to prevailw then the 
, _ 1  . . I '  , .  . 
rhet& will be 'well-equipped only when he knows what is right in 
.* " 1 
- .  
, .", - ~. 
whichever, field he operates -,deliberative, forensic, .or epideictic. 64 
And, indeed, Aristotle's detailed accounts of the various spheres of 
rhetoric concentrate,ahost exclusively on exactly these questions. The 
rhetor must know.what makes,for,good government and what the means are 
for achieving it;.he must know.what motivates good and bad actions 
respectively; and he must.be , .. able to recognize the qualities that 
constitute,upright and low characters. These must be known, in order 
that the,rhetor can argue for the good in general: 
. ? 
e*. . 
we must be able to employ persuasion, just as deduction can be 
employed, on opposite sides of a &eition, not in order that we 
,may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must.not make 
people believe what is wrong), but in order that,.we may see 
clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues 
unfairly, we on our part may be able to.confute him...the 
, I 
underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to contrary 
. - . . w  
views. No; things that are true and things that ake better are, by 
'- their nature, practically always easier t o  prove and more 
65 
,persuasive. . . . C r C !  t ,'. 
,, *', , -  * 
~ .." 
. . 
I -  < . , ' ' ;  . x  
Given this privileging of the "underlying facts1', it is hardly 
surprising to find that Aristotlef.s descriptions of the materials 
needed for rhetorica1.argument read like extracts from his works ,on 
politics and ethics. However, since.,rhetoric is addressed to a 
relatively uneducated audience, only "extractsw.are required: the most 
basic points wil1,suffice to convince the crowd. Thus, at the end of 
his discussion of the knowledge, required for deliberative oratory, 
Aristotle comments: 
*. - 
We have now considered the objects, present or future, at which we 
are to aim when urging any p r ~ p ~ s a l ,  and the grounds'on which we 
'are to base our persuasions'in favour of its utility...only, 
however,~.to the extent demanded by the present occasion; a 
detailed account of the subject has been given in the 
- - , . - , -  . . 
~t would appear, then, that there is not much for the rhetor to do, so 
, % 
far as argumentation is concerned. He merely has to learn the relevant 
. . .  . . 
facts and apply them to the particular circumstances. His role is 
passive and subservient: Aristotle even defines rhetoric as 'the 
faculty of observing in any given case the available means,of 
persuasion. '' Small,.wonder, therefore,. that ,his, treatise ,on rhetoric 
. . , , 
has remained of relatively minor interest to philosophers, 
.what is. missing, from Aristotlef s account? In a word, it .is 
the element of creativity in rhetorical-argumentation. This is at least 
suggested by the term given in Latin to rhetorical argumentation, 
namely inventio - the invention or discovery of suitable meanslof 
persuasion. According to Cicero, the key requirements for this 
wdiscovery of arguments" are acuteness or natural talent (acumen, 
ingeni um) , theory (rat1 01 , and diligence .(di li genti a) , of which. the 
most important is the first .68 Though Cicero was heavily inf luenced by 
Aristotle, his awareness of the importance of acumen is indicative of a 
different emphasis (as is his typically   om an belief in" pradtice) , Why 
, * < "  
require acumen if there are fixed and discoverable rules for good and 
bad government and for good and bad actions? , . 
The problem is that Aristotle gives the impression that the 
job is done, and that after him there is no need to winvent" but simply 
C * .  .. .. 
to learn.  hit he was extremely effective in this regard 'is witnessed 
, .,. 
by the degeneration of much =hetorical teachikg into the mere learnin4 
I +  . 
of a vast wstockw of facts and arguments. The cosy assumption is that 
- .  . 
the world is basicilly fixed and ultimately amenhble to description, in 
which case invention is not' needed. But at its best, the inventio of 
rhetoric is capable of approaching subjects with a breadth of outlook 
which is 'unavailable' t'o wscientific method". Because it arises out of 
the concern to persuade and is not dominated by idgical dr ontological 
rules and restrictions, any material may be used, and it 'is up to the 
=hetor to' justify its inclusion. Cicero moves towards this' idea of a 
, 
more active use of material: 
I hold that all things relating to the intercourse of fellow- 
citizens and the ways of mankind, or concerned with everyday life, 
the political System, our own corporate society, the common 
sentiments of humanity, natural inclinations and morals must be 
mastered by.the orator; if not in the sense that he is to advise 
on these matters one by one, as the philosophers do, yet so far at 
least as to weave them skilfully into his discourse.. .69 
* ' 
There is no need-for Cicero to be so apologetic a b o ~ t , t h i s ~ ~ w e a v i n g  
in", ,for 'it may be.-that insights which cannot be gleaned from a 
systematic "one by onew study can be produced by the mixture of 
subject-matter appropriate .to rhetoric. Compare this with what 
Nietzsche,'says about his own use of Wagner and Schopenhauer:',.. . + ,  
What.1 did by and large was t o  t a k e - t w o  famous and still 
I '  . ( 
altogether undetermined types by the forelock, as one takes an 
opportunity by the forelock, in order to bay something, in .order 
to have a couple more formulae, signs, means of expression in my 
.hands. 70 
,', , .(, , ,  - .  
Here,is the essential difference: while the Aristotelian,rhetor remains 
an observer of the means of persuasion, Nietzsche is concerned to forge 
an argument through the use of his knowledge about various subjects., 
Moreover, this willingness and ability to create is not-reliant on the 
possession of genius: Aristotlet,s account systematically excludes 
creativity, because in an.essentially ordered world, ,reason does not 
require it; but if the world is a chaos, then to understand it will 
always involve a creative element, which is present neither in the 
demonstrations of Aristotelian science nor, the.testing procedures of 
his dialectics .,,The inventi o of rhetoric has great potential for 
playing the required.role, but not when limited by the Aristotelian 
world-view. 
/ 
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I will conclude.this chapter by summarizing the main,implications, as -I 
see them, of this long re-interpretation of the nature and 
<, , 
possibilities of rhetorical argumentation. There are consequences both 
for the ,role o f  rhetoric =in general, -and for the .way -in which Nietzsche 
is'approached and used, which flow from the line of argument I have 
adopted here. :,:. - -  ' - ,  . : 't . c, , ., .:,. . L.*,~, . S ,  . , , -. + 
- r 2 , b  . I So far as rhetoric'is concerned,, some elements of"my account 
merely echo the consensus of"rhet~rical,-theory~~ in.the past few 
decades. This applies particularly to the basic-assumption of this 
chapter,"which is that,'argumentation is an ,important part of rhetoric. 
Here,, 1- am:in complete~concord with>the overturning of the~platonic 
prejudice that rhetoric ,is-about "mere style"; the return to Aristotle 
has helped to break down the'centuries-old prejudice that rhetoric does 
not engagedthe ,rational3 faculty. However,.t'he.significance o f t h i s  
rediscovery will depend on the'answers to two.further questions,%.which 
today arerfar more controversial: first, given that rhetoric does:use 
argumentation, 'to what -'extent does that argumentation work .along 
patterns -already understood and explored (i.e:demonstration and 
dialectic), and to what.extent is it3,different? Second, what is the 
"proper sphere" of rhetorical argumentation? Does-it 'apply only to the 
realm" of "practical decisions", or can it: invade 'the provinces 'of 
> ,, . , * . ,  . science and philosophy? *. - !t . ,.?' gy: , - s .  . 
a .  The question that-is often.posed by-contemporary discussions 
of*rhetorical-arguments is whether'they can be assessed in terms of 
soundness, or' merely in terms of' e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  Since the, goal of 
rhetoric is to persuade, 'an.extreme version of the latter view might 
assess an argument by whether it actually,succeeds i n  persuading an 
audience:',one looks a t  the 'interaction between audience and'text. At 
the opposite extreme.the audience is excluded altogether, and the 
question becomes whether the arguments meet the "required standardsw. 71 
~ristotle tends to mix.thetwo approaches'together: the fundamental 
requirement of-rhetoric is to persuade, but the:best2way of persuading 
is to%employ sound argumentation.-Hence the stress on arguing correctly 
which pervades the,Rhetoric. . ,  , . '  . ,. r
- - - *  , The approach I have taken here has.been to follow this notion 
of "rational soundnessw~ of .argumentation rather ,.than- to start 
researching the .empirical effectiveness.of rhetorical arguments. 
However,-I have come to conclusions very different from Aristotle's. 
Fordhe clearly takes the measures of rational soundness to be the logic 
of deductiontand induction and the careful method of dialectics; 
rhetorical argumentationdretains thezoutlines of these sound 
procedures, but is able to weaken-them because of the rational 
deficiencies of its audience. Thus, to the extent that rhetorical 
argumentation is "reasonablen it is because of its affinities with 
other, more clearly rational forms; and to the extent that it is not, 
it is because2it does not need to be. What I have hoped to suggest, 
through the explorations of Nietzschets argumentation, is the 
possibility of argument that is rational-in ways that Aristotle cannot 
consider, due to the ontological prejudices of his framework of 
rationality. Aristotle's procedures are alllabout the creation of a 
unitary*and systematic description: they test hypotheses; they rule out 
and they establish. Against this, I argue that the resources of 
rhetoric are not weaker versions of these unifying procedures: they 
tend in a different direction. The "gapsWbof the enthymeme, the 
imaginative connections of analogy, and the infinite multiplicity of 
material all go towards making many hypotheses reasonable,* rather than 
making one canonical and discarding the rest. They offer the 
possibility, in other words, of "rationalityw disconnected from 
wsoundness". r 
A possible collective name for these forms~of rhetorical 
argumentation-i~-"pr~d~~ti~e log c". This contrasts with deductive and 
inductive, and suggests the important principle of "leading forwardsw 
(which would be a'straight transliteration from the'latin "prow 
wducere"). Deductive and inductive logics grip us with the'presurnption 
that rational criticism means simply to establish a theory. This, 
according*to^Nietzsche, implies,a basic complacency: find something 
that wworksw,-and stick with it; accept it as the truth. Thus it-would 
be a mistake to conceive of a new organon for productive 1ogic;because 
it is not a logic that tests and satisfies and ends thinking, but one 
that drives it forward, showing it new opportunities and-reasons for 
dissatisfaction with explanations that: may be "soundw according to 
traditional norms. - . , 
The second question I.asked was-whether this rhetorical logic 
applies only to the accepted "rhetorical.spherew of political decision- 
making and legal judgements. It is certainly understandable why more 
flexible forms of argument should arise in.areas of practical decision- 
making; quite apart from the considerations of a non-specialist 
audience.. Aristotle himself admits that the traditionaliapplication of 
rhetoric is to Situations which,allow many possible outcomes, and he 
contrasts this with-science and its search for the necessary,and 
eternal features. of,exiStence. A form of reasoning which,allows many 
possible courses to emerge and enter serious consideration,is therefore 
in no way superfluous and diversionary, but a natural outcome of the 
feature of choice which governs such situations. .-. 
of course, if one'adoptsJa7positivist conception of 
philosophy and science, the productive logic of rhetoric will become 
"unsound" outside the practical sphere, because it encourages the 
multiplication of hypotheses and interpretations, when the task.of 
science and p h i l ~ s ~ p h ~  is to find the true description of the world. 
However, if we assume either that*there is no stable true world and/or 
the weaker hypothesis that there is no unique accurate description or 
explanation of the world, then the relevance and soundness of 
rhetorical argumentation starts to emerge:- it enforces the conception 
of science as a process, it counteracts all tendencies towards dogmatic 
world-interpretations (including the dogmatic faith in the power of 
traditional logics), and it produces material for,the multiplication of 
perspectives and interpretations, which other forms,of argumentation do 
not. To'summarize, then: not only is rhetorical argumentation 
reasonable, it has its own distinctive standards of rationality, and 
they are standards which have a-.relevance far wider than the 
traditional practical concerns of rhetoric. 72 
The remaining .questions concern 'the- consequences. 'this 
detailed study of Nietzsche's argumentation and its relationship to the 
rhetorical tradition might.have forfinterpreting Nietzsche. The first, 
obvious implication of almost everything I have said here is-the 
futility of producing "logical reconstructionsw of.Nietzschets 
arguments, which unfortunately-has.been all too typica1.a manoeuvre, 
particularly in Anglo-American Nietzsche-interpretation; This mistake 
(it is really nothing less than that) stems from exactly the same 
prejudices which have led to the,widespread underestimation or 
dismissal of ,rhetorical argumentation. Not only d o .  these 
reconstructions ignore everything Nietzsche wrote about the weaknesses 
of logical and dialectical argument,'they exclude the possibility of 
alternative Structures Of rationality and assume that Nietzsche was 
simply a bad or careless logician, not considering that he might be a 
different kind of logician. 
However, there are ---, ways of ignoring , Nietzschefs 
other than simply rewriting his arguments. Under the 
influence of ~eidegger, there has been a tendency to focus discussion 
, .. - - . . ,  
on Nietzschet s "great themesw of Ubermensch, ' will to power, and ete&al 
I I. ' 
recurrence. There is a grave danger that the more seriously and 
earnestly these thought-experiments are taken, the more pervasive will 
become the notion that they are metaphysical descriptions; this, 
indeed, is exactly ~eidegger's understanding of+them. But according to 
Nietzsche's own understanding of the universe.as a process, such 
wdescriptionswwould be an impossibility. The nature of the.world, even 
as a world of becoming, simply cannot-be fixed in.thought. As a 
corrective measure it is preferable to go to the other extreme,, ignore 
the "themesw altogether, and concentrate on the.endless process of 
scientific inq~iry.'~ .? 
What I have tried to glean from Nietzsche's' comments on 
science and the model of his argumentation is in a sense a demand to 
restrict interpretation to what we can use for ourselves,' and.to 
disregard the rest. What matters i s 9 t o , b e  "doing science" in 
~ietzsche's sense - inquiring and advancing; whether or not Nietzsche 
, . 
can act as model for such a procedure is a subsidiary question. At any 
rate, perhaps one of the greatest of all links between Nietzschean 
science and rhetorical argument is the intellectual necessity of strife 
and opponents, which all master-descriptions, systems, and the 
assimilating forces of logic and dialectics, set out to overcome; 
~ietzsche's comments on the ageing philosopher indicate not* just the' 
dangers for the individual,,but what Western philosophy has almost 
. - always been - or, at least, wanted to be: 
. . 
..*$ . , . . * .  _ I  
. ," . , .  : . I '  , 
ft is all over now with the self-surpassing desire that filled him 
in earlier years for genuine pupils, that is to say genuine 
continuators of his thought, that is to say genuine 
opponents . . .now it torments him that he =annot 'be the last 
thinker; he ponders how, with the inheritande he kill bestow' upon 
! 
mankind, he can a l s o  impose upon them a l i m i t a t i o n  of  independent 
t h i n k i n g . . . a f t e r  h imknone  s h a l l  have  f u l l - p o w e r  o v e r  h i s  own 
i n t e l l e c t ,  h e  wants  t o  s t a n d  a s  t h e  bulwark  a g a i n s t  which t h e  
surges of thought i n  genera l  s h a l l  eve r  af terwards  break...74 
Despi te  t h e  c o u n t l e s s  warnings and e x h o r t a t i o n s ,  t h i s  a s p e c t  
of  N i e t z s c h e p s  t h i n k i n g  h a s  n o t  y e t  been t a k e n  s e r i o u s l y ,  o r  l i g h t l y  
enough;  a n d  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  p r o m i n e n c e  o f  t h e  p h r a s e  t h a t  
encapsula tes  it: gay a c i  ence. Even i n  t h i s  p resen ta t ion ,  though, t h e r e  
has  been much about sc ience ,  b u t  l i t t l e  g a i e t y .  This  s c i e n t i f i c  s p i r i t  
is  eager  and e a r n e s t  and t h i r s t s  f o r  knowledge, b u t  i t s  joyfulness  and 
f r i v o l i t y  a s  y e t  remains a mystery. There i s  an a i r  of paradox about  
t h e  t h e s i s  s o  f a r :  can Nie tzsche  a f t e r  a l l  be a sober  s c i e n t i s t ,  and 
h i s  r h e t o r i c  t h e  v e r y  embodiment of  r a t i o n a l i t y ?  I d o  n o t  wish t o  
r e p u d i a t e  t h e s e  c o n c l u s i o n s  j u s t  a s  I have  r e a c h e d  them, f o r  t h i s  
element of se r iousness  and e a r n e s t  sc i ence  e x i s t s  i n  Nietzsche, even i f  
it i s  t h e  s i d e  of h i s  work which c a l l s  f o r t h  mockery: ,"No! Not such 
t o n e s !  L e t  u s  s t r i k e  up more a g r e e a b l e ,  more joyous tones!",75 ~ u t  
t h i s  is  t h e  point :  without t h e  mockery and t h e  laughter ,  t h e  impression 
would be a s  lop-sided a s  it would be  without  t h e  sc ience .  O r ,  t o  p u t  it 
sober ly :  how can reason,  t r u t h ,  and s c i e n c e  be amusing, s t y l i s h ,  and 
e n t e r t a i n i n g ?  It is, a f t e r  a l l ,  o f t e n  h a r d  t o  b e l i e v e  e v e n  i n  an  
a c c i d e n t a l  r e l a t i o n  between t h e s e  e l e m e n t s ,  l e t  a l o n e  t h e  s o r t  of 
i n t r i n s i c  connect ion  sugges ted  by t h e  p h r a s e  "gay s c i e n c e w .  And s o  we 
a r e  b r o u g h t  t o  t h e  t h r e s h o l d  of t h e  mos t -d i scussed  e lement  b o t h  of  
~ i e t z s c h e  and of r h e t o r i c :  e l o c u t i o ,  s t y l e ;  w i t h  t h e  t a s k  b e f o r e  u s  
which he set out: 
The l o v e l y  human b e a s t  always seems t o  l o s e  its good s p i r i t s  when 
it t h i n k s  w e l l ;  it becomes n s e r i o u s . "  And "where l a u g h t e r  and 
g a i e t y  a r e  found, t h i n k i n g  does n o t  amount t o  any th ingn :  t h a t  i s  
the  prejudice o f  t h i s  ser ious  beast  against  a l l  "gay sc ience ."  - 
well then, let us  prove that t h i s  i s  a ~ r e j u d i c e . ' ~  
* -'-$ . . r ! , -  ., s , 0. .  :, , . . .  
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Throughout this thesis, ;I have,resisted the'modern tendency to reduce 
nrhetoricn to "figures of speechn or "stylen, and have-sought to 
consider Nietzsche'a contribution to a wider; more classical conception 
of the term. Necessary as such a revision is, however, it would be 
equally partial to ignore altogether the question of style which, as 
the element of elocutio (- delivery, presentation; from e-loquor, "to 
speak outn), was after all an integral part-of classical rhetoric. This 
does not mean that the modern treatments have, after all, been 
partially correct, and should be acknowledged as such. On the contrary, 
their deformed understanding of rhetoric in general inevitably infects 
their approaches to Nietzschefs ,eloquence1 .in.particular; a fact which 
makes it all the more necessary that the quebtion of style should be 
broached once again, from a fresh perspective. , .  . . 
\ The general outline of the approach taken here.can be viewed 
by means of a comparison.with one of the most common methods of 
treating Nietzschets style, which! I have described as "literary- 
criti~al".~ Such studies probe,Nietzschef s eloquence .in detail, and 
often yield valuable insights; but they'fundamentally,take for granted 
the literary nature of Nietzschegs.texts, and seek to appreciate the 
impact made by particular cases of writerly skill. In contrast to this; 
I want to ask why Nietzsche insists, in theory and practice, on-the 
overall importance of style - why he displays a fierce will to 
eloquence in the face of a tradition which has always warned 
philosophers of the irrelevance and the dangers of such artistic 
impulses. These questions are outside - before.-and after - the domain 
of traditional aesthetic theory, because aesthetics asks about the 
nature of beauty and what is beautiful after the decision has been made 
to raise-truth above beauty or beauty above truth. In.the struggle 
between philosophy and rhetoric, what matters is not the naturerand 
meaning of art but rather its.value. And what remains to be appreciated 
- what I.hope to indicate here - is how and why Nietzschers eloquence 
stands against the answer given by philosophy and for that of~rhetoric; 
For such a discussion to make any sense, a preliminary requirement must 
be to understand the nature of philosophy's objections to eloquence. 
, .  . 
Here, as in previous chapters, the Platonic dialogues are the key 
source, since they argue for evaluations,which after Plato became 
accepted as axioms and thus disappeared from philosophical debate. The 
main discussions of art and beauty &dur in' the ' ~ e ~ u b l f  c, thi 
symposium, and the ~haedrus:' they are worth. separate treatment, for 
although all provide reasons for philosophical suspicion of the 
I. . 
* .  I .  
, .. , !  
aesthetic, the debates have quite different emphases, so that it is 
. . 
possible to identify two fundamental objections to eloquence, which 
will be used as the basis for the general discussion that follows.' 
The critique of art in the Republic concentrates on the 
i 
illusory nature of artistic representation. Socrates asserts that 'the 
. , 
artist's representation (mimesis) stands at third remove from 
, . . 
realityrt5 because the artist always represents particular objects 
I .  - , 
which are themselves, according t o  the Platonic scheme, mere 
-representationsn of their respective ideal Forms. Thus there is a 
. , 
hierarchy from (e .gm)  the Form of the bed, which is perfect, through 
the (necessarily imperfect) craftsman's "representation- of a bed, down 
t o  t h e  even  less p e r f e c t  a r t i s t i c  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  bed .  The 
~ e p u b l i c ' s  fundamental o b j e c t i o n  t o  a r t  i s  t h a t  it s e e k s  t o  convince 
i t s  a u d i e n c e  t h a t  t h i s  poor  i m i t a t i o n . o f  a n  i m i t a t i o n  i s  t h e  r e a l  
t h i n g ,  and t h a t  t h e  p o e t  o r  p a i n t e r  t h u s  h a s  g e n u i n e  knowledgesof  
Being.  Not o n l y  d o e s  t h e  a r t i s t  n o t  know t h e e F o r m s  o f  t h i n g s  - a  
knowledge a v a i l a b l e  only  t o  t h e  h i g h e s t  wisdom - he .does  no t  even know 
a b o u t  t h e  " a p p a r e n t w  world,  s i n c e  h e  d o e s  n o t  make o r  u s e - e v e r y d a y  
ob jec t s ,  bu t  merely observes them. F a r  from having p r i v i l e g e d  i n s i g h t ,  
t h e  a r t i s t  i s  t h u s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i g n o r a n t .  H e  persuades  and i n f l u e n c e s  
people due t o  t h e  power of i l l u s i o n  and t h e  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  of t h e  human 
mind t o  e r r o r :  + .  
a  s t i c k  w i l l  look ben t  i f  you p u t  it i n  t h e  , . water ,  s t r a i g h t  when 
you t a k e  it o u t ,  and  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  s h a d i n g  c a n  make t h e  same 
. . 
s u r f a c e  seem t o  t h e  eye  concave or convek; ' and i t ' s  a i 1 ' ' a  h a t t e r '  
o f * o u r  mind being confused. It is on t h i s - n a t u r a l  weakness of ours  
t h a t  t h e  s c e n e - p a i n t e r  and c o n j u r o r  and t h e i r  f e l l o w s  r e l y  when 
they  deceive us  with t h e i r  t r i c k s .  6 
Both t h e  Symposium and Phaedrus d e a l  wi th  t h e  n a t u r e  of love  
, ,,,.' - . - ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a r t ;  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e y '  s u g g e s t  a n '  i m p d r t a n t  ' c r i t i c i i m  
which i s , r e l a t i v e l y  m a r g i n a l  i n  t h e  R e p u b l i c g s  a c c o u n t ,  namely t h e  
seduct fve  na tu re  of t h e  a e s t h e t i c  - i t s  appeal  t o  t h e  lower elements of 
t h e  human b e i n g .  I n  b o t h  t h e  P h a e d r u s  a n d  t h e  Symposium, t h e  
ph i losopher  i s ' p r e s e n t e d  a s  a  l o v e r  of beauty ,  b u t  0 f . a  v e r y  s p e c i a l  
t y p e  o f  b e a u t y ,  t h e  Form of  B e a u t y , . w h i c h  d o e s  n o t  r e s i d e  i n  a n y  
e a r t h l y  o b j e c t .  P l a t 0  d e s c r i b e s  a  gradual.  advance, i n  which t h e  t r u e  
d i s c i p l e  w i l l  move from l o v e  of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t  t o  love  
of t h e  genera l  metaphysical  idea:  he w i l l  recognize t h a t  ' t h e  beauty of 
-. ' 
e a c h  and ' ' ev2ry  body i s  t h e  samei, and a f t e r  t h a t  w i l l  make t h e  even 
- .  
- *  / .  . * * . < ,  ,~ ~ . .  t )  . ,-. > r ^ C  .%* 
more important  d iscovery  t h a t  , t h e  b e a u t i e s  o i ' t h e ~ b b d y  a ;eSas  nothing 
. . .  
# I , .  - ,  . . 
t o  t h e  , . beau t i e s ,  o f  t h e  s o u l '  ; t h r o u g h .  t h i s  , c o m p a r i s o n ,  . , '.he , w i l l  
conclude  t h a t  t h e - b e a u t y  of t h e v b o d y  i s  n o t ,  a f t e r  a l l ;  o f . s o r g r e a t  
' ^ .  
rnomerit.,' Whi le  i n  t h e  ~ ~ m ~ o s i v m  t h i s i s  p r e s e n t e d  a s  a  smooth  
progression,  t h e  Phaedrus s t r e s s e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l l y  d i s r u p t i v e  c h a r a c t e r  
8 
of  l u s t  f o r  t h e  p h y s i c e l ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  myth of' t h e  chd;ioteer; b u t  
. .  . 9 . ? *  - - q i  
common bo th  accounts  i s  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  complete s e l f - c o n t r o l  and 
. *  , . .: , 
overcoming of p h i s i c a l  disi;e i s  ' the '  philosobherr  s objec t ive .  ' ' 
, "".Z.* * ,  * .  :.. * ' ,  ' , 
~ h i i  h ierarchy i s  .g iven furt'h;r r e i n i o r c e ~ h t  i n  A l c i b i a d e s ~ s  
, ~ *, . I 4  - .  .~ , . 
d h n k e n  speech . in  p r a i s e  of ~ o c r a t e s :  which i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  d e s p i t e  h i s  
o ~ t e r / ~ h ~ s i c a l / a ~ ~ ' a r e n t  u g l i e s s ,  s o c r a t e s  i s  i n u i f e c t  b e d u t i f d l .   he 
g r e a t e r  fake of s p i r i t u a l  beauty is  t h u s  dramatized by t h e  i rony  t h a t  
P I  
the '  p h y s i c a i l y  b e a u t i f u l  A l c i b i a d e s  i s  t h e  l o v e r  of  t h e  p h y s i c a l l y  
dec rep id  Socrates,  which t u r n s  t h e  normal s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  upside-down. 
I > .  
, . 
. . .  . 
S o c r a t e s t  . . u n s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  i s  k e e n  t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h i s  a e s t h e t i c  
+. - revaluat ion:  .*. . . , 
4 .   'p  ' .  .' . ' .  
. . 
. , *  
- 7  * > . A .  "l,, 
"you mudt f i n d  m e  bo e x t r a o r d i n b r i l y  b e a u t i ' f u l  t h a t  id;; own 
a t t r a c t i o n b  must be q u i t e  ec l ipsed .  &d ' i f  yoL;;e t r y i n g  t o  b a r t e r  
y o u r  own b e a u t y  f o r  t h e  b e a u t y  you h a v e  f o u n d  i n  m e ,  y o u ' r e  
d r i v i n g  a v e r y  hard ,  b a r g a i n ,  l e t  m e  t e i l  you. ,Your re t r y i n g  , t o  
. i s  
exchange t h e  semblance  of b e a u t y  f o r  t h e  t h i n g  i t s e l f  - l i k e  
. . - ,  
~ i o r i e d e  and ~ l a u c u s ~ * s w a & i ~ g  bronze f  o; gold. 
- .  , _ . .  I ,  ' ,  . .  8 . , "  ,_, I '' k : , 
. . .. . ,  . 
*,. . - . , , ., . ... - . , a  .. . , ' 
s his " t r u e w ,  i n n e r  beauty  a l i o  s u r f a c e s  ( c r u c i a l l y ,  f o r  our  'purpose&) 
. ' ?  . ,  . , % 
i n  ' ~ l c i b i a d e s ' s  desc r ip t ' i on  of s o c r ' i t e s t s  manner o f  speech,  and i t s  
absence of  charm. A t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  t h e  c o n t r a s t  wi th  r h e t o r i c  i s  almost  
.A - , , .- , > - ' 
palpable  : r i . . 
he,always.seemS t o  be*  s a y i n g  t h e  same o l d  t h i n g  i n  j u s t  t h e  same 
o l d  wayI s o  t h a t  anyone who wasn't u sed  t o V h i s  s t y l e  a n d , w a s n r t  
very:quick on',the uptake would naturally take 'it for-the most. 
utter nonsense. But if you open up his arguments, and really get 
under the skin of them, you'll find that they're the only 
arguments in the world that have any sense at all, and that nobody 
' " - * : ' G !  ?: 61s6,s are. so godlike, so rich in images ' o£ virtue'. ; .' . 
_ .  .... ,.. .. ' ,' . , 
. i ,  - .; ? . _ *  .. . , , ,  
s .  ' 
The plea is t o  avoid deception by appearancis'and "iine words" and td 
~ 
penetrate to-the essence of things, to the underlying truth. 
So, to summarize: art should be excluded from philosophy 
v :  
because it has no connection with the essence of reality but pretends 
it does; also because, like all material things, it has the potential 
. . , .. io distract attention &om the truly important - it appeals t o  a lower 
pbrt of the human bein&. b his dual inapprdprihteness is briefly 
recognized inlthe G u b l i c :  
. I '  '. " ,  
. . , .  , , "  . 
-we can fairly take.the poet and set him beside the painter. He 
,resembles+him,both because his ,works have a low degree of truth 
and because he appeals to a ldw element i n  the mind. We are 
, ,  :I . . ,. 
therefore quite 'right 'to 'refuse tb admit ~ i m  to a properly run 
I state, because he,stirs-*up and encourages and strengthens'the 
lower elements+in.the mind at the expense of reason... 10 
~:,.. , ' * ! A ,  
, t i  , , i :  . . , , 
. . .  It I is remarkable, ,given the lapse of time involved, how 
closely,many modern cofnmentators~on,Nietzsche' manage to retrace these 
platonic criticisms. ." Pasley, for example, while insisting ,on the 
importance of Nietzsche's artistic language, invokes.the old problem of 
. , 1 * 
the,illusion that gets itself taken seriously: 
' ,.:, 
. , , E l  , 
,- .-* - .  ? ,  . 
~ o t  least among the questions raised in these pages is how far 
. ~. - . <  
[~iet~sbhil allowed his imagery to dictate his argument even when 
A , he supposed that his argument was .in control of his imagery;-how 
,. ,".."., 
far his theories and doctrines were formed or.swayed - more 
. ,>>, .  
decisively than he knew and to more damaging effect than he could 
') 
foresee -.by the picture-patterns and the mythical models.on which 
., * .  
he drew. 11 
8 ,. Y '  " '  , . , , ' . %  .. I ' . %  . , ; -  . . 
Even more pervasive than this suspicion, however, is the assumption of 
? , ' . , * ,  i. 
a dichotomy between the beautiful and artistic "expressionn and the 
, t ! < : . ,  , " 
underlying ideas of Nietzsche, examples of which have already been 
-. 
, , , - 
documented in earlier chapters. 12 
, ' . . 
AS with all the criticisms of rhetoric discussed in this thesis, a 
. .  " i . . 
variety of anti-Platonic strategies present themselves, The first is to 
- ,  - T .  r .  i 
, " 
dispute the applicability of the Platonic criticisms to Nietzschefs 
case: this would mean to insist in various ways that Nietzschers 
. .: = 
.I ' 
. . , .  
eloquence is non-illusory, and actually reveals some kind of important 
truth.0~. meaning. The second strategy - not necessarily incompatible 
with the first --is to attempt to undermine the validity of'plato's 
- 1  , 
critique, by' indicating philosophy~s complicity with what it attempts 
to exclude. The most sophisticated of these efforts is to deconstruct 
, _ . .  ' 
, , .  
the critique of style. The third approach, more consiste'nt with the 
n, , , 
oderaii strategy adopted in this thesis, is to accept the platonic 
. ,. 
debcriptioili, 'but seek to' transform the evaluation. 1n20ther words: 
what if Nietzsche's eloquence is both "illusoryn and "seductivew? What 
then...? I will return to these questions later;,but first, there ,is a 
need to'explain why the alternative strategies - which have, after all, 
, , '. I . . 
dominated recent discussions of ~ietzsche's style (s) - aee inadequate. 
. The most common response,to the philosophicalm, criticism of 
. . \  . 
eloquencejhas been to claim that literary language is not at "third 
. ' , ,  - , 
, . 
remove from realityn, as Plat0 believed, and may actually be capable of 
expressing truths'that are inaccessible to more prosaic thinking.. The 
debate has ragedewith particular ferocity about the trope of metaphor, 
and the way it functions. In the Romantic tradition, metaphors are not 
regarded,as wornamentalw versions~of literal truths,- but rather as 
presenting natural, sensuous and direct relations to the world, beyond 
the scope of conceptual language. Much attention is given to "dead 
metaphorw, or initially physical, material terms which have lost their 
6 .  
immediate contact with the world through constant us'e, 'and have become 
abstract and immaterial. - , 
The suspicion that Nietzsche held such a view of language and 
' C  
metaphor is based primarily on his unpublished 1873 essay'*wOn truth axid 
lie in an extra-moral sensew (henceforth abbreviated to l1OTLW), which 
emphasizes the metaphorical ,essence of language. In a much-quoted 
passage, Nietzsche asserts that 
- .  ~ r u t h s  are illusions which we have'forgotten are illusions; they 
are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of 
sensuous force... 14 
 his sense that conceptual truth - the normal "coinagew of philosophy - 
- ,  , . 
has lost or forgotten an original metaphoricity is indicafed dy 
' .< .  , 
~ietzsche's comments on the origins of language in the same essay: 
' ' < * 
TO begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred' into ' an' image :, 
first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second 
metaphor. And each time there is a complete.overleaping of one 
sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different 
'one.. .we believe that we know something about the things 
themselves when we speak of trees, colours, snow, and flowers; and 
yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things - metaphors which 
correspond in no way to the original entities.'' 
The :language in thisessay is necessarily.paradoxica1, since Nietzsche 
is.describing many senses of "truth"; but hescertainly,implies that 
what- we-normally think of as the language of truth - literal 
expressions,~conceptual definitions - emerged and prospered due to a 
will to power, not a will to truth. The advantage of concepts lies in 
r. . = .  - .  * . h -1 . \ ,  '._ * 
their"'6reater' power: 
* ,  - .  L . ,-. -. ./ ^. , 
. - C ., - 
something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could 
never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the 
construction of a pyramidal order,according to castes-and degrees, 
the creation of a .new .world of laws, privileges, subordinations. 
, I  
and clearly marked boundaries - a new world, one which now 
.. , ~ , .  , 
. , 
cdnfronti that 'dther 'vivid world oi first impressid'& as Aora' 
solid,, more universal, better known, and more human than the 
immediately , - perceived world, and thus as the-regulative and 
imperative world.16 
. , I .  . r, . . . . .. ,,. . , 
, . 
, - .. 
i '  
- , *  & , ' <  
~, $ * *  * *  - , . I )  
. : 
Lying in this praise for the conceptual, there lurks a justification 
for the return to metaphorical language: if that language better 
. .. .-. .<l 
captures our "vivid first impressions" and "immediately perceived 
.* , , 
world", it can be considered more truly descriptive. And thus, against 
,.* . 
' . ' .,. ' . '  
plato, it can be seen as the appropriate vehicle for philosophical 
~ \$" , . 
thinking in its efforts to approach a description of reality. 
There are a number of reasons why such a "defencew of 
, , 
~ietzsche's eloquence would be quite inadequate. In the first place, it 
. . 
' .  
is a justification of metaphor, whereas style and eloquence often arise 
- .  I .  
from other uses of language to which this framework would clearly be 
. , t r  '. - 
inapplicable: "metaphor" cannot stand as a synecdoche for the totality 
< 
of ~ietzsche's eloquence. 
' 4  
~ u t  even when the theory is restricted to metaphor it is 
. , 
highly problematic. Derrida describes it as a wsyrnbolist~ theory, l7 
because the metaphorical terms.are regarded as holding a strong 
connection with material objects, which is *lost .or.;ef f aced when 
metaphors become concepts. Something like this seems-to be imp1ied.b~ 
Nietzsche's metaphorical description of truths as * . . % .  
. - , ' I  . ~ ; ; ? . !  "- . . , . 
., , .* 
metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of 
sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now 
. _  
" '18 considered as metai and no lonker as coins. 
, . Z .  . )  . 
11 j , ,  
a - . -* . '  1 :  
., ..,, ..*; .. 
its-~errida points out, a symboiist conception of metaphor -retains 
the dubiouj m&aphysical ideal of a proper link betwLen''languna&e and 
the "things themselves", the shift being only in the linguistic vehicle 
through which this link is to be established. To,look on metaphor 
nostalgically as a way to return to the immediacy of'human relations 
with Being, before they were corrupted by the imposition of concepts, 
is to rewrite the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis. Moreover, Derrida 
ih&s tihiti the attempts that 'some "sy~bolistsw have made t a  reduce 
- .  
abstract philosophical concepts to "original metaphors1* is no" escape 
from philbsbphy, since it repaats the central'motif of a return to 
. . . .  
k d i a t e l y  present truth. such theories dr; thus, for Derrida, w&s bf 
, . ' 
reinforcing the system they o$tensibly confront : 'me'taphor remains, in 
< '. 
its essential characteristics, a classical philosopheme, a 
. . - , - r $  
,I9 > - '  metaphysical concept. 
I . .  ' '~ / . .  
Has Nietzschi fallen into this trap? Many con~ntators, 
. .  ( "  . . , - . , 
doncerned by passages 'from "OTLW such as those cited above, have sobg& 
, . . - ,  , .  . . % . .  
to distance this essay from Nietzsche's mature position, out 
~. . , " , .  % -  
that it was an early work .(I8731 which despite its polished nature 
. . 
, , . 
&etrschb considered .unsuit'able for publicatioh, and that its 
3 .  . - 
. . 
wsymbolistW ideas are clearly abandoned and re jetted in Niet ziche, s 
' ' 5 , .  later comments on language." While I would agree that the mature wdrks 
o f f e r  no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a "symbolist" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  t h i s  judgement 
a p p l i e s  equa l ly  t o  t h e  1873 essay.  While t h e  l a t t e r  i s  imperfect  and i n  
.I' ,, T,. . .I , . ' ' " (  I 
p l a c e s  confGsed, t h e r e  a r e  p o i n t e r s  w i t h i n '  it' t d  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  
theory- of t r u t h  and metaphor, which i s  worth b r i e f l y  o u t l i n i n g  here ,  
s i n c e  . i t .  h a s  h i t h e r t o  r e c e i v e d  * s o  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n ;  it m i g h t ,  b e  
- $. X". 
,-l -,, " described a s  a p o l i t i c a l  theory  of metaphor. 
The key elements of a symbolist  theory  of metaphor a r e  simply 
a b s e n t  from "OTL". The e s s a y  r u l e s  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a " t r u e  
. _ . /  L' - u  .I ' . . 
correspondence" t o  t h i n g s  through any  means of expression.  The cause of 
t t  , :  I - I, * . .  
misunderstanding on t h i s  po in t  l ies  i n  sentences  such a s  t h e  following: 
. . 
Wherchs each pe;ceptual metaphor'  i s  i n d i v i d u a l  and without '  equa l s  
a n d  i s  t h e r e f o r e  a b l e  t o  e l u d e  a l l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  t h e  g r e a t  
e d i f i c e  of  c o n c e p t s  d i s p l a y s  t h e  r i g i d  r e g u l a r i t y  o f  a Roman 
columbarium... 21 
' - 
. .  . , . . 
. - 
~f one f o r g e t s  t h e  q u a l i f y i n g  a d j e c t i v e  "perceptualn,  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
make o u t  f o r  t h i s  a s t o r y  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  " t r u t h "  ( i n  t h e  s e n s e  of 
l ies  i n  metaphors, s i n c e  Nietzsche always i n s i s t s  t h a t  
I .  
. " . . . ,  . 9 .  
a c e n t r a l  element of t h e  f a l s i t y  of concep t s  r e s i d e s  i n  t h e i r  making 
: . , 
" I ' 
e q u a l  unequal  t h i n g s .  If metaphors cou ld  e x p r e s s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  of 
. . t .  
, . .. 
. . 
t h ings ,  t h e y  would be "c lose r  t o  t h e  t r u t h w .  But t h i s  is  no t  t h e  case .  
- . . .  . . 
"percep tua l  metaphors" a r e  n o t  a t y p e  of l i n g u i s t i c  metaphor a t  a l l ,  
, r 
. a  . . . <  " . . i 
b u t  r a t h e r  a s h o r t h a n d  d e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  N i e t z s c h e ' s  Schopenhauer ian  
. . 
. . I ,  ^ . 
account  of  percept ion ,  g iven  e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  e s say ,  which a s s e r t s  t h a t  
. " . .  
, . 
i s  i n d i r e c t  and must always t a k e  t h e  form of t r a n s l a t i o n s  
' r  . . 
and  t r a n s f e r s  from one r e a l m  t o  a n o t h e r .  D e s c r i b i n g  p e r c e p t i o n  a s  
, . ' "  
-metaphoricalw is t h u s  q u i t e  t h e  opposi te  of accounting it  true^.^* 
"OTL" does unquest ionably g i v e  a p o s i t i v e  eva lua t ion  of  t h e  
, . 
. . 
use  of metaphor, bu t  t h i s  is  not  on account of its t r u t h f u l n e s s ,  a s  a 
careful,,reading of the key passage makes clear: . *I . , - 
> .  
There e x i s t ~ ~ n o  word for these,intuitions; when man sees them he 
grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in 
unheard-of'combinations of d ~ n c ~ s t s .  He does chis so thitb; 
shattering%and'mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least 
correspond creatively to the,impression of the powerful present 
. I 
intuition .23 
. - _  , 
. , 
. ' 
I (C , . /  4 . <  ,: - I  
~ h o u g h  Nietzsche talks of "correspondencew here, it is not to the 
, . 
1 ,' - . \ 
truth of things but to "the powerful present intuitionw. What is meant 
. T  , " 
by that phrase remains somewhat obscure, and Nietzsche soon abandons 
. , , . ;> ' , ~. 
the Kantian terminology of "intuitionn in opposition to lvconceptw. ~ u t  
, . ,., , . - - .  - * 
- .  
the impression is very much of a conflict between the "authorized 
. , t ,  
descriptions" of ordinary language-use and the "unauthorized 
- .  . . 5 " I 
descriptions" of metaphorical and poetic language. This conflict is not 
. , , - 
about t r u t h :  both types of descripticn are "false" to the "things 
. . 
themselves". The struggle is rather over evaluations and aspirations: 
' ~ -  
acceptance of the c o n c e ~ t u a l l ~  structured order of things and men 
. ., - I *  
v e r s u s  the recalcitrance of the artist, who wanders in dreams and 
. . 
~isions, and insists on the priority of his own particular experience, 
* ,  
even though it may require unheard of combinations of words to convey 
. ? .  
, .. 
' I  
it.   his tension between conventional and unconventional language use 
is certainly developed and deepened in the later ~ietzsche,~' but the 
. . 
early essay certainly does not promote the Romantic alternative to the 
later texts that is often supposed. Indeed, as we shall see later in 
' .  
the chapter, the idea of art as a "politicalw force, presenting 
. . 
alternatives t o  established "realitiesn, has echoes throughout 
Nietzsche's work. 
. . 
What does all this imply for a defence of Nietzschers 
~ eloquence against the Platonic attack? Fundamentally,.it means that the 
1 attempt to justify artistic means of expression by.reference.to their 
allegedly privileged access to reality,is a failure. Not.only would 
~ such a thesis imply an unacceptable reversion to a Platonic project of 
mirroring Being; it is also a position that cannot.be attributed to 
I Nietzsche even for the one text widely touted as .a symbolist theory of 
I 3 4 metaphor. ' , : '  
Many of the strongest critics of such a theory have sought by 
way of an alternative to justify Nietzsche!~ eloquence in what I would 
term a p e r f o r m a t i v e  manner.l5 One can lump together in ,this respect 
I 
~ e r r i d a  and Nehamas, who both agree, despite their differences 
~ 
concerning what Nietzsche's "stylesw perform, that these styles 
constitute a performance of some kind. Indeed, they- even agree that 
. . 
style functions as a limitation on the textual "contentw. For Nehamas, 
I what is crucial is the multiplicity of Nietzsche's styles, which 
~ conveys that Nietzschevs views are idiosyncratic and do not aspire to 
. ,- 
~ canonical status; for Derrida, whose interpretation is easily the more 
subtle, Nietzsche's Styles enact above all the rich, indecipherable 
ambiguity of life and 1anguage.l' Neither of these readings is 
particularly convincing, as,,I .indicate below;,but the decisive 
is to the performative framework itself, w h a t e v e r  the 
detailed account might look like.. 
- 
The effort to interpret Nietzschers styles as encoding some 
kind of l i m i t a t i o n  on the truth-value of his texts has one obvious 
advantage: it provides a plausible ,answer to:,the,objection.that 
~ietzsche could s'imply have s t a t e d  whatever it is 'that his-styles are 
4 
supposed to "exhibit", rather than encoding it in so complicated a 
fashion. For if it is a question of-denying or undermining or rendering 
questionable and ambiguous the whole of what is stated, then merely to 
s t a t e  t h i s  a s  an e x t r a  f a c t  o r  appendix would f a i l  t o  do t h e  job: what 
i s  r e q u i r e d  i s  a n o t h e r  l e v e l  o r  mode of  d i s c o u r s e ,  which c a l l s  i n t o  
ques t ion  what t h e  f i r s t  l e v e l  of "conceptual content"  a s s e r t s .  
Other than ' t h i s  l o g i c a l  po in t ,  however, t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , f o r  any of t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of N i e t z s c h e f s  s t y l e s  a s  
" l i m i t s w .  'Nehamas produces  much t e x t u a l  ev idence  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h a t  
Nietzsche was a p e r s p e c t i v i s t ,  b u t  nothing a t  a l l  t o  sugges t  t h a t  t h i s  
a c c o u n t s  f o r  h i s  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of s t y l e s .  Tha t  c l a i m  rests on t h e  
s u p p o s i t i o n  t h a t  N i e t z s c h e ' s  p r i m a r y  c o n c e r n  i s  t o  have  h i s  v iews 
a c c e p t e d  a s  n o t h i n g  o t h e r  t h a n  " h i s  o h "  views, an ambi t ion  whic'h a  
more d i r e c t  approach could not  hope t o  f u l f i l :  
Cons tan t ly  t o  r e p e a t  t h e  phrase  " t h i s  i s  on ly  my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  
a s  one 's  s o l e  concession t o  t h i s  ant i-dogmatic o r i e n t a t i o n  would 
soon rob it of a l l  ~ r e d i b i l i t ~ . ~ '  
s o  Nehamas would have u s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of s t y l e s  i s  
~ i e t z s c h e ' s  way of c o n s t a n t l y  saying ' (without  saying)  " t h i s  i s  on ly  my 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " ;  or ,  a s  Nehamas p u t s  it, ' H e  depends on many s t y l e s  i n  
o rde r  t o  suggest  t h a t  t h e r e  is  no s i n g l e ,  n e u t r a l  language i n  which h i s  
views,  o r  any  o t h e r s ,  . c a n  e v e r  b e  p r e s e n t e d e t 2 '  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  t h i s  
i g n o r e s  t h e  r a t h e r  obvious p o i n t  t h a t  t h e  one passage  where Nie tzsche  
t a l k s  e x p l i c i t l y  about m u l t i p l i c i t y  of s t y l e s  mentions nothing of t h e s e  
"pe r spec t iv i s t "  concerns. 
TO communicate a  s t a t e ,  an  i n n e r  t e n s i o n  of pa thos  through s igns ,  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  tempo of t h e s e  s i g n s  - t h a t  i s  t h e  meaning of every  
s t y l e ;  and consider ing  t h a t  t h e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of i n n e r  s t a t e s  is  i n  
my c a s e  ex t raord ina ry ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  i n  my c a s e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
many s t y l e s  - a l t o g e t h e r  t h e  most man i fo ld  a r t  o f  s t y l e  any man 
has ever  had a t  h i s  disposal .2g 
I n  o t h e r  w o r d s , . t h e  v a r i e t y  of s t y l e s  i s  n o t  a b o u t  s a y i n g  t h e  same 
t h i n g  i n  many d i f f e r e n t  ways, but  about communicating a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of 
s t a t e s .  A d i f f e r e n t  s t y l e  f o r  each " i n n e r  t e n s i o n  of  p a t h o s w  - t h a t  
seems t o  be t h e  point  .30 
Despite  t h e  g r e a t e r  s u b t l e t y  of h i s  a rgument ,  D e r r i d a r s  
I I 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of Nietzsche's s t y l e s  i s  even more l o o s e l y  connected t o  
t h e  t e x t .  The method of h i s  r e a d i n g  i s  p u t  forward  j e s t i n g l y  a t  t h e  
very s t a r t  of Spurs: . . 
. ,  . 
The t i t l e  of  t h i s  l e c t u r e  was t o  have  been t h e  ques t ion  o f  style. 
But - woman w i l l  b e  my s u b j e c t .  I t  remains  t o  b e  asked  whether  
31 t h i s  comes down t o  t h e  same t h i n g  - o r  t o  . the o the r .  
, . 
-..- -..... -. . 
. . I n  f a c t ,  t h e  . t e x t ' s  d e t a i l e d  d iscu$sions  concern Nie tzsche ' s  comments 
~ on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between woman a n d ' t r u t h ;  t h e  l i n k  to t h e  questid* 
of s t y l e  i s  made on ly  through ~ e r r i d a ,  s-"own games of word-association . 
~ e r r i d a  i n s i s t s  on t h e  a t t r i b u t e  .of d i s t a n c e  a p p l i e d  bo th  t o  womanly 
t r u t h  and t h e  t r u t h  of woman: b o t h  " a r e n  o n l y  i n  t h e i r  absence;  one 
cannot come t o o  c lose .  And, f o r  Derrida,  Nie tzschers  styles a r e ,  i n  t h e  
end,  l i t t l e  more t h a n  a  way of = e i n f o r c i n g  t h i s  i n i p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
grasping truth/woman: 
~ i e t z s c h e  had no i l l u s i o n s . . . t h a t  he might know any th ing  of t h o s e  
e f f e c t s  c a l l e d  woman, t r u t h ,  c a s t r a t i o n ,  o r  of t h o s e  o n t o l o g i c a l  
e f f e c t s  of  presence  o r  absence. H e  c a r e f u l l y  guarded a g a i n s t  t h e  
h a s t y  d e n i a l  which t h e  e r e c t i o n  o f  a  s i m p l e  d i s c o u r s e  a g a i n s t  
c a s t r a t i o n  and i t s  sys tem would c o n s t i t u t e .  Without  a  d i s c r e t e  
parody, a  s t r a t e g y  of wr i t ing ,  a  d i f f e r e n c e  o r  v a r i a t i o n  of pens, 
without s t y l e  - grand s t y l e  - t h e  r e v e r s a l  r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  same i n  
t h e  loud dec la ra t ion  of t h e  a n t i t h e s i s  .32 
AS i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  Nehamas, t h e  o n l y  r e a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  
interpretation of the function of Nietzsche's styles is a consideration 
of what the case would be without them: for Nehamas, un-perspectivist 
'interpretations of,Nietzsche; for Derrida, mere negation of the 
metaphysical system, hence the failure to evade it. Derridars only 
illustration of the "discrete parodyw enacted by Nietzschets styles is 
his analysis of the fragmentary note 'I have forgotten my umbrella', 
which in its banal everydayness illustrates the gulf separating 
~errida's understanding of "stylew from anything remotely approaching 
the wcommunication of a statew asserted by Nietzsche. Naturally this 
scrap, which floats without context, is the perfect Derridean "stylate 
spurw, puncturing all attempts to assign it meaning, evading the 
determinations of metaphysics and anti-metaphysics, forever distant: 
'it can always remain at the same time open, offered and 
undecipherable; one cannot even know it as " ~ n d e c i ~ h e r a b l e . " ~ ~ ~  But 
this proves only that Derridats understanding of "stylew has nothing in 
common with Nietzsche's; that there is no agreement even on what would 
count as "stylishw, let alone on how style functions. 
So far, however, my criticisms have only suggested that these 
performative interpretations are wrong in important particulars about 
the function of Nietzschers styles, whereas my main suspicion concerns 
the whole performative framework, which must itself be brought into 
tquestion. For, in spite of everything, there is no justification of 
eloquence in these works. Quite apart from the typical philosophical 
spiritlessness with which these accounts are produced, there is no 
attempt to revalue art as a distinct force: rather, the effort is to 
reassure the understanding that art was a theoretical exigency in the 
case of Nietzsche, required in order to ward off error, in the form of 
dogmatism or metaphysics. To formulate it as a response to Plato: 
illusion may be necessary, in order to ward off a greater threat of 
illusion e(dogmatism,. error of anti-metaphysics ,that remains 
metaphysics). The.,allegedly hostile'force of eloquence is justified as 
a novel .way of aiding the vigilance of.the understanding.. As Nehamas 
x i  " ? " '  ,? .f " '  * 
.. . 
When I claim that we must pay attention to Nietzschefs style, I am 
- '  
, . 
claiming only that his changing styles convey significant 
3 4 :. , information to -his redders . 
'.* ,. / r 4  * ,: , ,  . I .lf , . ., 
, . 
~t i$.hard to* resistq'the idea that these periormative iRterpretations 
" .  
of '.'~iet zschef ii eloquence may'.ifter all and despite 'everything*' b i  doing 
r *  . 
bl&f k ''wdrk: For it i s  often forgotten that, when so&rat&' cast 'out 
the 'poets, he did niti exclude 'the pos$ibility o f  're'admittancti* - if 
., <. . , -. 
, . ,  
, . poetry can be shown .to have a nhighern purpos<: 
" .  -.;.. d'# % . T 
. y , .  , . :  . ,  
'we-should give.her.defenders,imen who aren't poets.themselves-but 
who love poetry, a chance of defending her in prose and proving 
5 
that she doesn't only give pleasure but brings lasting benefit to 
- I 
human lit= and' h-n society. < ~ n d  "e will like* ' f avourably, as we 
,.... -.*+l.shall gain ,much: if, we .f indcher a, source of prof it as well as 
pleasure. 31 
. I  , ? , . .  * 
.. . " ,  
.- . 
- ,  
~ f ,  as this 'suggests, .many 'of the attempts to defend 
eloquence,continue to play-the, Platonic game, an alternative strategy 
could be to; turn the tables.on?,,the philosophersf critique of art, and 
question their capacity to ~tand~outside it in judgement. In other 
words, it is possible to counter-attack , .  . against , the critics of 
eloquence, rather than mount a defence to their, accusations. 
. .  , 
. . 
-' 1 
Plato himself has always appeared particularly vulnerable to 
such tactics, since his skills as,a stylist make his criticisms of art 
._ .. 
look hypocritical. I do not propose to discuss this here, however. The 
debate seems destined to lead only to psychological questions 
concerning the "winner.turmoilw of Platots conflicting drives; besides, 
even if Plato proved'unable to follow his own advice,36 this counts. for 
little against the influence'which that advice has had'on'philosophyfs 
subsequent development. - \  ' . , - . ' - < ' $ , ,  . -  
A far more interesting form of this'counter-attack, one'which 
has been highly influentialrand deserves someLattention here, isthe 
suggestion that philosophy is inescapably reliant.on figures of speech, 
so that if there is.an'hypocrisy,: it is organized and structural. The 
most sophisticated of these strategies is contained in Derridars essay 
"white nythology" , "  other'elements of which.have alreadyabeen 
exploredin this chapter:Derrida notes an-ambivalence in'the 
philosophical~tradition's response to metaphor:'on the one hand, it is 
treated as inferior to and always'dependent on,"properW; literal usage; 
on the other.hand, it is-recognized as a valuable additional epistemic 
resource, capable of bringing to language ideas which have hitherto 
failed to-receive ex~ression.~For Derrida, this official account of 
metaphor as a marginal Concept covers up the important work it,does,on 
behalf of philosophy:,at'key points in the great texts of Western 
metaphysics, metaphors of sun, light, vision, etc. intervene; and they 
' . .  , 
recur sb' persistently precisely because there is no "proper1* term which 
could take their place - they are the fig-leaf half-covering 
philosophyrs failure to bring-Being firmly within' its grasp. While this 
...- ' *. ,: - . . . 
suggests a far'greater complicity of metaphor in'the workings of 
. ~ 
* 
metaphysics than has traditionally been recognized - and Derrida is at 
pains to reject those who see in metaphor an "escape" from metaphysics 
- there is nevertheless a firm conviction in "Whitemytholog$' that i: 
metaphor is also the Achillest heel of metaphysics. For,,as well as the 
detour which will lead back to' literal, proper truth (the function 
assigned to it by metaphysics),,,metaphor is also susceptible to an 
, other self -destructiont38 which, unlike the first, philosophical one, 
'is no longer a question of extending and c0nfirming.a philosopheme, 
but rather, of$unfolding it without limit, and wresting its borders of 
propriety from it.' As ever, Derrida leaves the operator of this "self- 
destructionn ambiguous: it is partly a task to be carried out by 
deconstructive readings, and partly what metaphor itself properly 
generates, outside the restrictive connection with "proper meaningn 
imposed throughout the history of metaphysics. , . 
As a project for liberating eloquence, in the form of 
metaphor, from the tutelage of metaphysics, Derridars essay has two 
major flaws. In the first place, his account of metaphor's relationship 
t o  philosophy is dependent at many" points on unjustifiable 
generalizations. Many of his assertions clearly apply to particular 
instances but equally clearly do not- apply t o  "metaphorn or 
"philosophyn as a whole; without the grandeur of these 
universalizations, Derridafs essay loses much of its persuasiveness. 
Three key example:= Ibf' this' shift of scope are w&th analyzing' 
more closely. First, Derrida asserts that 
the philosophical evaluation of metaphor has always been 
ambiguous: metaphor is dangerous and foreign as concerns 
intuition.. ., concept..., and consciousness...; but it is in' 
complicity with what it endangers, is necessary to i t + i n  the 
extent to which the,de-tour is always a re-turn guided by the 
function of resemblance (mimesis or homoiosis), under the law of 
39 the same. 
certainly, both these contrasting evaluations have been adopted by 
. . .. , 
. ( ( .  
philosophers; but, since.they have only rarely been adopted by the same 
philosopher, " t h e  ~hilosophical~evaluation~ (assuming that such a 
,. ,.' - 2 ,  
phrasemakes sense at all) might more plausibly be described as 
ndisputedn rather than wambiguousw. At the very least, one would have 
* :  * .  ., 
t;' talk =bout t w o  ev'aluatibns: one, eiemplif ied by 'Plato -and ~ocke; 
..... - 1 . i .  
which 'regards metaphor as 'ng more than ornament and surf ace,~dan~eroub 
, $ 4  . 
and foreignw torphilosophical discourse; the other, exemplified by 
, , . .+, 8 . I. 1 . , 
~ristotle, which accords metaphor a potentially constructive epistemid 
role through its ability to recognize resemblances between things. 
. . 
~errida's' gssimilation of the two traditions produces an unmiitakeably 
.. , 
~egelian motif - the "negativen aspects of mAtaphor are aufgehoben when 
meiaphdr is itself negated - which 'canno't with any plausibility be 
applied t o  as a whole: Quite ' why Derrida should * want 
, .> 
to present the philbsophical evaluation of metaphor as always 
. , . ,  . 
already ~egelian is a question I will consider presently. 
Derrida is 'also somewhat dogmatic with respect to the 
symbolist concept of metaphor discussed earlier in the chapter. He 
, 2 ,.. , ' 
asserts that: 
- 1  ' . b  . ' , ' . . 
Metaphor has always been defined as the trope of resemblance...to 
take an interest in metaphor...is...therefore to take a symbolist 
stand. It is above all to take an interest in...semantic "depth", 
, . 
in the 'magnetic attraction of the similar.. .'O ' 
, ~ . - ,  
9 .  
. ' 
once again, the walwa~sw' is untenable: certainly,' as Derridavs detailed 
&udy shows, *this is an accurate depiction of the' ~ristotelian 
, , . , ,  C ^ L ,  
co&eption of mithphor, which has indked been highly influentialj but 




. Metaphor...does not record pre-existing similarities in things; 
rather, it is the, 1inguistic.means by which we bring together and 
thus fuse into a unity diverse thoughts and thereby reform our 
.perceptions of the, world.? . 
.. . , . , ,  
. , 
Derrida's silence concerning alternative conceptions of metaphor can 
hardly be accidental, since his own positive,thesis is dependent on 
this notion of naming similarities. Derridars whole argument turns 
around,Aristotlers.e-ple of a metaphor naming what did not yet have a 
name: in such a situation, the asqumption,that.the metaphor is simply 
describing a pre-existing similarity lacks the usual support,of the 
"proper" name-of the object or ~activity. Thus, to Aristotle's example 
that the sun's casting forth of flame can be described,as "sowing", 
Derrida puts the question: 'Where has it>ever been seen that there is 
the same relation between the sun ,and its rays as between sowing and 
seeds?r42, The. straightforward, circular exchange of names and ,meanings 
becomes an "enigmaW,.an "ellipsew. Derrida concludes: .:,,,, ;,. -, 
1 .  . 1 . 1 '  ) "  . .  . 6':  , ..,.,- , . .: - . 
NO reference properly being named in such a metaphor, the figure 
. . 
- C 
is carried off into"the adventure bf a long, implidit sentence, a 
. secret=narratlve which nothing assures us will lead us back to the 
43 proper name.. . , . . 
. ,.. 1 - " . . . 7 , , ,-. . - I *  , . . , . \ , . . '  
 his is quite clearly intended as the statement of a kind of paradox: 
if metaphorrloses,the.,fixity of,its referent,.then it can no longer 
claim to state,;a. resemblance, since< it .cannot state what  reference,, it 
was supposed to name.without resort to further metaphors. A stark 
opposition is,presented between metaphors wlanchoredw,by their ties to 
"proper referents," , . and metaphors "infinitely'floating",without these 
ties. But%that this infinite floating is the clear alternative depends 
on ~errida excluding the possibility of any other theories of metaphor 
44 
entering the ,frame. , , 
.? . : - , , :  . r -  . , . , 
The third instance of Derrida's dogmatism comes with his 
r .  
assertion, cited above,45 that 'metaphor remains, in all its essential 
characteristics, a classical philosopheme, a metaphysical concept.' why 
treattmetaphor as "essentiallyw-any kind of concept,""et alone a 
metaphysical one? The entire structure .of "White Mythology". does 
indeed suggest that, for Derrida, metaphor is more or less what 
philosophyshas made and,will in future make of it. For the essay 
concentrates exclusively on a variety of philosophical~definitions,and, 
analyses of metaphor, and Derrida's constant use of the term "metaphorv1 
as a grammatical subject suggests that he really takes this process to 
. . . > .  ,- - * .  ? .  : > ;  
pl-ovida ah'bnalysis' of the' nature of metaphbrs and how' the; operate. 
Under these circumstances the complete absence not only of empirical 
examples,but even of a.gesture2towards the possibility of empiricism is 
a critical omission. The likely explanation for this silence is that 
any serious;investigation of the usage of the'term "metaphorw would be 
just as embarrassing for Derridafs- ideal of-"infinitely 'floating 
movement" as forJthe.ideals:of philosophers past. Indeed, ,isnrtithe 
problem here that,,Derrida is employing traditional-idealist~~tactics*to 
establish a new "concept' of..metaphor"?'Therefis no pithiernresponse:to 
such methods'than Wittgensteinfs dictum: 'Let the use teach you.-the 
meaning. f 46 r., ,.: ~- , . -  e +  - 7, r . - 3  . . 
. But quite 5 .  apart from ,.all criticism , of . sDerridaf s methods, 
there is an over-riding question-mark concerning the v a l u e  of his 
conclusions concerning,metaphor,- assuming, -for the sake'of argument; 
that he,has a right to these conclusions.- As we have seen, Derrida 
himself contrasts his- fother.self-destructionf:-of metaphor to -,the 
philosophical onef : 9 he clearly believes that by "explodingi1 - the 
reassuring opposition of the metaphoric and the properf he has overcome 
the philosophical determination of metaphor. But whatlif philosophyfs 
approach to metaphor is~recognizable~less as-a specific determination 
than:as an horizon of questioning? Recall Plators discussion of art,in 1 
the Republic: in the end what matters is not so much whether art 
remains inside or outside the republic, but that it justifies itself on 
grounds of its contribution to morality and truth,, not on grounds of ~ 
aesthetic merit. , - . A . I, I 
I 
Derrida in no way departs from the horizon of truth -in his 
questioning of metaphor: on the contrary, it is his sole.concern. He ~ 
states that: , , I 
, 4 
In order not to wind up at an empiricist reduction of knowledge 1 
and a fantastic ideology of truth, one should surely substitute 
another articulation for the (maintained or erased) classical ~ 
opposition of metaphor and concept. '' 
 his sentence illustrates that Derridars interest in art and metaphor 
is restricted to,its potential for revealing truth. His "breakn with 
the tradition goes noLfurther than the subordinate questions of what 
will be revealed and how. That is why Derrida has to make the efforts, 
discussed above, to-fit all theories-of metaphor into an ~egelian 
model. If wthe~philosophical" approach to metaphor were always 
characterized - by the assertion,of metaphor as mimesis and'as ndetourn 
on the inevitable.path to "proper meaningn, then Derridafs moves 
clearly would be un- or anti-philosophical. as he claims. ~ u t  if 
philosophy is determined more broadly as an..horizon of questioning 
which seeks and values only the essential-truth offits objects, then 
~errida fits perfectly into the tradition..He provides a new truth- 
value of metaphor, which might'be described as kata-mimeseos.- the 
escape from and disruption of the representation of Being. 1 .  
In relation to Nietzsche, what matters about all this is that 
the value of truth reigns unquestionably, over art and aesthetics in 
~errida's approach. Indeed, it .seems likely that' it: actually implies 
thewadvocacy ofnbad metaphors,. since'when a-metaphor is~obscure or 
incomprehensible;.- ' any recourse to "proper meaning" i s  most 
unequivocally excluded. The fact that Derrida elsewhere gives priority 
to,Heideggerian "quasi-metaphors" such as "language is the house of 
Beingn4' indicates that what is of value .for him in "metaphoricityw is 
certainly nothing to,do.with aesthetics. All*in all, Derridats 
approaches consistently sidestep .Platovs anti-aesthetic criticisms 
and thus"do nothing to alterLthe traditional philosophical assumption 
that eloquence can only have value if it serves truth. - 
. " IS, 
. . S 3 "  I-: > 
~ l l  the .strategies we h a v e  reviewed thus far retain,the common 
characteristic that.they seek.the value'of eloquence @through its 
contribution to truth; this"is-the case even when its alleged 
contribution is to change our whole "ideology of truthw. But what"if 
eloquence does not need to justify itself.before the court of-the 
and its test,of truth? What ,if this whole effort is a 
misunderstanding? What if.. . ,art ,is worth more than truth,?50 , . 
That this phrase marks the greatest- of all Nietzschets 
revaluations is the conviction and. the argument of the remainder-of 
this chapter. I.will outline the various aspects of this revaluation 
presently, but nothing provides a better preliminary indication ofjits 
importance than philosophy's astonishing refusal to confront it; and no 
figure illustrates this tendency more perfectly,than the one 
philosopher who most palpably claims to'take.the revaluation 
"seriously": MartimHeidegger. I .  ,,, : .  . 
The most thorough analysis of ~ietzsihe~s 'attitude to art is 
the3frst volume of Heidegger's Nietzsche, "The will to power as 
art", 'l which 'discusses the notes collected under the same. heading by 
the editors of The Will to Power. At first glance, this appears to take 
full cognizance of Nietzsche's revaluation of art, since not only do 
severalbda&eI. comrknt on the Fonfiigt in ~i'etzsche between f ruth =*d 
. , 
art; the last of Heidegger's "Five statements on art", which claim to 
present the basic Nietzschean position;, istthe assertion: 'Art is worth 
However, ~eideggei's subtle ainendiiexits to more than "the ' 
, . - ., 
Nietzsche's statement that "art is worth more than t r u t h v r e  neither 
accidental-nor insignificant. As Heideggerrs exegesis makes clear, they 
are intended to show what ~ietzsche-~s- comment "really meant", which 'is 
that 'the sensuous stands in a higher place and is more genuinely than 
the supersensuo~s~.'~ Heidegger insists that when Nietzsche talks about 
truth, he is always talking about the Platonic/Christian "true world", 
i.e. the supersensuous world, i".e. the world which'does not exist. When 
he further insists that,by "art", Nietzsche always means an affirmation 
of t h e L  sensuous, it is possible t o  reach the extraordinary 
interpretation of 'art is worth-more than trutht 'thatlHeidegger 
pr0poses:And it is extraordinary:-for it would meawthat Nietzsche's 
affirmation of art is the affirmation of reality ("the sensuous") over 
illusion ("the supersensuous"), once.again;,which is to say: the 
reaffirmation-of the.very Platonic-opposition on the basis.of which the 
artists were dispatched from the Republic. . . . ,  
r . ~eidegger,is, of course,, quite right to-claim that Nietzsche 
regards:the supersensuous world as illusory and this sensuous world as 
the only real world; but, it is' a comp1ete:blunder to suppose that, when 
Nietzsche says,"artw he always,implies the sensuous, and that when he 
says "truth" he always implies'the supersensuous. Indeed,~'.in the very 
same-#853 of The Will to Power from which the statement that 'art is 
worth more t h a n  t r u t h r  i s  t a k e n ,  t h e r e  i s  a  p a s s a g e  which. u t t e r l y  
c o n t r a d i c t s  t h e  Heideggerian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Nietzscheqcomments on The 
B i r t h  .of  Tragedy: . - . , , ..,.-,. L L .  - , . .  . I  
. . 
The a n t i t h e s i s  of a  r e a l  and an a p p a r e n t , w o r l d  i s  l a c k i n g  he re :  
U 
t h e r e  i s  on ly  one world, and t h i s  i s  f a l s e ,  c r u e l ,  c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  
seduct ive ,  without  'meaning-' A world t h u s  c o n s t i t u t e d  i s  t h e  r e a l  
world. W e  have need o f  l i e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  conquer t h i s  r e a l i t y ,  t h i s  
" t ru th" ,  t h a t  is, i n  o r d e r  t o  l ive-  That  l i e s  a r e  necessa ry  i n  
o r d e r  t o  l i v e  i s  i t s e l f  p a r t  of t h e  t e r r i f y i n g  and q u e s t i o n a b l e  
i 
char&ter ' .of  &is tence . .   if e o'ught t o  inspire conf iden&" : t h e  
. ,. t a s k  t h u s ' i m p o s e d ' i s  tremendous. To s o l v e  it, man must be a  l i a r  
b y  n a t u r e ,  h e  mus t  b e  a b o v e  a l l  a n  a r t i s t .  And h e  i s  one :  
m e t a p h y s i c s ,  r e l i g i o n ,  m o r a l i t y ,  s c i e n c e  - a l l  o f  them o n l y  
* p r o d u c t s  of  h i s  w ' i l l  t&rt, t o  l i e ,  t o  f l i g h t  from i ruth^, t o  
negation of , " t ru thN .*. ' '* 
Here, n e i t h e r  " t r u t h N  nor  " a r t N  means what, according t o  H e i d e g g e r , - i t  
o u g h t  t o  mean.  : The ' " t r u t h " '  o r .  ' r e a l  w o r l d '  i s  f f a l s e '  . a n d  
, c o n t r a d i c t o r y ' ,  s o  it q u i t e  - o b v i o u s l y  i s  n o t  t h e  P l a t o n i c  
supersensuous realm, b u t  r a t h e r  t h i s ;  sensuous world. S u b s t i t u t i n g , t h i s  
te rm would t ransform Heideggervs i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  absurd: " the  
sensuous is more-genuinely  t h a n  t h e  sensuous." But i n  any case ,  s i n c e  
~ i e t z s c h e  mentions metaphysics and r e l i g i o n  a s  s p e c i e s  of " the  w i l l  t o  
a r t N ,  it i s  p l a i n  t h a t .  He idegger f , s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  a r t  - w i t h .  t h e  
sensuous . ' i s  e q u a l l y  misguided: on t h e  c o n t r a r y ; t h e . i n v e n t i o n  of t h e  
s u p e r s e n s u o u s : w o r l d  i s  a  p i e c e  o f  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  a r t i s t r y  - a  
confirmation, ,one might add, t h a t  a r t  i s , w o r t h  more than truth': 
HOW is it t h a t  Heideggergs i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  can go s o  badly 
wrong on t h i s  p o i n t ?  A c l u e  l i e s  i n  h i s  response  t o  a n o t h e r  passage  
c i t e d  from Nietzsche, which s t a t e s  t h a t  '"The B i r t h  of Tragedy be l i eves  
i n  a r t  on t h e  background of another  b e l i e f  - t h a t  it is no t  possible to 
I_ .. * 5 - 9  ;* r - . . - .  . 3 -  . 
live with truth, that "the will to truthw is alreadi a '  symptom of 
, . r '  . \  . 
degeneration. "," Heideggerf s comment is that 'The statement sounds 
perverse.'But it loses its foreignness, though not its importance, as 
. . 
soon as 4; read it in the right '"ay.' He then proceeds tb' inte;pret the 
passage along the lines outlined above - very definitely the wrong way! 
~ u t  why is the statement "perverse" and "foreignw? Is it not perhaps 
i'. ' ._ .- , . r .  
that the search for truth is what Heidegger, along with the whole 
philosophical tradition behind him, regards as the task, so that to 
label it "a symptom of degeneration" would be nothing less than an act 
. , .  
. v  $ -* 
of apostasy? That Heideggerfs response was to rescue Nietzsche from 
. - 
this wperversity" rather than accept him as a heretic can be explained 
: I .  
~. 
in either or both of two ways. First: Nietzsche is a nodal point in 
z. . .. 
Heideggerrs story of metaphysics - the last metaphysician of the West. 
j > I . ., . , 
TO recognize an attitude to truth so alien to the tradition would make 
, -  . 8 . -  
. . , . . . .  < 
it virtually impossible for Heidegger to cast Nietzsche in the desired 
r . * .  
role, and would throw doubt on the whole story. Second: Heideggerrs 
. ' 
labrynthine account and critique of Nietzsche turns around the claim 
' :t ., *. , , 
that Nietzsche has failed to question properly concerning the essence 
, , 
of truth. Heidegger presents his own philosophy as marking the epochal 
, . ,  
shift to this ultimate question of truth's essence. But if Nietzsche, 
. . . . 
1 
rather than overlooking this question, regarded this sort of obsessive 
, I ,  
quest as a "symptom of degeneration", then not only would Heideggerrs 
.- , 
interpretation of Nietzsche be threatened - so too would his own 
philosophy's essential values. 
. .  . 
Overall, Heideggerfs determination to ignore Nietzsche's 
revaluation of art is further evidence of that deep-seated resistance 
- 2 .  .- . 
by philosophers to any attempts to question the value of truth, which 
' - 
~ietzsche was himself so well aware of: 
. ,. 
suppose we,want t r u t h :  why n o t  r a t h e r  u n t r u t h ?  and u n c e r t a i n t y ?  
even i g n o r a n c e ?  The problem of t h e  v a l u e  o f  t r u t h  came b e f o r e  
'.us.. . ~ n d  . though it' scarcely seem$ credible, it f i n a l l y .  a lmos t '  
* ,  seems t o  u s : a s  i f  t h e  problem had never  even been p u t , s o  far-as 
i f L  w e  were t h e  f i r s t  t o -  see it, f i x .  it w i t h  o u r  eyes ,  and . r i s k  
, . 
~ e s p i t e  a l l  t h a t  has been w r i t t e n  on Nietzsche, t h i s  problem has s t i l l  
- .  
j . .' 
s c a r c e l y  been recognized.  There a r e  e n d l e s s  d e b a t e s  on "Nie tzsche ' s  
: * > -, 
t h e o r y  o f  t r u t h " ,  b u t  s c a r c e l y  any  a t t e n t i o n  h a s  been g i v e n  t o  t h e  
. 1  . I "  - , I 
g r a n d  q u e s t i o n  mark c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t r u t h .  I t  i s  a l m o s t  
- .  
i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  p h i l o s o p h e r s  t o  t a k e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  "why n o t  r a t h e r  
, 
. - .  
untru th?"  s e r i o u s l y .  I f  it i s  no t i ced  a t  a l l ,  it i s  t r e a t e d  a s  a  p iece  
, . . - 
o f  " r h e t o r i c " ,  o r  a s  a  joke ,  o r  a t  most  a s  a  s i g n  t h a t  h i t h e r t o  
. ., L1 -.,  . m.. . 
e x i s t i n g  t h e o r i e s  of t r u t h  have led t o  t h e  d r e a d f u l  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
-- , ,. , . . . 
t h e  va lue  of  t r u t h  can be quest ioned,  s o  t h a t  t h e  cha l l enge  he re  is  t o  
,., . ?  . .. . " 
, , 
r e s c u e  t r u t h  from t h e s e  n i h i l i s t i c  d o u b t s .  A g a i n s t  a l l  t h i s  I w i l l  
suppose f o r  once, " fo r  t h e  sake  of argumentw, t h a t  Nietzsche i s  deadly  
~, 
s e r i o u s  when he q u e s t i o n s  t h e  va lue  of t r u t h ,  and t h a t  he does r e a l l y  
I 2  , . . .  
v a l u e  a r t  h i g h e r .  And s o  t h e  remainder  of t h i s  c h a p t e r  w i l l  n o t  a s k  
whether  N i e t z s c h e  v a l u e s  a r t  h i g h e r  t h a n  t r u t h ,  b u t  assume t h a t  he  
. - 
does, and seek t o  exp la in  why, and what inf luence  t h i s  has on h i s  work. 
, . . . 
The best way t o  begin  e x p l o r i n g  t h e  s ta tement  t h a t  ' a r t  i s  
worth more t h a n  t r u t h '  i s  t o  c o n s i d e r  it i n  t h e  l i g h t  of t h e  P l a t o n i c  
, . 1  
c r i t i q u e  of  a r t  o u t l i n e d  above, i n  which t h e  t w i n  concerns  were t h e  
- -. 
i l l u s o r y  and s e n s u a l  n a t u r e  of a r t .  N i e t z s c h e f s  r e v a l u a t i o n  t a k e s  i n  
: 8
b o t h  t h e s e  a s p e c t s ,  t h u s  m e e t i n g  head-on t h e  k e y  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
ob jec t ions  t o  eloquence. A new r o l e  f o r  eloquence can t h e n  be developed 
o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  p o s i t i v e  v a l u e s  a t t a c h e d  t o  " i l l u s i o n n  a n d  
"sensuali ty" of a r t .  
ð he first'element of Nietzschers revaluation is highlighted 
by the passage,,used against.-the Heideggerian-interpretation, which 
asserts: ,metaphysics, religion, morality, science - all of them only 
products of his will to art, to lie, to-flight f r ~ m . ~ t r u t h ~ ,  to 
negation of "truthn . 8 5 6  This clearly extends the sphere of the artistic 
well beyond any ordinary conception of "artn;-what justifies this 
extension? Two Nietzschean theses of relevance here. The first 
goes'back to "OTL": the most basic elements of a .language are already 
highly selective,, "artisticw representations'of things;~superstructures 
such as metaphysics and morality constructed from this base'will 
therefore be artistic fabrications to an even greater degree. But'quite 
apart from these considerations of man's inability to avoid artistry, 
there is the even stronger insistence that metaphysics, religion, etc., 
have always in any case hadcartistic intentions, in that they are 
driven above all by the feeling that, as Nietzsche puts it, "life ought 
to inspire conf id&cew . The artistic desire for "beautiful illusibns" 
has thus at all times predominated over.the will to truth. 
Even supposing these claims are granted, however, they still 
do not explain' why ,art' is worth more than truthf ;- at best, t<ey 
indicate that art has been and will continue to be a more powerful 
force than has commonly been accepted. They leave open the possibility 
. . 
that Nietzsche has highlighted the historic force of illusion in order 
to make a new appeal on behalf of "truthw; in order to say, "J, 
, , 
. .I . i- - 
~ietzsche, am the truth." Were this the case, then Nietzsche would be 
. . 
' I  * 
bludgeoning Plat0 with a Platonic implement (the truth/illusion 
. - . , . , , , 
opposition). What is required, therefore, is an indication of what 
, r 
distinguishes Nietzschefs understanding of art from Platots; otherwise, 
. . a  , . . . 
when he talks of religion and metaphysics as artistic, this will always 
- .  
. , 
. . I - ,  
4 r- 
continue to sound like an accusation. 
Thed distinctively Nietzschean approach .,to aesthetics. .is 
normally taken to be his 'insistence on the artist'rather than the work 
of art; but while.this is of vital importance, and is considered later 
in the.chapter,.Nietzsche also makes more dire~t,~ltheoretical" 
responses to the Platonic conception of mimesis, and'these form a 
convenient starting-point for an exploration of his revaluation of art. 
In the first place, Nietzsche r e j e c k  the distinction on 
which Plato's criticism of-.the artists as superficial rested.. Plato 
suggeststhat-artists cannot provide satisfactory representations 
because they.have not penetrated to the ultimate truth of things.57 But 
Nietzsche does not seek to turn this criticism back against Plato by 
criticising the superficiality of his "artn. He would have no right to 
I. - 
do so, since he' &kplicitly renounces- the'~1atbnic associations between 
art, superficiality and shallowness: 
0h;those Greeks! They knew how to live. What*is required for that 
is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the.skin, to 
adore appearance, to believe in forms, tones, words, in the whole 
olympus of appearance. Those Greeks were superficial - out of 
profundity ... Are we not, 'precisely in this respect, Greeks? 
Adorers of forms, of tones, of words? And therefore -  artist^?^' 
f , a  . 
m y  is it.profound 'to adore appearance'? Isn't the very starting-point 
of philosophy the fact that sticks bend in water, and "things are not 
what they seem"? Mustn't this awareness always temper a love of 
surfaces?.Such suspicions live on.,becauae of the Platonic 
interpretation of art as a-representation of the,appearances of things 
which suspends all questions concerning those appearances. ~ u t  at this 
point-~ietzsche's distance,from the Platonic model is at its greatest: 
the-.old worries about deceptive appearances haveto be stood against 
the Nietzschean revaluation of the seeming-being divide. Plate's 
critique of'art: is based upon the possibility of a clear separation 
between appearance and'reality:' art operates at'a level which leaves 
the underlying3reality untouched. But when Nietzsche talks about the 
"profundityw of "adoring appearancew, he does not-imply that it iscgood 
to abandon reality. For, according to Nietzsche',,.reality is not 
abandoned in such an'affirmation. Rather,' what is abandonedyis'a 
clearcut division between.reality and appearance:Artistic appearances 
can become real, and reality can in turn become illusion; - ,  
. -   One passage exemplifies the transformation of the Platonic 
structure, and is worth considering in some detail:' 
This has given me the greatest trouble and still does: to realize 
that what things are called is incomparably more important than 
.C 'L 1 1 . . 
what they 'are. The reputation, name, and appearance, the usual 
measure and weight of a thing, what it counts for...all this grows 
, from generation to generation, merely because people believe in 
it, until it gradually grows to be part of the thing and turns 
into its very body. What at first was appearance' becomes in the 
end; almost invariably, the essence and is effective as such. How 
foolish it would be to suppose that one only needs,to,point out 
this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy 
the world that counts for real, so-called "realft'Ln."~e can 
destroy only as creators;: - But let us not forget this either: it 
is enough to create new names and estimations and probabilities in 
order to create in the long run new 
. >  ., .  
plat0 dismissed art because it copied appearances and did not 
I /  
understand essences; but this statement renders such a distinction 
, . ' 
untenable. To represent appearances is at the same time (at least in 
the long run) to participate in forging a reality. Quite consistently, 
,. . 
, . 
moreover, Nietzsche draws the conclusion that former "realitiesn are 
. - 
-. , , 
not dismissed when their human origins are recognized;but only when 
alternative names and valuations provide a s~bstitute.~'. .- - * .  
; .  All this suggests that Plato has made a doubler.*blunder 
concerning the artists.. In the first place, he has completely 
misunderstood what artists aim at when he criticizes their "tricksw for 
making things appear to be in,a certain way rather than inquiring into 
their. "ob jectivew qualities of - size, weight, etc .61 This is not the 
token of an error, because artists,have only ever asked how best to 
represent things as they seem, how to represent the appearance. But 
this first mistake in turn arises from Plators insistence that how 
things seem and how things are desired are "mere~illusions" which are 
powerless to influence the enlightened man, and therefore cannot be 
what the artists aim at. If, on the other hand, appearance and desire 
are'major constituents of any "reality", then the representation of 
appearance~possesses an ineradicable power; indeed, - Platots "reality1*, 
supposedly uninfluenced by appearance and desire, is the real piece of 
naivety here. So,,to sum up'the contrast between Nietzsche and Plato: 
art .islnot the "copying of realityn, which would make.it dependent on a 
pre-existing grasp of reality (and thus, as Plato shows, always 
incompetent), but'the.presentation of appearances and desires, which is 
to say (at least in,the long,run) the presentation of what t h i n g s  
62 are. . . - ,  
Naturally, .that all this. testifies . in favour of the 
proposition that "art is w o r t h  more than truthw depends on the 
valuation of the role ofPart indicated here. Could one not continue to 
prefer truth, even if one accepted the ubiquity of art? Why should 
truth be displaced a s  an i dea l?  1.will~sirnply mention two points which 
tell against this. In the first place;:if,art is more than ornamental 
and is, as has been suggested here, a central and ines~apable~part.-'~f 
human life,-then'to attack it in the name of the "higher idealw of 
truth is to manifest-a distaste for life, which Nietzsche analyzes 
under the heading But Nietzsche also suggests that art is 
more powerful than truth, since the critique of old illusions can only 
work when an alternative illusion is ready to displace them; which is 
to say that "critique" is either useless or is already beyond critique, 
in the service of some artistic force - "we can destroy only as 
creatorsw. To prefer truth because of its critical success is to 
misunderstand "critique": even here, creating counts for more than 
revealing. 64 
Although these considerations greatly enhance the role of 
art, it could be argued that this is achieved primarily through 
diluting the concept to include virtually everything. Why be artistic 
in the narrow sense of the term if metaphysicians and scientists are 
already "artists"? Why bother with form and eloquence? These objections 
are not unanswerable; the full importance of the attack on Platonic 
mimesis will become clear later in the chapter. But it would be wrong 
to give the impression that Nietzsche only defends art and artists by 
changing the signification of the terms. On the contrary, he frequently 
champions art against religion, morality and science; and, concerning 
plate's critique of artistic sensuality, what Nietzsche has to say is 
quite clearly supportive of art in a narrower, more literal sense. 
As we have seen,65 Plators other objection to art is that it 
seduces from the true path of philosophy by appealing to the.senses and 
thereby encouraging passion, rather than reason, to take control. 
Applying this rule to Nietzsche would suggest that his texts are 
suspect to the extent that they produce aesthetic pleasure rather than 
intellectual insight. Nietzschefs own comments counsel to the contrary: 
artfs stimulus of the senses indicates its soundness; Platots suspicion 
of.it indicates h i s  morbidity. - . !. I >  . 
- . . :  There is, even so, a point of agreement between Plato and 
Nietzsche: that art is pleasurable, stimulates the senses, and 
. "  > . L :  
, inf lam=s desirer ; 66 '~ietzkche indeed contra=ts 'this ~la'tokic 
, -- 
understanding, of how art ,operates quite explicitly with the 
Schopenhauerian-belief-that art serves to p a c i f y  the will: on this 
,- . ' 
point at least, Plat0 is credited with a far deeper insight than rival 
aestheticians. 67 
,, ' I ., 3 . . . I -I 
Concerning the evaluation of'-'this' effect, however, the're is 
a ' 
. . r , * ; . .  . . . Ti . . . 
complete disagreement: For while Plato rega;ds the pleasureb of art 
with *su'spici6h andvh&stility, ~ietzkche enthuses about 'them: 
%. , . .. * .  P . .) C 1  
when-...-we encounter things that display...transfiguration and 
fullness [e.g. works of art], the animal responds with an 
excitation,of those spheres in which all those pleasurable states 
are situated - and a blending of these very delicate nuances, of 
animal well-being ? a ,  andc desires constitutes .. ,the a e s t h e t i c  
. . 
s t a t e  ...: Perfectionvv: in these states...there,is naively revealed 
what the deepest instinct recognizes as higher, more desirable, 
more valuable in general, the upward movement of its type... 68 
- .  
. : - . .  , , I . . .  - ,  . , .* - - 
Nietzsche is not a hedonist; he does not admire the "aesthetic statew 
: - .  . 
, , , ?  , . _ .  . - .  
b e c a u s e  it produces pleasure. Rather, the feelings of pleasure are 
. ,.. \ . 7 ,  ( .  - , . I  . < . . . 
themselves traceable to a sense of the "upward movementw of a type, and 
z ,  , . 
t h i s  is what makes the stimulus provided by art so important. The 
1 I , .  
assumption that the satisfaction of the passions is purely a matter of 
. . 
" i" ' -  
producing "pleasurable feelings" is part of the Platonic denigration of 
. .." 
, *- 
the body. 69 
1 ,  
The reasons why Nietzsche and Plato reach such different 
-> . 
evaluations of the pleasurable effects of art are not hard to discover. 
. . 
For Plato, poetry 'has a terrible power to corrupt even the best 
charactersv, by encouraging the expression of feelings which shame and 
morality would normally keep under check:$ . . 
3 '  ' .. ., -. . , . . . " 1  : . 
Poetry has the same effect on us when it represents sex and anger, 
and the other desires and feelings of pleasure and pain which 
, r 
normally accompany our actions.' It feeds them when they ought to 
becstarved, and makes them control us when we ought, in.the 
interests of our own welfare and happiness, to control them.70 
' I -  . . -  9 .  . < ,  . . 
Nietzsche disputes the assumption that,the stimulus of the desires 
provided by art,leads to a loss of,control, . . and an abandonment to the 
passions. There is nothing inevitable about such a reaction; a strong 
and harmonious type has the capacity to benefit from such stimuli 
8 .  
rather ,than be overwhelmed by them: . -,, 
.. . - .  . , .  . 
Fear of the senses, of the desires, of the passions, when it goes 
so far as to counsel us against them, is already a symptom of 
weakness:.extreme measures always indicate abnormal conditions...A 
"stimulation of the sensesw i s  a seduction,only for those whose 
system is too easily moved and influenced.. ." 
1 
, . . , - r - . .  
None of this implies that Nietzsche counterposes a crude "liberation of 
the passionsn to Plato'S suppression of them. His point is rather that 
the simple dichotomy - "crush them or be crushedw - arises only for an 
already debilitated organism. Nietzsche does not share the romantic 
. .  t , s 
belief that passion liberated will solve the world's ills. On the 
. . 
contrary, as a disorganizing, potentially overwhelming force, passion 
makes ugly. Nietzsche admires great passion, but only when it co-exists 
. ,  
w i t h  a greater, dominating will.72 The great contrast he offers is 
L > 
between art, which sublimates and rides the passions, and morality, 
which seeks to crush them.'3 To let the passions run wild is simply 
degenerate. 
 his revaluation of art's-stimulus of the senses remains only 
a first step. It is necessary to follow through the implications of 
& . . ,  . 
this 'line df 'thinking, to show that it does more than make a 'case"for 
3 .  
art's right to co-exist with philosophy. For there is a danger that 
philosophers could grant the arguments presented so far, and allow the 
importance of style - so.long as it does not interfere with their right 
b 
to "substanceu. Why not retain a division of labour along these lines? 
This separation between "stylev1 , and "substance1* is a 
commonplace today, but for precisely that reason *it demands far closer 
scrutiny than the , overt . rejection of art which is Platofs more obvious 
legacy. For while it stands, any rehabilitation or revaluation of art 
will remain something external.,to the main concerns of philosophy. And 
this means that Nietzschers eloquence will continue to be regarded as 
superfluous, even by those who admire it. The simple fact that 
Nietzsche unequivocally rejected the content-form hierarchy7' can only 
. , 
be a st'arting-point. what matters is why' the 'distinction'should be 
. , .  
abolished, and how and why it got set up in the first place: only when 
these questions are answered will the rejection start to gain some 




.. , , 2 .  
Under what conditions do style and substance become divided? 
, - . " 
Answer: when a contrast between them has become a real possibility, 
when a.case arises where (outer) form is seen-to conflict with (inner) 
content.:Such a case-receives its theoretical justification in Plato; 
. . 
but, more importantly, it is embodied in ~ocrates. socrates is 
I .  
physically repulsive and his speech graceless, and yet he exerts a 
fascination on his noblest contemporaries, who see in him a beautiful 
soul concealed by an ugly exterior. While this contrast strikes us as 
something commonplace, conditioned as we are by two thousand years of 
207 
C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  -it must  h a v e  s t a r t l e d  t h e  G r e e k s ,  who h a d  a q u i t e  
different perspect ive  on things:Nietzsche expresses  it neat ly :  
. Socra tes  was rabble .  One knows, one sees f o r  onese l f ,  how ug ly  he 




a re fu ta t ion .  Was Socrates a Greek a t  
. - .. 
. . , ,  I .  
 his recdgnize 's  t h e  f a t a l i t y  'df sb&tes. A f t e r  him, ' something i s  
. .- 
changed: u g l i n e s s  i s  no l o n g e r  a " r e f u t a t i o n " ,  and s c a r c e l y  even a n  
dbjeGtion.  Indeed, t h e  burden of prdof s t a r t s  t o  move i n  t h e  oppos i t e  
. . . : .  - 
d i r e c t i o n ,  ' t h a n k s  t o  P l a t o t  s propaganda.  hose who spebk b e a u t i  f u l l ;  
a r e  regarded wi th  suspic ion:  i f  t h e y  have nothing t o  h ide  - ignorance, 
depravi ty ,  etc. - then  why make t h e  e f f o r t  t o  p l e a s e  us? Henceforth, it 
i s  u p  t o  t h e  e l o q u e n t  t o  p r o v e  t h e i r  w o r t h .  The r e v o l u t i o n  i s  
encapsulated i n  t h e  words of Socra tes  a t  h i s  t r i a l :  , , 
d i s r e g a r d  t h e  manner of  my speech - it may be b e t t e r  o r  it may be 
worse - and.. .consider and c o n c e n t r a t e  your a t t e n t i o n , o n  t h i s  one 
quest ion,  whether my claims a r e  f a i r  o r  not.76 
, b .. . , 
,. ; .; .,, .. :. : . . . ,. .'k 
1 'I 
Nietzsche 's  response t o  t h i s  s e p a r a t i o n  i s  h i s  physiognomy: 
outward  form i s  t h e  best way of  judg ing  c h a r a c t e r .  T h i s  i s  a p p l i e d  
d i r e c t l y  t o  Socrates:  
. .. 
A n t h r k p o l o ~ i s t s  among c r i m i n o l o g i s t s  t e l l  i s  t h e  t y p i c a l  c r i m i n a l  
t y p e  i s  u g l y :  monstrum in fronte, monstrum in animo. But t h e  
c r i m i n a l  i s  a decadent. Was S o c r a t e s  a t y p i c a l . c r i m i n a l ?  A t  l e a s t  
t h a t  famous physiognomist's opinion which S o c r a t e s r s  f r i e n d s  found 
" 
s o  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  "ould  n o t '  c o n t r a d i c t  t h i s  i d e a .  A k o r e i g n e r  
pass ing through Athens who knew how t o  read f a c e s  t o l d  Socra tes  t o  
h i s  f a c e  t h a t . . h e  was a monstrum - t h a t  h e  c o n t a i n e d  w i t h i n  him 
every k i n d  of f o u l  v i c e  and l u s t .  And S o c r a t e s  answered merely:  
77 
"YOU know me, sir!"- 
While the tone here is flippant, the suggestion that physiobnoniy shouid 
be taken seriously is quite in keeping with Nietzsche's "physiological" 
approach to aesthetics. Moreover, Nietzsche sees an instinctive 
wisdom in aesthetic judgements: the ugly, which is to say the decayed 
and debilitated, has a depressive effect and saps energy, just as the 
beautiful, which is a token of strength, in turn  invigorate^.'^ All 
this means that, for Nietzsche, questions of taste and aesthetic 
judgement are once more of the highest worth. There is nothing 
"trivial" about finding a book or a person dull and depressing; no 
consc ious  judgements have been tested so thoroughly by the history of 
mankind. When a person hates something ugly, 
He then hates from out of the profoundest instinct of his species; 
there is horror, foresight, profundity, far-seeing vision in this 
hatred - it is the profoundest hatred there is. It is for its sake 
that art is profound ... 
How does this approach deal with the Platonic suggestion that 
beauty may be invisible on the surface, and that the apotheosis of 
beauty is an abstract and immaterial essence? The response must be that 
platovs "true beauty" is actually no kind of beauty at all. TWO 
considerations serve to enforce this judgement. The first is that, 
according to Platofs own statements, the proper effect of pure Beauty 
is to sober and calm the passions rather than to excite them, as art 
does.OO From the perspective of physiognomy, however, narcotic effects 
point decisively to an origin very different from the one Plato would 
have us believe+in and suggest that he is not describing beauty at all, 
let alone its most.perfect form. But as well as producing suspect 
effects, Platonic "Beautyw is a thoroughly de-naturalized entity, and 
that alone would suffice to make it unacceptable to Nietzsche: 
I£ one , s e v e r s  an  i d e a l  from r e a l i t y  one d e b a s e s  , t h e  r e a l , .  one. 
. 1 1  I 
impover ishes  it, one defames it. "The b e a u t i f u l  f o r  t h e  sake  of 
-I I 
. , " ,  
t h e  b e a u t i f u l n . .  . [ i s  a form of1 e i i l  e y e  f d r  t h e  r e a l .  - A r t ,  
knowledge, m o r a l i t y  a r e  means: i n s t e a d , o f  r ecogn iz ing  i n  them t h e  
aim of ,enhancing l i fe ,  one has  a s s o c i a t e d  them.with the .an t i th8s i . s  
o f  l i f e ,  w i t h  "Godw - a l s o  a s  t h e  r e v e l a t i o n  of  a  h i g h e r  wor ld  
, . .  - , ,  
which here  a n d ' t h e r e  looks down upon us  through them." 
 his r i ~ h ' ~ a s s a g e  s r v e s  n o t i c e  b*ce a g a i n  how m i s t a k e n  it  i s  t o  
b ', - . , . I .  . .  
i n t e r p r e t '  Nie tzsche  a s  a  t r a d i t i o n a l  a e s t h e t e ;  f o r  a l l  h i s  p r a i s e  of 
a r t  a n d  b e s u t y ,  t h e r e  i s > . n e v e r  a'. suggesti& of  a  l i f e  s p e n t  i n  
nconte'kplation" of t h e  beabt i ful :  t h e ' l i t t e r ' i s  a  pure ly  ~ l a t o h i c  
. . , , *  ,h * 8; . . .  
concept ion .  For Nie tzsche ,  such  con templa t ion  i s  merely  a  s u b s t i t u t e  
for; of  r e l i g i o n ,  and  w i t h  t h e  same d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t ,  namely t h e  
c a s t i g a t i o n  of t h e  t h i n g s  of t h i s  wor ld  f o r  f a i l i n g  ' t o  match u p C ' t o  
onef ideal.^^ Of course ,  a s  w e l l  a s  dangerous, Nie tzsche  rega rds  t h i s  
e f f o r t  t o  d i i t i l  a b s t r a c t  i d e a l s  from our  i e a l  6xperiences of t h i n g s  a s  
nbnse'nsical.. Beauty cannot be  a b s t r a c t e d '  from b e a u t i f u l  o b j e c t s  because 
u l t i m a t e l y '  it only  s i g n i f i e s  a  r e l a t i b n s h i p  w e  have wi th  them1 -removed 
. I 
f r o i i t h i s ,  'it i s  a  m e r e  phantasm: 
. ,. ,. . . . . + .   , 
: - ~ o t h i n g  i s . . s o  c o n d i t i o n a l . . . a s  , o u r  f e e l i n g  f o r  t h e  b e a u t i f u l .  
. I ..',I 
Anyone who t r ied t o  d ivorce  it from manfs p leasure  i n  man would a t  
once  f i n d  t h e  g round  g i v e  way b e n e a t h  him. The " b e a u t i f u l  i n  
i t s e l f n  i s  n o t ' i v e n  a doncept, m i r e l y  a  ' -  
.. . r I ' ,, I 
.* , - 
TO summa'rize, t h e n :  beau ty '  c o n c e i v e d  a s  a  &re, ' i d e a l  es 'sence i s  a  
. . .  , 
c b n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  t e r m s ,  . a n d s a '  s i g n  o f  *a d e c a d e n t  form of  l i f e  .' The 
p l a t d n i c  c o n ~ ~ ~ t i o n ~ '  inaugura tes  t h e  tyranny of "content" '  over  "form",' 
- , 
, , by s ~ g g e s t i h ~  t h a t '  " t r u e  beautyw ' e x i s t i  ourbide  appeirancks ; moreover, 
, .  . .. 
. . ,  , i t h , p r o t e c t s  t h e  ugly, d e g e n e r a t e  .'£om of l i f e  which sponsors  it 'from 
t h e  " '  fo rce  of a e s t h e t i c  judgement by suggest ing t h a t  ug l iness  may a f t e r  
all hide-beauty. Against this, Nietzsche'argues that, -rather than the 
surface which needrto be penetrated, the beauty and.style of a thing 
is-the best possible indicator of the degree of spirit it possesses. ~t 
isiby-"essencesw that we are liable to be fooled,'not appearances. -'.! 
Inevitably,,doubts remain about how,seriously physiognomy can 
be treated as a means for divining character; its general reputation is 
that of a mediaeval superstition.,But this is to treat physiognomy'as 
one means.among others of apprehending the.essence of things; the 
desire for objective knowledge is what motivates.the suspicions..By 
contrast,.physiognomy-has been seen here as a way of illustrating.the 
indissociablity of inside and outside, not as a-path to a higher truth. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of.such'a criticism indicates that 
physiognomy can only'be part of a-revaluation of aesthetics; it leaves 
, . 
- ,  * many questions unanswered. e ~ . . 
.-The basic-reason for such misunderstandings is that: so far 
the,shift which-Nietzsche considered the most important in aesthetics, 
and his own unique contribution,~has not'been-made - the.shift from the 
perspective of the;<observer,to thatsof the artist.85 without.this 
shift, the revaluation remains paSSive:.one recognizes~in~eloquence an 
expression of'health,' yet it is like a mark of grace,lexternal and 
mysterious. ' a b  " : . ', . . + _ I  
.-. n r .  To;: present Nietzsche only. as a . contributor - to aesthetic 
theory, however important,"is to misrepresent him - because of what it 
omits. ,It3makessthe question of eloquence look 1ike.a merebranch-line 
in philosophy, and even in Nietzsche's own work;,as if it were a matter 
of contributing to the.philosophica1 grasp of art, ,without questioning 
philosophy,s right 'to its cold, observer eye. Moreover, to stage 
~ i e t z s c h e  as part of an intra-philosophical debate would be 
inconsistent with,everything I have said in previous chapters about the 
clash between philosophy and the rival force of.rhetoric. It-is not a 
question of philosophy accepting eloquence or even-becoming eloquent, 
but rather of philosophy versus eloquence, .of a basic clash of, values; 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to rectifying these omissions. 
Nietzsche -marks a decision in favour of art and artists and 
against the ontological preoccupations of philosophy; there is'no 
possibi1ity:of compromise here.*One passage indicates this fundamental 
choice perfectly.. Having. just emphasized that artists- - and 
psychologists -,are, really uninterested in "naturen, and that their 
observations are always -directedv.towards an, outcome, Nietzsche 
concludes with the contrast: 'Seeing what is t- that pertains to a 
different species:of spirit, the anti-artistic, the prosaic. One has to 
know who one is.. .re6 But the ,first question of 'philosophy: has always 
been precisely the ontological "What is...?" So the philosopher cannot 
become an artist without renouncing virtually everything that has 
hitherto counted as philosophy. " '  
This fundamental divergence of objectives deserves further 
exploration: what makes these "artists and psychologistsn. different? 
primarily, it is a question of valuing creativity: As we saw earlier in 
the chapter,.Nietzsche regards metaphysics as a form of creative 
activity, but with an extraor&mari\j bad conscience;-so that it is 
creative against its will. The philosopher does.notYsee himself as 
using,,language to make a world; thus he will never be much good as a 
creator, because he does not'see the need for all those exercises and 
disciplines which are required t o  construct that type. Most 
fundamentally,.Nietzsche's injunction to"become hard!', because 
,creators are hardr," goes against the philosopher's grain. For if the 
prime directive-is to find out what is, then it will be an advantage to 
be.asqreceptive and as soft as.possible, and "becoming hardw will seem 
not..just.unnecessary but positively damaging. Given'the vehemence with 
which Nietzsche,-presents the contrast between creative and merely 
receptive types, ":)it .:is perhaps surprising that even his interpreters 
have, by and large, either regarded creativity as a marginal addition 
to philosophical investigation and critique, or ignored the motif 
altogether. Alternatively, it could be seen as further confirmation 
that philosophers are too concerned with "finding outn to take the 
ideal, of the creator seriously.a9-But whatever its-explanation, ,no 
misunderstanding could be more significant. Forsthis shift to the 
perspective of the artist not only provides the best justification of 
eloquence - of the process of becoming-artistic, above and beyond 
any "significationn it may have for.observers - it also marks once 
a g a i w t h e  extent of Nietzschers departure from the traditional 
objectives of philosophy. "Art is worth more than 'truthn. 
" - C ' .  
with the shift to the perspective of the artist, Nietzschers aesthetics 
comes into its own; but at the same time, it seems.'to entail a slide 
into contradiction, for him-and for' the thesis I have 'been presenting. 
The.whole,of chapter four, which insisted that Nietzsche was a 
fanatically scfentiffc spirit, seems to have been forgotten in the new 
enthusiasm:,for'the creative, artistic Nietzsche. If the-only thing 
necessary is to make oneself and the world beautiful, then where is the 
need for science, even as Nietzsche conceives of-the term? Is there not 
an irreconcilable conflict between these two demands? 
The confusion is exacerbated by the fact that Nietzsche 
himself has some criticisms of the artists, as well as all the 
compliments I have chosen to report. His praise often seems to come 
from.0lympean heights - as if he saw artists benea th  him - and 
sometimes this sense of distance becomes explicit, for example in the 
, , A .  
sugge$tion that. 'we should learn from artists while being wiser than 
.-. , 
they are in others, matters' Occasionally, Nietzsche expresses 
outright suspicion or8irritation.towards artists," and then an 
undercurr&t 'of 'thought comes"to the surface, as he laments the 
artists' infinite capacity to deceive themselves and become actors in 
everything they do. Ultimately, the artist is just not very good as a 
. ,  I , . :> 
thinker, because he is too warm-blooded for its rigorous demands: 
'i 
c , . .  
once the aesthetic drive is at work.. .it is not possibl6 tb' remain 
- ,objective, or .to :. suspend the interpretive, ,additive, 
interpolating, poetizing power..,.the judgement of beauty is 
shortsighted, it sees only the immediate consequences; it lavishes 
upon the object that inspires it a magic conditioned by the 
- association of various beauty judgements - that are quite alien to 
, - 
the nature,,.of that object. To experience a thing as beautiful 
means : to experience it necessarily wrongly. . . '*
. . , . 
, . 
To put it bluntly (Nietzsche never explicitly states this 
. c , *  . " - 
link), the artist lacks the in t e l l e c tua l  conscience and its passion for 
endless experimentation. But if Nietzsche was aware - of this limitation 
of artists, how can he have been so determined to make life artistic? 
Either ~ietzsche 'himself is conf used or the interpretation offered in 
the last two chapters is mistaken somewhere...or is there a way of 
e'2 
resolving the' paradox? I 
,I - . . 
Already in this chapter we have considered~h~6n~eption of
- . .  
art which .incorporatei metaphysics :nd morality," and d narrower version 
of art and artists, closer to common usage. But Nietzsche also 
. - 
idkhtifies different sub-types of artist within the latter grouping, 
one of which is'important enough to be treated here as a separate 
category: the tragic artist. Nietzsche says of him: 
" . : . . .  i * , , . .  ? ' ' I I. 
The profundity of the tragic artist lies in this, that his 
aesthetic instinct surveys the more remote consequences, that he 
does-not,halt shortsightedly at what ,is,closest at hand, that he 
affirms the large-scale economy which justifies the terrifying, 
the evil, the.questionable - and more than merely justifies 
them. 93 
. . 
. .. . . -  . . , . ' ,  . . . P I :  
. . " 4 7 .  . , . 5 -  
There is here a striking contrast with the previous quotation: this 
,.. . ' * " .  - .  I .  . . 
artist 'does not halt shortsightedly', whereas the other was 




> " ,  + * - '  
'shortsighted'; and he 'surveys the more remote consequencesr, while 
. . ' .  
the other 'sees only the immediate consequences~. Unless Nietzsche is 
. 7 ; .  ... U .  , . . . .  
- 3 
talking nonsense, we must assume that the tragic artist is different: 
' S  - . .  -. . , .  
he has not lost his deeper insight into things and his will to that 
. . , ... t' . . ,  . , . -. 
insight; he has not lost his scientific eye. This figure is 
* * , . i .  C ,,." . .  -_ / 
, '  ' 
fundamentally the fusion of two drives, the scientific and artistic; 
, .I 
. . '  
r ,  
here, he is presented as an artist with an extra, scientific quality, 
. . . - : :  . * '  , " .  e .  , I  ' < - 
but he can just as well be presented as a man of knowledge with an 
. I  ' *  ? v * ., - ' .  . I  , - ,  
artistic dimension, without altering the description: 
. . 
. I \  , 3 
' ', 
i r I  i *>. I .  . - .  , " > -. 
' ~ r t  as the redemp;ibn of the man of kno"ledge - of those who see' 
- -the~terrifying and questionable character of existence, who want 
9 4 
? .  w to see it,,the men of tragic . , knowledge, , 9 
, !-~ t ,  - ,\ *-. . 3. > . A .  $ I .. , , , . . 
. i 
. . ' 3 .  
  his figure is more than just another of the many "types" 
described by Nietzsche. It is the highest ideal, to aim for which could 
be considered his "categorical.~imperativew - assuming it is recognized 
. . . , .  . 
. .  i 
how very far, from all ethical. imierativks it lies 
 he" best 
~ietzschean formula forthis ,scientific-artistic imperative is amor 
fati ("love of fate"), since both principles emerge in Nietzsche's 
- *. " - .& -  . - ,. ? * 
exegeses-of the term. .The artistic element.:is stressed in the aphorism 
f ' 
which first introduces the term: 
I.. ,, . 'I " 
I want t o  learn more and more to see as beautiful what is 
necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things 
. . . 1  . . ., 
beautiful. &or fati: let that be my love henceforth! I 'do not 
- want,to wage war against what is ugly. 96 
 his connection is' hardly surprising, since Nietzsche-says elsewhere 
that love-is the-precondition of art and that mlmaking.beautiful" is 
precisely what love always does. " But amor fati seeks, to generalize 
the artistic instinct,by making it apply not,only to objects easily 
recognizable.as ."beautifulw but to everything",that is'necessary in 
things..At the same time, amor fati.liberates the scientific impulse. 
~o+assume:that science is motivated by utilitarian and humanitarian 
considerations*is a complete misunderstanding: on the contrary,. ethics 
is fundamentally hostile to.science - 'it considers it, a squandering of 
one n o t  rich enough-,to squander when man'-concerns 'himself seriously 
with - plants and stars ."' By contrast; the love of fate insists =that 
things are worth knowing for their own sake, which means that science, 
far from being intrinsically hostile to art, arose out:of the stimulus 
to life given by art. Art delights, and consequently inspires a desire 
for life of which science is a,manifestation. This is brilliantly 
expressed in a passage which long predates the arnor fati doctrine but 
is.already imbued with its spirit:- . , P. . 
art.. .has taught us for thousands of yeirs to look upon 1 i f e . h  
any of its forms with interest and pleasure, and to educate our 
sensibilities sO far that we at' iast cry: "life, however it riay 
be, is good!" This teaching by art to take pleasure in life...has 
been absorbed into us,-,and_it.now reemerges as an almighty 
I 
requirement of knowledge...if art disappeared the intensity and 
multifariousness of the joy in life it has implanted would still 
, . .  
.,. . 
continue to demand satisfaction. The scientific 'man is -the further 
'-evolution of the artistic. 99 
. .. . . . ., , 3 ,  ' 
i ' .", 
The high value Nietzsche places-on science is not in contradiction to 
the priority'accorded art, but in harmony with it. Indeed, ,some 
passages point,to an even stronger conclusion: that the will to 
knowledge is actually strengthened and perfected by art. For will one 
not also'see better if one approaches things with.means of honouring 
the ugly and disgusting as well as the "good" Nietzsche dreams of 
artists for whom only the ugly and disgusting will present a sufficient 
challenge; and they will be scientists too, even if it~is'the~demands 
of art - the search for subjects and-"means of expression" - that'make 
, .- them scientific. , . 
(Having ' suggested that amor fati plays ,.the key role - of 
harmonizing the artistic and scientific drives - and is thus perhaps 
the most important N i e t z s c h e a n ' " c ~ n c e ~ t " ~ ~ ~  - it might be considered 
problematic,that many.of Nietzsche's friends have been so critical of 
it. ~ t s  apparent2reconciliation with the status quo is what disturbs 
the critics of-amor fati, suchCas A,. .*P. Fell: 'it could be ,the 
idiosyncrasy of a failure, or,onerwho needs an illusion to accept his 
lot because he has,not managed to turn',all to advantage.' Worse, it 
could evewbe 'an unnecessarily contrived and distorting vision of the 
world, one which involves approval of avoidable as well as unavoidable 
,101 
suffering. . .  i . +. 
. .  his sort,of comment is quite justified in response to the 
" c a l i f o r n i a n l - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of-Nietzsche, 'which regard?his "Great 
yesn-as a call to overcome psychic blocks-and achieve an ecstatic sense 
of personal well-being. It' also counters the Panglossian efforts to 
show that "all is for the bestw in this best of all possible worlds. 
~ u t  amor fati is neither of these things. Such misinterpretations arise 
from a *failure to recognize the implications of loving-fate. For 
Nietzsche, love is not a passive affect; it is n o t  related to 
acquiescence or acceptance. Love is,described rather as 'the-most 
astonishing proof of how far the transfiguring power of intoxication 
can gor ;Io2 amor fati means the transfiguration of fate. 
The literal meaning of "transfigurew, however,' 'is "to change 
. . 
form or appearancew: does this not imply a wallowing in 'visions' and 
rillusions', as Fell suggests; in short, escapism?-But with'this we 
have returned full circle to Plators critique of art - to the belief 
that "dea1ing.h appearancesW,makes no difference to reality. Here, the 
earlier discussions of mimesis and the relationship between seeming and 
being should be recalled.lo3.But 'it may,also be said that the fatalism 
Fell condemns and the-rebellion against Fate with which-he condemns it 
are,both aspects of the same, Christian evaluation of existence. ~ o t h  
find evil and suffering unbearable, a curse on life: they are the two 
great Christian antidotes.to this condition. On the one hand, a 
theodicy - the world's awfulness justified by believing that good 
triumphs in the higher scheme of things; and, on the other,hand, 
-improvingw mankind through struggle against the world's evils. ~ o t h  
are species of odium fati; the debate about fatalism and avoiding the 
future is an internal affair for theologians. 
Beyond this, Fell wonders how Nietzsche can 'hope for 
through amor fati, since this seems to contradict all 
the other great themes of his'philosophy. Indeed it wou1d;'if this were 
the role of amor fati. But it is-not a question of redemption from 
existence; of being "savedw in some way. This is to mistake subject and 
object! Amor fati means neither to be redeemed, nor to seek redemption, 
b u t  t o  become a  redeemer. . . .. 
.  his is not  a  d i g r e s s i o n  from t h e  themes of a r t , a n d  sc ience  
t h a t  l e d  a m o r ' f a t i  t o  be  introduced; ,  f o r  a r t  and sc ience ,  a s  Nietzsche 
c o n c e i v e s  them, a r e  t h e  ways i n  which t h i s  . t r a n s f i g u r i n g  f o r c e  i s  
manifested.  An occasion f o r  drawing t h e s e , - t h r e a d s  t o g e t h e r  i s  provided 
by a b r i e f ,  almost p l a y f u l  note  i n  The . W i l l  t o  Power: " - 
~. . ,. . 
. . ,  r - I  ?. , 
7 *.' , 
One i s  an  a r t i s t  a t  t h e  c o s t  of  r e g a r d i n g  t h a t  ... which a l l  non- 
a r t i s t s  c a l l  "form" a s  c o n t e n t ,  a s  " t h e  m a t t e r  i t s e l f . "  TO b e  
s u r e ,  t h &  one b e l o n g s  i n  ' a  t o p s y - t ' l r v y  world:  f i r  h e n c e f o r t h  
content  becomes something merely formal : - our  l i f e  included. lo5 
The l a s t - p h r a s e  - "our l i f e ~ i n c l u d e d n .  - s t a n d s ~ o u t .  The complete a r t i s t  
makes e v e r y t h i n g ,  i n c l u d i n g  h i s  own l i f e ,  m a t e r i a l  f o r  h i s  a r t .  But 
t h i s  m i r r o r s  e x a c t l y  what Nietzsche says  of t h e  s c i e n t i s t ,  a s  w e  saw i n  
t h e  l a s t  c h a p t e r : . h e  makes h i s  l i f e  an  experiment; l i f e  s t a n d s  i n  t h e  
s e r v i c e  of  s c i e n c e .  Th i s  a r t  and s c i e n c e  h a s  n o t h i n g  t o  do  w i t h  t h e  
. I .  . '  
requirements of s a l v a t i o n ,  which can only  impose r e s t r i c t i o n s  upon it. 
' 
Far  from lead ing  t o  a  r e s o l u t i o n  i n  f a t a l i s m  o r  s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  amor 
f a t i  demands t h e  g r e a t e s t  s c i e n t i f i c  c u r i o s i t y  a n d  t h e  g r e a t e s t  
a r t i s t i c  c r e a t i v i t y ;  it imposes a  t a s k ,  and  p e r h a p s  t h e r e  i s  none 
g r e a t e r .  
Whitever t h e  m e r i t s  of t h i s  framework a s  a  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  eloquence 
i n  N i e t z s c h e ,  it i s  bound t o  a p p e a r  h o p e l e s s l y  g r a n d i o s e  f o r  t h e  
. , . , i- ' . . 
a n c i e n t  r h e t o r s ,  who u s e d  f i n e  .words t o  make t h e i r  s p e e c h e s  more 
 leasing and i n s p i r i n g ' t o  their.audience:Can-there r e a l l y  .be  any 
. . 
c o n n e c t i o n  between t h e i r  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  k l o i u e n c &  and ~ i e t z b c h i i  s,  
b ~ . .  * -, . l i . ,  
besides the' "accidentbf an admiration for it held in common; or does 
. . 
the link between Nietzsche and ancient rhetoric break down here? 
At first glance, nothing seems further removed from Nietzsche 
1 i , . , - + - .  " , "' . 
than the rhetors' educational commitment to eloquence as an art to be 
' .- .- I ' - i  
acquired through the careful learning of technique. This emphasis 
* -  i 
inevitably lends force to the Platonic suspicion of "verbal trickeryN: 
1 . ,  + 
if they are honest, why calculatingly acquire these formal arts? This 
I (  I 
, . #.. , 6 .  * 
premeditated exploitation of linguistic resources does not even have 
', ::. , , , , 
the artist8s excuse of "inspirationN. Yet ii is precisely here that 
. , .. % 
* .  , . 
Nietzsche's affinity with the rhetors is most obvious. From Human, All 
. .  ... 
" .- 
TOO Human onward, he goes out of his way to reject the Romantic idea of 
A 0 - ,> 1. 
. , 
, .. . 
the "inspired genius", and praises all the mechanical tricks and 
- ). , - - 4  . , 
techniques which made the rhetors so detested. Thus, for example, he 
$ . .  .r. * ' , a  ' 
. , .  . 
, - ~  - .  
writes enthusiastically about the necessity of 'preparation for artr, 
, . 7, . >  . . 
. . 
an important element of which should be to practise 
the prdduc'tion Of manifold versions o f  a given:content and 
not...the invention of this content itself. The mere presentation 
of a,,given content was the task of Latin style, for.,which the 
teachers of antiquity possessed a subtlety of hearing which has 
. - 
long since been lost .Io6 
, i; . r  , '  6 - - - ' . g  , . 
. a  
. - 
..? . . ; - 
~his~commitmtint~ tb fo=mal training is not a marbinal eleiicint in 
. .  . 
Nietlsche' i' work; 1t follo-ws 'f rOme his inristence that creativity is 
something acquired thrdugh discipline, a'nd certai*ly not an' "innaf em 
. -  I .  . . . , . 
gift : 
Every artist knows how far from any feeling of letting himself go 
his "most:natural" state is - the free ordering, placing, 
disposing, giving form in the moment of "inspirationN - and how 
strictly and bubtly he obeys. thousandfold laws precisely then; 
laws that precisely ,on account of .their hardness and determination 
defy all fornulation through concepts... 107 
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What this suggests is that eloquence is not simply an ornamental 
. , , . . . . "  . .. . .. . . 
topping, but something requiring an immense effort and schooling, 
. . ? ' ,  *, ~ , . * ., - 
almost a way of life in itself. Its value lies in the great 
. . ," . - 
, . 
contribution it makes to the task of becoming a creator. 
<- . . 1 .  " -* 
But Nietzsche shares something more with the rhetors than 
, . i  * ., .+ 1 , .  - .  
' j ,  r .  t 
this mutual concern for the nitty-gritty of technique; an evaluation 
* . ., 
that is quite basic, but no less important for all that. For him, as 
~ 9 ., A- ,- - . . .  
for them, eloquence is not something to be decoded and interpreted, in 
- <  ... . 
the speeches and writings of others, but something to be employed. That 
i . L .  ~ - .  .\ . . - .  I. . 
good writing and speaking act as a stimulus is justification enough, 
, - i  I C C  ' : .  . . 
because it is a sign of the priority of art; more than anything else, 
. , , .  . . $ ,  . .., 
it is this instinct which unites Nietzsche and the rhetora against the 
' ,  - . ,  ' I  
. , .  
philosophers. 
, . ,. - . .,*I. . '  " 0 , . . 
And yet, in spite of all this, there is a certain general 
. . 
- ,( r 
. . 
, i "  
question-mark concerning this Nietzsche-rhetoric alliance which is 
. . 
perhaps particularly pointed with respect to eloquence. This is not to 
say that there can be any doubt concerning Nietzschers commitment to 
the value of eloquence and the aesthetic generally: .rather, it is 
because Nietzsche's avowal of art' is-so complete that' it stands at a 
great distance from the axicient ':rh=tors. when Socrates confronted his 
opponents with the "immoralityu of their methods of teaching and 
public-speaking, and the evils of "fine wordsw, they found no effective 
. . +, .. 
response; at best they managed, like Callicles, a magnificent display 
. '. 
. , . , 
of contempt for Socrates and everything he stood for. BY contrast, 
. - . ,  -. - 3 ,  . , .  
Nietzsche's defence of eloquence operates, as we have seen, in a 
. ,  . ' 7 ,  . 
vr ;Ae  variety of ways, at a level of profundity matching that of 
, , 
. " 
. :. . 
. . 
~1ato:himself. The affirmation of the aesthetic marked by-amor fat1 
does more than state a case that Socratests opponents might have 
thought of had they been cleverer or not been censored by Platofs,pen; 
for with,'it, Nietzsche presents a type of aesthetic-scientific ideal to 
rival all the ascetic ideals of history. As Nietzsche says: 'Apart from 
the.ascetic ideal...wwhy-man.at all?" was a question without an 
'f108 But one 'could.add: it ;was a question that the Sophists answer.. . 
did not ask; they belonged to an earlier period,.whose state of health 
was such that one did.not dive to such depths. ,-,. , 
) .  , - TO , recognize this gap between Nietz~che~and the* rhetors is 
simply to acknowledge the inescapable effects of two thousand years of 
platonic-Christian.ncivilizationw. While the .Sophists taught and 
practised eloquence instinctively, delighting in ,its effects, 
unconcerned.about wider consequences - and for precisely that reason 
vulnerable to the Socratic critique once they took him.seriously - 
~ietzsche lookseback with the whole progress of the moralistic assault 
on the instincts in view (and, indeed, in him) and, seeing it as a 
mistake, fights a principled defend of the instincts.  his paradoxis 
, * . , 
at times palpable: 
. , 
- .  l Y, . I, 
, . , , 
The.Greek culture of thexSophists had developed out of all the 
instincts...And - it has ultimately shown ltself to be right: 
every advance in ep1stemologlcal and moral knowledge has 
reinstated the Sophists... 10s 
It is no longer enough to assert the value of eloquence by 
saying, "it gives pleasure, it inspires, it makes people well-disposed 
towards usw, as the rhetors once did. This is too easily overwhelmed 
now by philosophical scepticism and asceticism. But, unlike the 
=hetors, Nietzsche is a master of these black arts, who delights in 
showing the disreputable origins*.of the opposition to pleasure and 
inspiration - very far from~ltruth"or "mankind's greater benefitw. ~t 
the end, Nietzsche emerges with the same positive judgement of 
eloquence as the rhetors before him; but, because of the march of time 
and.his own thorough survey*of the alternatives,rthe value placed on 
eloquence in speech and writing, and on art in,life general1y;is even 
higher. Thus precisely 'in ,this element of? rhetoric, (the elocuti o) , 
where ~ietzsche'is most.unquestionably aligned with the rhetors, his 
distance from them is'also most marked. He affirms their evaluation; 
but-isLonly using it to respond to a much broader,-universal framework 
of questioning than,they admitted. Art bec0mes.a vocation; eloquence 
part,of the answer to the question, "why man at all?" Here, at'least, 
Nietzsche isenot simply a-"modern rhetorw; hb is rhetoric's defender 
only because of the contrast its judgements-present.to those of 
platonism-Christianity, and the signpost it can be to something new - 
an aesthetic ideal that comes after~the ascetic flood: 
,AS an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, and 
art furnishes us with eyes and above all the good conscience to be 
f r -., 
able to t k n  ourselves into such a phenomenon.. .prebiselY because 
we aresat bottom,'grave and serious human beings - really, more 
weights than human beingsr- nothing does-us as much good as a 
fool's cap... 110 
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An exhortation to "turn ourselves~~.into an aesthetic phenomenon" 'is'a 
strange way for a work of philosophy to conclude, for it is not-in any 
obvious sense either philosophical'or con~1usive;~On the other hand, it 
fits,in with the prevailing-mood,of the work; which'has put in 
question the nature and value of canonical~philosophical procedures and 
moved"towards what has hitherto'been labelled'as inimical to or -at 
least outside philosophy; But it is perhaps.time to be a little less 
enigmatic, and *to ,state what .I see- as the main implications of my 
argument for-thetthree-specific.areas of concern in this'thesis, 
namely:. Nietzsche; the Sophists;.and the more'general question of the 
relationship'between philosophy and rhetoric. c - I .  . . I  .. 
e c So far as Niet2sche.i~ concerned, I do not claim to establish 
the f a c t  of an important link with rhetoric,'since this is already 
widely recognized,and is indeed something of~a~commonplace among modern 
commentators. Nor have41 conducted so comprehensive an analysis of the 
details of Nietzschefs rhetoric and attitude to,rhetoric as has been 
undertaken elsewhere:' had, that been my intention, ,there would have 
been no,call for the detailed-comparisons with Plato, Aristotle'and 
the'sophists. My aim8has rather been to indicate the extent to which 
questions at the heart of the debate between ancient Greek philosophers 
and rhetors are revived through Nietzsche:after a long period in which 
they lay dormant, apparently decisively settled in philosophyfs favour. 
There are two principal advantages gained by opening up. this historical 
dimension. In.the first' place, it exposes the inadequacies of the 
modern tendency to'reduce'rhetoric to e l o c u t i o  and shows that 
Nietzschefs connection with rhetoric also' incorporates.not only his 
love of' polemics (chapter two) ..and "inadequate" argumentation (chapter 
four) but even the relationship between knowledge and.action (chapter 
three). On top of this, the ancient conflict between philosophers and 
rhetors makes possible a new way ' o f  considering Nietzschers 
relationship to rhetoric. Instead of treating Nietzsche a s . a  
philosopher whose texts are rhetorical, it is.possible to.regard him as 
a rhetor,-a member of a differentstradition which has always taken an 
entirely different approach to "philosophica1"'questions. This7has 
important implications for how Nietzsche will be interpreted, and I 
have suggested that at various points,even such inventive readers'as 
Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze.underestimate the extent'to which 
Nietzsche breaks mores.that have bound and continue t o - b i n d  
philosophers ,since Plato. - The hypothesis that Nietzsche belongs3 to the 
rhetoricalttradition is a way of exp1oring:the manner in,which he 
remains outside and antagonistic to the basic instincts of philosophy. 
while my primary ;concern here has been to indicate-,the 
possibilities offered by the'Sophistsifor reappraising Nietzsche, this 
is \not the only direction in which'the comparison is fruitful. For 
while Nietzsche repeats the "errors"-ofrthe Sophists ,that had drawn 
platof s fire, he -also provides a, more sophisticated framework for 
defending rhetoric than any that was developed by the ancient rhetors. 
 his is particularly true for.the,questions of,pragmatism (chapter 
three) and art (chapter five): as I make clear, both the ideal of the 
promethean and amor fati are only possible'after Plato.   his does not 
contradict the claim,that Nietzsche belongs to the rhetorical 
tradition, for to belong,to a tradition does not mean to ape one's 
predecessors but to build on their achievements. -In any case, there is 
another sense in which.Nietzsche is far closer to the Sophists than he 
i s  t o  o t h e r  p a r t s  of t h e  r h e t o r i c a l  t r a d i t i o n , -  which j u s t i f i e s  t h e  1 
a t t e n t i o n  I have p a i d  t o  them a t  t h e  expense of t h e  l a t e r  exponents of 
r h e t o r i c .  S i n c e  A r i s t o t l e ;  r h e t o r i c  h a s  b y  and  l a r g e ' b e e n  s e e n  a s  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  s p e c i f i c  r eg ions  of d i s c o u r s e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  p o 1 i t i c s : a n d  
law, ' b u t ' h a s  ceded p r i d e  o f , p l a c e  t o  philosophy:  t h e , S o p h i s t s ,  on t h e  
o t h e r  hand, f o u g h t , f o r  n o t h i n g  less t h a n  c u l t u r a l  and  e d u c a t i o n a l  1 
hegemony. By r e v i v i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  r h e t o r i c  a s  a  substitute f o r  
philosophy, a s  opposed t o  a  co -ex i s t ing  d i s c i p l i n e ,  Nietzsche he lps  t o  
c h a l l e n g e  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n a l  v i e w - t h a t  t h e  S o p h i s t s  made w i l d l y  over-  
ambitious claims f o r  t h e  s t a t u s  of t h e i r  a r t .  
. ' . , .  
, This is i n  f a c t t h e  a x i s  around which t h e  e n t i r e  t h e s i s  
revolves:  t h e  c e n t r a l  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  cons ider  r h e t o r i c  an a l t e r n a t i v e  
paideia o r  c u l t u r a l  i d e a l ,  a s  it was f o r  t h e  The way i n  
which I have  s o u g h t  t o  a c h i e v e  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  t a k e  f o u r  key 
d i f f e r e n t i a e ,  which philosophy has used t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  of 
i t s  i d e a l ,  " and s u b j e c t  them t o  a  c r i t i c a l  f e a p p r a i s a l .  The p o i n t  i s  
n o t  t o  prove phi losophy wrong, b u t  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  p a r t i a l  n a t u r e  of 
i t s  judgement, and t o - a r g u e  t h a t  r h e t o r i c  t o o  has  a  c l a im t o  nwisdomn, 
though no t  a s  t h e  word i s  understood by philosophers.  The c l a s h  between 
phi losophy and r h e t o r i c  i s  . no t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  between good and evi1;as 
has s o  o f t e n  been supposed, bu t  between r i v a l  wisdoms. 
, The substance of t h i s ' r i v a l r y  has  emerged chap te r  by chapter .  
I n  c h a p t e r  two ili was seen  t h a t 0 t h e  more polemical  t o n e  of  t h e  r h e t o r  
does no t  make him a  manipulator; t h a t  c l a im is more a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  
s o c r a t i c  c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  which p r o v i d e s  p h i l o s o p h y ' s  model. The r e a l  
problem i s  t h a t  t h r o u g h  i t s . o v e r t  p a r t i s a n s h i p ,  r h e t o r i c  d o e s  n o t  
a s p i r e  t o  o r  even acknowledge t h e  u n i v e r s a l ;  t h e  q u e s t i o n  devolves  t o  
whether o r  not  disagreement c a n ' b e  a  v i r t u e .  The t h i r d  chap te r  t r ies t o  
s e p a r a t e  t h e  acknowledged pragmatism o f '  r h e t o r i c  from t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
of myopia and pettiness with which philosophy has stigmatized it. I 
argue that the,most important distinction is rhetoric's refusal to 
accept the necessity - or possibility - of finding firm grounds-and 
justification for actions;- it is a question of whether or not knowledge 
and action are fundamentally separate matters. Chapter four considers 
whether the looser argumentation of rhetoric makes it less than fully 
rational or-even irrational.'My claim is that it is dogmatic to 
idealize rationality as "capturing the truth" and-that if it-is 
conceived instead as.an ongoing process, without end, :rhetoric is 
actually more reasonable than philosophy. Finally, chapter five 
considers whether the artistic commitment of rhetoric confuses its 
practitioners,and its audience, and argues that this negative -judgement 
is dependent .on philosophy's unfulfilled rival promise .to. provide 
ontological insight. That one side can give primacy to truth while-the 
other side gives primacy to art'is a clear sign of the deep cultural 
division between philosophy and rhetoric. 
As I suggested above, all these specific disputes can be 
gathered,together under a more general implicit rivalry concerning the 
nature of wisdom. The wisdom towards which the;philosopher strives is 
knowledge . of the - truth, and . a l l  the 2: aspects of ' rhetoric's 
differentiation from.philosophy stem from a fundamental suspicion of 
this objective. If there is no unitary truth, then it is dishonourable 
to be dialectically "working towards" what does not exist - better open 
conflict of values; if knowledge can never be complete, then wisdom 
involves what is done without- and against-knowledge; if knowledge of 
truth never comes, then reason~should*develop in ways that enforce and 
stimulate continuing inquiry; ifgtruth cannot be found,. then art is 
needed to fill the narrative void that would otherwise be left. It-is 
important to emphasize that these "ifs" do not arise due to some sort 
of super-ontological insight into the absence of true being. To make I 
I 
I 
such a claim would not only be obviously paradoxical, it would also I 
distort the nature of rhetoric's alternative; for it is not a question i 
I 
of an intellectual'response to a perceived failure of-philosophy's 
1 
efforts, but of a rejection of philosophy's values: the rhetor doesanot 
want knowledge of the truth:What'he does want is far.harder t o  
determine than for the philosopher, but a provisional approximation'of I 
the wisdom for which,he strives.might be mastering fate and fortune; I 
this would, at any'rate; be consistent with the distinguishing.features ~ 
of rhetoric that are considered.here. It also draws attention to two 
essential contrasts with~philosophy's ideal..First, even at the end,. 
there is no end: the rest and'resolution of pure knowledge has no 
equivalent; a plurality of forces and consequent struggle always 
remains. Second,sit is an active process,that is involved, rather3than 
the individual's attunement to the guiding force of.truth; wisdom is 
not found, but invented. These differences,-and the many others that 
could doubtless be generated; test-ify by their intractable and 
irresolvable nature that' this rivalry of wisdoms- is,above all about a 
difference in spirit, 'associated.with different forms of life. Every 
wlover of wisdomw must therefore choose one side or the other, since.it 
is not possible to have-both: which is it to be?, .. , . 4 
:. '. *** . , . ' - .  6. . . . 
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Before giving my answer to this'question,,,I want to consider two 
reasons for supposing that-'such a choice never arises, on the ground 
that the whole idea of rhetoric'and philosophy as having conflicting 
ideals-of wisdom is misguided.-These'are, in effect, question marks 
against the thesis as a whole and as such-could hardly be:avoided; but 
they also provide a useful opportunity to clarify the connection 
between rhetoric and wisdom. - ' ,  % .  . ! ,  $ I  ~. 
The first objection,is.that it is essentially paradoxical to 
talk of rhetoric having an ideal'of wisdom, s i n ~ e . ~ l o v e  of wisdom" 
defines philosophy, and so rhetoric with a "love of wisdomw ceases to 
be rhetoric and becomes philosophy. The confusion~is compounded by the 
suggestion'made iwchapter two that methods normally associated with 
philosophy are more effective than any others at persuading people in 
modern times,-which implies that philosophy has become (or at least can 
become) rhetoric. It would, of course, be quite possible to accept that 
there is no real difference between the two, but to do so would be 
incompatible wit< th'e position I ha;e adopted throughout this thesis. 
The reason for eschewing this course is that to dissolve rhetoric into 
"anything that persuades1', would be the height of idealist ,abstraction: 
as is blindingly dbdious from even'="cursory glance at the cbnflict 
between Plato/Socrates and the rhetors, there is a fundamental rivalry 
of cultures, orientations, and material forces in operation; both sides 
are committed.to.particular procedures from something akin to instinct. 
AS a consequence, it isquite conceivable that procedures associated 
with rhetoric ,can have results that are functionally philosophical, and 
vice versa. I have simply chosen to follow the concrete historical 
phenomenon rather than the abstraction, and in each case it is to this 
that the label "rhetoricw or ."philosophyw applies.' A corollary of my 
main thesis is therefore that rhetoric and philosophy are both more 
specific than.an abstract application o f , t h e  phrases "art of 
persuasion" and "love of wisdomw ,,would imply; as the confusion of.names 
among the Greeks itself suggests, both descriptions can with a little 
imagination be, stretched to cover, almost anything .' 
~ u t  even if claims made about rhetoric as a "love of wisdomw 
areanot paradoxical, the objection remains that the p r i v i l e g e  I have 
given to "rhetorical wisdom" makes for-a thoroughly implausible and 
confusing evaluation of rhetoric. To suggest that a Callicles - to take 
a suitably extreme example -,can be a seeker:of wisdom is to-invite 
criticism from both sides. Philosophers >wille find it .monstrous that any 
self-confessed manipulator can be accorded honourable status while, 
from the other side, it will be'suspected that I have fallen into the 
trap mentioned in my introduction of honouring the rhe tors  morally, and 
thus betraying them. Perhaps,~inevitably,:it is Nietzsche.who most 
clearly articulates the 1atter:problem: . 
..\- . ., . . -  .  ~ . '  . , -  , .  ,,a, Q '  . 
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we ourselves are probably least inclined to.put on the garish 
finery of such moral word tinsels ... honesty, love of truth, love 
" ,  
'' 
of wisdom, sacrifice 'for knowle'dge, herois'm 'of the truthful - they 
, .- have something that swells,onefs'pride. -But we hermits and marmots 
have long,persuaded ourselves..;that this worthy verbal. 
pomp...belongs to the old mendacious pomp, junk, and gold dust of 
6 unconscious human vanity ... 
I readily accept that I have not provided a description of 
that could apply to all its practitioners, but such a 
description was never my intention. As I have already made clear, the 
sophists have been the focus of attentido not because they ire 
. .  
~representati~e" of the rhetorical tradition, b&t because,they stood as 
direct' rivals to the philosophersi it was this aspect of rhetoric that 
interested me. ~iien this restriction, the insistence on an alternative 
rhetorical ' ideal ib justified, however much '.it may outrage 
philosophers. Indeed, the outrage provoked by figures such as 
callicles may be 'explained by the very fact that they'do have 
alternative ideals that remain impervious to dialectical entreaty.' 
But what of the.suspicio* that 'all this talk of ideals means 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no e s c a p e  from ph i losophy ,  and  t h a t  t h e  ph i losophy-  
r h e t o r i c  d icho tomy I have  p o s i t e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t u r n s  o u t  t o  b e  a n  
i l l u s i o n ?  C e r t a i n l y ,  t h e r e  i s  a  d a n g e r  i n  t a l k i n g  o f  " r h e t o r i c a l  
wisdomw, and t h e  pa th  taken by C a l l i c l e s ,  who p r e f e r r e d  t o  be l a b e l l e d  
a  catamite'  than  - t o  c la im f o r  himself any of t h e  "moral word t i n s e l s w ,  
i s  a  v i a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  t e r m  "wisdom" i s  n o t  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  h e r e ,  s o  l o n g  a s  i t  i s  a l w a y s  remembered how v e r y  
d i f f e r e n t  t h i s  i s  from ph i losoph ica l  wisdom: it i s  n o t  a  q u e s t i o n  of 
two pa ths  l ead ing  t o  t h e  same goal ,  b u t  of  a  divergence a t  every  s t e p ,  
without  any'hope of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .  U s e  o f - a  "phi losophica l  wordw such 
a s  wisdom p r i m a r i l y  s e r v e s  t h e  purpose  o f  c h a l l e n g i n g  s e l f - s t y l e d  
phi losophers  t o  t h i n k  again,  on t h e  grounds t h a t  a s , " l o v e r s  of wisdom" 
t h e y  c a n  s c a r c e l y  i g n o r e  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  wisdom may b e  u t t e r l y  
d i f f e r e n t  f rom how t h e y  c o n c e i v e  it.  I n  a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h e y  w i l l  
cont inue  t o  opera te  a s  they  have done h i t h e r t o ,  a s  " lovers  of P l a t o n i c  
wisdom", i n  which case ,  a l l  honour t o  them! - a t  l e a s t  t h e y  w i l l  have 
made t h e  choice. 
There can ha rd ly  have been any doubt over t h e  answer g iven h e r e  t o  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  t h a t  was l e f t  h a n g i n g  e a r l i e r  - "which i d e a l  s h o u l d  one  
fo l low?" .  E q u a l l y ,  though,  it c a n  h a r d l y  b e  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  p a t h  of  
r h e t o r i c  i s  pursued here ,  however s t r o n g l y  it i s  a t  times advocated.  
 his i s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h i s  p r o j e c t ,  which h a s  been i n  
e s s e n c e  t o  r e t u r n  phi losophy t o  t h e  c r o s s r o a d s  where t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  
reject r h e t o r i c  was made, i n  o r d e r  t o  review t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  t h a t  took 
p l a c e  t h e r e  - a n d  p e r h a p s  c h a n g e  t h e  outcome.  A t  some p o i n t  t h e  
d i scuss ion  must end, a s  it d i d  once before ,  when t h e  ph i losoph ica l  pa th  
was taken and rhetoric was condemned and forgotten; whatever the 
outcome, this crossroads, like all others,'can only be a point of 
transit. 
As for Nietzsche - he, ultimately, has been no more than a 
means to arrive at this location and an example of what can be achieved 
by following the rhetorical alternative. For those who admire these 
achievements,.the challenge is not to "be Nietzschean" but to'mark out 
a ~ n e w  path within the terrain of rhetoric.,Or, to put it another'way, 
to mark out such a pathtls to be Nietzschean; for his legacy is not a 
store of insights to be carefully treasured and-preserved, but rather 
the discovery -.or',rediscovery.- of a world in which who or what things 
are matters .infinitely less-than what we make of them; To explore.this 
worldis the challenge he lays down;-not to speak of rhetorical wisdom 
- but to show itsin action. . . 
Y .. - ,.., . . ,- 
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Notes to Introduction 
1 : -  NOTES - ,  , .  
1. A.C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York, 1965): 'In 
recent years, philosophers ,have been preoccupied with logical and 
linguistic researches,., pure and applied, and I have not hesitated to 
reconstruct Nietzschevs arguments in these terms...because we know a 
good deal more philosophy today, I believe it is exceedingly useful to 
see his analyses in.terms of -logical features which he was unable to 
make explicit, but toward which he was unmistakably groping.'(p13) 
2. Heideggerrs main assertion of the pre-eminence of The Will to 
power comes in his 'Nietzsche (tr. D.F. Krell, London, 1981) Vol. 1, 
Chapter 2.-The descriptions he gives here of'the late-Nietzsche's 
published and unpublished works provide a fascinating insight into 
~eidegger's whole approach. In 1888, 'A peculiar restlessness now 
possessed Nietzsche. He could no "longerawait for the gestation of a 
broadly conceived work which,would be able to speak for itself, on its 
own, as a work. Nietzsche himself had to speak, he himself had to come 
forth [sich selbst herausstellenl and announce his basic position vis- 
a-vis the'world...But Nietzsche's-philosophy proper [die eigentliche 
philosophie-Nietzschesl, the fundamental position [Grundstellung] on 
the basis of which he,speaksLin these land in*.all'the writings he 
himself published, did not assume a final form and was not itself 
~ublished in any book.;.What Nietzsche himself published during his 
~reative life was,always foreground...His philosophy proper was left 
behind 'as posthumous, unpublished work.' (pp8-9) In Nietzschers case 
(and probably in all cases), the distinction Heidegger seeks to draw 
-il - 
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between's work~~which~would be able tospeak for Itself; on its own, as 
a work~,'~and'works'thr~ugh w ich the author .speaks, is an entirely 
mythical one: This,-whole passage gives'the thoroughly misleading 
impression that there existed a pure metaphysical thinker whose 
meditations were distilled in The Will to Power and then employed for 
polemical purposes in the "foregroundw works. In fact, The Will to 
power-is justas full of provocative and polemical statements aspis, 
for example, Twilight of the Idols;, there 'is no indication that had it 
been developed into a publicationlit would have been fundamentally 
different in style from Nietzsche's others - that it would have "spoken 
for itselfn. Heideggerfs.comments really.say far more about his own 
prejudices than-they do about Nietzschers work: unable to accept~that 
such a great philosopher could have done without a Hauptwerk which 
would detail his -wfundamental.positionw and'"phi1osophy proper", 
Heidegger had to.invent such a work for him. Just like Danto, he simply 
cannot believe, in the face of all the evidence, that Nietzsche and 
rhetoric-are inseparable. . -  . I <  . . .,,. 
3.- I am thinking in . particular here 0f.C.G. Jung, in his,vast 
~ietzsche's Zarathustra (ed. J.L. Jarrett', 2 vols, Princeton, 1988). - ,- 
4. ~ i k e  .the effort to ignore Nietzsche's rhetoric, this 
approach.transcend~ the usual,.division between wanalyticn and 
ncontinental~hilosophy. Thus, despite major differences, both the 
wanalyticn Ni etzsche: Imagery. and Thought (ed. M. Pasley, London, 197 8) 
and the' wcontinentaln Nietzsche,et la mdtaphore ..(S. Kofman, ,Paris, 
1972) share the project of interpreting Nietzschers metaphors. 
5 .  For, example, - Nehamas ., states ..that - 'Nietzsche r .  exemplifies 
through his own writings one way in which one individua1,may have 
succeeded in fashioning it~elf...this, individua1.i~ none other than 
~ietzsche himself, who is's Creature Of his.own texts.' (A .  Nehamas, 
-. . 
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Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge, Mass., 1985, p8.) -.  , I , i  
..' , 6. See 'his Allegories of Reading (New Haven, 1979), 'which 
includes three chapters.on Nietzsche 14-61 that essentially apply in 
practice the theory of rhetoric developed by de Man .in the book's 
opening chapter. De Man's distinctive theoretical position-is:most 
clearly seen in his-analysis of the rhetorical question, "what's the 
difference?': which- concludes: ,,The grammatical model of the question 
becomes rhetorical not when'we have, on the one hand, a literal meaning 
and on-the other hand.a -figural meaning, but when it is-impossible to 
decide by grammatical or other linguistic devices which of the two 
meanings'(that can be entirely2incompatible) prevails. Rhetoric 
radically suspends'logic and opens'up vertiginous -possibilities of 
referential aberration.' (p10). . .. . . , .. 
7 .  .This is . best, illustrated by, the 'section ,entitled "1. have 
forgotten 'my umbrellaw, in Spurs/Eperons (tr. B. Harlow, Chicago, 
1979)r ~~123-139. . c- - 
8. The idea of reconstructing Nietzsche's philosophy without 
reference-to rhetoric is discussed in chapter 4,- while literary- 
critical and performative readings are both treated in chapter 5 .  The 
one approach which receives.no further.comment is the psychologistic: 
whether or not it is possible to "readw the author's unconscious in his 
text&, may be of concern to those,who wish to add to the already 
voluminous biographical~literature; to those who have no such wish, 
~rojections of the authorial~~unconscious; like projections of-authorial 
intentions,;can only be a distraction. 
9. De Man quite explicitly recognizes the different nature which 
his shift towards tropes means for-rhetoric:.'Considered as persuasion, 
is performative,-butewhen considered as*a system of tropes, it 
deconstructs its own performance. Rhetoric is astext in that it allows 
p.. '  
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for two*incompatible mutually self-destructive points of view, and 
therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any reading or 
understanding.' (op. "cit., p131.) 
$110. The "traditional division 'of rhetoric had -fourb elements in 
addition'.to -the elocuti 0, as ~follows: inventio, or the discovery of 
arguments:useful for 'the winning of a case; dispositio, or the 
arrangement and ordering of a speech; memoria, or the committal to 
memory :of* a speech; finally, actio and pronuntiata, or the. use of 
gesture and tone of voice (respectively)- for effect. Clearly only the 
elocutio, inventio, and dispositio are directly relevant to written 
texts, although-it can be argued that tone and gesture are also 
present,jin a metaphorical sense. While.,I'do not divide the thesis 
strictly according to these elements, chapter 5 clearly relates to 
elocutio, while chapters 2 and'4 are generally concerned with different 
sub-elements of inventio: chapter.2 relates, broadly-speaking, to ethos 
and pathos - the character of t h e  speaker and thewemotions aroused'in 
the audience; and chapter 4 to the argumentatio - arguments and proofs 
adduced. Finally, chapter 3'deals with-more general differences in 
educational and cultural outlook between rhetoric and philosophy. 
11. The use of the Greek ,term serves as. a. reminder that there is 
no equivalent role in,the modern world; it also contains a useful 
ambiguity, which is difficult to translate: rhetor means both "teachern 
and "practitioner" of rhetoric. , .  
12. t his term has no canonical definition, but:it is usually taken 
to mean the paid teachers of rhetoric who flourished in 5th and 4th 
century Athens, and.1 shall-interpret-.it thus here. It has sometimes 
been argued that Plat0 andlor Socrates were Sophists; suffice it to say 
that t h i ~ ~ t h e s i s  'is utter1y;opposed 'to any such notion, and provides 
plenty of reasons for supposing'that'to yoke these heterogeneous 
-.+. 
Notes t o  In t roduct ion  
f i g u r e s  toge the r  under one , t e rm can-cause  nothing b u t  confusion. 
-13.  his has r e c e n t l y  been t r a n s l a t e d  i n  f u l l - f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  
i n  F r i e d r i  ch N i e t z s c h e  on R h e t o r i c  and Language (ed. and t r .  S.L. 
Gilman, C: B l a i r  and D . J .  Parent ,  Oxford, 1989) - a n o t h e r  s i g n  of t h e  
g rowing , in te res t  i n  Nietzsche and r h e t o r i c .  
14. ~ o s t  , o f  t h i s  m a t e r i a l  i s  t r a n s l a t e d  i n  Philosophy and Truth 
(ed. a n d  t r .  D. Breazeale,  N e w  J e r s e y ,  1979) . F o r ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n  of . - the  
t r a n s l a t e d  m a t e r i a l  t o  t h e  P h i l o s o p h e n b u c h  a n d  i t s  p o s i t i o n  i n  
N i e t z s c h e f s ~ c o r p u s f - s e e  B r e a z e a l e f s  i n t r o d u c t i o n ;  p p x v i i i - x x i i i ,  and 
h i s  -Note o n , t h e  t e x t s w , - p p l i - l v i i i .  . . 
15. See e s p e c i a l l y  X ' s  427-429, 442-3, and 578. Note t h a t ,  while 
t h e r e  a r e  comments on r h e t o r i c  i n  N i e t z s c h e f s  publ ished works, t h e y - a r e  
o n l y  o c c a s i o n a l  a n d ' o f t e n  throw-away remarks ,  which c e r t a i n l y  add 
nothing s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  t h i s  unpublished mater ia l . : .  , - .  
1 6 .  fNie tzsche  moves . - the  s tudy  of r h e t o r i c  away from techniques 
of  e loquence  a n d . p e r s u a s i o n  by making them dependen t  on a  p r e v i o u s  
theory  of f i g u r e s  of speech o r  tropes. '  . ( D e  Man, op. cit. ,  p105 .) ,: 
: 17. For those  who a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  t ake .de .  Manfs i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
s e r i o u s l y ,  I would.recoznmend t h e  b r i e f  b u t  d e v a s t a t i n g  a t t a c k  on it 
c 0 n t a i n e d . h  B. VickersF In  ,Defence ,of Rhe to r i c  (Oxford, 1988),  pp459- 
464, which i s  abou t  a s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  l a s t  word on a  m a t t e r  a s  it i s  
poss ib le  t o  g e t  i n  philosophy. 
18.  Nietzsche,  Philosophy and Truth, "The s t r u g g l e  Petween 
s c i e n c e  and wisdomw, W193. A l l v i t a l i c s  i n  quo ta t ions ,  u n l e s s  o therwise  
s t a t e d ,  a r e  t h e  o r i g i n a l  a u t h o r f s .  
19. F. ~ i e t z s c h e ,  The.Will. t o  Power . (tr. W. Kaufmann and R.J. 
~ ~ l l i n g d a l e ,  N e w  York, 1968),-#427.  . , 
20. The development towards , . r h e t o r i c  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  emphasized 
i n  c h a p t e r  3, below; more g e n e r a l l y ,  it can b e . s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  t h e s i s  
---. 5 
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focusses attention on the works from Human, A l l  Too Human onwards, 
which incorporate most of Nietzschefs significant contributions to the 
rhetorical tradition: ' . . 
21. Nietzsche, The Will. to Power, #429. The reference is to George 
Grote (1794-1871); who led a varied-career as parliamentarian, 
utilitarian philosopher and historian. His magnum opus, A  History of 
Greece (London, 1846-56, 12 vols. 1 ,  contains' an attempt to exonerate 
the Sophists from Plato's criticism (Vol. 8, Chapter 67). It is not 
difficult to see what would have irritated Nietzsche in Grote's 
account: he suggests that.Plato and the Sophists represent respectively 
the theoretical and practical sides of ethics, which not only can but 
should co-exist in a well-run society; the mutual antipathy is 
explained away as little more than personal rancour. Grote compares the 
sophists with modern professors and 'schoolteachers, whose concern is 
only to give,their students a sound education and prepare them for 
responsible citizenship. Consequently, Callicles is simply dismissed as 
a degenerate, and certainly no' representative or even distant relation 
of the Sophists; the whole point of Grotefs argument is'to make the 
sophists acceptable to high Victorian morality and to justify them 
~ithout ever questioning the norms upon which such justifications are 
based. : I 
1. The more famous. statement of method is in section two of the 
Discourse on Method, and until relatively recently the Regulae were 
virtually ignored. But although they were neither completed, polished, 
nor published by Descartes, they nevertheless contain at the very least 
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anL important, supplement to the Discourse account. For, an4 extremely 
balanced discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the Regulae 
see L. J. Beck, The Method of Descartes (Oxford, 1952), Chapter*l.j. .!. v 
2. R. Descartes, "Regulae. * ,,ad directi onem ingenii" . (in; The 
~hilosophical Writings of Descartes, tr. J.- Cottingham, R. Stoothoff 
and D. Murdoch, Cambridge, 1985, Vol. ,l) , 12,' pp12-13 ... , . * 
3 .  ibf d. ,.; #3, .- p14. , I >  .; r . . - i
4. ibid., X7, p25. . -- :, - ,! - .. * . . . . " # .  . . , ,  ' 
5:ibid.,-#8, p32. . , "  , " . . 1 
- 6.-. LetterL to Regius, May - 24th, 1640, - quoted -in S. I jsseling, 
Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict. (tr. P. Dunphy, The. Hague, 1976) ,' 
. ,- p62. . + ' , % ." 
7. preface.. to . the second edition of the Critique of Pure . Reason 
(tr. N. Kemp Smith, London, 19291, Bxxii-xxiii. , .  , , _ ,  I , ,  . '  
8. This ambition is well expressed in Wittgenstein's summary- of 
correct method at the close of the Tractatus: ,'The.correct method in 
philosophy would'really be to say nothing except,what can be said;-.i.e. 
propositi~ns.of natural science...and then, whenever someone else 
wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to.him thatthe had 
failed t o  give a meaning-to certain signs in his propositions., 
(Tractatus L o g i c ~ - P h i l ~ S ~ ~ h i ~ u S ,  tr. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, 
 ond don, 1961, X6.53.) - . .  , . . , .  
, ,  . - 9. Kant, op. cit., Bxiv. . - . . . .  
10. The most. penetrating, ,critique of the Cartesian model :of 
knowledge as,an edifice constructed upon simple, absolutely,certain 
is Wittgenstein's brilliant 0n.Certainty (tr. D. Paul and 
G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, 1979). The.work needs to be read as a.whole, 
but~~en.isolated.aphorisms show.how,far'from Cartesianism.the former 
disciple has ,travelled: '1t:is not single axioms that strike one.as 
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obvious, it'is a system in which.consequences and premises give one 
another mutual support. c (#I42 .) -. , 
11. A recent statement of analytic philosophyfs self-understanding 
is contained in the first chapter of W. Charltonfs The Analytic 
Ambition (Oxf ord, -1991) which, despite *the brash title,, is in many ways 
remarkable for its modesty. It is not just that logical atomism is 
explicitly rejected; Charlton also claims that conceptual analysis is 
something all philosophers from Aristotle onwards have performed, and 
even admits that fphilosophical problems are not like problems in:-a 
maths exam...They are+more like problems in the arts, which admit of 
good and bad solutions butq-nevertheless present themselves over and 
over again to su~cessive'ages.~ (pll) Carnap would no doubt turn in his 
grave; but Charlton-is doing no more than-accept that analytic 
philosophy has to discard even its long-standing scientific pretensions 
if it is to retain any future credibility. As he admits, analytic 
philosophers'are now often thought of as 'like the fabled Japanese 
soldiers in the Melanesian jungle who believe that the Second World War 
is still' going on.' (139.1 . r ' .  
' 12. Martin Warner ' makes the point that conceptual analysis ,is 
confronted with a paradox 'according to which all analysis is either 
trivial or.false; if the'analysandum and the analysans'are synonymous 
no information is conveyed, but if not the information conveyed is 
incorrect. ' (Philosophical Finesse, Oxf ord, 1989, p17. ) The first 
chapter of his book gives.an1excellent general account of the geometric 
model, its influence, and ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~the presentation of the 
case made here is heavily reliant.on that discussion. 
13. A good example of.this deconstructive strategy is Paul de 
Man's attempt to show that Locke, Condillac and Kant all end up using 
tropes despite.their best efforts to rule them out of.philosophy. AS a 
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result, confusion reigns: 'in each case it turns out to be impossible 
to maintain a clear line of distinction.between rhetoric, abstraction, 
symbol, and all other forms of language.' (P. de Man, "The epistemology 
of metaphorn, On Metaphor, ed. S. Shacks, Chicago, 1979, p26.) The 
essay concludes by stressing 'the futility of trying to repress the 
rhetorical structure of texts in the name of uncritically preconceived 
text models.,.' (p27). See below, chapter 5, pp189-95, for further 
discussion of this and similar deconstructive moves. * 
14. Plato, Protagoras (tr. W.K.C. Guthrie, in the Collected 
Dialogues,. ed. E. Hamilton and H:Cairns, Princeton, 1961; all 
translations of Plato are taken from this voltme, except those for the 
Gorgias and fortthe Republic), 336c-d. ' 
15. ~ialectic comes from the same root as dialogos, viz. did- 
legomad, meaning to converse or talk with one another. 
16. See R. Robinson, -Platofs Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 1953) for 
a clear and thorough account ofthe first two'phases, and an outline'of 
%<>. ..-.;, the third. ' '  , 
17. The most important statement in support of the elenchus is 
socrates's famous comment that he'is wiser than other men not because 
of his positive knowledge but because he alone "knows that he does not 
know. (Plato, Apologyt tr. H. Tredennick, ,23a-b) . See Robinson, op: 
tit;; ~hapter'2~for a full discussion of the-elenchus. ~. 
18. ~obinson, -op.  cit., p95. . . 
19. 'let us proceed on the assumption that we are right, it being 
understood that if we see reason t o  change our minds all the 
consequences of:our hypothesis will fall to the ground.' (Plato, 
Republic; [tr. H.D.P. Lee, Harmondsworth, 19551, Book 4, 437a.) 
20. ~ccording to the Phaedrus account, it is a species of the 
genus "divinely inspired madnessn (Plato, Phaedrus, tr. R. Hackforth, 
Notes to Chapter 1 
265a-b. 1 .. . .  3 
21. On this point see especially Plato, Philebus 16d-17a. 
22. ~he.prob1em.i~ described in the,Republic at Book 7, 516e-518d. 
23. Descartes, op. ci t . , Regulae, #2, p10. * .  
,, 24. Plato, Phaedrus, 265e. - , . .  _ 
25. Plato, *Seventh Letter (tr.: L.A. Post), -343d-344a. 
26. ibid., 344b. . . ,_ - a  , s 
27.:H.-G. " Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic (tr. P.C. Smith;' New 
. .  - York, 19801, p122. 
28. ,~hetoric and philosophy are the continually recurring athemes 
in his work and.one can even say that.Platonic philosophy arose within 
the polemic against- the orator and the sophist., (S. Ijsseling, op. 
p . '  . . I , 
citl, ~14.1 i 
- 29.  his is in many,ways an artificial division, and no doubt it 
could be argued that,some of the categories ,I have chosen could be 
merged and others added:My hope is that.this structure allows the 
force of,Platofs attack,to be appreciated without significant omissions 
or repetitions.' 
30; This- ..chapter, unlike-* the. other -I three, concentrates on 
~ristotle rather than Plato. The reason for'this is not that Plato made 
no attack' on 'rhetoricfs standards of argumentation; it is rather that 
platofs attack was so intemperate as to be-relatively easy to .rebut: he 
suggested'that rhetoric did not really employ reasoned argument at all. 
BY contrast, Aristotlefs subtle-gradations of rationality between 
philosophy and rhetoric have convinced and satisfied even many 
defenders of.rhetoric, and present the most sophisticated case for 
philosophy as the model of scientific thinking. 
. . 
' . ,  . . 
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1. I have deliberately chosen the very-general terms wsourcew, 
waddresseel', .'and "messages" for this definition, " in order to emphasize 
its broad scope:~Thus it applies equally to television broadcasts, 
philosophical texts, and$the speeches of-the ancient rhetors. 
2:The charge of pandering, or flattery, is first introduced at 
46313, and is debated at length ,from 515a-522b. The idea that rhetoric 
corrupts:because.it aims only.to please,is considered in Chapter 5. The 
~orgias is 'also an important point of reference for the discussion of 
rhetori~fs pragmatism contained'in Chapter 3. 
3. -.fPolu8: Do-.'they.not, like tyrants, put to death any man they 
will, andideprive of their fortunes.whomsoever it seems best?, (Plato; 
~orgias . [tr. W. .Hamilton; London, .19601, 466b-c.) . , .? .r 
.4. ,Polus: To listen to you, Socrates, one might think that you 
wouldnftvbe,glad to,have the opportunity of doing,what you please in 
the staterather.than not,'and that you donft envy a man who can kill 
, ", or confiscate or-at will. ' ,  I 1  
Socrates: Justly or,unjustly, do you mean? 
Polus: It makes ,no difference; he's enviable in either case, 
isnf t he?' (ibid., 468e-469a.l - *  - ,  
5.  his is not,to presume that they are insignificant per se. On 
the contrary, they are'of crucial~importance to the questions raised in 
the following chapter;' and'are dealt with'in detail there. See below, 
chapter 3, especially pp87-9. . . .~ 
. 6.  lat to,- :Gorgias, 456c. - - .  
7. fSocrates: Let'us consider how [the rhetorl stands with regard 
to right and wrong.'..Iteis not your business; as a professor of 
rhetoric, to teach-your'pupil about'these things. Will you, then, if he 
- 
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comes to you ignorant of them, enable him to acquire a popular 
reputation for knowledge and goodness when:in fact he possesses 
neither, or will you,be quite unable to teach him,rhetoric at all 
unless he knows the truth about these things beforehand?... 
Gorgi.8: - I suppose, Socrates,, that I shall have-to teach a 
pupil those things as well, if he-happens not to know them.' (ibid., 
459c-d,e, 460a.l . - , , 
8. S e e  Plato, Phaedrus, especially 272b-274b. Of course, in.. the 
Phaedrus account, Plato is prepared to t e r m ~ t h i s  foundation of 
discourse "true rhetoric", a fact which has provoked much discussion 
among Plato scholars, since it appears to mark a softening of-the 
uncompromising hostility to rhetoric portrayed in the Gorgfas. ,(See, 
for example, R.W. Quimby, "The.growth of Platofs perception of 
rhetoric" [in Plato:*True and Sophistic Rhetoric, ed. K.V. Erickson, 
Amsterdam, 1979, pp21-301-for one view of the subtle variations in 
plate's approach to rhetoric and a discussion of some of.the others.) I 
have ignored such questions in my exegeSis.of Platots,approach to 
rhetoric, and have presented it as a monolithic "positionw, becauser1 
do not consider these variations to be of major significance. What 
Socrates terms "true rhetoricw in the Phaedrus is dfa1ectfcs;the 
essential opposition remains..The change of terminology is due more~to 
the change of interlocutor (impressionable -youth,as opposed to 
committed Sophist) than to any change in Platonic doctrine. 
9. ~hough the point at issue is different,. the dramatic logic 
parallels that of the debate with Polus; -i.e. Socrates cannot.in any 
meaningful sense lose the argument. -. . 
10. See,above, pp35-6. L .. 
ll. E. R. Dodds, Appendix to Plators Gorgfas (Oxford, 1959), ~387. 
12. The caselagainst the Nazi "interpretationw of Nietzsche is well 
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put i n  W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche (Princeton, 1968), Chapter 10, which is 
also a good bibliographical source for'those3wishing to explore this 
well-trodden path. It could of course be argued that the very fact that 
Nietzsche .discusses racial characterist'ics- (and, a fortiori, 
"breedingn) at all is highly problematic,'.even if the general tenor of 
those comments is un- or even anti-Nazi; anyWracial stereotyping, 
however "benign", seems highly dangerous and open to abuse. This is an 
important objection, but-to consider it here would be to anticipate the 
general discussion of the "abuse" of NietzscheVs texts that occupies 
the later stages of this chapter. (See below, p47 ff.) 
13. Of course, this was 'not done by Nietzsche himself. As ,is 
well-known, the ordering, editing and most,of the section titles were 
the work of the original, editors (primarily Peter Gast and Nietzsche's 
sister, ~lizabeth): The material in this,"workw must always, therefore, 
be treated with some circumspection. ., 
14. Nietzsche, The Will* to 'Power, 1890. This . is not in , any 
sense an isolated comment. For example, #954 muses in similar fashion: 
'And would it not be a kind of goal, redemption, and justification for 
the democratic movement itself if someone arrived who could make use of 
it - by finally producing beside its new and sublime development of 
slavery (that is what European democracy must become ultimately) a 
higher kind of dominating,and Caesarian spirits who would stand upon 
it, maintain themselves by it, .and elevate themselves through it?* 
15.  his is explicit in the brief note X902 of The Will to Power: 
,On the sovereign t y p e s .  The "shepherdw as opposed,to the "masterw 
( the former a means of preserving the herd; the latter the'end for 
- 
which the herd exists).' ~ietzsche'even sets out what amounts to a 
programme of indoctrination for the masses, to equip them for the 
rnchinelike existence which the new society will require of them.  he 
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will-to Power, W888.) , - ~ , +  - , , 
16. For ,example,. Y868' of The Will to Power: 'Problem: where are 
the barbarians.of the twentieth century?' 'Nietzsche.need not have 
. 8 $ -7 .' * ' doubted: our century has had no problems on this score! 
+ 17. F." Nietzsche, :- ,,The Genealogy*of - Morals (tr. W: Kaufmann, New 
York, 1969), -. Essay I, #11, pp40-1'. See -below, p65 for a- different 
perspective on this passage. . -!- - . -, 
18. Kaufmann, op. cit. ,. p225. ,, - ' 
19. Plato,'Gorgias, 483e-484a. .,The link-with Nietzsche is made in 
,: E. R.. Dodds,. op. cit;, .p389. ~, . . 
20. In particular,. Nietzsche is .too sophisticated to accept 
Calliclesfs justificatory-idea 0f.a return tocthe natural state of 
society. Thus,' for example, The Will to Power, 1120: f ~ o t  "return to 
nature" - for there has never yetlbeen a'natural humanity. The 
scholasticism of un- and anti-natural values is the rule, is the 
beginning; man reaches nature'only after a long struggle - he-never 
21. W. Kaufmann, op. ,tit., p224.- -. ' . , ,  
22. Nietzsche; The Will to Power, #871, p466. . .  : 
23. ~ietzsche, Ecce Homo (Munchen, 1978), p127. My emphasis. 
doctrine as outlined above. (1)-Nietzsche frequently emphasizes the 
value of the self-discipline -and moderation of strong natures,- not,to 
be confused with the timidity of the weak. See, for example, The Will 
to Power, W870. (2) Occasionally, Nietzsche stresses the "virtuesw of 
the weak and mediocre - without ever leaving any doubt where his true 
sympathies lie; W864 of The'.Will to Power is fascinating in this 
regard. Nietzsche never advocates the elimination of the weak, merely 
that the strong distance themselves from them. 
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25. Nietzsche, The Will to Power,. W749. 
26. The term "propaganda" is closely connected with "manipulationn, 
but the two are'not synonyms. In particular, propaganda implies a 
potential mass appeal and'a direction towards a cause or-organization, 
neither of which are essential'to the notion of manipulation. However, 
as I see it, neither of these conditions excludes the possibility of a 
printed philosophical text being, or being used as, propaganda. 
27. Nietzsche was extensively used by non-German fascists and was 
well-liked by Mussolini. Furthermore, Thus Spoke Zarathustra first sold 
in large numbers during World War I, when German recruits were 
encouraged to take it with,them to the front. I 
28. J. Derrida, ."Otobiographiesn, tr. A.rRonel1, -(in The Ear of the 
Other, ed. C. McDonald, Lincoln; Nebraska, 1988) , - pp30-1. 
29. T.B. Strong,. Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration 
(Berkeley, 1988) , p2. . *. . > . .  
30. M. ~eidegger, What is' Called Thinking? (tr. J. Glenngray, New 
York, 1968) , p73. Previous 'quotation: ibid., p13. 
31. F. Nietzsche, - The Antichrist ' (tr. R.J. Hollingdale, 
~armondsworth, 1968; Twilight of, the Idols ie translated in the same 
volume), W43. 
32. F. ~ietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (tr. R.J. Hollingdale, 
~amondsworth, 1968), Zarathustraf s Prologue, #3, p42. . 
33. F. ~ietzsche,' The Gay Science, :,(tr. W. Kaufmann; New York, 
1974) 1283 
34. ibid., 4377. r . . 
35. F. ~ietzsche, Ecce Homo, (tr. R.J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth, 
1979), "Why I am a destinyw, XI. 
36. M. DBat, Pensee Allemande et Pensbe Francaise (Paris, 1944), 
ppg7-8. MY translation. 
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37. The two plausible methods are both deeply flawed. On the one 
hand, to'attempt a canonical reading of sthe rhetorical effects,is to 
lapse back into the game'of authorial interpretation in all but name. 
On the other hand, an empirical survey, as well as being long-winded, 
diffuse, and a move towards sociology, has the opposite weakness that 
it is entirely indiscriminate (at least in principle) between readers, 
and indeed implies the suspension of all judgement. "Conclusionsw could 
only be derived from such a survey through the reintroduction.of an 
implicit criterionrof-judgement, which merely repeats the problem at 
, '- another level. 4 --' - ,. 
38. The move away from authorial intention does not require the 
term wmanipulation",to be qualified or replaced. I n d e e d r 6 t h e  
possibilities~for applying the term are in some ways considerably 
extended; because the evidence forfthe charge is to be sought not in 
Nietzschefs intentions but in the effects of his writings, and in their 
potential propaganda uses., Texts can be made to play a propagandist 
function, whether or not they were originally intended;so to do: what 
matters is how:the.words ondthe page work. In the case of Nietzsche, 
this means that the propaganda uses that have as a matter of fact been 
made of his work cannot be judged simply according to whether-or not 
they fit in with the authorts intentions., 
39. J: ~llul, Propagandes (Paris, 19621, p86. My translation. , ,. 
. 40. For further .discussion of philosophy's relation.to action, see 
below, chapter 3, especially pp81-92. ' 
41.  his,-of course, is to restate the'cynical notion of the r h e t o r  
presented by Polus and Callicles. See above, pp36-8. 
42. See above, pp46-7. . , 
43. J. ' Goebbels, quoted in, M. Balf our, Propaganda i n  War, 1939-45 
(London, 1979) ,. ~431. 
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44. plato, Euthyphro (tr. L. Cooper), 14e. (Translation amended.) 
45. ~ l l u l ,  op. cit;, pp89-90. My translation. For more'detai1,on 
the distinction between agitation and integration propaganda, see pp84- 
47. The most trenchant assertion of+this faith in argument is in 
plate, Phaedo (tr. H.  rede en nick),-gob-e. The development of Plato!~ 
dia1ectic.from.a purely critical to a constructive force is considered 
> '  above, .chapter 1, pp21-2. ! '" , , i - r ,  , .  
48. While a detailed study of this idea would be a'digression, %it 
is worth stressing that it is not restricted to Plato. Indeed, the 
importance of this motif to the history of philosophy (and beyond) 
would be hard to overestimate. Marxist.Ideo1ogiekritik and.all formsbof . 
ndemystification", ,for example, retain the loaded opposition between 
bogus and authentic truth-telling, and as such are implicit co- 
defendants in the,case presented here. , . ,. rn , , . . 
49. See ~ristotle, . a Rhetoric, 11, #I, and Cicero, De Oratore, 11, 
#,s 182-184'for further detail on the nature.of ethos. Aristotle said 
of it: 'we believe good men more fully and more readily than othersf; 
. 
and he claimed that.a speaker's character may almost be called 'the 
most effective means,of persuasion:he possesses.' (Rhetoric [tr. W. 
~ h y s  ~oberts] - 1356a 3-13., All t~anSlati0nS of'~ristot1e are taken from 
the Complete Works, -ed. J. Barnes, Princeton, 1984, 2 vols.) 
50. Cf. chapter,4 below, especially pp145-7,,where Nietzschers 
to the,faith in truth is considered. . . 
51. There is a very Strong case for excluding certain works from 
this description, especially those of the middle "scientific" period - 
Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, and the first four books of The Gay 
Science. However,,lI will leave this case to be made by those who can 
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find no positive responses to Nietzschefs later work. 
52. Cf. Nietzsche, Thus ,,Spoke Zarathustra, Book 3, Wll, "Of the 
spirit of gravityn, p212: 'to chew and digest everything - that is to 
have a really swinish nature! Always to say Ye-a <I-A> - only the ass 
and those like him have learned that., 
53. ibid., Book 1, #lo, "Of war and warriorsw; p75: ~ d u  may have 
enemies whom you hate, but not enemies whom you despise. You must be 
proud of your enemy...' . * ,  , . 
54. ibid., Book 1, P14, "Of the friend", p83: 'In your friends3you 
should possess your best enemy. Your heart .should feel closest'to.him 
when you oppose him.' - . .. ? 
55. This is of course,to echo Zarathustra's scathing remarks about 
the "inverse cripplesw: #"That is an ear! An ear as big as a 
=n!"...And in truth, the monstrous ear sat upon a little, thin'stalk - 
the stalk, however, was'a man! By the use of a magnifying glass one 
could even discern's little, envious face as wellt and onegcould 
discern, too, that a turgid little soul was dangling from the stalk.' 
~ h u s  Spoke Zarathustra, Book 2, #20, "Of .redemptionn, p160. 
56. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, I, #ll, p42. . . 
57.   he contrast between Nietzsche and Plato concerning the 
wdangerous" effects of art is another aspect of this crucial 
difference. See below, chapter 5, pp204-7. 
58. Ellul, op. cit., p42. . , . .  
59. ,I attack only causes that are victorious - under certain 
circumstances I wait' until they are victorious.' Ecce Homo, "why I am 
so wise",' W7r ~ 4 7 .  . I .  . . ,. . !- 
60. Discussed above, p43. 
61.  lat to,.- Gorgias, 455a. 
62. ibid., 459a. 
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63: Plato, Meno (tr. W.K.C. Guthrie),&95b-c. 
+., 64. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians (tr. R.G. Bury, London, 
1961) ,'Book 1; X65, p35. 
... 65. See M. Untersteiner, The Sophists, (tr. K. Freeman, Oxford, 
1954); chapters 4-9 on Gorgias. 
66. Plutarch,'De - Gloria Atheniensum, DK 82b23. Quoted in 
Untersteiner,"pop. cit., pp113-4. 
- 67 .* This theme * '  is'fi echoed by Nietzsche in "On the uses and 
disadvantagesvof h'istory'for lifew, #l: 'As he who acts is...always 
without' a' conscience," so h e  is also always without knowledge; he 
forgets most-things so as to do one thing, he is unjust towards what 
lies behind-him,..and he recognizes the rights only of that which is now 
t o  come -into being and no other rights whatsoever.' Untimely 
 edita at ions (tr. R.J. Hollingdale, Cambridge, 1983), p64. See chapter 3 
for a full discussion of the implications of this view. 
, . . , a  68.-SeesEllul, op cit., especially the section: "La n6cessit6 de la 
propagande.pour l'individ~,~ pp156-178. 
r .  - ;69; Nietzsche, The Will to Power, #435. 
. <  ,. 70 .. Nietzsche,' wSchopenhauer as educatorw, #8, Untimely 
~editati 0ns;f p194. 
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, 1, See below, pp92-3 for discussion of this interpretation. 
'2:A more detailed exploration of the degeneration of the concept 
of rhetoric is given at the beginning of chapter 4, pp125-7. 
3. H. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (tr. G. Lamb, 
* ,  London, 19561, p47. , 
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.4. In Greek, the term initially meant simply "child-rearing", 
but gradually took on loftier connotations. Its significance is 
comprehensively examined in W. Jaegerrs seminal work Paideia (tr. G. 
Highet, Oxford, 1939-45, 3 vols); see particularly the introduction to 
Vol. 1 for an overview of its educational and cultural meaning. 
:5. Isocrates (436-338 B.C.) set up his school in 393 B.C., six 
years before Plato founded the Academy. They were the first 
institutions of higher learning in Europe. 
6. Cf. Marrou, op. cit., p84. 
7. Plato, Gorgias 462c and passim. 
8. See Plato, Phaedrus 266c-274a. 
9. Marrou, op. eft., p194. 
10. Cf. J-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (tr . G. ~ennington 
and B. Massumi, Manchester, 1986) which argues that the dominance of 
"performativity" in all aspects of life is the determinant element of 
postmodernism. Specifically of education, he asserts: 'The desired goal 
becomes the optimal contribution of higher education to the best 
performativity of the social system. Accordingly, it will have to 
create the-skills that are indispensable to that system.t(p48) 
11. Plato, Gorgfas, 450c. 
12. Jaeger says of the fifth century Sophists: 'Their weakness was 
in the intellectual and moral foundations of their teaching...it was 
inevitable...that that generation should come to see that, more than 
any other, it lacked the greatest of all educational forces: rich as it 
was in talents, it had not the most precious and most necessary gift, 
an ideal towards which to direct them.' (Vol. 1, p328.) 
13. Plato, Gorgias, 485c, 486d. 
14. See in particular Isocrates, "Antidosisw (in Works, tr. G. 
~orlin, London, 1929, Vol. 2), X's 266-269: 'I would...advise young men 
. . , " , .* 
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to spend some time on these disciplines, but not to allow their minds 
to be dried up by these barren subtleties...such curiosities of thought 
are on a par with jugglersf tricks, and I hold that men who want to do 
some'good in the world must banish utterly from their interests all 
vain speculations and all activities which have no bearing on our 
lives. ' 
15. See Jaeger, op. cit. , Vol. 1, Book 1, Chapter 1 for a 
detailed account of the Homeric concept of arete, and Vol. 1, Book 2, 
Chapter 3 for a discussion of how the rhetors amended it to suit their 
times. * 
16. In the British tradition, which stresses conceptual analysis 
and concentrates discussion on epistemological points of order, many of 
the teachers may also suppose that the main purpose of philosophy is to 
disseminate socially useful intellectual techniques. 
17. Cf. ~illiam James, "What Pragmatism Meansvv (in Pragmatism 
and American Culture, ed. G. Kennedy, Boston, 1950) for the most 
accessible account of philosophical pragmatism. There are important 
differences of emphasis between the leading trio of James, Dewey and 
Pierce, but they are not particularly relevant to the issues raised 
here and can be ignored for our purposes. 
18. Plato, Gorgias, 467c. 
. 19. Plato, Republic, Book 9, 592a-b. 
20..~ristotle defines phronesis at one point as 'a true and 
reasoned state of capacity t o  act with regard to human goods., 
(~icomachean Ethics, tr. W.D. Ross, VI, 5, 1140b20-1.) 
21. ibid., 1140b8. 
22. ibid., VI, 7, 1141a16, 20-1. Aristotle's main discussion of 
the relative merits of political and intellectual virtue takes place at 
~icomachean Ethics X, 6-8, and is the subject of major controversy 
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among commentators. My own reading, that he holds the contemplative 
life superior to the political life, is not lacking in supporters (for 
example W. F. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1980), Chr s 
15 ,and '16; and R. Kraut's Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, 
1989), which is probably the most detailed of all the studies on this 
aspect' of~Aristotlevs work). However, some readers have argued that 
Aristotle's ideal incorporates the contemplative and political, and 
that contemplation is not privileged in the way I suggest (see for 
exampleTD. Keyt, wIntellectualism in Aristotlew, in G. C. Simmons 
(ed.), Paideia, Special ~ristotle Issue, Brockport, 1978, pp138-158; 
also N., Sherman, The Fabric of Character, Oxford, 1989, Ch 3 ,  16.1 I 
will say here only that, by its adherentsr own admission, this second 
interpretation has to explain away the crucial section (X, 6-61 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, which appears to point quite clearly towards the 
priority of,the contemplative life. Sherman suggests that 'These 
remarks. ..are antithetical to the whole thrust of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, in which the ethical life is defended as the best life...' (op. 
cft., ~971, but this is to fundamentally misunderstand the project of 
the Nicomachean Ethics which, like many of Aristotle's works, questions 
concerning the excellences appropriate to a particular area of human 
existence without thereby deciding on the overall significance of those 
excellences for human life as a whole. Moreover, one might just as well 
say that the advocacy of contemplation is "consistentw with the 
~etaphysics, De Anima, etc., as that it is "inconsistentw with other 
sections of the Nicomachean Ethics. Further problems with this 
interpretation are considered in note 26. 
23. The Greek term is theoria, which strict Heideggerians might 
object to translating with a Latinate term. However, Heideggerrs 
objections come from his ultra-theoreticaJ perspective, which is 
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considered below (pp89-91): there is no disputing that this is a 
special category of thinking, however it is to be labelled and 
approached. A serious consideration of Heideggerfs overall attitude to 
translating Greek would be an intriguing undertaking (it is conceivable 
as a critique that would go to the heart of Heideggerfs project), but 
it would be too great a digression to be included here. 
24. Plato, Phaedo, 80b. 
25. ibid., 82e. 
26. The key passage is Nicomachean Ethics, X, 7, 1177b27-1178a8. 
There, Aristotle states that 'If intellect is divine, then, in 
comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison 
with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, 
to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but 
must, so<far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve 
to live in accordance with the best thing in us., h his divine element 
is also the essence of man, because it is the authoritative part, 
better than and in control of the rest: ,This would seem, too, to be 
each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better part of him. 
1t would be strange, then, if he were to choose the life not of himself 
but that of something else.' The desperation of those commentators who 
have refused to accept Aristotlefs commendation of the contemplative 
life is illustrated by the preposterous interpretations of this passage 
they are forced to offer. Thus Sherman quotes approvingly Keytfs 
sophistry that "to be most of all (malista) man is to be less than, and 
nonidentical with manw, and adds: ,The force of malista is thus to 
suggest.that the identification of the self with theoretical reason is 
at best qualified., (op cit., p101.) 
27. The main discussion of this theory is at Nicomachean Ethics 
x, 8,-1178b8-23. Aristotle ridicules the idea of God making contracts 
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and returning debts, and then asks: 'if you take from a living being 
action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? 
Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in 
blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, 
that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of 
happiness., The superiority of action that contains its end within 
itself is also asserted in the Metaphysics, IX, 6-8. 
28.'See above, p81. 
29. Plato, Gorgi as, 486a-b. 
30. ibid., 522c-d. 
31. ibid., 525d. My emphasis. 
32. Some of the parallels with the New Testament are so direct as 
to be uncanny: Socrates even invents "turning the other cheek" ('Let 
people despise you for a fool and insult you if they will; nay, even if 
they inflict the last indignity of a blow, take it cheerfully; if you 
are really a good man devoted to the practice of virtue they can do you 
no harm., - ibid., 527c-dl. It would be tedious to point out all the 
analogies, but one puzzle is too intriguing to ignore: if Socrates is 
the equivalent of Christ, then which figure parallels Plato? Generally 
speaking, efforts t o  separate Socrates/Plato into distinct 
npersonalitiesw are futile; we do not have enough evidence from 
independent sources to make even informed guesses. The one respect in 
which a Platonic hand can be clearly discerned is in the dramatizing of 
socrates's death, which, while occurring offstage, dominates the 
Gorgias even more than the Phaedo and the Apology. These three indeed 
stand apart, since they tell, in its various aspects, the meaning of 
Socratesws sacrifice: they are not so much dialogues as gospels. 
Nietzsche might have made of this relationship something similar (NB: 
"similar"; not V h e  samew) to his ingenious analysis of Christ/paul in 
. - 
' I , , .  
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the.Antichrist, #Is 40-43. That he remained silent on this point 
attests, as does so much else, to his unconscionable bias in Plato's 
favour; he could never really resist the seduction of Plato's 
aristocratic birth. 
33. "~emorial Addressw (in Discourse on Thinking, tr. J. M. 
Anderson and E. H. Freund, New York, 1969), p46. This text contains the 
most~explicit commitment to contemplation, although it pervades the 
whole of his later work. 
34. See above, p87. Heidegger's "Aristotelian1' metaphysics is 
particularly evident in two assertions : a. Manr s own special naturer 
is 'that he is a meditative being.' That is his 'essential 
nature'. (ibid., p56.) b. 'the nature of thinking we are seeking (i.e. 
meditative thinking) is fixed in releasement (Gelassenheit).' 'Perhaps 
a higher acting is concealed in releasement than is found in all the 
actions within the world and in all the machinations of 
mankind. ' ("Conversation on a country pathw, ibid., pp62, 61. ) 
35. Once again, the "Memorial Addressw contains the most 
forthright expressions of Heidegger's anxiety: 'technological advance 
will move faster and faster and can never be stopped. In all areas of 
existence, man will be encircled ever more tightly by the forces of 
technology. These forces, which everywhere and every minute claim, 
enchain, drag along, press and impose upon man...have moved long since 
beyond his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision.' (ibid., 
~51.1 
36. ibid;, ~ 5 0 .  
37. ibid. I ~ ~ 4 7 - 9 .  
38. ibid., ~ 5 9 .  
. 39. ~his.statement will no doubt prove objectionable to orthodox 
~eideggerians, since Heidegger Situates himself as a "new commencement" 
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at,the end of a history of metaphysics inaugurated by Plato. But 
however seriously one is inclined to take Heideggerfs history of 
philosophy, the fact is that both he and Plato/Socrates unquestionably 
stand out against more pragmatic rivals. Moreover, Heideggerfs critique 
of Plat0 - that with the idea thinking is already beginning to 
objectify - is very much plus royaliste que le roi. The two are 
indissolubly connected by their common call for a turn (or return) to 
contemplation. 
, . 40: Cf. Isocrates, op. cit., "Against the sophists", #'s 7-8. 
. 41. Jaeger, op. cit., Vol. 3, p58. 
'42. Danto, op. cit., p72. 
43. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, #493. 
. . 44. Nietzsche's revaluation of truth is examined more thoroughly 
in' Chapter 5 .  
' 45. A rarity in Nietzsche - one passage directly refutes the 
pragmatist interpretation: 'a belief, however necessary it may be for 
the preservation of a species, has nothing to do with the truth., (The 
will to Power, X487) NO "traditional" anti-pragmatist could put the 
basic objection more succinctly. 
46. Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, "Schopenhauer as educatorw, 
#8, ~193. 
. 47. ibid., pp184-7. 
48. F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human (tr. R.J. Hollingdale, 
Cambridge, 1986), A, X283. 
49. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, #51. 
50.  This and the following two quotations: The Will to Power, #291. 
51. ~ietzsche, The Will to Power, #430. The best statement of 
~ietzsche~s Suspicion of "ideal states" can be found in Human, ~ l l  TOO 
Human, A, X235. As ever, his main concern is that they conflict with 
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the goal'.of "perfecting" the individual. 
52. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, #335. 
. -  53. J.B. Sykes (Ed.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary 7th ed. 
(Oxford, ;1982). 
% . . 5 4 .  ,Nietzsche, The Will to Power, #45. 
55. Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, "Schopenhauer as educator", 
#I, p129., 
.56. .I have resisted the adjective "existential" (or even 
*'existentialist") to describe Nietzschefs pragmatism, because despite 
the obvious parallels with thinkers such as Sartre there are also 
important,differences which it would be unfortunate to blur. In 
particular, existentialists tend to regard individual freedom as a 
basic ontological fact, which can be evaded in "bad faith" but which 
never disappears, whereas Nietzsche regards Individual autonomy as a 
relatively rare event that is achieved through struggle and represents 
nothing more, ontologically speaking, than a particular (and highly 
unstable) balance of forces. Or (what amounts to the same thing): the 
active-individual is for Nietzsche the goal, where for existentialists 
it is-the starting point. All this notwithstanding, it is very much 
more plausible to postulate a continuity between Nietzsche and Sartre, 
who ata'least share an individualistic passion, than the currently 
fashionable link between Nietzsche and Heideggerl~errida; which perhaps 
only goes to show how frivolous are all efforts to assimilate disparate 
philosophies. 
57 ;. For example : 
. . ,. . . .i. Let us, as men of the vita contemplativa.. ., (Daybreak 
[tr. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge, 19821 # 4 1 )  
'ii. ,we fail to recognize our best power and underestimate 
ourselves, the contemplatives, just a little.' (The Gay Science, #301) 
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58. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 1354. 
59. Nietzsche, Daybreak, 142, entitled: "Origin of the vita 
contemplativan. 
60. F. ~ietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (tr. W. Kaufmann, New York, 
1967), #7. 
61. This and the next quotation: Nietzsche, Daybreak, 141. 
. 62. The method of a "double description" is ascribed to Hesiod in 
Daybreak, 1189 and again in The Genealogy o f  Morals, I, 111. 
Nietzschefs own dual response to the active/contemplative conflict is 
plainest in The Genealogy of Morals, I, #*s 6-7, which describe the 
rivalry between priestly and knightly-aristocratic values. While the 
priest is 'unhealthyf, it is only with his emergence that 'man first 
became an interesting animalf and the soul first became *evilr (the 
latter is, of course, a compliment). Cf. also The Gay Science, 1350. 
63. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, I, -116. 
64. This point has already been made in the context of 
Nietzsche's politics. See above, chapter 2, p46. 
65. Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, "UDHLn, 110, p120. 
66. Thus despite his suggestion that 'the unhistorical and the 
historical are necessary in equal measure for the health o f  an 
individual, of a people and of a culturef, Nietzsche immediately goes 
on to state that 'we shall...have to account the capacity to feel to a 
certain degree unhistorically as being more vital and more fundamental, 
inasmuch as it constitutes the foundation upon which anything sound, 
healthy and great, anything truly human, can grow.' (Both quotations: 
ibid.,, 11, ~63.1 
67. ibid., #lo, ~ 1 2 1 .  
68. ~eidegger's brief discussion of "UDHLn in Being and Time (tr. 
J. ~ a c ~ u a r r i e  and E. ~obinson, Oxford, 19621, ~ ~ 4 4 8 - 9 ,  focusses solely 
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on the uses  of history, which in fact occupies only one sixth of the 
essay (X's 2-3). Of course, this would not be objectionable had 
Heidegger made it clear that he was focussing on a sub-section of the 
text; but, as his introductory remarks make clear, he has completely 
misunderstood the attitude towards history taken up by ~ietzsche's 
essay: 'The possibility that historiology in general can either be 
"usedw for one's life or "abusedw in it, is grounded on the fact that 
one's life is historical in the roots of its ~eing, and that therefore, 
as factically existing, one has in each case made one's decision for 
authentic or inauthentic historicality. Nietzsche recognized what was 
essential as to the "use and abuse of historiology for lifew in the 
second of his untimely meditations (1874) and said it unequivocally and 
penetratingly.' (p448) As we have seen, the "fact" that "life is 
historical in the roots of its ~eing" is precisely what the essay 
challenges: it is rather the u n h i s t o r i c a l  that is primary and 
essential. A f o r t i o r i  the question cannot be of "authentic" and 
"inauthentic" historicality, since that implies that there is some sort 
of t r u e  relationship possible to history - exactly what Nietzsche 
denies; the only appropriate adjectives are wusefulv' and 
wdisadvantageous". Given this misunderstanding of the essay's overall 
structure, it is perhaps not SO surprising that Heideggerrs exegesis 
of those parts of the essay he does choose to discuss is also highly 
misleading. Thus he suggests that monumental, antiquarian and critical 
whistoriologyw are organically linked and correspond respectively to 
the future, past and present modes of Daseinrs temporalizing. 
~ietzsche, by contrast, Suggests that they are thoroughly different 
modes of approaching history, and implies that they are likely to be 
undertaken by different individuals, rather than constituting necessary 
elements in any Dasein's "authentic historicalityW'. This obsession with 
. . . . - . . - , -T, I i - . .  r,, 
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weaving the types together causes critical history virtually to drop 
out of-the picture altogether, since Heidegger implies that its 
function is taken up by the other two modes: 'As authentic, the 
historiology which is both monumental and antiquarian is necessarily a 
critique of the "Pre~ent".~ (p449) Nietzsche, on the contrary, states 
that 'antiquarian history...knows only how to preserve life, not how to 
engender it...it hinders any firm resolve to attempt something new, 
thus it paralyses the man of action' (ibid., 13, p75). Critical history 
is not a "critique of the Present", but a critique of the past in order 
to make room for creative activity. It is precisely what the 
unhistorical force of "life" most requires of history; and so it is the 
element that Heidegger effectively ignores. For his whole comprehension 
of historicality is that "Dasein" must acquire a proper/authentic 
relation to its past and understand itself truly: criticizing the past 
simply does not fit into this pre-ordained structure. Heidegger does 
discuss Nietzschefs essay again many years afterwards but, far from 
correcting the imbalance of the earlier account, his later comments 
belong to the realm of fantasy: 'Nietzschefs 'thinking gives the false 
impression that he is fighting against "sciencew in favour of so-called 
life, whereas in truth he is fighting for knowledge in honour of an 
originally conceived "lifew and reflection on "life". This indicates 
that'we sufficiently understand the necessity of knowledge for life, 
and'of truth as a necessary value, only if we keep to the one path that 
simultaneously leads to a more original grasp of knowing in its 
essential unity with life.' (Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol 3, p94) 
concerning Heideggerrs general misunderstanding of Nietzschets attitude 
to truth, see below, chapter 5 ,  pp195-8. Concerning the "necessity of 
knowledge for lifen, it might charitably be said that Heideggerrs own 
faith in-the value of reflection makes it impossible for him to 
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understand theconflict between knowledge and life felt by Nietzsche. 
The uncharitable will simply reach for the big red pen. 
-,69. Nietzschers commitment to - and radicalization of - the 
~nlightenment is thoroughly expounded in chapter 4 below, especially 
pp139-47. 
70. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, B, 1886 Preface, #l. The 
most striking sign of the revaluation that occurs after the Untimely 
t edit at ions is the altered value of some of the key images Nietzsche 
uses to,insist on science's necessary subordination. According to 
"UDHLW, science 'seeks to abolish all limitations of horizon and launch 
mankind upon an infinite and unbounded sea of light whose light is 
knowledge of all becoming. If only man could live in it! As cities 
collapse and grow desolate when there is an earthquake and man erects 
his house on volcanic land only in fear and trembling and only briefly, 
so life itself caves in and grows weak and fearful when the concept- 
quake caused by science robs man of the foundation of all his rest and 
security, his belief in the enduring and eternal.' (110, pp120-1.) By 
contrast to this, the "infinite seaw is a staple image of the new and 
coming tasks, particularly in the works of the middle period. #I24 of 
The Gay.Scfence, for example, entitled "In the horizon of the 
infinite", ends: '...and there is no longer any "landw.' Moreover, the 
wconcept-quakes" and their disastrous consequences no longer hold any 
fear for the Nietzsche who commands: 'Build your cities on the slopes 
of ~esuvius!' (The Gay Science, Y283) What was once to be avoided comes 
to be embraced. 
71. Cf. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, #lo. 
72. This and the next two quotations: ibid., #9. 
73. ibid., #lo. 
74. ibid., X5. 
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75. ~ietzsche, Ecce Homo, "The birth of tragedyw, #l. 
76. Perhaps he did, albeit obliquely. One of the few explicit 
connections with the Christian epoch made in The Birth of Tragedy is 
when-Nietzsche describes the Dionysian orgiasts as achieving a state of 
,complete self-forgetfulnesst, and adds that 'In the German Middle 
Ages, too, singing and dancing crowds, ever increasing in number, 
whirled themselves from place to place under this same ~ionysian 
impulse.' In these dancers of St. John and St. Vitus, we rediscover the 
Bacchic choruses of the Greeks...' (#l) But when these dancers reappear 
in one of Nietzschers later works, it is not in so complimentary a 
light: ,In the wake of repentance and redemption training we find 
tremendous epileptic epidemics, the greatest known to history, such as 
the St. Vitus' and St. John' s dances of the Middle Ages. . . ' (Genealogy 
of Morals, 111, #21) Such "orgies of feelingn are not in any sense 
curative and healthy, as suggested in The Birth of Tragedy, but rather 
aim at 'combating the depression by relieving and deadening its 
displeasure. ' (ibid., Y20) 
77. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, #20. 
78. That this change constitutes one more step away from 
christianity is attested by a passage from the later Nietzsche which 
castigates Christianity for precisely those effects that in The Birth 
of Tragedy are the ideal Spectator's response to the Dionysian. The 
contrast - unnamed by Nietzsche - is implicitly with the Promethean 
alternative to,this follower of Christ (or "epopt of Dionysusw?) who 
'"is free from sinn - not through his own deed, not through a stern 
struggle on his part, but ransomed for freedom through the act of 
redempti~n...The true life is only a faith (i.e., a self-deception, a 
madness). The whole of struggling, battling, actual existence, full of 
splendour and darkness, only a bad, false existence: the task is to be 
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redeemed from it. (Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 1224) . 
79. Cf. Aeschylus, "Prometheus Bound", (in Plays: One, tr. F. 
Raphael and K. ~cLeish, London, 1991) 441-470, where Prometheus recites 
an impressive list of his gifts of insight to mankind. 
80. Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, "UDHL", #lo, p120. 
81. This and the following quotation: Nietzsche, The Birth of 
Tragedy, # 9 . 
82. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, A, #228. 
83. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, W301. 
84. Cf. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 11, #24. 
85. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, X300. 
86. :Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Book 2, #I, "On the 
blissful islandsw, plll. 
87. M. Heidegger, "Dialogue on language", (in On The Way to 
Language, tr. P. D. Hertz, New York, 1971), p29. 
88. Aeschylus, op. cit., 953, 965-7. 
89. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, 11, #24. 
.. 90. See above, p91. 
, .  91. Isocrates, op. cit., "Against the sophistsn, X's 9-13. 
92. Isocratesfs response to the Socratic criticism that his is a 
mere knack gained by experience rather than a true art (see above, 
pp76-7 and note 7) is therefore that an art wbuld be inappropriate, as 
the "teachers of politics" demonstrate: 'I marvel when I observe these 
men setting themselves up as instructors of youth who cannot see that 
they are applying the analogy of an art (techne) with hard and fast 
rules to a creative process (poietikou pragmatos) . (ibid., #12.) Note 
that the narrow-minded, matter-of-fact pragmatists who teach rhetoric 
as a techne are closer to the Socratic ideal than is Isocrates.  his is 
the first hint of the secret alliance between common-sense pragmatism 
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and idealism that is further explored at the end of the chapter. 
93. Plato, Gorgias, 511b. 
94. ~ietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Why I am so wise", #5. Cf. The 
Genealogy of Morals, 11, 423. 
95. Viz., that pragmatism has been successful. See above, pp77-8. 
96. Nietzsche, Daybreak, 1328. 
- 97. This is a very brief synopsis of the ideas in J. Daviesfs 
provocative essay, "Not in front of the students" (Radical Philosophy 
7, 1974). 
98. This and the next quotation: J.-F. Lyotard, op. cit., p67. 
.99. Nietzsche, Daybreak, #196. The aphorism is entitled: "The most 
personal questions of truth." 
1.  heir seminal work is The New Rhetoric (tr. J. wilkinson and P. 
Weaver, Notre Dame, 1969). Its main themes are summarized in Perelmanfs 
The Realm of Rhetoric (tr. W. Kluback, Notre Dame, 1982). 
2. Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric, p3, citing Ramus. Style and 
eloquence of course remain important elements of rhetoric (I will deal 
with the role they play in Nietzsche in the following chapter), but 
perelman insists that they cannot be the only elements. 
3. ibid., pp3-4. 
4. ibid., .p7. 
5. ibid., p3. In places, Perelman does indeed seem to accept the 
platonic overtones of the modern approach to rhetoric, e.g. p152, where 
the emphasis on making a discourse pleasing is described as f a  
tendency...the premises of which were already to be found in the 
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Platonic conception of rhetoric., 
6. ibid., p5. 
7. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (tr. W. Kaufmann, New York, 
19661, 15. 
8. I should make it clear at this point that Perelman himself does 
not argue along exactly these lines in support either of Nietzsche or 
forfthat matter of anyone else. Nonetheless, his defence of rhetoric 
suggests-this sort of response, even if it is presented here in a stark 
and perhaps oversimplified form. "Complicationsw are introduced in the 
course of the chapter and, in any case, it remains my suspicion that 
Perelmants self-confessed modifications of the Aristotelian schema do 
have a simplifying effect: there is nothing intrinsically "unfairw 
about this projection. 
9. See above, chapter 1, pp18-20. 
10. According to Aristotle, philosophy counts as the "special 
science" of ontology, although dialectics are at least useful in 
preparing the ground for this science, and hence may be considered part 
of the overall project of philosophy. In the modern division of labour, 
philosophy tends to be aligned far more with the dialectical "testing 
the truth of opinionsw rather than a positive science of ontology. The 
reaeons for this change are beyond the scope of this thesis; for my 
purposes,. what counts is that neither in ancient nor modern times has 
philosophy been held to come within the Aristotelian sense of 
"rhetoric". 
11. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 2, 1356b4. 
12. For an example of this interpretation, see W. Thompson, 
~~istotle's Deduction and Induction (Amsterdam, 1975), pp72-4. 
13. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 11, 22, 1395b23-27. 
14.  his is made clear by the examples ~ristotle gives of 
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enthymemesf none of which a r e  completed syl logisms,  and a t  one p o i n t  he 
s t a t e s ' t h e  case  q u i t e  unambiguously: , i f  any of t h e s e  p ropos i t ions  i s  a  
f a m i l i a r  f a c t ,  t h e r e  is  no need even t o  mention it; t h e  hea re r  adds it 
h imse l f .  ~ h u s ,  t o  show t h a t  Dorieus h a s  been' v i c t o r  i n  a  c o n t e s t  f o r  
which t h e  p r i z e  i s  a  crown, it is enough t o  say  "For he has been v i c t o r  
i n  t h e  Olympic gamesw, wi thou t  add ing  "And i n  t h e  Olympic games t h e  
p r i z e  is  a  crownw, a  f a c t  which everybody knows., ( A r i s t o t l e ,  ~ h e t o r i c ,  
I, 2, - 1357a17-22) 
15. ~ r i s t o t l e  i n  f a c t  devotes a  chap te r  of t h e  Rhe to r i c  t o  t h e  use  
of maxims (11, 211, i n  which t h e y  a r e  recognized a s  reduced enthymemes, 
s o  t h a t ,  of t h e  normal sy l log i sm,  o n l y  t h e  conc lus ion  remains - bo th  
premises a r e  missing. 
16. Nietzsche, Twilight o f  t h e  Idols ,  "Maxims and arrows", #8. 
1 7 .  The Greek  h e r e  i s  pistis, w h i c h  i s  o f t e n  t r a n s l a t e d  
u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y  a s  l l p r o o f w .  However, whereas  i n  modern e n g l i s h  
"proofw has  come t o  be  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  a p o d i c t i c  c e r t a i n t y ,  t h e  Greek 
t e r m r i s  much weaker, meaning something more l i k e  " t h a t  which i n s p i r e s  
t r u s t " .  S i n c e  a  major  p a r t  of my d i s c u s s i o n  concerns  whether  o r  n o t  
r h e t o r i c a l  forms of argumentation provide  s a t i s f a c t o r y  proofs,  it would 
be misleading t o  use  t h e  term from t h e  o u t s e t .  I have t h e r e f o r e  p laced  
t h e  word "proof" i n s i d e  i n v e r t e d  commas where i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  would be  
con t rovers i a l .  
18. A r i s t o t l e ,  P r i o r  Analyt ics  (tr.  A . J .  Jenkinson),  11, 24. 
. . 19. A r i s t o t l e ,  Problems (tr. E.S. F o r s t e r ) ,  X V I I I ,  3, 916b25-30. 
20. A good i l l u s t r a t i o n  of t h i s  i s  #I36 of The Gay Science ,  i n  
which t h e  Jewsf r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  God i s  compared w i t h  t h e  F rench  
n o b i l i t y ' s  r e l a t i o n  t o  Louis XIV.  
21. A good example of t h i s  is  Human, A l l  Too Human, A, #240. ~t 
opens with t h e  g e n e r a l  c l a im t h a t  'The h igher  a  man's c u l t u r e  ascends,  
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t h e  l e s s - s p a c e  t h e r e  i s  f o r  humour and mockery*, which is  defended only 
through the ,example  of how V o l t a i r e ' s  humour has da ted .  There a r e  many 
s u c h * c a s e s  i n  Nie tzsche ,  where t h e  "evidence" f o r  an  a s s e r t i o n  i s  no 
more than an h i s t o r i c a l  example o r  i l l u s t r a t i v e  p a r a l l e l .  
' 2 2 : ~ h i s ' i s  a  d i f f i c u l t  a s s e r t i o n  t o  j u s t i f y ,  a s  t h e r e  i s  no over t  
s t a t e m e n t  of  s u c h  a  d i s t i n c t i o n ;  t h e  e v i d e n c e  f o r  it l i e s  i n  t h e  
d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n s  of  m a t e r i a l  f o r  d i a l e c t i c a l  a n d  r h e t o r i c a l  
argumentation i n  t h e  Topics and Rhe to r i c  r e s p e c t i v e l y  (Topics, Bks 11- 
VII; Rhetoric,  Bk I, Ch*s 4-15.) The huge p ropor t ion  of t h e  d i scuss ion  
which concerns what A r i s t o t l e  c a l l s  t h e  "commonplace r u l e s "  ( ~ k  I, ch 
1 8 )  f o r  c o n d u c t i n g  a  d i a l e c t i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  i t s e l f  shows t h e  
i m p o r t a n c e , p l a c e d  on method i n  t h e  Topics.  There i s  no e q u i v a l e n t  i n  
t h e  R h e t o r i c : ~ ~ s i m i l a r  view t o  mine is  found i n  S. Raphael, "Rhetoric, 
d i a l e c t i c , .  and s y l l o g i s t i c  argument: A r i s t o t l e f s  p o s i t i o n  i n  Rhetoric ,  
1-11", Phrones i s ;  1974: * i n  t h e  R h e t o r i c  [ A r i s t o t l e ]  u s e s  t h e  t e r m  
t o p o i  i n  a  r a t h e r  wider  s e n s e  t h a n  i n  t h e  Topics.  The t o p i c s  i n  t h e  
R h e t o r i c , a r e  based, n o t  on t h e  d o c t r i n e  of t h e  p r e d i c a b l e s ,  b u t  on a  
d i v i s i o n  o f  r h e t o r i c a l  s p e e c h e s  i n t o  d e l i b e r a t i v e ,  l e g a l ,  a n d  
e p i d e i c t i c .  Fur thermore ,  A r i s t o t l e  i s  r e a d y  t o  c a l l  t o p o i  n o t  Only 
grounds f o r  arguments p roper  b u t  any informat ion  which an o r a t o r  w i l l  
f i n d  u s e f u l  f o r  persuasion,  such a s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of emotions and t y p e s  
of cha rac te r .  * (ppl61-2) 
23. A r i s t o t l e ,  Topics (tr. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge) , I, 2, 101a34- 
101b4. 
' , 24. J.D.G. Evans, A r i s t o t l e ' s  Concept o f  D i a l e c t i c  (Cambridge, 
1977), p6. . 
- , 25. I t  could  be argued, of course, t h a t  a  w r i t t e n  philosophy cannot 
on p r i n c i p l e  be d i a l e c t i c a l ,  s i n c e  d i a l e c t i c s  i n v o l v e s  an exchange of 
ques t ions  and answers. But P l a t o  shows t h a t  t h e  process  can b e  captured  
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by a single writer; and a discourse can be dialectical in its use of 
material "without using the question-and-answer format at all. Thus it 
is perfectly meaningful to characterize Nietzschefs use of as 
rhetorical rather than dialectical. It is more problematic for a 
written text to be dialogical - but this is a separate issue (cf. 
chapter 1, pp24-5) . 
26.sThis is not to say that Nietzschefs objectives are simply to 
find another route to the same goal. As has been shown in the previous 
chapter, the conception of wisdom towards which Nietzsche works is far 
more practical than it has ever been in the post-Platonic western 
tradition. . 
27. Descartes, op. cit., "Discourse on methodw, #3, p124. 
28. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, A, 1265. 
29. Nietzsche, Daybreak, #197. 
30. For example: 
i. '1 believe that I am a few centuries ahead in 
~nlightenment not only of Voltairet but also of Galiani, who was far 
profounder...' The Will to Power, #91 (1885). 
ii. 'The view that truth is found and that ignorance and error 
are at an end is one of the most potent seductions there is. Supposing 
it is believed, then the will to examination, investigation, caution, 
experiment is paralysed. . . ibid., Y452 (1888) . 
31. ~ristotle, Nichomachean ~thics, I, 2, 1094b26. 
32. Aristotle's detailed requirements for scientific premises are 
given at ,Posterior Analytics (tr. J. Barnes) 11, 11, 94a20-b26. 
33. See for example J. Barnes, "Aristotlef s theory of 
demonstrationw (in ~hronesis 14, 1969, pp123-152), for a modern 
examination of the problem. 
34. J.D. Bernal, Science in History, Vol. 1 (London, 19651, pp200- 
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201. 
35. For example Derrida, who is often mistakenly thought to 
abandon all traditional logical norms, maintains a heavy reliance on 
structuralist linguistics to prove his assertions. Ironically, this is 
nowhere more blatant than in the closing stages of his analysis of 
Nietzsche, when he states that 'the hypothesis that the totality of 
Nietzsche's text...might well be of the type "I have forgotten my 
umbrellaw cannot be denied. (~errida, Spurs; p133.) What fascinates 
about this passage is the logician's delight expressed in the phrase 
"the hypothesis...cannot be denied"; even this avant-garde thinker 
prefers the old philosophical benchmark of necessity t o  the 
uncertainties of rhetorical argumentation. 
36. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, #516. 
37. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Preface, #l. 
38. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, "The problem of Socrates", 
#5. 
39. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Foreword, #3. Previous quotation: The 
Genealogy of Morals, Preface, #4. 
40. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, "Maxims and Arrowsw, #26. 
41. Cf. ~ietzsche, The Will to Power, #584: 'Instead of employing 
the forms as a tool for making the world manageable and calculable, the 
madness of philosophers divined that in these categories is presented 
whkh 
the concept of that world to which the one iniman lives does not 
correspond...The intention was to deceive oneself in a useful way; the 
means, the invention of formulas and signs by means of which one could 
reduce the confusing multiplicity to a purposive and manageable 
schema. ' 
42. Aristotle, Metaphysics (tr. W.D. Ross), I, 2, 983a14-19. 
43. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, #608. 
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n ' 44. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, W373. 
, ~ 4 5 .  Paul Feyerabendfs brilliant Against Method (London, 1975), is 
particularly.ri~h insparallels with the "rhetorical science" outlined 
in this chapter. It would be beyond the scope of the thesis to explore 
themzproperly, but the following comment can at least serve to 
illustrate.the.fascinating possibilities that exist here: 'The task of 
the scientist..^;is no .longer "to search for the truth", or "to praise 
godw, or "to7systematize observations", or "to improve predictions". 
~hese-are but side effects of an activity to which his attention is now 
mainly directed and which is "to make the weaker case the stronger" as 
the sophists.said, and thereby to sustain the motion of the whole.' 
(~30;) * .  * -  .- . , ;. 
4 6 .  ~ven*innovative methods which mark an advance for enlightenment 
in their-own time can later retard science if they are seen as 
"solutionsn. In this context, the case of Bacon is fascinating: he was 
a key figure.in the first Enlightenment, who helped to develop 
inductive logic and thereby to free science from the prison of 
scholasticism by making observation and experiment rationally 
respectable.-And yet, for all that, the seeds of a new dogmatism are 
contained even in the liberating onslaught on the old tradition. Bacon 
condemns the Scholastics because 'they have forbidden the happy match 
between'the mind of man and the nature of things; and in place thereof 
have married it to vain notions and blind experiments., (F. Bacon, "In 
praise of human knowledge", Works, ed. B. Montagu, London, 1825, vol. 
1,,p254.) While this indicates his distaste for dogmatism, it 
nevertheless retains, through its belief in "the happy match 
between.-..mind..and nature", the old Aristotelian ideal of science as 
the,discovery of truth; the dispute concerns means and method, not 
goal. By contrast, Nietzsche can talk of himself as a radicalization of 
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enlightenment because he disputes even the goal of science; he takes 
Bacon.3 a 'step further. 
-1~47 .* Nietzsche, Daybreak, Preface, #5. Previous quotations : a) The 
Genealogy.of Morals, Preface, X8; b) Human, All Too Human, B, Y168.  : 
- .  ' - 48 . I  See above, p133. 
- .&, ' 49. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Foreword, p22. 
, , .50;c ibid., n f  Reasonv in Philosophy", 4's 3,4. Note the inverted 
commas around the word "Reasonn. The prospect is held out of a better 
rationality. 
. ,-51:-ibid.; "The problem of Socrates", #7. 
52;sTheGreek word used by Aristotle is paradeigma, meaning "from a 
samplen, which originated in the practice of merchants offering Samples 
of their-cloth in the market-place at Piraeus. The image is of a token 
of the same'type, which is precisely what is in dispute here; "analogy" 
(analogia or "according to proportionn in Greek) is a less restrictive 
term"and'is'theref0re to be preferred as a description for this type of 
argumentation. The obvious objection to my employment of the term 
nanalogy" ,:here is that it carries a weight of philosophical 
associations'which are, by and large, unhelpful to the meaning I 
intend.,The concept has been of especial importance in the ~homist 
tradition,?where it is often interpreted as strict mathematical 
proportionality, i.e. a:b::c:d. More troublesome still, there are hints 
of this sort of usage in Aristotle himself, who uses the term 
n a n a l o g i a ~ ~ ~ i n  the context of more "Seri0~S" reasoning than that 
employed by-the rhetors. Against this, I can only insist that 
nparadeigman.-is an inadequate description for the mode of argument even 
as.~ristotle depicts it, and that the everyday "loosen usage of 
"analogy" is just as important a guide as the supposedly stricter 
mathematical interpretation of the term. For analogy - in the everyday 
.. , -% 
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sense --describes where "reason" and "imaginationw meet and merge, and 
t h e r e , i s ' n o  better way of depicting this type of rhetorical 
argumentation. 
53. Some of Nietzsche's comments on "objectivity" strongly suggest 
the value of different descriptions. For example: 'precisely because we 
seek-knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to...resolute reversals of 
accustomed perspectives and valuations...to see differently in this way 
for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline and 
preparation of the intellect for its future "objectivity" - the latter 
understood not as "contemplation without interest", but as the ability 
to control one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows 
how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations 
in the service of knowledge.'(The Genealogy of Morals, 111, #12.) 
,- 54.'Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 11, 24, 68b37-39 and 69a14-16; 
Problems, ' XVIII, 3, 916b25-34; Rhetoric, I, 2, 1357b29-30. 
55. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 1355. 
56. ~ristotle, Topics, I, 5, 102b17-18; 11, 2, 109bl. 
57. An,excellent example of such a "non-issuew receiving serious 
treatment'in Aristotle's own text is Topics, II,4, lllb4-12, when the 
problem of,whether the soul moves is discussed with an earnestness that 
today'appears somewhat comical. 
58. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Why I am so cleverw, #l, p51. 
59; Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Why I am a destinyw, Y8, p133, 
60.' Aristotle, Topics, I, 10, 104a5-8. 
61:"Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Why I am so wise", X7, p47. 
-621 No-one , expresses the value of free-ranging discussion better 
than,~alileo: "I am unwilling to compress philosophical doctrines into 
the most-narrow kind of space and to adopt that stiff, concise and 
graceless manner bare of any adornment which pure geometricians call 
. - ..,P ".r* -.,,...*-A ,.".-- ." .,-. .--.., .. 
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their own,t not uttering a single word that has not been given to them 
by3necessity....I,do not regard it as a fault to talk about many and 
diverse things, even in those treatises which have only a single 
topic...for I believe that what gives grandeur, nobility, and 
excellence to our deeds and inventions does not lie in what is 
necessary...but in what is not..."(letter to Leopold of Toscana, 1640, 
cited, in Feyerabend, op. cit., p69) . 
.. , 163.' Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 1, 1355a14-23. 
.."64. The: three types are described in outline in Aristotle, 
~hetoric,. I, 3, and in more detail thereafter (I, 4-14). Deliberative 
oratory urges us to do or not to do something, is linked to the future, 
and is appropriate to politics; forensic either attacks or defends 
somebody, is linked to the past, and is appropriate to the law; and 
epideictic.praises or blames somebody, is linked to the present, and is 
appropriate to public speaking. 
.65, Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355a29-39. My emphasis. 
1 66. .-ibid. ,; '1366a18-22. 
+. - 67. ibid. ; ~,1355b27-8. My emphasis. 
... '68.,,Cicero,iDe Oratore, 11, xxxv, 1147. 
71., Ajl.useful summary of the debate and a strong case for the 
rsoundnessW-criterion is provided by W. D. Harpine, "Can rhetoric and 
dialectic serve the purposes of logic?" (in Philosophy and Rhetoric 
18, 1985).,However, while his criticisms of the "effectivenessw 
~riterion'are generally apposite, Harpine's insistence that rhetorical 
arguments must be "evaluated" for their wlogical soundnessw marks a 
rather more;conservative approach than the one I have adopted in this 
chapter. 
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72. Naturally, it will be objected that these conclusions have only 
been reached on the basis of Nietzsche's argumentation, which is to say 
the least'a very special case, and hardly one that can be applied to 
rhetoric,.in general. Certainly, this is not supposed to be an 
historica1;account of how rhetoric has been considered and used, but a 
suggestion concerning its potential. My main idea is that Nietzsche 
does employ,recognizably rhetorical forms of argumentation, and thereby 
shows,to what extent they can be used to inquire effectively into 
foreign domains, once the ontological prejudices which govern the most 
influential depictions of rhetoric (Plato and Aristotle) have been set 
aside. .-' 
, .-73;'Admittedly, Nietzsche does at times descend from these heights. 
He occasionally appealed to more traditional notions, in particular 
when he'talked about eternal recurrence as the most scientific 
hypothesis, for which a "proofw might be possible. Such comments 
represent a retreat from his own beat insights, according to which no 
such.proof'would be available, and the will to such a proof would be a 
sign-of weariness - a sign that the will to go on experimenting had 
vanished. Perhaps eternal recurrence can be the low as well as the high 
pointcof the-meditation: it occasions, at any rate, Nietzschets one 
1apse.into moralizing, when he states: 'TO me...everything seems far 
too valuable to be so fleeting: I seek an eternity for everything: 
ought one to pour the most precious. ..wines into the sea? - MY 
consolation isythat everything that has been is eternal: the sea will 
cast it up again., (The Will to Power, 11065.) 
,74. Nietzsche, Daybreak, 1542. 
75. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 1383. 
76. fbid., 1327. 
i .  . 
Notes t o  Chapter 5 
1. I \ h a v e  used t h e  term neloquencew i n  t h e  t i t l e  and throughout 
t h e  chap te r ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  more common " s t y l e "  o r  " s t y l e s w ,  l a r g e l y  
i n  o r d e r  t o  stress t h e  l i n k  wi th  t h e  e l o c u t i o  of  c l a s s i c a l  r h e t o r i c .  
However,, it i s  a l s o  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  weloque.ncew i m p l i e s  a n  a p t  o r  
f o r c e f u l  use  of language, whereas " s t y l e n  normally r e f e r s  pure ly  t o  t h e  
%annern ' , r a the r  than  t h e  "matter" of a d i scourse ,  and can be e f f e c t i v e  
o r  i n e f f e c t i v e .  P a r t  o f  m y  p u r p o s e  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  t o  a r g u e  why 
" s t y l i s t i c  eloquencew i s  impor tant ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  j u s t  t h e  "ques t ion  of 
s t y l e w ,  which has o f t e n  been h i g h l y  valued i r r e s p e c t i v e  of t h e  f o r c e  o r  
persuasiveness ( o r  l ack  of them) a s t y l e  may a t t a i n .  
2. ,Cf: Introduction,  p3. 
.- ' :  3;  The impor tant  d i s c u s s i o n s  a r e  l o c a t e d  a s  follows:- i n  t h e  
~ e p u b l i c ,  Books 2-3 (377a-398b), Book 5 (475d-483e), Book 10 (595a- 
608b); i n  the'Symposfum, t h e  r e p o r t e d  t a l e  of Diotima (201d-212b) and 
~ l c i b i a d e s ' s  eulogy of Socra tes  (215a-222b); i n  t h e  Phaedrus, t h e  myth 
of t h e  , c h a r i o t e e r  (246a-256e) . 
; . 4 ; . I t T . m a y  be ob jec ted  t h a t  i n  a l l  t h e s e  d ia logues  P l a t o  i s  
concerned wi th  a r t  and b e a u t y  r a t h e r  t h a n  w i t h  r h e t o r i c ;  b u t  it can  
h a r d l y - b e  d e n i e d  t h a t  t h e  whole p o i n t  o f  e l o c u t i o  i s  t o  make t h e  
rhe to r ' s  speech b e a u t i f u l ,  s o  t h a t  what P l a t o  says  of poe t ry  and beauty 
i n  g e n e r a l  can be  d i r e c t l y  a p p l i e d  t o  r h e t o r i c  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  Indeed, 
S o c r a t e s  h i m s e l f  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  l i n k ,  a t  G o r g i a s  501-2, when h e  
condemns b o t h  r h e t o r s  and  p o e t s  a l i k e  f o r  t h e i r  c o n c e r n  t o  p l e a s e  
r a t h e r  than e d i f y  t h e i r  audience. 
'5. Pla to ,  Republic, Book 10, 5978. 
6. ibid.;  Book 10, 602c-d. 
7. P la to ,  Symposium (tr. M. Joyce),  210b-c. 
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- 8. ibid. ;  2188. 
9. ib id . ;  221e-222a. This  same p l e a  t o  d i s r e g a r d  t h e  form i s  a l s o  
made . ' (more,  u r g e n t l y )  b y  S o c r a t e s  i n  t h e  A p o l o g y ,  1 7 b - c :  'My 
accusers;.:have s a i d  l i t t l e  o r  no th ing  t h a t  i s  t r u e ,  b u t  from m e  you 
s h a l l "  h e a r ' t h e  whole t r u t h ;  n o t ,  I c a n  a s s u r e  you, gen t l emen ,  i n  
f loweryslanguage l i k e  t h e i r s ,  decked o u t  wi th  f i n e  words and phrases ;  
no;, what you w i l l  h e a r  w i l l  b e  a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  speech i n  t h e  f i r s t  
words  - t h a t : " o c c u r  t o  m e ,  c o n f i d e n t  a s  I am i n  t h e  . j u s t i c e  o f  my 
cause;..,' ' 
10.  lat to, Republic, Book 10, 605a-b. 
11. Pasley, op. cit., p v i i i .  
'. 12; See i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  In t roduct ion ,  p2, and t h e  accompanying 
notes; ' ,"which. identify Heidegger and Danto a s  two i n t e r p r e t e r s  who adopt 
t h i s p l a t o n i c  framework when reading Nietzsche. 
- -13 ; ,An 'exce l l en t  exeges is  of t h i s  t h e o r y  of metaphor is  given i n  
t h e  "Exergue" of D e r r i d a ' s  e s s a y  "White mythologyw,  i n  Margins  o f  
ph i1osophyd( t r .  A. Bass, Brighton, 1982), pp209-219. Derrida d e s c r i b e s  
how.one.of i ts  l ead ing  proponents wants , t o  save t h e  n a t u r a l  wealth and 
o r i g i n a l  v i r t u e  o f  t h e  s e n s o r y  i m a g e ,  w h i c h  i s  d e f l o w e r e d  a n d  
d e t e r i o r a t e d  by t h e  h i s t o r y  of t h e  concept .  Thereby he supposes - and 
t h i s ' i s  a - c l a s s i c a l  mot i f ,  a COrnmOnPlace o f  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  - 
t h a t  a p u r i t y - o f  sensory language could  have been i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  a t  t h e  
o r i g i n - o f  language,  and t h a t  t h e  etymon of a p r i m i t i v e  s e n s e  always 
remains determinable, however hidden it may be.' (pp210-11.) 
- -  rl4 ;? Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth, p84. 
- 15. ib id . ,  pp82-3. 
'"16. ' ibid.,  ~ 8 4 .  
, ' - 1 7 .  See "White mythology", p215, f o r  D e r r i d a ' s  e x e g e s i s  of t h i s  
t e r m ;  H i s ,over -emphas i s  on t h e  s y m b o l i s t  c o n c e p t i o n  of metaphor  i s  
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criticized~later in the chapter - see below, pp190-4. 
c 18 .cNietzsche, Philosophy and Truth, p84. It is worth noting that 
Derrida at least insinuates Nietzschets complicity in the symbolist 
theory;in aLparenthesis to his discussion of the arch-symbolist Anatole 
France: 'the words "Godw, "soulw, "absolutew, etc., are symbols and not 
signs; what is symbolized maintaining a tie of natural affinity with 
the- symbol, and thus authorizing the etymological reactivation, 
(arbitrariness thus, as Nietzsche also suggests, being only a degree of 
the 'usure of the symbolic) ' (Derrida, Margins Of Philosophy, p212. ) 
19.. ibid., ~219. 
. 20. For a recent example of this approach, see M. Clark, Nietzsche 
on Truth.,and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1990), Chapter 3, in which she 
defends the thesis that 'Far from a'precocious statement of Nietzschers 
lifelong views, "On truth and lie..." belongs, according to my 
interpretation, to Nietzsche' s juveni lia. ' (p65. ) 
21. Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth, p85. 
22. The distinction between linguistic and perceptual metaphors is 
also important when considering the structuralist criticism of a thesis 
which'talks of metaphors being "cooled down" into concepts, implying 
that metaphors precede concepts. The obvious objection to such an idea 
is that metaphors operate through an "abnormalw employment of terms 
outside their customary context, which means that without "normaln, 
conventional designations there can be no metaphors, either. However, 
if ~ietzsche is talking about "perceptual metaphorsn (as I think it can 
be shown~he~always does, in these contexts), this logical criticism 
does not,apply: at best, one can accuse Nietzsche of confusing the 
matter by using the term "metaphor" to apply to too many different 
things. *. -.& 
23. ibfd., p90. 
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24. The play of forces becomes much more subtle and complicated in 
the~later-Nietzsche. The presumption of the artist's innate superiority 
disappears, asadoes the idea that there is anything primordial.or 
original about the artist-type. (The later Nietzsche in any case 
rejects~the~idea that chronological priority implies any kind of 
superiority$ the early essay is unclear on this point.) But perhaps 
most:important is the disappearance of the simplistic contrast between 
"scientistw-and "artist" that is drawn and overdrawn in the last 
section"of.the 1873 essay. By the late 1870fs, there is a clear 
recognition that scientists also incorporate artistic drives, and that 
artists are not just gloriously irrational fools. The work of synthesis 
is .under. way. 
-2cb:-.:25..By ."performative" I mean in this context that Nietzsche's 
eloquence or aspects of it is taken to act out or perform certain key 
insights on his part. 
26. !IfrNietzsche had indeed meant to say something, might it not 
be just that limit to the will to mean...?' (~errida, Spurs, p133.) 
27. Nehamas, op. cit., p35. 
28. ibid., ~ 3 7 .  
29. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p74. 
30. Considering that the title of Nehamas's chapter on Nietzsche's 
styles ("The most multifarious art of stylew) is taken from this 
passage, ,itd'is all the more remarkable that he totally ignores the 
suggestions"contained within it. 
.:31. Derrida, Spurs, pp35-7, amended translation. 
: _?  ; 32.. ibid.,, p95, amended translation. 
!: 33.. ibid.;,.p137, amended translation. 
, a - ,34. -Nehamas, op. cit ., p37. 
- - 35. Plato, ~epublic, Book 10, 607d-e. 
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* -'-36.- The general opinion that Plato's strictures against art are 
floutedAby.the stylistic excellence of his work is by no means 
unchallenged. Thus Nietzsche writes: 'In respect to Plato I am a 
thorough sceptic and have always been unable to join in the admiration 
of P1ato:the' artist which is traditional among scholars...For the 
Platonic dialogue, that frightfully self-satisfied and childish kind of 
dialectics, to operate as a stimulus one must never have read any good 
French writers.. .Plat0 is boring.' (Twilight of the Idols, "What I owe 
to the'ancientsw, #2) 
. 37 . *For - .  a simple demolition of the hypocrisy involved in the 
philosophical rejection of "ornate languagew, there is nothing better 
tharl.de Man's deconstruction of Locke in his essay "The epistemology of 
metaphor"~~(col1ected in S. Shacks, op. cit.). However, ~errida is more 
ambitious %in that he seeks to explain why philosophy uses metaphor, 
and mustcgo on using it, despite its condemnations. 
38. This quotation and the next: Margins of Philosophy, p270. 
. .  ; 39;t.id:. ? 
40. ibid., p215. 
41. E.F. Kittay, Metaphor (New York, 1987), p6. 
42. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, p243. 
43. id.' ,- - 
44. It is- worth noting that Derrida's other major treatment of 
metaphor, "The retrait of metaphorw, (Enclitic, Fall 1978) also 
operates-against a carefully determined "ordinary conceptionw of 
metaphor; -except that in the later essay the characterization of "the 
traditionn.;has degenerated from an over-simplification to an outright 
fabrication.'Thus Derrida asserts that 'Habitually, usually, a metaphor 
claims.to procure access to the unknown and to the indeterminate by the 
detour of something recognizably familiar.' He does not say who 
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,claimsf'this, but'the'famous example in the next sentence points the 
finger-at Aristotle: !"The eveningw, a common experience, helps us to 
think'wold age", something more difficult to think or to live, as "the 
evening of ,life," etc., This conveniently omits to mention that the 
passage alluded to in the Poetics also gives the example "evening is 
the old age of the day"; ~errida even forgets his own discussion of 
this'example in "White Mythology", which makes no suggestion that the 
metaphor'only works in one direction (Margins of Philosophy, pp241-2). 
In whatever way this oversight is to be explained, its significance for 
Derridats argument can hardly be disputed, since he goes on to praise 
metaphors.and readings of metaphor where the terms act on one another 
to-undermine all presumptions of familiarity. It would appear that the 
"normal conception" of metaphor is manipulated to suit the essay's 
overall trajectory. 
- -  -.,45. See.above, p181, note 19. 
- 46 .~ L.. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (tr. G.E .M. 
Anscombe, Oxford, 1953) 11, xi, p36. 
P-47. See above, p190, note 39. 
.48. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, pp262-3. My emphasis. 
.49; See.-The retrait of metaphor", especially pp23-5. 
50. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, X853, iv. 
.. - 51. ~his~applies to the English translation, published in four 
volumes. In the original two-volume German edition, "The will to power 
as..artw is the first part of the first volume. I 
- ' 52. Heidegger, Nf etzsche, Vol. I, p75. 
' -53. ' ibid. , p74. 
54. Cited ibid., p74. 
55. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, #l 
56:-Nietzsche, The Will to Power, X853, i. Cf. p197 above. 
Notes to Chapter 5 
.'""'57;, Cf. Plato, Republic, 598-9. 
58. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Preface, #4. 
r. 59. :. ibid., X58. 
.-..? '60:~his emphasis on making rather than discovering alternatives 
clearly'has'its origins in the "On truth and lie..." essay and its 
"political" theory of metaphor, as discussed earlier in the chapter,' 
pp181-3;' ~- . 
; : a :  61;. Cf. Plato, Republic, 602d-e. 
- c 62; Itfshould be emphasized that this clear repudiation of Plato's 
aesthetics.cannot be straightforwardly aligned with the Romantic 
alternative of art as "creative expression". The latter invites the 
sort of ghettoization of art produced by the logical positivists' 
division'of language into "statements of fact" and "expressions of 
emotion" - art naturally being placed in the second category. Since 
Nietzsche:regards metaphysics and science as artistic, it must be 
assumed that mimetic "representation of reality" is at least part of 
what he understands by art. Moreover, it has long been recognized by 
classical scholars that Plators use of the term mimesis is, to say the 
least, idiosyncratic. Aristotlets understanding of the concept is 
significantly'broader: 'The poet being an imitator...he must 
necessarily in all instances represent things in one or other of three 
aspects, either 'as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to 
be or to have been, or as they ought to be.' (Poetics, tr. I. Bywater, 
25, '1460b8-11.1 If one further qualified this statement to read "allw 
rather than-"one or other" of these aspects, one would not be far from 
Nietzsche's broad conception of art, in which things are represented as 
they are/seem/are willed, these three being incapable of proper 
isolation from each other. Perhaps it would be too confusing to call 
thi~;.~too, "mimesisw; but it would at any rate be no stranger an 
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employment 'of the term than Plato' s . 
,>' -63.' The locus classicus for Nietzsche's conception of nihilism is 
the.,first part of the "first book" of The Will to Power. On the 
specificaaspect of "ideals" becoming increasingly destructive, see for 
example'c Y37: 'The development of pessimism into nihilism - 
~enaturalization of values. scholasticism of values. Detached and 
idealistic'values, instead of dominating and guiding action, turn 
against action-and condemn it...At this point nihilism is reached: all 
one has"1eft are the values that pass judgement - nothing else.' 
64. Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche as a radicalization of 
  anti an critique must therefore be rejected, despite the prominence it 
accordsrto Nietzsche's revaluation of truth. For to prioritize critique 
serves notice+that one is fundamentally "against illusionw, that one 
expects and-respects only liberation from it. And indeed, Deleuze asks 
rhetorically: 'Is there any discipline apart from philosophy that sets 
out to criticize all mystifications, whatever their source and aim, to 
expose all the .fictions without which reactive forces would not 
prevail?' '. (G. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, tr . H. Tomlinson, 
  on don,-1983, 'p106.) The enemy - reactive forces - wprevails" through 
its use'of~~fictions"~which it is the task of philosophy to wexposew. 
what'.other conclusion can be drawn from this language than that 
philosophy, . in its highest form, is free from fictions and 
mystifications? Reactive forces require fictions to prevail: what 
possible'sense-can this assertion have, unless it carries as its secret 
obverse 'that 'active forces do not? And since "active forces1* are 
Deleuze's' heroes, it follows that, for him, truth is still worth more 
than~.art.'The great paradox of Deleuzets account is that, while 
allegedly.speaking for active forces, its mode Of operation is always 
responsive: ' (negative) freedom from reactive forcest (self) destruction 
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of reactive forces effected by eternal recurrence. Given these 
objectives,.Deleuze has to retain the valuation of truth over art; 
otherwise,"e would lack the metaphors with which to explain the 
dominance hitherto of "weaker" reactive forces, and the corresponding 
salvation'from them which is supposedly in prospect. 
. 7..:.1 . 65.. See - above, pp175-7. 
a ' .-166.; Nietzsche, The will to Power, #809. 
y y  : 67. See ,,, Twilight of the Idols, "Expeditions of an untimely manw, 
X's 21-3. e .  
.-.. - 68. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, t801. 
.h- 69. Cf .:': Nietzsche, The Will to Power #387: 'Passion is 
degraded;'..in as much as it has for its object something of no great 
value,:amusement-' 
.:.--70.;Plato, Republic, Book 10, 606d. previous quotation: fbid., 
6 0 5 ~ ;  ' >.( + '  . 
- "  .: 71. .Nietzsche, The Will to Power, #778. 
- .  ,72. Cf .- Nietzsche, The Will to Power, X933: ,The greater the 
dominating,power,of a will, the more freedom may the passions be 
allowed. TherWgreat man" is great owing to the free play and scope of 
his,desires;and to the yet greater power that knows how to press these 
magnificent monsters into service.' 
73. Nowhere: is' this contrast better drawn than in the first 
section of~."Morality-,as anti-nature" in Twilight of the Idols. 
;:?+74.:Nietzsche insists that forms are not epiphenomena, since they 
influenceZ.the ,"contentw of which they are normally considered 
expressions.%.g. Daybreak, X257: 'We always express our thoughts with 
the,wordsZthat lie to hand. Or, to express my whole suspicion: we have 
at any -moment only the thought for which we have to hand the words. 
--75: Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, "The problem of Socratesw, 
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#3.  " , . . 4' C. , ?i:. h, i  " ' ' . . - . - , . *  f 
T-. i$  76:'-Plato, Apology, 18a. 
77.'~ietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols, "The problem of Socratesw; 
. . 
. "  ,) . - . ,  - ,  # 3 . ' - -  a ;  . "  - -  . . . . , r % .  * ., 
:78.'The physiognomic theory is often expressed in serious, almost 
medicali:terms, for example when Nietzsche comments.that 'ugliness 
signifies the~decadence of a type, contradiction and lacX of.co- 
ordination'among.the inner desires...' (The Will to Power, #800) ":' ' r  * 
,--79. Nietzsche asserts that: 'The effect of the ugly can be 
measured with,a dynamometer.' This and the next quotation:' Twilight of 
the Idols,-."Expeditions of an untimely manw, 120. 
r - * ,  .-80..~hus in the Phaedrus, when the soul's chariot approaches close 
to,,~eauty, :'the driver's memory goes back to the form of Beauty, and he 
sees-heruonce again enthroned by the side of Temperance on her holy 
seat; then 'in awe and reverence he falls upon his back...' (254b) And 
~lcibiades's speech in the Symposium, while praising the inner beauty 
ofSocrates as of higher value than any outward beauty, says of its 
effect:..'therers.one thing I've never felt with anybody else - not the 
kind of:thing you'd expect to find in me, either - and that is a sense 
of.shame. Socrates is the only man in the world that can make me feel 
ashamed.' (216a) . 
:,. 81. Nietzsche,, The Will to Power, #298. 
82.~ One could scarcely invent a more perfect example of the "evil 
eyew*for.reality than'Plators rhetorical question: 'if it were given to 
man to gaze on'beautyrs very self - unsullied, unalloyed, and freed 
from.the mortal-taint that haunts the frailer loveliness of flesh and 
blood - if, .I'say, it were given to man to see the heavenly beauty face 
to face, would you call this...an unenviable life...?' (Symposium, 211e 
-'amended translation.) 
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- ... 1 ,  ' 83. ~ietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, "Expeditions of an untimely 
manl,.:#lg;r i u't ' . -.%. -X ) .  I 
3 -. 84..one-difficulty for .the "Nietzsche versus Platow account just 
outlinedais that Nietzsche explicitly praises Platofs theory of beauty 
in re1ation:to' Schopenhauer (in Twilight of the Idols, "Expeditions of 
anruntimely'man", #'s 22 and 23). Against Schopenhauer, who sees 
sexuality repressed'by+beauty, fPlato...maintains...that all beauty 
incites to.procreation - that precisely this is the proprium of its 
effectr'.~Nietzsche goes so far as to claim that 'Nothing is less Greek 
than'the conceptual cobweb-spinning of a hermit, amor intellectualis 
def. Philosophy.in the manner of Plato should rather be defined as an 
erotic contest...' Now, while Plato does indeed state that beauty is 
always loved for a procreative purpose (Symposium 206-7), the account 
later-goes on to stress the joy of simply contemplating 'absolute 
beauty' ,(211e), and the "child" is nothing more tangible than ,true 
virtuef,"for bearing which the aesthete 'shall be called the friend of 
god, and if ever it is given to man to put on immortality, it shall-be 
given to him., (212a) In other words, Nietzsche is quite mistaken to 
seize on the,word wprocreation" as an indication of a materialist 
undercurrent in Plato: the context robs the term of all sensuoua 
connotations; it becomes a bad metaphor for an infusion of divine 
grace. Furthermore, it should be recalled that in the Phaedrus account 
of love, it-is.the recollection of pure beauty that allows the 
virtuous elements of the soul to resist those that would commit ' a  
monstrous and forbidden actf (254b). I would suggest that the talk of 
"procreation" is,used to add plausibility to the notion of an "absolute 
beautyW,by connecting it with an important feature of earthly beauty, 
and is-certainly no,indication that Plato indulges sexual desire, In 
this, I,am scarcely even opposing Nietzsche; for his claim that Plato 
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marks~as~continuation f the typically Greek honouring of sexuality is 
inconsistent~7.with,his many comments - suggesting that Plato/Socrates-is 
a-crossroads of world-history and-a bridge to the asceticism of the 
Christian*era, opposed to the older Greek spirit. To take the most 
glaring example: ,Art...is much more fundamentally opposed to the 
ascetic .ideal than is science: this was instinctively sensed by Plato; 
the greatest'enemy of art Europe has yet-produced. Plato versus Homer: 
this isfthe.complete, the genuine antagonism - there the sincerest 
advocate of the "beyondw, the great slanderer of life; here the 
instinctive deifier,-the golden nature.' (The Genealogy of Morals, 111, 
#25) ' In sum;. Nietzschegs attempts in Twilight of the Idols to set up 
plat0 'in opposition,to Schopenhauerian asceticism not only constitute a 
dubious'interpretation of Plato on beauty; they also mark an aberration 
fromiNietzschegs profound understanding of Plato as the origin of the 
ascetichideal. 
,.- 85. ;Cf; Nietzsche, The Will to Power, X811: ,Our aesthetics 
hitherto: has been a womangs aesthetics to the extent that only the 
receiversrof art.have formulated their experience of "what.is 
beautiful3"In all philosophy hitherto the artist is lacking.' 
. . I  86., Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, "Expeditions of an untimely 
manu, .#7. . . .:. . .  . 
I . .87. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Book 3, #12, "Of old and new 
law-tablesw, 'X29 .. ,- 
.I - , ? a 8  ;.~ ~ p l ~ r a t i ~ n - ~ f  the nature of creativity and its contrast with 
contemplation runs as -a*.leitmotif through Thus Spoke Zarathustra, It 
would~.require'too great a digression to detail its many appearances in 
that,work,:but:the chapter "Of immaculate perceptionn (Book 2, Xis), 
with,its:contrast between the leering gmoon-loveg of philosophers and 
the gsun-lpveg ,of-'creative desireg would certainly figure prominently 
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~ \ in* any .such,- account; ..tr- '6 >' " . 
89. A-:fascinating study in miniature of this philosophical 
blindnessSfs"provided by Heideggerfs interpretation of the hammer 
metaphor'in Nietzsche's work. Heidegger asserts: 'Above all it means-to 
tap all-thingsbwith.the.hammer to hear whether or not they yieldthat 
familiar*hollow sound;. to ask whether there is still solidity and 
weight in:things or whether every possible centre of gravity has 
vanished from them.' (Heidegger, op. cit., p66) The justification for 
this' interpretation'is provided by the Foreword of Twilight of the 
~dols, whichaspeaks of'the hammer as a tuning-fork. But Heidegger 
completelyrfails to mention the other hammer in Nietzsche - namely, the 
sculptor8s hammer which l f  my ardent, crea'tive will. . .drives.. .to the 
stone.Ah;"you-men, I see an image sleeping in the stone, the image of 
my'visions! Ah,*that it must sleep in the hardest, ugliest stone! Now 
my hammer rages fiercely against its prison. Fragments fly from the 
stone: what: is^that to me?' ("On the blissful islandsw) The importance 
that'this conception has for Nietzsche is indicated by the re-iteration 
of 'the passage:in Ecce Homo, with the appended cormnent that 'Among the 
decisive preconditions for a dionysian task is the hardness of the 
hammer, joy even in destruction. The imperative "become hardw, the 
deepest certainty that all creators are hard, is the actual mark of a 
dionysian nature.', ("Thus Spoke Zarathustra", 4 8 )  If this is not "above 
allw-.what~~Nietzschers hammer means, surely it is at least worth a 
mention?.The best -:and worst - one can say is that its omission is 
consistent-with Heidegger's more general silence concerning Nietzschets 
"creative will". ,' Y , '. 
90. ~ietzsche, The Gay Science, 1299. Also worth noting in this 
context is'The Will to Power, #943: 'We protect artists and poets and 
those who are-masters.in anything; but as natures that are of a higher 
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kind than these...we do.not confound ourselves .with them.' 
, , - 91. F o r  example:, . i. ,the dangerous concept of the "artistn - a 
conceptsthat has so far been treated with unpardonable generosity' (The 
~ay~science, $361) ii. '1 have grown weary of the poets, the old and 
the new:-they all seem to me superficial and shallow seas., (Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra; 'Book 2, $17, "Of Poets", p151.) 
792. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, $804. 
, 93 .- ibid., $852. 
~ i ,  'e94. ibid., #853, ii. 
-. 95. The idea of a Nietzschean categorical imperative of course 
comes I.£ rom ~Deleuze (op. cit., p68), but while his version differs 
significantly~from the Kantian formulation it nevertheless remains an 
,ethical?thoughtf, because it seeks to change the world for the better. 
Deleuze believes that the thought of eternal recurrence will weed out 
not--only.,bad- (reactive) actions, but bad men; he calls this 
!Zarathustravs curer (~71). This is an ingenious piece of crypto- 
Kantiani~m~cbut it completely reverses the progression of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, which starts with hopes of eradicating the reactive man, 
butiends;in the affirmation that 'All eternal joy longs for the ill- 
constituted!! (ThusrSpoke Zarathustra, Book 4, $19, "The intoxicated 
song", #11'.). This is the only consistent conclusion that Nietzsche 
could come to; for,.,as he states elsewhere: 'It is self-deception on 
the,part of philosophers and moralists to imagine that by making war on 
decadence they therewith elude decadence themselves., (~wilight of the 
 doi is, "The,problem~of Socratesw, ill.) 
- 96. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, X276. 
,. 797. Cf. ~Nietzsche, The Will to Power $805. 
. 9 8 .  ibid.,rX443. 
. . 99.%Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, A, #222. The clearest explicit 
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statement,of arnor fati's scientific directive is in The Will to Power 
t1041, when-Nietzsche comments that 'It ig part of this state to 
perceive.not:merely the necessity of those sides of existence hitherto 
denied, but their desirability...' (my emphasis). This perfectly 
captures'the duality of seeing more and affirming more than all 
previous~~philosophies. 
100. Itdcan hardly be doubted that arnor fati is of major importance, 
since,Nietzsche describes it as 'my formula for greatness in a human 
beingr (EcceAHomo, "Why I am so clever", 110); nevertheless, it has 
tended to'be.,subordinated to the doctrine of eternal recurrence, a 
\ 
judgement which I do not share. The two are, of course, closely 
related, as the unfolding story of Thus Spoke Zarathustra makes 
particularly clear. Amor fati presents the problem that the "creative 
willn cannot change what is and has been, and as a result inclines to 
revenge;-eternal recurrence compounds the agony by suggesting that even 
the future is already made, that what we and the world will be is only 
what we,have been: But the eternal recurrence also has a tendency to 
deflect, rather than sharpen the challenge of amor fati. This is partly 
because its conceptual complexity facilitates bizarre interpretations, 
such~as the,metaphysics of the cosmic wheel, or the extermination of 
reactive forces. .But there is also a sense that through eternal 
recurrence one can'solve the problem of fate at a stroke, as if it were 
a ridd1e:'one cannot will backwards - unless the future is also one's 
past! TO cut the -knot of life's problems through a great "Yes!" to an 
implausible doctrine.- does this not have an all-too-familiar ring? 
Eternal recurrence was one way Nietzsche tried to meet the challenge of 
amor;fati;,that he thought it the best does not mean that we must, too. 
.:+ :..lOl:This and the previous quo tation: A. P. Fell, "The excess of 
~ietzsche's amor fati" (in The Great Year of Zarathustra, ed, D. 
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Goicoechea, -. ' New 'York, '. 1983) , p93. 
-, :102. Nietzsche, :The Will to*Power, #808. 
;" 103; See above,- pp201-3; - :  " . 
w - .  104.- Fell, op. tit.,- p88. * 
.-... ,105. Nietzsche, The.Wi11 to Power, #818. 
+'106.- Nietzsche; Human, .All Too Human, A, P203. 
107. ~ietzsche,: 'Beyond Good and .Evil, t188. 
'108.-~Nietzsche, *The -Genealogy of Morals, 111, P28. 
109. + Nietzsche, The*Will.: to-Power, 1428. MY emphasi5, 
110. Nietzsche, The 'Gay Science, #107. 
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I . \  Cancluaion 
.. . . ,. 
1. The most. thorough descriptive account of Nietzsche's rhetoric 
is J."' ~ 0 t h ' ~ :  Nietzsche und die ~hetorik (Tiibingen, 1970), although 
this, too,rshares the modern tendency to reduce rhetoric to questions 
of sty1e;'and contains very little about its other elements. 
'' 2.7See above,? chapter three, for a detailed discussion of the 
concept 'of paldeia. 
3. Iram not*sufficiently Kantian to assert that these are the only 
four differentiae that philosophy can use, or indeed has used, to claim 
superiority over rhetoric. It therefore remains at least theoretically 
possibleto~accept.the case that I have made against these particular 
distinguishing features while nevertheless maintaining that philosophy 
can establish its:superiority over rhetoric, in ways that I have 
perhaps been-too biased to consider. I think it unlikely, however, that 
any ~ersuasive criticisms"of rhetoric exist that are not at least 
closely related to those.1 have considered here. 
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.o4.;-~t might'be thought that-by treating rhetoric in this way.1 am 
undertaking.exactly~the;"reificati0nW for which Paul de Man was 
criticizediearlier (cf.-'Introduction, pp4-5). The differenceris that de 
Man','ignores the"uncti0n of rhetoric altogether, while my point is 
merely-that if'everything that has the effect of persuading is'termed 
"rhetoricw.-then complete confusion will arise. Indeed, an abstract 
functionalism~.would be just as effective as de Man's reification, at 
obliterating-rhetoric as a concrete historical phenomenon. 
5. Atnleast three points testify to this ambiguity: 
';i;' The .+teachers of rhetoric of the fifth and fourth century 
B.C. have become collectively known as "Sophistsw or "wise menw; as a 
further complication, it is quite likely that the name was initially 
applied ironically, by their opponents. 
ii. Socrates was often "accusedw of being a Sophist. 
iii. Isocrates called himself a philosopher, and withheld the 
term from many of his uphilosophicalw opponents. ' 
These facts indicate that the abstract meaning of the various terms waa 
not sufficient to distinguish between the figures involved, which 
implies that the clear distinction that does now exist between 
"rhetoricw and "philosophyw is primarily a conventional imposition, and 
results from concrete differences between separate groups of forces. An 
insistence on the purely abstract "conceptual meaningw of the terms 
thus inevitably leads back to the overlap and confusion in which the 
Greeks found themselves; I fail to see how this can be considered 
desirable. 
6. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, X230. 
7. A perfect example of this conflict of fundamental values arises 
when Socrates and Callicles debate temperance. Socrates compares the 
intemperate to a man with a leaky pitcher, which must constantly be 
Notes to Conclusion 
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filled and refilled. To his astonishment, Callicles accepts this model: 
'Calliclea: The man who has filled his casks no longer has 
any pleasure left...once:his:casks are filled his existence is the 
existence of!a,--stone, exempt alike from enjoyment and pain. But'the 
p1easure"of life consists precisely in this, that there should be'as 
much'running in as possible. . . 
". - 
. . . Socratea: But'if much is to run in much must necessarily run 
out, and.there must be large holes for it to escape by. 
. .. 
. . <' Calliclea: Certainly., (Plato, Gorgias, 494a-b. ) 
= ! ~  ' "8: ibid.; '494d-e. ' 
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